Women and occupational pensions 1870-1983 : an exploratory study. by Groves, Dulcie Monica
This electronic thesis or dissertation has been 











The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or information derived from it 
may be published without proper acknowledgement. 
 
Take down policy 
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing 
details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. 
END USER LICENCE AGREEMENT                                                                         
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 
International licence. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 
You are free to: 
 Share: to copy, distribute and transmit the work  
 
Under the following conditions: 
 Attribution: You must attribute the work in the manner specified by the author (but not in any 
way that suggests that they endorse you or your use of the work).  
 Non Commercial: You may not use this work for commercial purposes. 
 No Derivative Works - You may not alter, transform, or build upon this work. 
 
Any of these conditions can be waived if you receive permission from the author. Your fair dealings and 








Women and occupational pensions 1870-1983 : an exploratory study.
Groves, Dulcie Monica
Download date: 06. Nov. 2017
/Z3 6
-1-
WOMEN AND OCCUPATIONAL PENSIONS 1870-1983:
AN EXPLORATORY STUDY
DULCIE MONICA GROVES
KINGS COLLEGE LONDON (KQC)
19
THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
-2-
ABSTRACT
Women and Occupational Pensions 1870-1983: An Exploratory Study
This study, derived from secondary sources, is concerned with
female access to occupational pension scheme provision, with particular
reference to retirement benefits and is written as a contribution
to knowledge on the position of women with regard to this form of
occupational welfare provision.
The thesis seeks, especially, to account for the under-representation
of women in and their differential access to the benefits of membership
of employers' pension schemes designed, primarily, to provide an eventual
replacement income for earnings foregone in old age. It also seeks
to throw light on poverty among elderly non-married women in relation
to the part played in constructing such poverty by limited access
to occupational pension benefits, including provision for 'survivors'.
An introductory section locates the topic area within the lit-
erature of social policy and administration in relation both to the
'social division of welfare' and to women and welfare. The second
part traces the development of occupational pension provision during
the nineteenth century and discusses the entry of women into 'white-
collar' employment and into membership of employers' pension schemes.
A third section focusses on female membership of occupational pension
schemes 1939-83, including the post-war expansion of scheme provision
and the 'pensions debate' culminating in the Social Security Pensions
Act 1975. The fourth section focusses specifically on issues of equal
treatment for men and women in membership of occupational pension
schemes, covering equal access, sex discrimination and equal status.
It addresses two issues in detail - survivors' pensions and benefits
de'iving from female membership of schemes and the differential 'normal'
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retirement ages typically applied to males arid females. It also discusses
women's paid employment in the context of 'equal treatment'. The
penultimate section addresses the provision of occupational benefits
for widows and female survivors, including loss of potential entitlement
to widows' benefits, on divorce.
The conclusion focusses on gender divisions in occupational pension
provision and some implications for social policy and the financial








Table of Contents	 4
List of Tables	 8
Abbreviations	 10
Acknowledgements 	 12
Part I:	 Introduction : Women and the Social Division of
Welfare: the Case of Occupational Pensions 	 14
References: Part I	 26
Part II:	 The Entry of Women into Occupational Pension
Scheme Membership to 1939 	 27
Introduction	 28
Chap. 1: The Development of Occupational
Superannuation Schemes	 30
I Scheme origins	 30
II The rationale of occupational
pension provision 	 43
Chap. 2: Women's Paid Employment and Access to
Occupational Pension Scheme Provision 	 51
I The female white-collar and
professional worker 	 51
II Women and occupational pension
benefits	 57
III A final perspective	 89
Appendix on 'surplus' women	 93
References: Part II	 96
Part III:









I The 'two nations': 1939-59	 111
II 'Pensions for Prosperity'? 	 132
1959-69
III The 'pensions debate': 1969-75 	 147
IV The Social Security Pensions Act
1975 and after	 160
V The growth of occupational pension
schemes 1939-83	 165
Chap. 4: Employers' Pensions and the Woman Worker 	 169
I The female employee 1939-83 	 169
II Women as members of occupational
pension schemes	 180
(a) The 'second sex' and the 'two
nations': 1939-59	 180
(b) 1959-69: Whose pensions for
prosperity?	 191
(c) The 'pensions debate' and the
female employee 1969-75	 200
(d) The Social Security Pensions Act
1975: implications for women	 212
(e) Women and the growth of occupa-






Part IV:	 Equal Treatment for Men and Women in
Occupational Pension Schemes: Some Issues 	 229
Introduction	 230
Chap. 5: Occupational Pension Provision and Sex
Discrimination: Issues of Equal Access,
Treatment and Status	 232
I Occupational pension provision and
sex discrimination 	 232
II The EEC and sex discrimination in
occupational pension schemes	 252




Chap. 6: Equal Treatment: Issues Relating to
Differential 'Normal' Retirement Ages
for Men and Women in Occupational
Schemes and to Eligibility for Survivors'
Benefits	 267
I Normal retirement age 	 267
II Eligibility to confer survivors'
benefits	 287
Chap. 7: Occupational Pension Entitlement and
Women's Paid Employment	 304
I Female economic activity rates 	 306






V The domestic division of labour 	 330
VI Women, paid work and access to




	 Survivors' and Dependants' Benefits	 349
Introduction	 350
Chap. 8: Widows' and Survivors' Pensions and
Benefits	 351
I Provision for widows to 1939
	 351
II Provision since 1939
	 358
III Provision for widows since the
SSPA 1975
	 369
IV Other female survivors' benefits 	 378
V Some issues	 384
Chap. 9: Loss of Prospective Rights to
Occupational Pension Scheme Benefits
on Divorce under English Law 	 386
-7-.
Page
I The Divorce Reform Act 1969 and	 386
subsequent legislation
II Recent trends in divorce	 389
III The current jurisdiction of courts
with regard to loss of a wife's
prospective benefits derived from
her husband's membership of an
occupational pension scheme	 394
IV Suggestions for changes in the
jurisdiction of courts regarding
loss of prospective pension rights
in divorce	 402
V Financial self-sufficiency on
divorce: towards divorce law
reform 1984	 406
VI Some issues	 409
Reference: Part V
	 417







































Normal retirement ages: private occupational pension
schemes 1936: GB.
Compulsory retirement ages: private occupational pension
schemes 1936: GB.
Estimated numbers covered by existing employers' pension
schemes (1950-52): GB.
Occupational scheme membership 1956: GB and N. Ireland
(Private sector: estimate).
Occupational scheme membership 1963: UK (Private and
public sectors: estimate).
Employees in schemes by sex and category: private and
public sectors: 1956, 1963: GB.
Proportions of employees in schemes by sex and
category: private and public sectors: 1956, 1963: GB.
Occupational scheme membership 1963:1967, UK
(Private and public sectors: estimate).
Proportions of employees in schemes by sex and
category: 1963, 1967: UK (Private and public
sectors).
Occupational scheme membership, 1967:1971, UK
(Private and public sectors: estimate).
Proportion of employees in scheme by sex and
category: 1967, 1971, UK (Private and public sectors).
Occupational scheme membership, 1971:75, UK
(Private and public sectors: estimate).
Occupational scheme membership, 1975:1979, UK
(Private and public sectors: estimate).
Male and female employees in pension schemes
1936-79, UK (Private and public sectors: estimate).
Employees in employment: GB:1921-83.
Percentage of employees in occupational pension
schemes: by occupation, April 1970, GB.
-9-
Page
17. Percentage of employees in occupational pension
schemes: by age group, April 1970, GB.	 208
18. Proportict-s of full or part-time employees whose
employer has an occupational pension scheme by
occupational group, 1980, GB. 	 217
19. 'Normal' age of retirement for men and women in
occupational pension schemes, 1975:1979, UK. 	 272
20. Current economic activity by age: all women except
full-time students; GB, 1980. 	 308
21. Occupational group and social class of full and part-
time working women: GB, 1980. 	 314
22. Average gross weekly full-time earnings (including
overtime): . GB, 1983.	 323
23. Gross weekly earnings: full and part-time women: GB, 1980. 327
24. Death in service benefits: 1971, UK.	 364
25. Widows' pension provision on death in retirement:
1971, UK.	 364
26. Death in service benefits: 1975, widow's pensions, UK.	 366
27. Death in retirement benefits: 1975, widow's
pensions, UK.	 367
28. Provision for dependants other than spouses, death
in service: 1979, UK.	 379
29. Divorce: UK.	 390
-10-.
ABBREVIATIONS
ASTMS	 Association of Scientific, Technical and Managerial Staffs
CSO	 Central Statistical Office
COS	 Charity Organisation Society
CPAG	 Child Poverty Action Group
CDP	 Community Development Project
DES	 Department of Education and Science
D of E	 Department of Employment
DHSS	 Department of Health and Social Security
EOC	 Equal Opportunities Commission
EPA 1970 Equal Pay Act 1970
EEC	 European Economic Community
FES	 Family Expenditure Survey
FSSU	 Federated Superannuation Scheme for Universities
GHS	 General Household Survey
GAD	 Government Actuary's Department
GB	 Great Britain
GMP	 Guaranteed Minimum Pension
HMI	 Her Majesty's Inspector
HMSO	 Her Majesty's Stationery Office
H of C	 House of Commons
H of L	 House of Lords
ILO	 International Labour Organisation
LFS	 Labour Force Survey
LC	 Law Commission
MPNI	 Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance
NALGO	 National Association of Local Government Officers
-11-
NAPF	 National Association of Pension Funds
NCCL	 National Council for Civil Liberties
NI	 National Insurance
NSPA	 National Spinsters' Pensions Association
NUT	 National Union of Teachers
OPB	 Occupational Pensions Board
OPCS	 Office of Population Censuses and Surveys
RCDIW	 Royal Commission on the Distribution of Income and Wealth
RIPA	 Royal Institute of Public Administration
SDA 1975 Sex Discrimination Act 1975
SSRC	 Social Science Research Council
SSPA 1975 Social Security Pensions Act 1975
SPCK	 Society for the Promotion of Christian Knowledge
SERPS	 State Earnings Related Pensions Scheme
SBC	 Supplementary Benefits Commission
TUC	 Trades Union Congress
UK	 United Kingdom
USS	 Universities Superannuation Scheme
-12-
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Grateful thanks for consistent help, advice and support go first
and foremost to my supervisor, Professor Robert Pinker, late of Chelsea
College and now of the London School of Economics. His paper on Social
Policy and Social Justice (1974) led me to see the potential of occupat-
ional pensions as a research topic within the subject area of women
and social policy. His continuing interest and his delight in the
more esoteric and humorous material which has come his way has been
invaluable.
Thanks also to: Fran Bennett (CPAG), Helen Bolderson (Brunel
University), Janina Brzerkwinski, Susan Clayton, Steve Constantine
(Lancaster University), John Dewar (Warwick University), Janet Finch
(Lancaster), Sheila Gilmore (Edinburgh University), Leslie Hannah
(Business History Unit, London School of Economics), Sam Hastings
(Polytechnic of the South Bank), Richard Hemming (Institute of Fiscal
Studies), Glenys Jones (Lancaster), Jane Lewis (LSE), Judith Masson
(Leicester University), Ann McGoldrick (University of Manchester Institute
of Science and Technology), Ellen Miles (National Portrait Gallery,
Washington DC), Peter Moss (Thomas Coram Foundation), Frances Price
(Lancaster), Mike Reddin (LSE), Lesley Rimmer (Family Policy Research
Centre), Alice Russell (University College, Aberystwyth), Adrian Sinfield
(Edinburgh), Marie Scott (ASTMS), Penny Summerfield (Lancaster), Pat
Thane (Goldsmiths' College), Sylvia Walby (Lancaster), John Walton
(Lancaster), Alan Walker (Sheffield University), Sue Ward (Nuffield
College, late TtJC), Tess Woodcraft (NALGO), Diana Woodward (Sheffield
City Polytechnic), Carol Watson (late of Business History Unit, LSE).
These institutions and libraries kindly provided assistance:
-13--
Company Pensions Information Centre (Mike Fowler), Department of Employ-
ment Library (Mr Paphitis and colleagues), Equal Opportunities Commiss-
ion (Rowena Burns and colleagues), National Association of Pension
Funds (especially Mrs Brenda Walker), National Union of Teachers (Pensions
Department), the Occupational Pensions Board, Royal College of Nursing,
Centre for the Study of Policy on Ageing, Institute for Advanced Legal
Studies.
Especial thanks go to the DHSS Social Security Library (Juliet
Male, Mr Whitehead and colleagues), the University of Lancaster Library
(Mike Hutchinson, social sciences librarian and the inter-library
loan staff) and the British Library.
Helpful criticism has been received from participants at meetings
organised by the Social Administration Association, Critical Social
Policy, ESRC Social Security Workshop, Independent Pensions Research
Group, ESRC Division of Resources in the Household Workshop, Rights
of Women, Centre for Economic Policy Research (London), University
of Lancaster Women's Studies Research Centre Seminar and Department
of Social Administration post-graduate research seminar.
My thanks go to Veronica Holmes (University of Lancaster) for
work on the final draft and, for this typescript, to The Typing Pool
(a women's co-operative) at Unit 6, Cockpit Yard, Northington Street,
London, WC1N 2NP. Thanks also to Chelsea College Graduate Registry
for a helpful administrative relationship extending over many years




Women and the Social Division of Welfare:
the Case of Occupational Pensions
'Now my family urged upon me the Civil Service because there
had been a family member who was very successful in the Civil
Service and they kept saying "You'll get a pension."
At 21, who cares ?!'




Women and the Social Division of Welfare:
the Case of Occupational Pensions
This thesis is concerned with female access to occupational pension
scheme provision, with particular reference to retirement benefits,
and is written as a contribution to knowledge on the position of women
within this sector of occupational welfare provision. Occupational
welfare has been a comparatively neglected area of academic research
within social policy and administration, though in recent years there
has been a renewal of interest in the wake of public and political
discussion on pension provision. Also in recent years there has appeared
a growing literature on female access to welfare provision and, in
the wake of a re-emergent women's movement, a feminist critique of
social policy. However, until lately, sparse attention has been given
to issues surrounding female access to retirement pension provision.
Hence, what follows is an exploratory study.
This seeks to account for the long-standing under-representation
of women in, and differential access to the benefits of, membership
of employers' pension schemes designed to provide an eventual replacement
income for earnings foregone in old age. It also seeks to help explain
poverty among elderly non-married women not only in terms of their
typically limited access to occupational retirement benefits earned
in their own right, but also in relation to their potential entitlement,
if any, to occupational widows' and other survivors' benefits which
generate income for elderly women.
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The aim of this necessarily brief introduction is to discuss
occupational welfare provision in the context of Titmuss' concept
of a 'social division of welfare'. There follows a short review of
some relevant academic work on women and welfare with, finally, some
comments on the major areas of exploration contained within this thesis
and on the research methodology.
'The social division of welfare'
Richard Titmuss in 1956 first drew attention to what was, effect-
ively, social welfare provision which had grown up outside the statutory
(2)	 .
sector.	 He defined three major categories of welfare - social,
fiscal and occupational as sharing similar objectives in their responses
to 'states of dependency' (Titmuss, 1963d, pp.41-44). Titmuss argued
that all such dependencies could to some degree involve 'the destruction,
curtailment, interruption or frustration of earning power' and, further-
more, could incorporate 'secondary dependencies' in relation to wives,
children and other relatives (ibid., p.43). 	 Extreme old age was
characterised as a 'natural' state of dependency and compulsory
retirement from paid work as a 'man-made' (sic) dependency (ibid. ,pp.
43-44).
Titmuss argued that increased recognition and awareness of the
causes of such states of dependency had influenced the growth not
only of 'social' welfare provision, but also of 'fiscal' and 'occupational'
welfare. He noted the extent to which, since 1907, the fiscal (tax)
system had facilitated family income support via tax relief given
in recognition of dependencies. Such relief had, originally, been
directed solely towards the lowest paid taxpayers (ibid.,p.45). In
addition, there had occurred 'a great expansion in occupational welfare
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benefits in cash and kind', that is 'fringe benefits' derived frc
participation in paid employment, again partly in 'recognition of
dependencies' (ibid., pp.50-51).
The essay, subtitled 'Some Reflections on the Search for Equi
constituted a counter-argument to those critics of the welfare stat
who maintained that the rapid post-war expansion of state welfare
provision had benefitted the working class to the detriment of the
middle and upper classes. Titmuss held that, to the contrary, the
latter groups had themselves profited greatly from the growth of usc
and occupational welfare provision and received forms of welfare not
accessible to those lower down the income and occupational scales.
He showed how occupational or 'fringe' benefits linked in with concess
ions provided by the fiscal system so as to function as 'concealed
multipliers of occupational success' favouring wealthier taxpayers
(ibid., pp.51-52).
'Occupational social services' argued Titmuss, though provided
by 'good' employers and expressive in many cases of a desire for 'good
human relations' in industry were, none the less, divisive. Their
existence raised a 'fundamental question of equity' ('analogous to
that raised, by the dual roles of fiscal policy') that is 'whether
and to what extent social service dependency benefits should be prop-
ortionately related to occupational achievement.' (Ibid., pp52-53)
In a section headed 'Welfare for the Better Off' in a later (1959)
essay, Titmuss returned to this theme, arguing that during the l950s
occupational benefits were among those which had 'nearly all been
concentrated on the better-off third of the population, particularly
with regard to pensions, tax-free lump sums ...' (Titmuss, 1936b,
pp.229-30). The debate over the 1959 National Insurance Act (8ee Ch.3
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below) had brought the issue of occupational pensions into the public
arena. Commenting on the 'contracting-out' option, Titmuss stated
that 'More fringe welfare for the better-off will then provide the
argument that Britain should lead the world in abolishing a state
system of social security' (ibid., pp.230-231). From quite another
perspective, Rubner (1962, Ch.VII) likened the provision of such benefits
to the old 'truck' system and argued for their abolition in a polemical
study which elaborated on the shortcomings of occupational 'death
and retirement' benefits.
Titmuss subsequently conceptualised British fiscal and occupational
welfare as 'the indirect or submerged parts of the Iceberg of Social
Policy' which had expanded notably over two post-war decades (Titmuss,
1976, p.192). Returning to his theme of inequitable redistribution,
he noted that occupational welfare benefits incorporating 'social
security provisions in cash or kind' were linked to 'employment status,
athievement and record'. Such benefits were 'legally approved' by
governments which viewed them as 'alternatives to extensions in social
welfare'. While they favoured, predominantly, 'white-collar and middle-
class occupations' their cost fell 'in large measure on the whole
population'. (Ibid., pp.192-93)
Arguing that all three sectors of welfare 'function redistribut-
ively', Titmuss cited occupational pension provision as redistributing
claims on resources from lower to higher paid employees. Furthermore
'the cost to the Treasury (the whole community) of private pension
schemes substantially exceeds the Treasury contribution to social
security payments for the whole population. The pensions of the rich
are more heavily subsidised than the pensions of the poor.' (Ibid.,
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pp.193-194). Yet there was no public appreciation of the relationship
between social, fiscal and occupational welfare.
One attempt to promote such appreciation was a study of fringe
benefits (Reid and Robertson, eds., 1965) which devoted a chapter
to occupational pension schemes in the context of the development
of state pension provision (Wiseman, 1965). At the same time Rhodes
produced his major if under-rated	 study of public sector occupational
pensions - a landmark in the analysis of occupational pension provision.
Townsend's important study of poverty undertaken in 1969 gave consider-
able attention to 'occupational deprivation' and dealt with welfare
and fringe benefits (Townsend, 1979, Ch.12, see pp.455-61).
During the mid-seventies, several scholars returned to the social
division of welfare, including Pinker, who noted a significant increase
in real expenditure on public social services and 'an even more remark-
able growth in the importance of fiscal welfare provision, which has
in turn given added stimulus to the growth of occupational welfare.'
(Pinker, 1974, p.3) The divisions of welfare identified by Titmuss
had 'become more marked', a trend which appeared likely to continue
(ibid.). Pinker went on to discuss the 'work ethic' and the linkage
of entitlement to social welfare benefits, especially in the field
of income maintenance, to the status of being, or having been, in
paid employment (ibid., pp.3-8). In particular, he showed how the
1971 Conservative pension plan created an integral relationship between
benefits and employment status (ibid., pp.9-il).
This paper is notable for the connection made between the social
class dimensions of the 'social division of welfare', which Titmuss
had emphasised, and complementary forms of sex discrimination, which
he had not, though as will be seen, he was not unaware of this dimension.
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Arguing that sex discrimination had always been 'a key feature of
social security', Pinker noted the assumptions about female financial
dependence in marriage implicit in the Beveridge Report (1942) - assumptions
which 'helped to sustain a complex network of positive and negative
discriminations.' (Ibid., p.11) Commenting on earnings-related social
insurance/occupational benefits, in the context of the Conservative
White Paper on pensions (DHSS, 1971), Pinker argued that such graduated
provision could 'only leave unchanged the basic sex inequalities in
pay prospects and work status which originate in the economic market
and the educational system.' (Ibid., p.12)
Sinuield (1978) appraised the analytic potential still residing
in Titmuss' concept of' the social division of welfare, arguing for
more systematic exploration of the link between the social division
of welfare and stratification theory, including the relationship between
the social division of welfare and the division of labour. Sinfield
held that the interaction between various 'welfare systems' had become
much greater in the mid-seventies (ibid.,p.140). He argued that 'a
careful analysis of resources, security, status and power through
the social division of welfare would help us to understand more thoroughly
the operation of these mechanisms and systems of distribution and
redistribution that generate and maintain social, political and economic
equality.' (Ibid.,p.132) However, there is no suggestion from Sinfield
that a study of gender divisions might prove rewarding in this context,
though his discussion is, in point of fact, highly relevant to issues
of gender.
It is Reddin who within the field of social policy has developed
a sustained critique of occupational welfare and of both public and
occupational welfare provision, with an awareness of gender issues.
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Reddin (1977) discussed the SSPA 1975 and the relationship between
contributory and occupational pension provision and later (1980) the
relationship between pension provision and tax. His paper on 'Occupation,
welfare and social division' (1982) examined occupational welfare
in general while, in a further paper (1983) Reddin returned to his
critique of state and occupational pensions. In addition, Field (1981,
Ch.8) has written on 'The Company Welfare State', drawing attention
to the findings of the Royal Commission on the Distribution of Income
and Wealth (1976, Ch.4; 1979, Ch.9) on 'fringe benefits' and occupation-
al pensions.
Women and the social division of welfare
Titmuss directed his original analysis of the social division
of welfare towards an exposure of differential access, as between
income groups, occupational groups and social classes, to the benefits
conferred via fiscal and occupational welfare. In 'The Social Division
of Welfare' no mention is made of gender inequalities, though as Rose
(1981, p.481) points out, Titmuss had developed 'an unusual sensitivity
to the position of women'.
His 1952 Fawcett lecture on the position of women, while mainly
directed towards issues of marriage and motherhood, also addressed
female longevity. It briefly identified 'The problem of social policies
for old age' as 'mainly a problem of elderly women - a fact that is
generally overlooked by those who consider that private occupational
pension schemes for men will answer all the questions of' income main-
tenance in old age.' (Titmuss, 1963b, p.98) Titmuss noted a possible
challenge to social policies arising from a new phenomenon, the 'married
woman returner'. A new generation of women were reaching their forties
as their own children reached adult life, only to find themselves
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shut out from 'practically all forms of educational and vocational
training, along with entry to many pensionable occupations ...' (ibid,
p.102)which, for women, would have been public service occupations
or the better type of 'office' or 'manual' occupations.
The critical link between gender and the social division of
welfare has been established by Rose (1981, p.478) who argued that
Titmuss' particular mode of analysis of social policy lends itself
to an examination of gender issues. Thus, his concept of a 'social
division of welfare' is potentially 'open for the examination of
the contradictions of race, age and sex as structured by social policy'
and 'offers a tradition of empirical enquiry which refuses the automatic
reduction of all oppression to that of class. Not least it facilitates
the development of analysis of the sexual division of welfare. 1 (Ibid.,
p.479)
Rose commented on the neglect of occupational welfare as a subject
of study by members of the Titmuss 'school' during the 'golden age'
of academic social administration in the 1950s and 60s, linking this
neglect of 'an increasingly important sector' to a parallel failure
to address issues of gender in relation to welfare (ibid., pp. 492-
93). She maintained that where the triple division of welfare has
been studied, as in Townsend's work on poverty (1979), 'credence'
is given to Sinfield's (1978) belief in the analytic potential of
the social division of welfare (ibid., p.493). The work of Reddin
may be cited once more in this connection.
Pascall(1983) offers a comprehensive account of the emergence
of a feminist analysis of social policy, noting the extent to which
the mainstream literature of social policy has, up to the time of
writing, failed to address gender divisions in social welfare (ibid.,
pp. 83-84). Pascall suggests thatthe unifying theme of this feminist
critique has been comment on 'the "patriarchal" family in modern
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society and an analysis of the Welfare State in supporting relationships
of dependency in that family.'. (Ibid., p.84)
(5)
From the early 1970s, Land has sustained an on-going critique
of the treatment of women within the tax and income maintenance systems,
emphasising the part played by the domestic division of labour in
constructing both women's financial dependence within marriage and
their role as unpaid 'carers' (Land 1971, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979
(a) and (b), 1980, 1981, 1983). Wilson (1977, 1983) has dealt substantially
with issues of women and state welfare, as have McIntosh (1978, 1979,
1981) and Bennett (1983). Feminist writing on social policy has
also drawn on critiques of the family such as Barrett (1980) and
Barrett and McIntosh (1981) and on work done from the vantage point
of political economy such as Peattie and Rein (1983).
However, little specific attention has been given to women's
access to retirement benefits or their financial circumstances in
old age. The social issues addressed by the re-emergent women's
movement have mainly reflected the interests and concerns of younger
women (Finch and Groves, 1982, p.427; Phillipson, 1982, pp. 61-63).
Land (1976, pp. 124-26) has discussed pensions in the context of
female financial dependence and the social security system, while
Phillipson (1982) devoted one chapter of his study of issues of old
age to 'women in retirement and old age', with a parallel chapter
on men. Groves (1983) presented a discussion of women and retirement
pensions legislation, focussing mainly on women and state pension
provision, derived from research for this thesis on women and occupational
pension provision.
Women and occupation pensions 1870-1983
This research has been undertaken on a part-time basis and was
originally conceived as an M.Phil thesis which, for domestic reasons1
could only be contemplated as a library research project using secondary
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sources. The major resource available on commencing this study was
the then recent report of the Occupational Pensions Board (1976)
on Equal Status for Men and Women in Occupational Pension Schemes.
The available statistical information on female access to occupational
pension provision has derived from the periodic surveys of the Government
Actuary's Department and annual surveys of the National Association
of Pension Fund
	
At a late stage, useful statistics on access have
become available from the long-awaited survey of women's employment
(Martin and Roberts 1984 :). Unfortunately the Equal Opportunities
Commission's report on Equal Treatment in Occupational Pension Schemes'
appeared too late for inclusion in the main text, but is referred
to briefly in Part VI, be1ow?
It became apparent at an early stage that it would be necessary
to examine a wide range of secondary source material from diverse
disciplines and origins. The research has illustrated the contribution
which allied social science disciplines can make to the study of
social policy. In the event, material has been used from the literature
of social history, economics, sociology and law, from the general
area of 'women's studies' and from the technical publications of
the 'pensions industry' and insurance world.
This thesis traces the history of occupational retirement pension
provision and female access to such provision from 1870 when women
first joined the Post Office to 1983, just as the government was
setting up its Inquiry into Provision for Retirement (1984). It
focusses not only on women as employees but also as potential recipients
of 'dependency' benefits deriving from occupational pension schemes.
The aim throughout has been to concentrate on employers' pension
provision in terms of 'superannuation' benefits designed to replace
income in old age and including reference to 'death in service' benefits.
It is in this context only that survivors' benefits and 'early retirement'
issues are discussed. Dicussion of statutory pension provision has
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been included only to the extent necessary for proper understanding
of occupational pension provision. The thesis omits detailed reference
to the place of occupational pension provision in British capitalism
nor does it address feminist theory, though reference to source material
on these topics appears in the text.
Until recently women have been all but invisible in the literature
of occupational pensions. A flurry of interest at the time of the
'pensions debate' (1969-75) died down, but the subsequent involvement
of the European Community with issues of sex discrimination in occupational
pension provision has once more made female access to employers'
pension benefits a live issue, as, to an extent, have recent changes
in the divorce law. It is hoped that this research will contribute
further to the debate.
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Part I References Introduction Women and the Sexual Division
of Welfare
1. Subject interviewed by Alan Cohen (University of Lancaster)
for an oral history of social work.
2. For commentaries on the work of Titmuss and his treatment
of the social division of welfare see Wilding (1976 esp.
pp. 159-62); Pinker in Reisman (1977).; Reisman (1977 esp. pp. 87-90);
Sinfield (1978); Rose (l98l; Pascall (1983 esp. pp. 89-92;
Spicker (1984).
3. For a critique of Titmuss' concepts of fiscal and occupational
welfare see Spicker (1984).
4. For commentary on Titmuss in the context of the feminist
critique of social policy see Rose (1981) and Pascall (1983,
pp. 89-92). A further useful perspective can be gained via
his daughter's autobiography (Oakley, 1983).
5. Land, Rose and Reddin were junior academics at LSE with
Titmuss in the 1960s. Abel-Smith, an established member,
has recently written on issues of sex equality in social
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held with administrators of pension schemes and with trade
union officials. There was a quantitative study using SPSS
analysis techniques (McGoldrick, 1984) and is an excellent
complement to this research.
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PART II
The Entry of Women into Occupational Pension Scheme
Membership to 1939
'Her idea was for I to get a job to get a girl a
pension because she had no money except what her
husband would give her and she wanted a girl to
have a pension - which I eventually did get.'
Schoolmistress b .1893(1)
(Widdowson, 1983, p.67)
'I never made plans for a pension. No, I was





The Entry of Women into Occupational Pension Scheme
Membership to 1939
Introduction
Chapters 1 and 2 relate the development of occupational pension
provision to the increasing participation of women in paid work from
the mid nineteenth century to World War II. The focus is on women
as paid employees who, in certain occupations, gained rights to member-
ship of superannuation schemes. A parallel development of occupational
widows' and survivors' pensions which benefitted women as dependants
of scheme members is discussed in Chapter 8.
Growth in occupational pension schemes took place in a period
during which new employment opportunities opened up, with a contempor-
aneous development of educational provision and opportunities. However,
such possibilities were constrained by an individual's family financial
circumstances and by his or her location in the social class structure
and, for women, they were further constrained by custom and regulation,
much of which related to marital status. Throughout the period, a
married women was assumed to be her husband's financial dependant
and was, other than exceptionally, disbarred from those better paid
and 'white collar' occupations which were the very types of employment
wherein occupational pension schemes were pioneered. It was the single
woman who, initially, benefitted from occupational pension provision.
In the later decades of the nineteenth century and particularly,
after the first World War, increasing numbers of single women were
compelled by financial necessity, as well as by motivations of interest
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and principle, to seek paid employment. Such employment was character-
ised by low pay and by occupational segregation. Many such women
could expect an impoverished retirement. There seems no doubt that
the growing popularity of public sector employment especially teaching,
and the Civil Service, owed something to the fact that these were
considered 'secure' fields of employment, not least because they held
the promise of an occupational pension on retirement. For most single




The Development of Occupational Superannuation Schemes
I Scheme origins
Study of the antecedents to nineteenth century occupational
pension schemes proper, reveals a delightful confusion in the
terminology of pensions (Rhodes, 1965, pp.14-15). Raphael 	 has
traced the granting of the first public pension in 1684 to one Martin
1-lorsham, a Port of London employee, who was 'soe much indisposed by
a great melaricholye that he is at present unfit for business'. Titmuss
(1976, p.202) comments that the criterion for receipt of this particular
pension was unfitness not chronological age. Namier 	 notes 18th
century 'pensions' and 'annuities' as being given not only to retired
officials but also to dukes. These noble personages seem to have
been granted an early version of Family Income Supplement designed
to help them 'keep up appearances of strength and splendour required
from men placed so near the Throne;'. Nor were women excluded from
such rudimentary public sector provision, since lesser pensions were
apparently granted to many women, parasites and foreigners 'of a less
dignified character' than were the dukes (Rhodes, 1965, pp.14-15).
Government service
Early occupational pension provision within individual government
departments has been noted as 'a record of men in search of some
acceptable principles of equity by which the costs of pensions for
the aged and infirm should be distributed' (Titmuss, 1976, p .202 ) .(6) -
Between 1684 and 1712, in Customs and other branches of the Civil
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Service, three phases of pension development have been identified:
firstly the sale of an office by the holder to a personally nominated
successor ---'on grounds of infirmity, sickness and old age': secondly,
initiatives taken by the public authorities to propose the granting
of a pension to an individual employee whose successor's salary was
then charged with the cost of the pension: thirdly, 'the invention
of the superannuation fund' and the establishment of the principle
of collective responsibility whereby 'the young became responsible
on average terms for the income-maintenance of their aged predecessors
in office.' (Ibid.) Thus 'even before the nineteenth century, the
problem of providing for public servants who were unable, through
old age or incapacity, to continue working had been recognised.' (Rhodes,
1965, p.15)
Yet, as Rhodes makes clear, government departments differed in
their methods of dealing with the problem and the situation was further
confused by the varied means of remuneration for public servants.
Some were paid salaries, some fees, some both. A sinecure might provide
not only a salary in a working lifetime, but the equivalent of a pension
in old age. Furthermore, it was possible to receive remuneration
and use part of it to pay a deputy to perform the duties of the office
(ibid., pp.15-16). In the Post Office, public servants 'were generally
(7)
allowed to make private bargains for annuities with their successors.'
Not surprisingly such a system of remuneration was open to abuse.
In 1785 three Commissioners were appointed 'to inquire into the Fees,
Gratuities, Perquisites and Emoluments' of various public offices.
Thus, attention became drawn to the ways in which modes of remuneration
could be manipulated so as to provide what were, effectively, retirement
pensions (ibid.,p.16). Events then moved slowly towards the setting
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up of a superannuation system in the public sector. A Treasury Minute
of 1803, 'one of the great landmarks in British social policy' (Titmuss,
1976, p.202) set out 'a scale of allowances for certain Customs officials
who had served with diligence and fidelity' and were 'absolutely incapable'
from infirmity of mind or body to perform their duties (Rhodes, 1965,
p.17). The Committee on the Public Expenditure which had been given
responsibility for 'recommending reductions in public expenditure
without detriment to public service' (ibid.) approved the Minute of
1803 'as uniting a due consideration towards long and meritorious
service with a just attention to economyt.(8)
During this decade, James William Hay, senior clerk in the Foreign
Office, got a pension of £500 in 1805 'in consequence of his being
rendered incapable, by his continued ill state of health of attending
to the duties of his employment'. So did William Henry Higden (600),
second clerk of the Colonial Office, 'on account of his advanced age
and infirmities from a Paralytic Stroke, and in consideration of his
faithful and efficient services during a period of 37 years'. Esther
Spyer 'widow of the late Deputy Office Messenger' (Foreign Office)
was in 1803 granted a life pension of £50 'in consideration of the
particular circumstances attending his death and of his having left
his widow and four children unprovided for'. Other lesser dignitaries
were pensioned off, including John Stewart, a superannuated porter,
who received £75 p.a. and Elizabeth Player who had been housekeeper
to the Commissioner for the Care of Sick and Wounded Seamen. Pensions
were paid to widows and daughers 'determinable on marriage' or, in
the case of daughters, on reaching 21: occasionally they were paid
to sisters or 'relatives'. (Le Livre Rouge, 18lO)
Legislation enacted in 1810 (10) set up a non-contributory super-
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annuation scheme for civil servants, encompassing three chief principles.
Pensions were to be paid only to employees who were too physically
or mentally incapacitated or too affected by old age to continue working.
Pensions were to increase in relation to years of service completed
and were to be, other than in cases of exceptionally long service,
rather lower than the salary received while still working (Rhodes,
1965, p.17). By 1821 the cost of superannuation was being investigated
with a consequent recommendation that the scheme should be amended
to require employee contributions (ibid.,p.47). An Act of 1822 (11)
fixed such contributions at 2Y2% for salaries between £100 and £200
and 5% for those in excess of £200, the intention being to meet half
the cost of the scheme in this way (ibid.,p.48). Two years later,
however, as a result of opposition on the grounds of violation of
original terms of employment, an Act (12) was passed which not only
abolished contributions but required the return of those which had
already been paid (ibid.).
Over the next ten years the issue of contributions remained a
live one, culminating in theSuperannuationAct of 1834.(13) 	 This
repealed the earlier legislation and introduced a scheme to provide
a pension of two-thirds of salary at a minimum age of 65, after 45
years service (Pilch and Wood, 1979,p.4). Those who had entered public
service after August 4th 1829 were required to pay contributions (Rhodes,
1965, p.49). In this way public employees who would these days be
classified as 'established' Civil Servants were enabled to participate
in a comprehensive occupational pension scheme.
In 1856 a Royal Commission was set up to review the pension scheme,
reporting in 1857, the same year in which employee contributions by
civil servants were once more abolished. The 1859 Superannuation
Act 'marked the final step in the establishment in all essentials
-34-
of the modern Civil Service scheme.' A minimum retirement age of
60 was laid down, at which point a maximum two-thirds pension could
be obtained after 40 years' service (ibid.,pp.50-51). Thus the diarist
A L Munby 'beginning humbly ... at the age of thirty-one ... as a
supernumerary clerk with £120 a year' (Hudson, 1974, p.45) on January
2nd 1860 in the office of the Ecclesiastical Commissioners, was able
to record on June 30th 1889 "As from this day, I retire from Whitehall,
after 29Y years. The Lords of the Treasury allow me five extra years,
for special services, so the retiring pension is £340 p.a." (ibid.,p.414).
Titmuss comments on the Superannuation Act of 1859 and the preceding
legislation as having 'wrestled with the most intricate problems of
pension planning which policy-makers in Western countries are confronted
with in the l96s citing issues among which are some central to this
study, such as 'the proportionate relationship of benefits to earnings;
the problem of inflation, length of service and peak earnings in later
life; the definition of retirement and the age of retirement.' (Titmuss,
1976, p.203)
The 1859 scheme remained largely unaltered until the 1909 Super-
annuation Act which resulted in the pension being calculated on one
eightieth of final salary for each year's service, equal to half pay
on maximum service, with the addition of a lump sum on retirement (Rhodes,
1965, p.51). At this point one 'intricate problem' with which the
earlier architects of public service pension provision did not have
to deal presented itself in the shape of women Civil Servants who
had come into public sector employment since the passing of the 1859
legislation. They resisted the new arrangements made under the 1909
Act. It was not until the Superannuation Act of 1935 that both sexes




In 1846 the Committee of the Privy Council on Education provided
for pensions to be paid to aged or infirm teachers with at least fifteen
years' service and an untarnished character (Rhodes, 1965, p.23) though
few of these discretionary "Code" pensions were actually granted (Gosden,
1972, p.132). A minute of 1851 laid down that a maximum of £6,500
was to be spent on pensions in any one year and that no more than
270 teachers were to be in receipt of pensions, in these proportions:
20 pensions of £30 each, 100 of £25, and 150 of £20, the remaining
£400 to be distributed in the form of donations or special gratuities
(ibid., p.133). An existing pension could be withdrawn if the pensioner
proved later to have 'sufficient means of livelihood from other sources'.
And in 1862 all existing pension arrangements for teachers were withdrawn
until 1875 (ibid.).
Pension campaigning by teachers was one of the main reasons for
the foundation of the National Association of Elementary Teachers
(1870). Vigorous agitation by this Association led to the eventual
restoration in 1875 of the defunct discretionary pension scheme
(Tropp, 1977, pp.123-26). In 1884 the limitation of the number of
pensions which could be awarded ceased to apply to pre-1851 entrants
to teaching. The amount which could be spent annually was increased
in the years up to 1898 when the Elementary School Teachers (Superannuation)
Act was passed (Gosden, 1972, pp.33-35).
The attempts of the London School Board to establish a super-
annuation scheme for its own teachers in 1885 (Tropp, 1977, p.125)
had led to the setting up of a Parliamentary Select Committee which,
in 1892, recommended the adoption of a national scheme with retirement
at 60 for men and 55 for women (Rhodes, 1965, p.26). (15) 	 After further
-36-
governmental review, a national superannuation scheme was devised
(1898) and applied from 1899 to all new certificated (16) elementary
school teachers and to those already in service who accepted it. (17)
The arrangements, 'which seemed to owe nothing to other public service
schemes of the time' (Rhodes, 1965, p.62) were based on annual contributions
to a Deferred Annuity Fund of £3 (men) and £2 (women) with an annuity
payable at the age of 65 on a scale related to payments based on completed
years of service. In addition, the Treasury made an annual allowance
of ten shillings for each year of service and this was used to make
up the pension payments for those teachers who entered the scheme
too late to accrue the maximum forty years of contributions (Gosden,
1972, p.135).	 -
The 1898 Act established 'the principle that teachers were public
servants entitled to superannuation' (ibid., p.136), and the scheme
survived an attack by the Government Actuary in 1908 when a large
deficit in the annuity fund was revealed, due to an inconvenient pre-
disposition towards longevityon the part of the male annuitants (ibid.).18
Meanwhile complementary superannuation schemes were organised for
teachers in certain local authorities so that by 1912 the National
Union of Teachers estimated that a third of the certificated teachers
in England and Wales were benefitting under such arrangements to the
extent that 'it may be said that it is now impossible for officers
of a local authority to obtain a local superannuation scheme unless
the teachers are included too.' (Ibid.) (19)
At the outbreak of the first World War official consideration
was being given to the feasibility of extending superannuation to
teachers in secondary, technical and art schools and in training colleges
(ibid., p.139). In 1918 a Teachers' Superannuation Act was passed
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which introduced a non-contributory unfunded scheme for all teachers
(including uncertificated elementary school teachers) in grant-aided
elementary and secondary schools. The scheme was modelled closely
on that of the Civil Service. The pension was calculated on the basis
of one-eightieth of the average salary received during the last five
years of service in a recognised school, multiplied by a maximum
of forty years' service. In addition, a lump sum calculated at the
rate of one-thirtieth for each year of service was payable when a
teacher retired (ibid.). In consequence of public expenditure cuts
in 1922, contributions were levied, despite an energetic campaign
of opposition by the N.U.T., though an important concession was granted
in the form of tax relief on contributions (ibid., pp.140-41). A
further Act of 1925 established beyond doubt that a retirement pension
was a right for any teacher fulfilling the conditions for its receipt
(ibid. ,p.l43).
Other local authority schemes
As indicated above, certain local authorities had set up pension
schemes for their employees by the turn of the century, from which
some teachers were able to derive enhanced provision. Discretionary
pensions had been made available to Poor Law Officers from 1864, but
they were paid out of the same fund as officers' salaries and it was
1896 before a contributory scheme was introduced which allowed for
retirement at 65, as the result of a successful private member's bill
(Rhodes, 1965, pp.52-53). General superannuation schemes for local
authority employees had been preceded by substitute arrangements such
as Manchester Corporation's Thrift Fund (1891) (ibid.,p.55). Superannuation
schemes proper required a local Act of Parliament to promote their
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inception. By the outbreak of the first World War, where such schemes
were in existence, they required joint employer/employee contributions
usually at 2%-4%, with the pension calculated in one-sixtieths (ibid.,p.57).
Dissatisfaction over the lack of national superannuation arrangements
was voiced in the pre-war period, a National Association of Local
Government Oficers having been established in 1905 (Poole, 1978, p.18).
A government enquiry was promised in 1914 to meet dissatisfaction over
pension provision (Rhodes, 1965, p.56).
NALGO achieved trade union status in 1920 with a main aim of
establishing a national pension scheme (Poole, 1978, p.18), a Departmental
Committee having reported in igig.(2	 Following legislation introduced
in 1922 via a private member's bill, a national local government super-
annuation scheme was set up but it was left to individual local authorities
to decide whether or not they would adopt it. A minimum membership
of' 50 was required. Arrangements were made for employee pension rights
to be transferable between local authorities. Not until 1937 was
a compulsory national superannuation scheme adopted, following a lengthy
period of investigation into local authority staffing matters. (21)
This scheme was a one-sixtieth 'terminal salary' arrangement with
a compulsory retirement age of 65 (60 for some categories of female
nurses). Employees contributed at 6% into individual local authority
superannuation funds. The scheme was restricted to 'officers' i.e.
salaried staff, though local authorities could and did have their
own schemes for 'servants' i.e. manual/waged employees. By the 1920,
national schemes also catered for police (1921) and firemen (1925)
(Poole, 1978, pp.21-22; Rhodes, 1965, pp.58-63).
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Private sector provision to 1939
The early history of occupational pension schemes provided outside
the public sector is only now beginning to be documented. (22) Private
sector schemes, like their public counterparts, began as arrangements
which were 'riot guaranteed by means of a scheme but were ex-gratia
payments made by the employer at his.own discretion.' (Rhodes, 1965,
p.64; see also Owen, 1935, pp.82-83; Russell, 1982, p.158) 	 Rhodes
(ibid.) argues that cost would have been a limiting factor in converting
such informal arrangements into formal schemes. Nonetheless, by the
close of the nineteenth century, Charles Booth could comment
'Everywhere a good deal is done for old servants.
Their care is a recognised charge on all industrial
and commercial undertakings of standing.' 'There
are many old people in the receipt of industrial
superannuation allowances more or less charitable
in their character, though very often given as an
acknowledgement and recognition of past services.' (23)
By this time, funded pension schemes had been developed by railway
companies, banks, insurance companies and some industrial firms.
Unusually, railway companies provided pensions both for their salaried
staffs and for their 'servants', that is, manual workers. It was
usual for employers to devise pension schemes, initially, for salaried
staff: manual workers, typically, acquired membership of 'a more
modest and restricted scheme' (Rhodes, 1965, p.65) if indeed they
were ever brought within the scope of such provision. Russell (1982,
p.159) states that the practice of providing 'white-collar' pensions
was well established by the end of the nineteenth century, though
for manual workers this was not the case. She comments that manual
workers, typically, died in service or worked on if they lived. There
was a blurring between the states of sickness and old age and evidence
exists to show that elderly men were kept on to do light work by firms
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such as Rowntrees who, in effect, conferred 'hidden pensions' on such
employees (ibid., p.166). This was one response to increasing longevity
(see Gilbert, 1966, pp.171-74).
Private schemes appear to have calculated pension payments either
on 'average salary' earned over a lifetime and multiplied by the number
of years of service (a less financially advantageous procedure than
the 'terminal salary' scheme adopted by the Civil Service) or via
'money purchase' schemes whereby the amount of pension eventually
paid is directly related to the aniount of contributions paid and interest
earned thereon (Rhodes, 1965, p.66).
One problem area in the development of private schemes lay in
the necessity for such schemes to be able to guarantee eventual payment,
there being no statutory base for this, as in the public sector.
Hence, an alternative to the expensive operation of setting up a self-
administered scheme (with a fund guaranteed to provide pensions even
if the employer went out of business) was, especially for smaller
firms, to insure each employee. Deferred annuities could serve the
purpose of a pension scheme (as the teachers had already discovered)
and if 'they were of the endowment assurance type cover was provided
against the risk of death and might also provide a pension if the
lump sum payment at maturity could be converted into an annuity.'
(Ibid.)
By 1918 it was estimated that there were less than 400 staff
superannuation funds, mainly paying pensions only, and a similar number
of provident funds providing lump sums (Midland Bank Review, 1958,
p.4). After the first World War, developments in the private sector
were stimulated by various tax concessions allowable to employer and
employee under both the Income Tax Act 1918 and the Finance Act 1921.
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The niceties of tax legislation furthered the practice of providing
separate schemes for higher-paid 'staff' and, less commonly, their
lower-paid colleagues. Payment of tax-free lump sums on retirement
became possible under the 1918 legislation (Pilch and Wood, 1979,
pp.5-6). It is such lump-sum payments and other tax reliefs associated
with occupational pensions which have continued to distinguish the
former from state pension provision. From the late 1920s, 'group
life and pension schemes' were introduced on a model developed in
the U.S.A., whereby an insurance company effected a scheme for a whole
group of employees (Rhodes, 1965, p.87).
Thus in the mid-thirties Owen (1935, p82) (24) could refer to
a 'remarkable outburst of increased activity' in the occupational
pensions field, with 'bona fide' formal pension schemes replacing
the old 'grace and favour' arrangements which, where they still existed,
tended to be very unsatisfactory. Owen describes the growth of 'funded'
pension schemes which originally had been invested wholly or partly
in the firm itself but increasingly came to be invested outside the
firm, or, by the late twenties, in special trusts. (25) By the twenties
and thirties far more attention was being paid to the 'actuarial soundness'
of these funds (ibid., p.83). Owen notes as an important development
the use of insurance companies to set up and run schemes, relieving
the firms of the trouble of doing this themselves and further advancing
the growth of occupational pension provision (ibid.).
Jones (1983, pp.61-62, 69) notes the growth of occupational pension
provision between the wars as part of an expansion of occupational
welfare provision which occurred, characteristically, in 'large successful
and well-organised firms', typically in the south of England. Where
manual workers were provided for, it was usual to have separate schemes.
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Owen, writing of arrangements in the mid-thirties, states that the
most numerous schemes were those providing for 'administrative and
clerical staffs': quite commonly firms made separate provision for
manual and non-manual workers. Women employees were treated differently
again (Owen, 1935, p.84). Most schemes were devised to require both
employer and employee contributions, though 'staff' contributions
were usually wage-related, while manual employees paid a flat rate
(ibid., pp.84 and 87).
No official statistics were collected on occupational pension
schemes until an enquiry was instituted by the Ministry of Labour
in 1936 and published in 1938. Excluding the Civil Service and other
public sector schemes, it was found that 6,544 employers had voluntarily
adopted pension schemes, covering 1,617,000 employees, the vast majority
of whom were members of schemes operated by individual employers,
as opposed to group schemes 'covering a number of firms or undertakings'
(Ministry of Labour, 1938, p.172). There was an even split between
'staff' and 'manual' workers in terms of numbers covered, though only
1,600 of .the employers had pension schemes covering manual workers
(ibid.).
The Ministry of Labour estimated that in 1936 about 80,000/90,000
people were already drawing occupational pensions in the categories
surveyed from 'definite pension schemes on a pre-arranged basis' (Ibid,
p.174) These figures excluded persons formerly employed in public
service occupations and were not divided into staff and manual categor-
ies. Though no supporting evidence was presented, it was stated that
'considerable numbers' of people were drawing 'ex gratia' or other
(26)	 .pensions not derived from formal schemes.	 Nor is it known what
proportion of women were receiving any form of pension, though about
20% of the employed persons estimated as being in membership of private
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occupational schemes in 1936 were female (ibid., p.172).
In the next chapter an account will be given of the entry of
women into white-collar employment and, thereby, into membership
of pension schemes. However, pension schemes were originally and
indubitably designed by and for men and the remainder of this chapter
is addressed to the rationale of this pension provision up to the
outbreak of World War II.
II The rationale of occupational pension provision
What were the arguments for and against the provision of occup-
ational pensions before the second World War and how did such arguments
relate to the introduction of statutory pension provision? Why did
employers go to the trouble of assisting their employees to provide
for their old age? Why did employees seek such provisions as a right?
Rhodes (1965, p.17) views the early developments in Civil Service
superannuation as 'incidental and subordinate to a much wider concern
and movement to check corruption and reduce cost to the public service',
though by 1857 'the main emphasis seems to have shifted away from
the idea of checking abuse and moved towards the need for efficiency:
and now an increasing variety of reasons is put forward in favour
of a pension scheme.' (Ibid., p.19) He notes that throughout the
nineteenth century, it is the advantages which accrue to the State
in being able to 'get rid of men who are either worn out or for any
other reasons are incompetent' which are emphasised, rather than those
accruing to the employees themselves (ibid., p.20). While it seems
true to say that the Royal Commission which reported in 1857 (27)
was conscious of the hardship which might be caused if older and/or
infirm men were dismissed without pensions (ibid.,p.l8), such considerations
tended to be absent or consigned to a less than significant position
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in other contemporary arguments. Indeed, the Northcote-Trevelyan
Commission of the same period reckoned that the provision of pensions
was a negative influence on Civil Service recruitment since they
furnished 'strong inducements to the parents and friends of sickly
youths to endeavour to obtain for them employment in the service of
the Government.' (Ibid., p.l9)28) By the end of the century, arguments
for the provision of Civil Service pensions also encompassed their
usefulness in retaining employees who might otherwise be tempted else-
where. In addition, there was a realisation that, in the event of
there being competition for recruits to the service, it had to be
borne in mind that other potential employers such as banks, insurance
companies, railway companies and other commercial and industrial
employers as well as other public sector employers, had developed
superannuation schemes (ibid.).
'Efficiency' was a major consideration in the arguments for the
provision of pensions for elementary school teachers from the mid-
nineteenth century. However, strong counter-arguments were martialled
in the name of support for the traditional virtues of prudence and
thrift as exercised by individuals. In the 1850's pressure was put
on teachers to subscribe to assurance societies though, in reality,
as a contemporary HMI commented, 'It is all very well in theory to
subscribe to this and that insurance company, but practically the
necessities of a teacher with a family are too pressing to allow him
to do it.' (Tropp, 1977, p.42) As early as 1848, H M Moseley, an
HMI, 'drew up an elaborate scheme for creating a Teachers' Superannuation
Fund' and, six years later with a colleague, presented a petition
to the Lord President of the Council signed by no fewer than 725 church
schoolmasters (ibid., p.29). Moseley is quoted as saying 'In old age,
the schoolmaster is continued in his office when he has ceased to
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be equal to the discharge of his duties, because there is no other
means of providing for his support.' (Rhodes, 1965, p.23) The choice
'was often between inefficiency and sending the teacher to the work-
house.' (Ibid.) Yet the government of the time, while content to
tighten its control over schools and teachers, insisted that they
had no direct claim on the State for superannuation (Tropp, 1977,
p.31).
The original discretionary teachers' pension scheme granted pensions
to schoolmasters and schoolmistresses who were 'incapable by age or
infirmity of continuing to teach a school efficiently.' (Rhodes,
1965, p.23) However, the Revised Code of 1861 abolished teachers'
pensions amid arguments for the necessity for thrift and providence
among members of the teaching profession (ibid., p.25). Teachers
appear to have been called upon to demonstrate 'model' lifestyles
according to the values of the time. Yet the 1857 Commissioners
examining Civil Service pensions provision had scrutinised and dismissed
the argument that in return for a proper salary 'it ought to be the
business of a Civil Servant to make provision out of that salary for
his own future wants and those of his family.' (Ibid., p.19)
In the event, a Select Committee (29) which reported on teachers'
pensions in 1872 found arguments in favour of pensions not only on
the basis of 'efficiency' but also on the grounds that there was a
need 'to improve the quality of those who entered the profession and
to stop qualified people from leaving it.' (Ibid., p.25) This committee
heard witnesses who were opposed to pensions. Rhodes argues that
one reason why elementary school teachers got pensions at the end
of the nineteenth century was 'the weakening of the strict views of
self-help, which had so characterised the middle years of the century.'
(Ib1d.)° The pensions already granted to Civil Servants, some
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local authority employees and by various commercial and industrial
undertakings can perhaps be taken as proof of this statement.
The debate on the virtues of self-help was nowhere more vociferous
than in the arguments and counter-arguments which surrounded the
campaigns for the introduction of statutory old age pensions. Evidence
about the nature of the relationship between old age and poverty became
increasingly available at the end of the nineteenth century.(31)
But in the 1890's, while one lobby advocated the introduction of
statutory old age pensions on the grounds that 'the maintenance of
the aged should be a public charge upon the whole community, and should
include a general scheme of pensions,' (Mowat, 1961, p.141) opposing
views were well in evidence. 'What society requires for its refor-
mation is not that each man when he comes to the age of 60 shall find
that his fairy godmother, the State, has put a balance at his bankers,
but rather that, during his life, he shall have followed the prudent
course of so limiting his responsibilities to his income that at 60
he finds himself in possession, by his own exertion, of' adequate
provision for his old age .... To remove the necessity of providing
for old age would be to remove one of the most potent influences of'
civilisation.' (Ibid., p.143)(32)
Eventually the advocates of' statutory old age pensions won their
cause with the passing of the Old Age Pensions Act (1908). 	 Prior
to the availability of this means-tested benefit, people had to rely
for an income in their old age on savings, benefits accruing from
contributions to assurance schemes and Friendly Societies, occupational
pensions or on help from members of' their own families. Many were
without such income support, or had insufficient for their needs,
in which case their only recourse was to seek aid from charitable
sources or from the poor law which, at worst, meant the workhouse
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rather than out-door relief.	 Two years after the passing of the
1908 Old Age Pensions Act, 411,489 persons were recorded as being
in receipt of the small pension (5 shillings at maximum) which was
given at the age of 70 to persons of' either sex, to those of very
limited means and of (attested) upright character, that is, sane,
provident and hardworking (Gilbert, 1966, pp.216-217, 222-223).
After the first World War, the Widows', Orphans and Old Age
(36)Contributory Pensions Act 1925 	 was passed, which 'changed the
whole basis of state pensions: in place of the concept of a pension
as a reward on certain conditions to the deserving poor who had failed
or been unable to make provision for themselves, was substituted an
entitlement to a ten shilling pension in return for making contributions'
(Rhodes, 1965, pp.36-37). Everyone who was insured under the 1911
National Insurance Act became insured under the Old Age Contributory
Pensions Act. Pensionable age was reduced to 65 and 'all restrictions
with regard to means and property were abolished.' (Wilson and McKay,
1941, p.95) However a ceiling was set on the income level which entitled
an employed person to membership, which excluded those who were, by
the standards of the time, well-paid workers (ibid., pp.99-100).
In the debates which preceded the passing of the Act, the legis-
lation was supported on familiar grounds that it promoted thrift and
yet 'it was not intended to be a complete substitute for every other
provision for the same purpose.' 'Those virtues of thrift which had
done so much for the country in the past would be encouraged.' (Ibid.,
p.91) Hopes were expressed that 'employers would be encouraged by
the scheme to formulate systems of additional pensions for their work-
people.' (Ibid.) However, whole categories of persons were, in the
event, excluded from the new contributory pension scheme, by virtue
of having employment giving access to occupational pension benefits,
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ie. Civil Servants, railway clerks and salaried workers, teachers
(ibid., p.112-114).
As has been shown, the public sector was comparatively well
advanced in its provision for salaried workers. By the late 1920's,
private sector provision was expanding. Some of the principles which
informed the many individual private pension schemes are nicely expressed
in a contemporary handbook (Dougherty, 1927) which states that 'the
considerations which usually lead up to the question of forming a
pension scheme generally arise from a desire - a) to encourage and
promote thrift, among a body of employees; b) to provide for old age,
and a period of retirement; c) to anticipate on a sound basis the
moral obligation of an employer to relieve from service and automati-
cally provide for those servants who have given him the best years
of their lives' (ibid., p.1).
The author, undoubtedly advocating the interests of the insurance
industry, was specific as to the advantages to employers. Pension
provision leaves the employee 'to a great extent, free from anxiety
as to the future' and consequently able to 'direct his (sic) best
energies to the present', which in 1927 might well have meant consider-
able concentration on the best means of hanging on to his or her job.
'the employer who can hold out a sound pension scheme
is able to secure more easily and to retain the
service of a better class of men. It will also
follow in the majority of cases that, where a servant
becomes inefficient through old age, the employer
with a pension fund is able, without hardship to such
a servant, to replace him by a younger and more
efficient worker, and probably at some little saving.' (Ibid., p.2)
The attractions of occupational pension schemes are shown to
include benefits for dependants. 'The time has fortunately passed
when employers or firms regarded a pension as an act of grace or charity,
and the view is now generally held that such a benefit is really in
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the nature of deferred pay.' (Ibid.) Dougharty argues that this view
is upheld by the Inland Revenue, in that they define occupational
pension benefits as earned income.
The writer makes another point which is highly relevant to the
further development of occupational pension schemes in the inter-war
period. The 1925 legislation re;tricted participation in the new
state contributory pension scheme to employed persons earning less
than £250 p.a. It excluded those who were, by the standards of' the
time, well paid. 'Employees earning a wage of a larger amount are
dependent upon their own resources, or staff pension funds, for any
pension.' (Ibid., p.4) In this knowledge, private employers could
consider the pension position of their salaried workers.
Russell (1982, p.177) argues that the establishment of 'good'
pension schemes set precedents for other employers to follow, even
at a time of' depression. She points to an emerging trade union interest
in employers' pensions during the inter-war period, with non-cash
remuneration becoming an acceptable alternative to increased pay,
on the basis of employee-led demand (ibid., p.180). Though, as Jones
clearly shows, 'progressive' employers were anxious to increase their
provision of' occupational welfare during this period (including pension
provision) as part of their industrial relations strategy (Jones,
1983, esp. p.67). Ironically, although employers sought to reduce
class antagonism 'many of the schemes worked directly against this
end because they were provided on a differential basis, so re-inforcing
the feeling of "them" and "us".' (Ibid., pp.69-70).
However, inter-war occupational pension provision was not divisive
solely in relation to occupational class. It was also divisive by
gender. Differential arrangements were made for male and female
employees by the providers of occupational pension schemes. Many
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women, by virtue of their location in the occupational structure and
because of contemporaryviews on the extent to which women 'needed'
pensions, were either excluded from schemes or given access only to
special provision for women. A fresh interpretation can be put on
the history and rationale of occupational pension provision by dis-
cussing such provision in relation to the appearance, in the later
19th century, of 'white collar' women in the labour force.
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Chapter 2
Women's Paid Employment and Access to Occupational Pension
Scheme Provision
I The female white-collar and professional worker
In the mid-nineteenth century, women's opportunities for access
to employment and education were constrained by custom and regulation.
Such constraints related not only to gender and placement within the
social class structure but also to marital status. '
	With rare
exceptions, those young women (drawn mainly from the middle and artisan
classes) who were the female counterparts to the male employees in
pensionable occupations were expected to be financially dependent
on their fathers before marriage. It was a sign of 'reduced circum-
stances' if such single women worked and governessing(38) in some
form was one common solution to penury.
The 'duty' of every woman was to get married. The entry of women
into white-collar occupations in the later decades of the nineteenth
century was closely connected with the fact that many women were fated
to 'fail' in that duty (see Holai±e, 1973, esp. Ch.I, pp.3-20). If
a woman 'failed' to marry, her position was equivocal.
'Married life is a woman's profession: and to this
life her training - that of dependence is modelled.
Of course by not getting a husband, or losing him,
she may find that she is without resources. All
that can be said of her is that she has failed in
business.....(Saturday Review, 12 November 1859). (40)
This stark comment related to a subject which remained topical up
to the second World War - that of the 'superfluous' woman, usually
taken to be synonymous with the single woman (see appendix to this
chapter).
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Richards (1974, p.352) argues that the range of employment oppor-
tunities for women in the mid-nineieenth century was 'tragically
restricted' so that there emerged a 'vast surplus army of employable
women in the labour market which was to be a very considerable problem
of the Victorian age'. For indigent middle-class single women the
'higher' types of domestic service such as 'governessing' or, less
commonly, work as a 'lady's companion', were traditional forms of
paid employment, with school teaching and nursing only just beginning
to open up as possible aiternatives.(41) The plight of such women
was brought to public attention by Barbara Leigh-Smith in 1855 in
a pamphlet (Women and Work) which 'immediately called forth a flood
of criticisms and comments in the ordinary Press.' (Strachey, 1978,
p.91)
Barbara Leigh-Smith, Jessie Boucherett and associates founded
the Association for the Promotion of the Employment of Women (1859),
their work eventually extending to the related activity of promoting
education and training opportunities for girls and women. In the
last three decades of the nineteenth century, 'white collar' employ-
ment opportunities for women became more diverse, though such employ-
ment (almost exclusively restricted to single women) was characterised
by low pay and occupational segregation (ibid., Ch.XII). Indeed,
as will be seen, better educated middle class women who were willing
to work for low pay constituted a favoured form of labour in some
occupations, notably, clerical work. Holcombe (1973) has defined
the chief occupations of 'middle-class working women' between 1850
and 1914, as being those of teaching, nursing, the distributive trades,
clerical occupations and the Civil Service. With the exception of
nursing, these expanding occupations also recruited large numbers
of men.
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Changing attitudes towards working women (as well as a drive
to tighten up poor-law administration procedure) may be deduced from
the fact that, whereas in the original Poor Law Report of 1834 'the
single independent woman is nowhere mentionedl,(42) by 1871 a circular
'proclaimed that out-relief should in no circumstances be given to
able-bodied single women, except on a labour test. Single women were
now treated exactly as men - as potentially recalcitrant members of
the labour force.' (Thane, 1978d, p.38) This indicates that an
unmarried woman who was unable to support herself in the latter part
of the nineteenth century could, if destitute, have been defined as
a charge on her 'liable relatives'. Given the stigma of contact with
the poor law authorities, it is unlikely that these 'liable relative'
regulations were often put to the test in the case of impoverished
middle class women. The onus, increasingly, would have been on such
women to find or be placed in employment, perhaps with aid of charities
designed to cater for such 'deserving cases' (see ref.57).
Holcombe (1973, p.215) estimates that during the period 1861-1911
there was a 307% increase in the number of women in England and Wales
in the five 'chief occupations' of' middle-class working women as
compared with a 192.3% increase in the number of men. 'The rate of
increase for both men and women in the five fields of work.....was
substantially higher than the increase for men and women in the total
(43)
working population.'	 In 1861, men in those occupations represented
8.5% of the total male working population - by 1911, this population
had risen to 14.1%. For women the corresponding rise was even greater-
from 5% to 16.4% (ibid., Appendix, Table 6e, p.215). It has been
estimated that by 1911 there were, altogether, 1,114,000 women in
'middle-class' occupations, as compared with 1,669,000 men so occupied
(ibid., Table 6f, p.216). However, the 'higher professions' had largely
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succeeded in keeping women out altogether, despite an expansion of
opportunities for women to enter higher education (Strachey, 1978,
p.263).
The 1911 Census was the first to show the marital status of working
women in detail - 77.4% (4,830,734) of all working women were unmarried,
8.5% (411,011) widowed, and 14.1% (680,191) were married (Holcombe,
1973, Table 6g, p.217). Throughout the whole period of the development
of occupational pension schemes up to World War II, the position of
women in the labour market (and their educational opportunities) were
much influenced by the pervading assumption that a married woman was!
should be her husband's financial dependant and that, where a young
single woman was in paid employment, this situation was but a brief
prelude to marriage and permanent withdrawal from the labour force.
Commonly held assumptions about married women have been bolstered
by the law. The much-quoted dictum of the lawyer Blackstone (1765)
is worth repeating:
'By marriage the husband and wife are one person in
law: that is, the very being or legal existence of
the woman is suspended during the marriage or at
least is incorporated and consolidated into that
of the husband: under whose wing, protection and
cover she performs everything.'(44)
For decades after, Blackstone's interpretation was highly influential.
Until 1870, the earnings of a married woman belonged, by law, to her
husband.	 Hall (1979) has shown how 'the bourgeois ideal of the
family' became constructed during the mid-nineteenth century as one
in which the wife did not engage in paid work. However, married women
of the middle and upper classes increasingly, in the second half of
the nineteenth century, took up time-consuming voluntary work 'of a
social or public service nature, including what would now be termed
work with 'pressure groups' (see Summers (1979) in Burman, pp.33-61;
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Strachey (1978), pp.205-24; Hollis (1979), pp.223-80; Prochaska
(1980)	 (46)
In addition, many employers up to the time of the second World
War operated a 'marriage bar', which was differentially applied:
'It is a significant fact that the barriers apply almost
entirely to the stable and better paid employments,
and vanish at the level where cheap labour and casual
work are the rule. Although women are required to
resign on marriage from the Civil Service, from
teaching posts under local authorities, from banking
and retail shops, and from many of the best-managed
businesses, nothing of the sort happens to charwomen
and cleaners.' 0. Strachey (1934) (47)
Thus the married middle-class woman in paid employment was an unusual
phenomenon.
The first World War had a dramatic impact on the recruitment
of women into white-collar jobs, especially as replacements for men
who were conscripted from 1916 onwards. Marwick (1977, Table 3, p.166)
states that the number of employed women in Great Britain and Ireland
rose from 5,966,000 in 1914 to 7,311,000 in 1918, excluding munitions.
Huge numbers of women entered 'commerce', totalling 934,000 in 1918
as opposed to 505,200 in 1974. In banking there was a spectacular
rise from 1,500 to 37,600 and, in insurance, from 7,000 to 32,300.
Likewise, in central and local government (including education) numbers
rose steeply from 262,000 to 460,200.(48)
Marwick terms these developments 'the rise of the business girl'
and argues that 'it was the war which, in creating simultaneously
a proliferation of Government committees and departments and a shortage
of men, brought a sudden and irreversable advance in the economic
and social power of a category of women employees which extended from
sprigs of the aristocracy to daughters of the proletariat.' (Ibid.,
p.74) This may have been so, but the end of the war saw a vast and
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speedy exodus of such women from the workforce (ibid., p.122).
Thereafter, comments Richards (1974, p.353), 'the rate of progress
of women into professional occupations was not maintained', notwith-
standing the Sex Disqualification Removal	 Yet, as Fergusson
(1963, p.59) argues, 'the post-war period offered more opportunities
for women in the professional occupations than in non-professional
ones.' A number of professions admitted women for the first time,
though the number of entrants remained small between the two world
wars.(50) Women's 'white-collar' employment was predominantly in teaching,
central and local government, in clerical work and in the retail trades
(ibid.). Such employment was characterised if not by low pay, certainly
by 'unequal' pay, poor promotion prospects and the ubiquitous 'marriage-
bar'.
The 1931 Census shows that 72% (4,320,154) of all single women
over 14 in England and Wales were enumerated as occupied, 10% (896,702)
of those married and 22% (389,187) of those widowed/divorced. No
(51)fewer than 483,064 women were enumerated as out of work.	 Indeed,
the inter-war period with its heavy unemployment offered many oppor-
tunities for re-inforcement of the traditional view that the married
woman should receive her financial support from her husband,(52) nbt
from her own paid employment. However, the traditional assumption
that for young women, employment (if taken up at a1i)' 	 was but
a brief prelude to marriage, had been undermined in respect of a whole
generation of young 'marriageable' women by the considerable casualty
(54)
rate of the Great War.
Pensions for single women became a public issue in the mid-nineteen
thirties.	 At the same time, statistics became available on the
number of employed women in membership of occupational pension schemes
(Ministry of Labour, 1938). The second section of this chapter examines
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the position of women as regards access to occupational pension provision
up to 1939 and ends with a brief discussion of related issues in the
statutory pensions field.
II Women and occupational pension benefits
The development of occupational pension schemes in the nineteenth
century has been discussed, along with the increasing participation
of single women in 'white-collar and professional' occupations during
the same period. To what extent did such women, most of whom engaged
in paid work from financial necessity, benefit in the nineteenth century
from access to occupational pension schemes? It can be deduced that
these women benefitted very little. Employment which guaranteed a
pension was available only in the Civil Service. The most popular
female white-collar occupation, teaching, carried no established pension
rights until 1898. Nursing was an occupation characterised by inadequate
pension provision. In the more elite clerical occupations where private
sector pensions developed, insurance took on a modest number of female
recruits not necessarily entitled to employers' pension provision,
while banking and the railways remained largely male enclaves.
As a result the vast majority of Victorian 'white-collar' female
workers had to rely for an income in old age on employers' 'grace
and favour' payments,56) on their own savings, on the generosity
of family and friends, on charitable bodies 	 or, as a last resort,
(58)the poor law (see Thane, 1978d).
	
Lack of a pension or the prospect
of an inadequate pension provided incentives to keep working as long
as possib1e.	 The provision of statutory old age pensions in 1908
must have come as a relief to many elderly single women. Occupational
pensions were received by only a small minority of working women up
to 1939. During the inter-war period, within Holcombe's 'five chief
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occupations', public sector teaching and Civil Service were the most
likely to be pensionable, while in the retail trades, employers' pensions
seem to have been unusual. However, from 1926 many working women
were brought into the new state contributory pensions scheme.6(J)
By 1936, 335,068 women working outside the public sector were recorded
as being in employers' pension schemes (Ministry of Labour, 1938,
p.172).
(61)The Civil Service
The entry of women to the Civil Service was part of a wider
movement of women into clerical occupations or 'office work' during
the late 19th century (Silverstone, 1976) and owed much to new
'communication technology' i.e. telegraphy, telephones, typewriters,
copiers and carbons. It also owed much to a great expansion in the
work of the Post Office and the growth of other central government
departments, with concomitant structural and functional change (Holcombe,
1973, p.164).
If there is a date from which to chart female membership of
occupational pension schemes, that date is 1870. Women became civil
servants at the point when, in 1870, the Post Office took over the
telegraph system from a number of private companies, some of which,
(in particular, the Electric and International Telegraph Company)
employed women operators (Martindale, 1939, p.16). The Telegraph
Act 1869 gave the Post Office a monopoly over telegraph business and
required that the services of the operators be purchased along with
the telegraph companies (ibid.). The E.I.T. Co. had found that these
women made 'good', docile workers, content with low pay (Holcombe,
1973, p.165).(62) From 1871 the Post Office also began to employ
a few women as clerical workers in the telegraph department. Once
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past their probationary service, these pioneer women became entitled
to membership of the Civil Service pension scheme. They were absorbed
into a scheme designed for men.
The Post Office next decided to appoint women clerks to the Savings
Bank, since a large supply of well-educated young women(63) appeared
to be available. An official noted in 1871 that the initial entrants
had many points in their favour, including their cheapness and docility.
They were 'less disposed than men' to demand higher pay on grounds
of long service since 'Women solve these difficulties by getting married
as soon as they get the chance.' Another advantage of' employing female
labour was recorded: 'there will always be fewer females than males
on the pension list' (Martindale, p.l8)64) The likelihood that a
woman would not remain in lifelong employment was seen as a very positive
asset in her favour. Yet it could have been the prospect of secure,
pensionable employment which produced in 1875 no fewer than 2,000
applicants for thirty posts as female Savings Bank clerks.(65)
Civil Service employment proved attractive to women in the period
up to World War I, with great competition for posts, despite low pay
and severely limited promotion prospects. Employment within the Service
was sex-segregated, so that women could rise only to supervise other
women in women's grades. Central government took increasing advantage
of the existence of a pool of' cheap, competent female labour, employing
cost-effective strategies such as 'down grading', 'undercutting' arid
the operation of a marriage bar. These strategies reduced the wage
bill and cut eventual expenditure on pensions, to which only a minority
of women entrants eventually became entitled, at rates which corres-
ponded to their low pay.
In 1876 the Post Office formed a 'women's clerical branch' under
a Lady Superintendent, in 1881 established a competitive entry for
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a new grade of' 'woman clerk', and, in 1883, created a lesser grade
of 'woman sorter' who was, in fact, a filing clerk. By 1897 there
were 'girl clerks' of 16-18. Gradually, some trained and experienced
women clerks were filtered out from the Post Office into other depart-
ments (Holcombe, 1973, p.168). As part of the 'down grading' strategies,
the main male 'white-collar' grade was split in two in the 1880's,
including an elite, mainly graduate First Division. By the mid-nineties,
work from the lower division was further delegated to new lower-paid
grades of male clerk and women's grades took over 'men's' clerical
work (ibid., pp.173-74). The women clerks' work was delegated to
more junior and less well-paid women and girls. The clerical work
generated by the new teachers' pension scheme of 1898 was dealt with
by a group of nineteen Lady Clerks at the Board of Education: these
women were segregated and had no chance of promotion (Martindale,
1939, pp.44-45).
Both men and women suffered from the 'undercutting' strategies
which accompanied the 'down grading'. Established civil servants
could, furthermore, be undercut by unestablished civil servants, who
received even lower salaries and had no pension rights. In particular,
large numbers of unestablished women caine to be employed as clerks,
typists and even inspectors. Some achieved permanent status (Holcombe,
1973, p.175). Women were also the subjects of a device known as
'substitution' whereby they performed higher duties which were not
fully recognised via remuneration (ibid.). In addition, women's earning
power was severely limited by their lack of promotion prospects: the
new typing grade established in 1894 allowed merely for a progression
from 'typist' to 'shorthand-typist' (ibid., p.176).
The chief merit of a post as an established civil servant was
the security, generous leave and, in particular, the pension for old
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age. Low pay was justified by arguments which emphasised the good
conditions of service. However, for women, the job was secure and
pensionable only so long as they remained single. Although no marriage
bar operated initially in the Post Office, it was soon introduced (1875)
for new entrants and was applied to existing staff in some departments
(Martindale, 1939, p.147 and see Ch.6). The practice of generally
requiring resignation on marriage dated from 1894 when members of the
typing grade demanded better pay and 'establishment', which was granted
on condition that service would 'cease as a matter of course on marriage'
(ibid., p.148). Thus while more women became 'pensionable' while in
service, the majority left before reaching retirement age.
It was decided to institute the payment of a 'marriage gratuity'
to typists of good 'character and service' who had worked for at least
six years, the gratuity not to exceed one month's pay for each year
of service, to a maximum of twelve (Holcombe, 1973, p.178). This practice
was extended to all classes of established women civil servants and
the custom of requiring resignation on marriage became virtually universal
(Martindale, 1939, p.148-149). Holcombe (1973, p.178) states that
the mass of lower-paid women accepted the practice, believing that
the exclusion of married women improved the limited chances of promotion
open to single 'career' women civil servants: the more senior clerks
and the small number of women of 'exceptional ability and education'
who had achieved an appointment at the inspectorial grade, resented
the 'marriage bar'. There is no doubt that the 'marriage bar' strategy
was copied and justified in other occupations on the strength of Civil
Service practice.
In 1909, the Civil Service pension arrangements were changed by
the Superannuation Act of that year, so that men were awarded a retirement
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pension at a lower rate but gained an additional benefit in the form
of a lump sum which could be paid to the man on retirement or, alternatively,
as a 'death benefit' if a man died in service. The associations of
women civil servants had objected to this arrangement since their low
(and unequal) pay and lack of promotion prospects were a continuing
source of discontent and they objected to the notion of their retirement
pension being made even lower. They also feared that women might lose
the 'marriage gratuity' if they were brought into the scope of the
new 'lump sum' provision.	 The upshot of the women's objections was
that women remained within the 1859 Superannuation Act rules, while
men did not (Martindale, 1939, pp.173-175).
In the years immediately preceding the second World War, women,
by now well organised into their own associations, aired their grievances
around low pay, job segregation and the marriage bar before a Royal
Commission and a Select committee.166) They were not received sympath-
etically (Holcombe, 1973, pp.184-91). The first World War opened up
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new opportunities for 'established' women 	 and enabled many more
women to become unestablished civil servants, some in senior posts.
Most of these women were not retained. The service was re-organised
into five grades after the first World War, of which the two lowest,
for typists and clerical assistants, were, exclusively, 'women's grades',
with no promotion prospects. Some women did enter the second 'executive'
grade and a very small number passed the competitive examination into
the highest 'administrative' grade (Holcombe, 1973, p.192). A handful
were given a special dispensation which exempted them from the 'marriage
(68)bar', which otherwise operated universally. 	 Under the 1935 Super-
annuation Act men and women were given the 'same' pension rights
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(Martindale, 1939, p.175) on a continuing basis of' unequal pay. By
1939 there were 59,000 female non-industrial civil servants (excluding
minor and manipulative grades in the Post Of'f'ice) which represented
28% of the category. Just over half were typists or 'sub-clerical'
clerical assistants (RCEP, 1946, S29, p.8).
(69)Teaching
Teaching and, in particular, 'governessing' in private families
was a traditional occupation for women who needed an income. With
the growth of teacher training and the development of formal schooling,
from the mid-nineteenth century women began to train as pupil-teachers
and were certificated via this route, among others (Tropp, 1977, p.22).
By the 1880s and 90s elementary school teaching was becoming a popular
car'eer choice for girls of the artisan and lower middle classes, this
development being linked to contemporary developments in secondary
(70)
education for girls (see Widdowson, 1983).
Thus, in the nineteenth century, women teachers became eligible
for such limited pension provision as became available (see Ch.3).
The NUT campaigned, from its inception, for a national statutory pension
scheme and meanwhile established an associated provident fund, the
Teachers' Benevolent and Orphan Fund, which admitted non-union members.
(71)The provident fund included pension benefits (Tropp, 1977, p.125).
With the passing of the 1898 Superannuation Act, state elementary
schools offered secure, pensionable employment to a certified teacher.'2
In 1899, there were 37,832 women teachers in this category, of whom
nearly half were two-year college trained. The rest had obtained
their certificates by private study (ibid., p.117). However, no fewer
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than 15,012 female teachers who had qualified before 1st April 1899,
exercised their right to opt out of the new superannuation arrangements
(Barker, 1926, p.18). Thus, nearly half of the total number of women
certificated teachers were unwilling to take advantage of the new
pension scheme, whereas only 12% of certificated men chose to opt
out.
One possible disincentive was that participation meant retirement
at 65. Some women may have preferred the option of continuing to
work beyond 65 as an alternative to a modest pension, or may have
preferred to carry on contributing to a teachers' provident fund.
Or such women may have had reason to feel that, on a low salary, they
could not afford to contribute to the new scheme. On the other hand,
young teachers may have decided to take the chance that they would
marry.
It must also be noted that there were large numbers of female
uncertiuicated teachers, analogous to the 'unestablished' women Civil
Servants, who were not allowed to belong to the new superannuation
scheme. Statistics of 1899 show 25,500 female 'uncertificated' or
'provisionally certificated' teachers (4,750 men were in the same
category), 16,717 women in a special 'ghetto' class of 'additional
wonen teachers', and 24,702 female pupil teachers (6,081 boys) (Tropp,
1977, pp.117-il8). Furthermore, it was much harder for women than
for men to achieve 'certificated' status. Tropp notes a severe shortage
of training college places for women at the turn of the century.
In 1899, 7,572 out of 8,216 women successfully passed the Queen's
Scholarship examination which qualified them for entry to a training
college, but only 1,714 (23%) were admitted. By contrast, 2,556 out
of 2,904 men passed the examination, of whom 1,008 (39%) gained college
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entrance. Uncertificated teachers could study for certificate examinations
while teaching, but this was considered a much tougher route to qualification.
Nonetheless in 1899, 51% of women certificated teachers, as opposed
to 28% of men, are shown to have qualified by private study, rather
than by attendance at a training college (ibid.).
Thus, despite the introduction of a national superannuation scheme
for elementary school teachers in 1898, a much smaller proportion
of female than male elementary school teachers (qualified before 1st
April 1899) participated, for whatever reason. Also, while new entrants
to the profession from 1899 on had to be members of the scheme if
certificated, it was harder for women to gain the certificate. So,
even in elementary school teaching, the women's career 'par excellence'
before the first World War, access to an occupational pension scheme
was a hard-won privilege. However, in the years before the war, some
local authorities did make uncertificated teachers eligible for their
pension schemes, which were 'far more generous' than the 1898 Act
and these same authorities allowed certificated teachers to 'top up'
their government superannuation by additional membership of the local
authority scheme (Barker, 1926, p.24). National salary scales did
not apply at that time.
At the outbreak of the Great War, discussions were taking place
on the inclusion of secondary school and college teachers in a super-
annuation scheme. Holcombe notes that 'by 1912 only 126 grant-earning
secondary schools - 39 council schools under the larger and wealthier
local authorities, 25 Girls' Public Day School Company and 62 foundation
and other schools - had pension plans covering some 1,000 teachers
out of the 1,813 they employed.' Some schools granted 'grace-and-
favour' pensions to retiring teachers, especially head-teachers (Holcombe,
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1973, p.54). Under the Teachers' Superannuation Act of 1918, all
teachers in grant-aided schools, elementary and secondary, and 70,000
uncertificated (mainly female) teachers were admitted to a new non-
contributory pension scheme which guaranteed a pension at half-salary
after 40 years, plus a lump sum paid at the rate of one-thirtieth
annual salary for each year of service. The non-contributory scheme
was soon replaced, for economy's sake, in 1925, by a contributory
scheme, which was still in force by 1939 (Gosden, 1972, pp.139-142).
An interesting point with regard to the position of women teachers
under the new legislation was that after 30 years' 'qualifying' service
a pension could be taken at 60, though the 'normal' age of retirement
for all teachers remained at 65. However, a married woman from that
time was allowed to count as qualifying service 'any period not exceeding
ten years during which in the course of her married life she was absent
from all kinds of teaching service.' (Barker, 1926, p.24)
	
Since
most local authorities operated a 'marriage-bar' from the early years
of the twentieth century, this concession was presumably included
to benefit widows in the aftermath of the first World War. They were
in point of fact allowed to count in ten years of married life before
entering teaching (ibid.). This is a seemingly unique example of
an occupational scheme which attempted to compensate for a break in
service caused by 'domestic duties'. Such few married women who managed
to escape the 'marriage-bar' during the inter-war period would have
benefitted from this concesssion, perhaps to the envy of such of their
unmarried teacher sisters who 'broke service' in order to care for
aged parents and other relatives.
Up to 1939, the 'marriage-bar' played a crucial role in denying
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women teachers access to occupational pension benefits in retirement.
Prior to the first World War there had been no generalised 'bar' since
the governing bodies of individual elementary schools had decided
whether or not to appoint or retain the services of married women
staff. By the 1900s, however, the new local education authorities
began to impose a general 'marriage-bar' which was applied to new
recruits (Widdowson, 1983, pp.65-66). In London (1908), 39% of elementary
school headmistresses and 24% of assistant teachers were married. (73)
Complex motives underlay the trend towards barring married women,
based mainly on rationales of cost-cutting and opening up job and
promotion prospects for trained college leavers. It was also argued
by teachers' unions (including women's) and local education authorities
that it was unfair for married women to earn a good salary when 'young,
single women and men, trained at rate-payers' expense, were unable
to find jobs on leaving college' (ibid., p.66). Other arguments justified
the bar on the grounds that it was Civil Service practice. Also,
despite the presence in the teaching profession of women who had successfully
combined a paid job with the domestic duties of merriage, and, even,
motherhood, much was made of the 'fact' that married women could not
cope with both teaching and the domestic duties of the marital home
(ibid.). Thus, with the spread of the marriage bar, the position
of women teachers in terms of access to occupational pension benefits
via paid employment was subjected to detriment within a few years
of the passing of the Superannuation Act of 1898.
During World War I, the bar was lifted, but re-imposed on a near-
universal basis in the 1920s though the Board of Education disclaimed
responsibility or even denied all knowledge of such restrictions
(Partington, 1976, p.28). In the 1920s married women were hired to
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do 'supply-teaching' - an educational equivalent to non-established
work in the Civil Service, employing cheap labour which carried no
rights to fringe benefits such as pensions. Widdowson, interviewing
elderly ex-elementary school teachers, found some whose inclination
to marry during this period had been affected by the existence of
a marriage bar which forced a choice between financially secure
'spinsterhood' or the 'risks' of marriage at a time of economic recession
and high unemployment (Widdowson, 1983, pp.65-66).
Partington (1976) has documented the insecure position of married
women teachers after the first World War. The Chairman of the Nottingham
City Education Authority barred married women teachers from 1921 on
the grounds that better salaries were attracting married women back
into posts which 'should be given to those teachers who were compelled
to earn their living' (p.29), while Lincoln, in 1922, graciously thanked
37 married women teachers for their services and dismissed them on
the grounds that 'in most cases their husbands were earning good money'
(ibid.). Married women were seen as marginal labour: Cannock dismissed
its married women in the summer of 1922, but called them back for
the autumn term when there proved to be staff shortages.
A number of authorities dismissed all 'married' women except
widows and those with 'dependent' husbands. One secondary headmistress
survived the marriage bar, only to be dismissed on impending motherhood.
Another head was 'barred' despite a huge parental protest and a pupil
strike (ibid., p.29). That some authorities were aware of the connection
between the 'marriage-bar' and loss of occupational pension rights
is evident from the fact that married women were sometimes sorted
out into 'priority' categories for retention in service, including,
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in the case of Leicestershire, a category of 'Women shortly completing
their qualifications for superannuation' (ibid., p.31). In Wales,
where the bar was applied stringently unless (unusually) there were
no other suitable candidates, legal action was taken against the Rhondda
U.D.C. in the case of a married woman nearing retirement age who had
been dismissed. In an important legal decision (1923), the rights
of a local authority to dismiss competent women teachers solely on
the grounds that they were married were upheld. The judge publicly
sympathised with the teachers concerned because 'a comparatively short
period to serve was required before being entitled to their superannuation
allowance.' (Ibid.)
Other cases, backed by teachers' unions, were lost. An appeal
was successfully made against the 1925 decision of a judge who had
found in favour of a dismissed married woman teacher on the grounds
that the original judgement had been incorrect in ruling that the
dismissal had not been made on educational grounds. It was held that
the dismissal had been made 'in the educational interest' since the
grounds had related to the relative efficiency of single and married
women teachers and the future supply of teachers (ibid.). Public
opinion was reflected in statements from a member of an education
committee: 'There are few women who could do two full-time jobs at
one time' and from a clergyman: 'woman's first duty is to her husband
and children if they are ill and she could only carry out her duties
as a teacher by neglecting them.' (Ibid.)
Some local authorities were prepared to review cases on 'merit'.
Highly personal details relating to women teachers began to appear
on local authority education minutes, revealing, for instance, that
'married' women teachers were in fact separated from their husbands.
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Means tests were applied (ibid., p.32). Married women teaching in
voluntary schools had more success in retaining their jobs (ibid.,
p.30), perhaps because they were personally known to the school managers.
Private members' bills were introduced in Parliament in the late twenties
and thirties in a vain attempt to outlaw the marriage bar in teaching
and other occupations.
The turning point came in 1935 when the Labour-controlled London
County Council rescinded the marriage bar for teachers and doctors,
with a statement that it was the view of the Labour party that it
was 'in the public interests that a proportion of teachers should
be married' (ibid., p•34)•(74) Some authorities removed the marriage
bar after 1935, but tended to continue to place some restrictions
on married women. Partington (1976, p.47) argues that the application
of the marriage bar depended on two related factors - the political
complexion of the local education authority and the availability of
teachers. Lewis (1983, p.24) argues that 'there is strong evidence
to suggest that it was the ideology of domesticity which legitimised
the policy'.
School teaching was, demonstrably, the major professional career
for women up to the second World War. By 1938 there were over 130,000
women teachers in maintained schools, representing two-thirds of the
total: in elementary schools 71% of the staff were women (RCEP, 1946,
S78, p.23). For men and single women teachers,	 occupational pension
benefits improved during the inter-war period. While pre World War
I pensions based on the 1898 scheme had averaged £92 for certificated
men and £68 for women, by 1938 their real value had increased to an
average £183 (plus £549 lump sum) for men, and £144 (plus £432 lump
sum) for women. Furthermore, many teachers lived to enjoy their pensions
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for a long time, women typically retiring at 61 with a life expectancy
of 17 years and men at 62 with a life expectancy of 14 years (Partington,
1976, p.48). Employee pension contributions were returnable to women
leaving i marriage, constituting an informal 'marriage gratuity' (76)
However, although pay and pensions had improved by 1939, for
women teachers it was still 'unequal' pay, with limited prospects
of promotion. As more junior schools became mixed, infants were added
to juniors in jointly run schools, village schools were closed and
the National Association of Schoolmasters campaigned to protect the
interests of male teachers. Fewer women achieved the better pay which
went with a headship (ibid., p.36). Sporadic 'equal pay' campaigns
by mixed and women's teachers' unions made no headway between the wars:
indeed, at a time of recession and high unemployment, resentment was
expressed at the 'high' level of women teachers' salaries, not least
by the National Association of Schoolmasters, ever hostile to women
in the profession (ibid., p.49).
From 1893 there was a small group of women university teachers.
Reridel (1980, pp.146-148) identified 161 such women in British univer-
sities outside Oxford and Cambridge in 1912/13, 388 in 1921/22 and 484
in 193O/3l.	 Women represented 5% of the total before World War
I and 10% thereafter, being best represented at the University of London
(which had women's colleges), the University of Wales, and, especially,
the external university colleges of the University of London. At
these non-prestigious institutions, women comprised 53 out of a total
288 staff by 1930/31.
The universities had set up a Federated Superannuation Scheme
shortly before the First World War into which both university teachers
and their employers were required to pay 5% of salary for the purchase
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of private insurance so as to secure an annuity and/or lump sum at
60 (Barker, 1926, p.28). Rendel (1980, p.144) quotes strictures by
the University Grants Committee in 1923/24 on the need for universities
to secure 'adequate status as well as emoluments for women teachers.'
Rendel identified married women in university teaching before and
after the first World War and concludes that there was no general
marriage bar, though one may have operated in individual universities
(ibid., p.145). Women seem to have been over-represented in institutions
which were small, new or in relatively small and out-of-the way places.
University teachers were thought to be low paid, though members of
an elite profession (ibid., pp.145-146). Here then was another pensionable
form of teaching. However, while female lecturers paid the same percentage
of salary towards their male colleagues, their eventual annuities
were lower than for comparable men retiring at the same age, in consideration
of a presumed higher life expectancy in retirement.
Nursing (78)
Nursing is another 'traditional' female occupation which, with
the growth of formal hospital training in the second half of the 19th
century, opened up as an occupational choice for women. 'In providing
a suitable occupation for the daughters of the higher social classes'
which was, in reality, an approved extension of the unpaid work of
the home, it offered a 'vocation' to the prototype unmarried daughter
who might otherwise have undertaken 'good works' in a prosperous Victorian
family (Abel-Smith, 1975, p.17). From this poo1 came the 'career
nurses' of the 1870s and 80s who became the matrons and nurse educators
of the next generation.
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However, the early probationers at the London teaching hospitals
were a more socially heterogenous group than myth sometimes has it,
for nursing also drew its pioneer entrants to training from that
same pool of lower-middle and artisan class girls who were increasingly
attracted by clerical work and teaching. Indeed, since trainee nurses
were required to be in their early twenties, some entrants came from
those very occupations, including untrained teachers now facing competition
from newly trained teachers (Maggs, 1983, p.69). A large group of
entrants to the less prestigious hospitals in the closing decades
of the 19th century and before World War I came from domestic service
(ibid., p.71) and a range of hospitals took young women for training
who had had some paid nursing experience, often in private homes (ibid.,
p.73).
Abel-Smith (1975) has documented the emergence of general nursing
as a 'female' profession, characterised by low pay and the social
divisions which existed between voluntary/teaching hospitals (with
London teaching hospitals at the apex) and poor law (subsequently
municipal) hospitals. In whatever setting, hospital nursing was exceedingly
hard work with long hours and, typically, poor living conditions,
especially before the first World War (see Holcombe, 1973, pp.68-402).
As nurse training became institutionalised, so, in another sense,
did the hospital nurses. Residence during and after training became
compulsory. It was general nurse training as developed in the London
Hospital which came to have great influence on the provision of general
nursing services.
Abel-Smith (1975, p.29) notes that nursing became a 'suitable
and respectable career for women' and that matrons wielded 'absolute
power' over the nurses 're-inforced by the para-military organisation
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of the nursing staff and the rigid discipline imposed by the training
schools'. In one sense nursing was a low-paid 'vocation', offering
pay in kind as well as cash and conferring womanly skills of value
in the domestic setting. But it also offered opportunities of better
paid jobs to those nurses who achieved senior positions, especially
those whose voluntary hospital training enabled them increasingly,
by the 20th century, to obtain 'top jobs' in the public hospital sector.
The early nurses had to rely on the generosity of their employing
hospital for an occupational pension. A pension not exceeding twelve
shillings a week was awarded to nurses retiring after at least twenty
years' service by a decision of the governors of the London Hospital
in 1863 (Dainton, 1961, p.120). It was not until 1887 that the Royal
National Pension Fund for Nurses was set up so as to enable nurses
to buy private insurance for an annuity in retirement (Maggs, 1983,
p.131). The advantage of membership of this fund was that it enabled
the nurse to generate a 'portable pension' which would survive job
transfer between hospitals or into private nursing. However, it was
expensive and produced only a modest pension: the take-up appears
to have been limited (Business History Unit, 1983; Maggs, ibid.).79
Maggs (p.130) states that voluntary hospital nurses envied their
colleagues in the poor law hospitals for the pensions which became
available as a result of the Poor Law Superannuation Act (Revised)
1897.80) Until then, 'long-serving nurses often found themselves
ill-equipped to face retirement' • After the Act, those who opted
for membership could get a reasonable pension. In 1910, a Ward Sister
with at least ten years nursing service could get a pension of £65
p.a. based on a notional salary of £100 p.a. The top teaching hospitals
could offer quite elaborate schemes: in 1908, St. Bartholomews Hospital
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had a scheme which offered two-thirds annual salary for a minimum
of 36 years' service, at the age of 60, the pension being abated if
the nurse retired at 55, the earliest age allowed.
It seems that nurses retired early from hospital work (Holcombe,
1973, Ch.IV). Some transferred to 'private' nursing. The London
hospitals made money from hiring out trained nurses to private house-
holds (Abel-Smith, 1975, p.58). There were also nursing agencies which
provided home nurses. Abel-Smith gives figures which show that over
half the 69,200 'nurses' in England and Wales during 1901 were engaged
in home nursing, some being 'district nurses' for the poor (ibid.,
p.52).
There were over 10,000 nurses working in mental hospitals, the
women receiving wages comparable to those of domestic servants
(Carpenter, 1980, p.132). In this low-status sector there were male
nurses. The Lunacy Act 1890 allowed asylums to set up schemes for non-
contributory staff pensions, but this was at the discretion of the
employing authorities. A contemporary commentator on 'asylum service'
in 1900 lamented the lack of pensions which had raised the status of
other public sector occupations, such as the prison service. From
1909 the Asylum Officers' Superannuation Act brought in a com-
pulsory and contributory pension scheme - a controversial move, since
it effectively cut wages (Carpenter, 1980, p.134).
From the 1880s military nursing services were developed, and
following the Boer war, improved pensions (available as of right after
ten years' service and, at discretion, on less service) with retirement
at 55 (optional at 50) plus other benefits, made military nursing
a popular career choice for well-trained nurses (see Holcombe, 1973,
Ch.IV). Military nurses had always been given officer status. A
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very large number of young women became untrained nurses during the
first World War (see Macdonald, 1984) and the existence of this group
of women after the war hastened the culmination of a long drawn-out
campaign for national registration of nurses. From 1919, when certain
untrained but experienced nurses were 'blanketed in', nursing became
a profession for which its members had to be 'registered' as trained
and competent to practise (see Abel-Smith, 1975, Chs.V and VI).
Nursing also became a profession for single women, a direction
in which it had been moving steadily since the 19th century. By 1921,
84% of nurses were single and by 1931, 88% (ibid., p.118). Nursing
increasingly became a 'living-in' job in which there was 'unspoken
prejudice against married women' and a 'calling' which demanded the
nurse's full-time devotion (ibid., pp.118-119). Maggs (1983, p.135)
refers to the emergence of nurses up to 1914 as a 'third sex' and
states that a 'marriage bar e had operated in hospital nursing from
the time of Florence Nightingale on the grounds that 'married women
are no longer attached to (their) work but to (their) husbands'.
Despite the chronic shortage of nurses between the wars, the marriage
bar appears to have been universally practised by hospitals and local
authorities.
Outside the public sector, there was no universal system of compulsory
pension provision before the second World War. By 1916, most voluntary
hospitals were operating a pension scheme through the Royal National
Pension Fund, Maggs (1983, p.131), who interviewed elderly nurses
trained before the first World War, gives his impression that few
nurses seem to have taken advantage of the provision. Many nurses
went on working because of inadequate pension arrangements, often
due to broken service. Nurses trained in voluntary hospitals switched
-77-
into the public sector for promotion and out again. By the 1930s,
far more medical treatment was taking place in the hospital setting
than at home and there was an increase in proprietary nursing homes.
For the life-long hospital nurse, retirement income problems would
have been compounded by the fact that hospital nursing was a resident
job. Thus, older or elderly nurses with inadequate incomes sought
'easy' jobs in other institutions or quasi-domestic service posts
as 'nurse-companions', so as to eke out their pensions.(8)
Nurses' pay was low up to the outbreak of the second World War.
This was a 'female' profession. By the l920s, pay in public hospitals
was marginally better than in their voluntary equivalents. The Royal
College of Nursing was, by 1930, pressing not only for better salaries
but for universal compulsory superannuation. In 1932 it was found
that in England and Wales 81% of London voluntary hospitals and 68%
of municipal hospitals had such arrangements (Abel-Smith, 1975, p.137).
By 1937, 63% of all voluntary hospitals and 84% of all municipal hospitals
had compulsory superannuation schemes (ibid., Table 10, p.277). Evidence
(82)given to the Le Quesne Committee in 1938 	 showed that while larger
hospitals, which could afford to do so, subscribed to the Federated
Superannuation Scheme for Nurses and Hospital Officers, there was
still no universal superannuation provision. Retirement was usual
at 55. A large number of the employers (1,602) listed as having private
pension schemes in 1936 were 'Hospitals, Nursing Associations, etc:
of which 20,000 people, including nurses, were in membership (Ministry
of Labour, 1938, p.172).
By 1939, nursing had come to provide training and employment
for large numbers of women drawn from a range of social backgrounds. 83)
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Training as a hospital nurse offered a basic 'womanly' qualification
promising a secure if low-paid career in the hospital sector to those
who kept their health or providing a springboard to other ventures.
Unlike work as an established civil servant or teaching in the maintained
sector, nursing offered no compulsory pension scheme and was better
regarded by some for its potential marriage prospects than for its
(84)pensions.
Local government
Women made a comparatively late entry to local government service.
Before World War I a few women 'officers' had been appointed (mainly
as sanitary inspectors) and there were midwives and health visitors.
However, 'they had made no incursion into administrative and little
into clerical jobs' (Spoor, 1967, p.465). 8	NALGO complained bitterly
when large numbers of female clerks and typists (paid at 60% of the
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male rate) were appointed (ibid., p.27)
	
during the first World
War. Women officers represented 16% of union membership in 1921.
About half were clerks and typists, a third were nursing personnel
and the rest were library assistants, sanitary inspectors and doctors.
There was no national pension scheme for local government officers
until 1937 though about one-third of all officers were in schemes
after the 1922 legislation. Local government administration offered
surprisingly limited opportunities to women before the second World
War, 'the vast mass of women workers - filled the lowest paid posts
and also those posts with little or rio authority. The majority of
authorities appear to have regarded women as more or less temporary
employees' (RCEP, 1946, Appendix III, evident on local government
employment, p.188). The London County Council was an exceptional
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employer in the opportunities it offered to women (ibid.). Thus,
a woman local government officer in pensionable employment up to 1939
was fairly uncommon. And she had better be single. As a sponsor
of a heavily acclaimed motion pointed out at the 1936 NALGO conference
- if a married woman wanted to work outside her home there were a
great many voluntary organisations where she could do just this, and
not ccmpete for salaried jobs with men (Spoor, 1967, p.467).
Private sector pensions8
By the end of the nineteenth century, access to an employer's
pension scheme was becoming recognised as the hallmark of a 'good'
male white-collar job (Russell, 1982, p.179), typically, a 'clerical'
or 'office' job. During the last three decades of the nineteenth
century there was a tremendous expansion in this type of work which
offered, at its apex, posts with City insurance firms, banks, legal
firms or prestigious railway companies such as the G.W.R. Anderson,
in his study of the social economy of late Victorian clerks makes
clear that there was considerable competition for such jobs: indeed,
the most elite clerkships, such as those in banking, were never advertised
(Anderson, 1977, pp.114-li5).
Clerical work opened up white-collar office jobs to women as
well as men from the 1870s (Holconibe, 1973; Silverstone, 1976).(88)
Whereas in the 1851 Census only 15 female commercial clerks were enumerated
and 274 in 1861 (Silverstone, 1976, p.101), by 1901 there were 55,784
females employed as 'commercial and business clerks', which number
had more than doubled by 1911 (ibid., p.107) to 117,057 (Holcombe,
1973, Table 4c, p.211). However, even by 1911, comparatively few
women had got a foothold in the prestigious areas of banking, insurance
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and railway employment, where able clerks could hope to be promoted
to management and where occupational pensions were well established.
There were 476 women bank clerks to 39,903 male clerks, 4,031 women
insurance clerks to 41,866 men, and 1,120 women railway clerks to
84,802 men. Of law clerks, a mere 2,159 were female as against 34,106
men. The vast majority of women clerks were in the 'commercial or
business' category, with 117,057 women as against 360,478 men (ibid.).
Anderson (1977, pp.113-116) shows that while, from the 1870s,
'clerking' was the white-collar job 'par excellence' for men, there
was a very wide gap between the 'top jobs' in banking, insurance and
prestigious commercial firms and those of lower status. While clerical
work expanded as an occupation, competition for jobs became keener
and by the end of the century male clerks were increasingly becoming
marginalised due to economic depression, technological and institutional
changes and more limited prospects of promotion or opportunities to
become entrepreneurial.
The new women clerks experienced similar variations in job status.
Holcombe (1973, p.150) observes that although by the turn of the century
a 'female clerk' was sometimes well-educated and well-paid by the
standards of the day, many were ill-qualified and/or badly paid.
Male clerks had traditionally considered themselves to be badly paid
and resented the possibility of being 'undercut' by women. When women
clerks first appeared with shorthand skills, male clerks sought to
acquire those skills, but when these 'women's jobs' were seen to be
(89)leading nowhere, men ceased to seek them (Anderson, 1977, p.127).
Indeed, there appears to have been considerable occupational segregation
based on gender (Maggs, 1983, p.49). The prototype shorthand/typist
was a young woman.
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Maggs comments that clerical and commercial office work offered
women employment which was relatively easy and light, respectable
and genteel (ibid., p.53). Middle-class men employed other middle-
class men's daughters in white collar jobs (ibid., p.51). There seems
no doubt that female office workers proved to be, in general, highly
acceptable employees, valued on familiar grounds - competence, cheapness,
docility, disinclination towards unionisation ard lack of ambition.
Futhermore, 'Within the business and commercial sector, the marriage
bar - was an informal but extensive practice.' This practice further
depressed the pay and status of women workers, who were considered
easy to replace and were, by reason of their short 'shelf-life', given
little training and few opportunities for advancement (Maggs, 1983,
pp.50-51; Holcombe, 1973, pp.148-152)
It seems fair to conclude that few of the women employed in clerical
work in the private sector before World War I were likely to have
been members of formal occupational pension schemes, despite this
being an occupational sector where employers' pensions were well established.
Not only were women under-represented in the more elite clerical occupations,
but they tended to be segregated into specifically female types of
clerical work. As previously shown, the attraction of female clerical
labour in the Civil Service lay in its cheapness and vulnerability
to strategies designed to ensure a rapid turn-over of female staff
of 'marriageable age'. Maggs (1983, p.51) argues that for 'career
women', office work before the first World War did offer a degree
of job security with the possibility of long service bringing access
to a supervisory post. Certainly, it was within the power of employers
to offer an ex-gratia pension to a long-serving female employee and
on available evidence it may be concluded that such pensions were
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given, on an unknown scale. It seems likely that employers found
'ex-gratia' pensions a preferred alternative to including women in a
formal occupational scheme, since informal provision could be tailored
to individual circumstances.
Before the first World War a minority of 'progressive' industrial
firms made pension arranments for women, including manual workers.
Such provision was characteristic of the mcre 'paternalist' concerns.
Rowntrees had a pension scheme to which the employer added up to 60
shillings for every 20 shillings paid by a woman empioyee.(91) In
1911, the Bourneville 'Women's Savings and Pension Fund' was set up,
as an option: contributions could be withdrawn by women on marriage
(Russell, 1982, pp.172 and 173). Russell (p.168) documents Courtaulds
as in 1913 discontinuing a pension of 2/6d per week to a woman employee
when the firm discovered that she was already getting the state old
age pension. In this case the occupational pension appears to have
sprung a 'poverty trap': this may well have discouraged firms from
awarding pensions to low paid women manual workers.
After the first World War, as discussed in Chapter 1, there was
a considerable growth of occupational pension prcvision. While the
extent of this is not documented, it is known that by 1936, an estimated
1,617,000 private sector employees were covered by such schemes, including
335,056 women, or 20% of the total. 6,544 employers were shown to
have voluntarily adopted schemes when the first government-sponsored
survey results were published (Ministry of Labour, 1938, p.172).
The survey covered private sector pensions only, dividing the membership
into two groups - 'Administrative, clerical, sales, etc. staff' (i.e.
white-collar workers), and manual workers.
96% of all employees (96% of men and 94% of women) were members
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of schemes run by a minority of employers (2,580) who operated their
own pension provision themselves, either directly or through insurance
companies. This arrangement was typical for the 'large' employers
and others. A majority of employers (4,144) were responsible for
the remaining 4% of employees participating in 37 pension schemes
which were 'group' schemes, such as F.S.S.U. and the nurses' federated
scheme.
Nearly 5,000 employers limited their provision to white-collar
workers, while 1,600 had schemes which covered manual workers. Since
the latter were, numerically, the larger group in the case of both
male and female members, it can be concluded that it was the large
firms who catered for manual workers, including women, as suggested
by Jones (1983). However (see below) some female clerical workers
were probably enumerated under the 'manual' category (ibid.).
Large numbers of women had taken up clerical work in the first
World War (Braybon, 1981, pp.45, 64 and 216). The 1921 Census recorded
420,379 women as clerks and typists in the private sector: in the
1931 Census 565,055 women clerks and typists in both public and private
sectors were enumerated. 2 The 1936 survey gives no details on
occupation by gender, but it may be concluded from the figures on
broad occupational classification that a considerable proportion of
persons in schemes were clerical workers: in the 'administrative'
category, 25% were employees in banking, insurance and finance. The
proportion in 'sales' from this category would appear to have been
smaller.
Owen (1935, p.84) found that pension schemes for salaried or
waged workers were frequently gender specific, with women typically
being assigned to separate pension or 'savings' schemes:
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'The chief difficulties are that the majority of
of women have no need for retirement pensions, while
those who do not marry usually retire earlier and
live longer than male employees. Where women are
included in pension arrangements it is usual for
them to receive a lump sum on their marriage,
corresponding to their contributions, accrued
interest, and, in some cases, the firm's con-
tributions as well.'
In his details of 'typical' schemes, Owen cites Rowntrees which paid
pensions to women at 55, with optional retirement on a lower pension
from 50-55 (provided that they had not improperly disclosed the secret
recipes) while Oxo placed its female clerical workers in the same
pension schemes as 'operatives', calling it the 'Manual Workers' and
Female Clerical Workers' Scheme' (ibid., pp.89-91). Women's retirement
age was 55 and men's 65. The maximum pension for a woman was 17/6d
per week and 22/6d per week for a man. The Manchester Electric Power
Company had one pension scheme, inaugurated in 1930, which permitted
women staff who left to be married to be given 'a return of all their
contributions to which the company will add 5% compound interest by
way of marriage dowry' (ibid., p.94). The 1936 survey showed that
while the minimum age from entry to occupational pension scheme member-
ship was, typically, 18-21, 'Occasionally a higher age is fixed for
female employees' (Ministry of Labour, 1938, p.172).
Schemes usually specified a 'normal' (i.e. permitted) retirement
age for members. Women were commonly allowed to retire at a much















Normal retirement ages: private occupational pension schemes 1936: G B.
	
Admin., clerical, 	 Manual
All classes
	
sales, etc, staffs	 wage earners
Men	 Women	 Men	 Women




55 or under	 0.4	 37.2	 0.3
55-60	 2.9	 2.4	 0.3
60	 19.6	 18.5	 7.9
60-65	 23.3	 8.2	 5.5
65	 52.4	 33.2	 83.2
Over 65
	 1.4	 0.5	 2.8
.7
Source:	 Ministry of Employment (1938), Table, p.174.
Thus 37% of the staff women were permitted to retire at the age
of 55 or under, but only 14% of the 'manual' women. About 40% of






































































Source: Ministry of Employment (1938), Table, p.174.
57% of all women 'staff' individual scheme members were subject
to a compulsory age of retirement, and 40% of this number were required
to retire at 55 or below. Only 10% of manual women were required
to retire at 55: none below. 65 was the most common compulsory retirement
age for women. Manual women were much less likely to be in membership
of occupational pension schemes. Over 4Y2 million women were categorised
as 'operatives' in the 1931 Census, whereas only 169,867 female manual
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workers were recorded as members of schemes in the 1936 survey. 57%
of these female manual workers were in schemes which required no employee
contributions, as ccnipared with 35% of the 'administrative' group
(ibid., p.173). Membership of occupational pension schemes tended
to be optional for those employees in post when the scheme started,
but compulsory for new entrants though 'In a few schemes membership
is compulsory for some classes of employees, but not for others,'
(ibid., p.174). Such an arrangement would permit optional membership
for women.
One justification for not setting up private occupational pension
schemes, especially for lower paid employers, or for excluding categories
of lower paid employees (including women) from such schemes, related
to the existence of' the state contributory pension scheme provided
under the Widows', Orphans and Old Age Contributory Pensions Act 1925.
Persons in public sector and railway employment were excepted from
this scheme: otherwise all employees (including married women), excepting
those with incomes above the earnings limit of £250 p.a. by 1937,
were included (see Wilson and Mackay, 1941, Ch.X, esp. Appendix A).
The great majority of women in 'insurable' employment would have been
earning less than the 'ceiling' designed to exclude well-paid men
and thereby required to contribute towards a 10 shilling pension,
payable at
	
Some women might in fact have been contributing
to both state and occupational pension schemes if they were below
the £5 per week limit and in employment providing a compulsory or
optional pension scheme. However, as has been seen, it was an 'elite'
of women who were in occupational pension schemes.
In 1935 the National Spinsters Pensions Association was founded
with a main aim of obtaining contributory pensions for unmarried women
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at the age of 55•94) The activities of this association were given
a fillip by legislation in 1937 which increased the categories of
persons under the age of 55 who might become voluntary contributors
to the state pension provision, but applied a far more restrictive
income limit at entry to women than to	 In 1938 a government
committee of enquiry was set up to examine the position of women under
the contributoryinsurance arrangements. (96)
The proceedings of the Le Quesne committee throw light on the
position of women in both private and public sector occupational pension
schemes in 1938.'	 Clearly such women constituted an 'elite' among
female workers. Their professional and trade union associations were
not favourable to the idea of contributory pensions at 55 (H.M. Treasury,
1938, pp.17 and 18). The Association of Women Clerks and Secretaries
believed 'that the proposal would be used for undercutting wages'
leading to competition between female workers over and under the age
of 55. This association also believed that a contributory pension
for unmarried women at the age of 55 'would lead to the dismissal
of women who reached that age' and that this would reinforce the 'tendency
at the present time to restrict women in offices to the more routine
type of work and to refuse them opportunities for promotion to administra-
tive posts'. 'It would have reactions also on the private pension
schemes at present operated by firms for many salaried workers'.
Retirement at 55 gave women a shorter period in which to qualify for
a lesser pension (ibid., pp.53-54).
As seen from the 1936 Ministry of Employment survey employers
did in fact commonly require women in private occupational pension
schemes to retire at 55(98) Women in public sector occupational schemes
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were fearful that their age of retirement would be lowered from the
then 60/65 range. In evidence, the Open Door Council stated that
the municipality of Salford was attempting to get a Bill through Parliament
which 'seeks to pension off its women employees at 55 instead of 65'.
(Ibid., p.92).	 -
However, the outbreak of World War II ensured that in due course
employers, as in the first World War, sought to retain and recruit
women workers, rather than dispense with them.
III A final perspective
Chapter I focussed on the development of occupational pension
provision in Britain up to 1939. This chapter has related that development
to the entry of women into white-collar employment and their access
to employers' pension provision.
By the outbreak of World War II, teaching and the Civil Service
(notably the Post Office) were the major public sector occupations
which had come to offer secure, pensionable employment prospects for
women as well as men. Neither were 'women's' careers, though elementary
school teaching became feminied during the period in question. By
1939, women in these occupations were declared to be receiving the
'same' pensions as 	 However, these 'same' pensions when ultimately
received, typically reflected the low pay(10(3) and/or lack of promotion
which characterised a female 'career' in public sector employment,
including male-dominated local government service and the largely
female public nursing sector. Furthermore, to qualify for 'the same'
pension a woman was required to remain single. If she did this, she
shared with her male colleagues one great advantage of public sector
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occupational pension provision - an employee remained in the appropriate
pension scheme on moving to a new job within the same service.
The private sector employee normally lost his or her pension
rights on moving to a new job, a particular hazard during a period
of high unemployment. Of Flolcombe's five major occupations for 'white
collar' women, nursing in the prestigious voluntary hospital sector
offered membership of a group scheme which permitted transfer between
jobs without loss of pension. Women in the retail trades appear to
have been badly provided for in respect of employers' pensions. It
was the female administrative, clerical or secretarial worker who
was likely to be at risk to loss of pension rights on a change of
job, though due to the 'marriage bar' this outcome was potentially
serious only if she remained single. 'Office work' for women was
also characterised by that low and/or unequal pay which made female
labour attractive to the cost-conscious employer. The 'best' jobs
tended to be closed to women, as were some pension schemes. The private
employer could and did put female employees into women's pension schemes
which commonly doubled as 'savings' or 'marriage gratuity' schemes
as an added incentive to female membership. Conversely an employer
could offer 'ex gratia' pensions to that small proportion of women
who became long-service employees. From 1925, the employer could
use the existence of the state contributory pension scheme to validate
the exclusion of female staff from private sector pension provision.
In order to qualify for an occupational pension which bore a
reasonable relationship to earnings, women needed (as did men) to
complete a lengthy period of service in paid employment. This became
particularly problematic at a time of high unemployment. In addition, single
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women who, typically, were designated as unpaid workers in the home,
were 'target' carers who, in middle age, could be expected to give
up paid work if necessary, to care for an elderly parent, or 'housekeep'
for a widowed brother.
	 Such a break in or cessation of employment
could prejudice occupational pension entitlement. The obligations
of kinship, even when they did not involve giving up paid work, could
adversely affect a woman's ability to save or insure: single women
were also 'targeted' to give financial help to elderly parents or
pay for the education of siblings.
Occupational pension provision was developed initially to serve
the interests of a state which wished its paid male servants to be
both incorrupt and efficient. Such provision was expanded by public
and private sectors in the interests of employers who wanted an 'efficient'
workforce to which 'good' employees could be attracted and retained
as a contented pool of' labour from which 'poor' (i.e. enfeebled/elderly)
employees could be discharged. The target for these practices was
the white collar male, perhaps trained on the job at the employer's
considerable investment of time and inoney.2)
Once women entered white collar occupations, the rationale for
occupational pension provision began to be turned on its head. Whereas
an employer's pension scheme was meant to produce a prototype male
employee who would be loyal to the same employer over a lengthy, uninter-
rupted working life, for women the same provision was subverted to
help produce a prototype employee who would leave after a relatively
short period of employment, helped on her way by a 'marriage gratuity'.
Women were valued for their 'substitutability'. Because they left
their low status, 'ghetto' jobs, and were indeed required to leave
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them on marriage, (which effectively removed them from the labour
market) women were an asset from the pension point of view. They
did not draw pensions, or certainly riot in full: their pensions cost
less. Furthermore, if they did,as white collar workers, stay single
and remain with the employer, an occupational pension could be a vehicle
for compulsory retirement from the workforce as early as ten years
or more ahead of the men - in the interests of efficiency!
Occupational pension provision as developed up to the second
World War served to reinforce a sexual division of labour (which required
married women not to engage in paid work) by introducing arrangements
whereby men who, typically predeceased their wives, were enabled to
'provide' for their widows. However, by the inter-war period, and
probably because of the first World War, such single 'white collar'
women as did stay in continuous employment were more likely, especially
by the mid-thirties, to have access to a formal occupational pension
scheme. They had access, and were treated, as 'honorary men'. Only
in the unusual case of teachers who had married was any concession
made to the considerable domestic responsibilities borne by most women.
With the coming of the 1939-45 war, the situation of women in
the labour force was once more up-ended by the demands of a war-time
economy. During this period, also, the foundations were laid for
a completely new system of statutory pension provision which was,
eventually, to underpin an expanding post-war occupational pension
sector. How such occupational provision has developed up to the present
time is the subject of the next chapter.
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Chapter 2: Appendix on 'surplus' women
The reasons for the increasing number of single women in Britain
in the second half of the nineteenth century are commonly attributed
to the greater survival rate among female babies and to male emigration.
The full explanation would appear to be more complicated (see Johansson
(1977), pp.163-81). Branca (1975, p.10) argues that urban middle
class women had a better chance of marrying than working class and
rural women. Holcombe (1973, pp.10-i2) maintains, conversely, that
the disproportion in the sex ratio was greater among the middle than
the working classes. She also notes 'contemporary alarm' at the growing
disinclination of middle class men to marry at all and at their tendency
to postpone marriage until late in life. As W.R. Greg commented in
1862,
'thousands of men find it perfectly feasible
to combine all the freedom, luxury and self-
indulgence of a bachelor's career with the
pleasures of female society and the enjoyments
they seek for these' (Commas, 1963, pp.233-34).
This theme of 'redundant' or 'surplus' women was current through-
out the second half of the nineteenth century (see Deacon and Hill,
1972). Kanrier (1977) lists various writings which discuss the 'surplus
of women' and 'the ramifications of having a large single female
population seeking gainful employment and financial independence'. By
the end of the nineteenth century a well organised movement had been
established to promote the education and training of girls (see Dyhouse,
1981) which, as a byproduct, enabled single women to become more finan-
cially independent. To the extent that this development was a response to
the 'problem' of surplus women, it was a double edged weapon, since
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academic and, especially, higher education for women was commonly
viewed as a contaminating and defeminising influence, likely to render
its recipients less marriageable (see Delamont, 1978; Gorham, 1982).
Emigration was a popular solution to the 'problem' (Hammerton, 1977).
It should be noted that W.R. Greg excluded all female domestic servants
from any taint of 'redundancy' on the grounds that:
'they do not follow an obligatory independent
and therefore for their sex an unnatural career
In a word, they fulfil both essentials of
a woman's being: THEY ARE SUPPORTED BY,THEY
MINISTER TO men.' (Hollis, 1979, p.12)' 	 /
Deacon and Hill (1972, p.100) pinpoint the 'enormous impetus to
the early growth of the social service and nursing professions
in the mid-nineteenth century' which was provided by the existence of
'surplus' women. Notions of such single women as 'redundant' and as
'failures' are in evidence throughout the entire period covering the
development of occupational pension provision to 1939. Young, single
'white collar' working women were a commonplace of the inter-war period,
defined (sometimes inaccurately) as 'transients' whose main goal was
marriage in a society reaching less demographic imbalance between young
men and women (Beauman, 1983, pp.82-83).
The 'older' single woman of the inter-war period was of a different
ilk to her Victorian or Edwardian predecessor, since her solitary state
could be conceptualised not in terms of personal failure to 'achieve'
marriage but as a legitimate sacrifice made in the cause of war.
There is no doubt that these women felt themselves to be 'special.
Much evidence for this is to be found in the Le Quesne Report
(H.M. Treasury, 1939) and in the various issues of The Spinster,
journal of the NSPA. It seems highly likely that the very active local
groups of 'insured' women members of the Association in the industrial
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working towns, particularly in the north, would have included some of
the fiancees and girlfriends of the men who were decimated in World War
I as members of the various 'pals' brigades (see Brown, 1980, pp.34-37).
These brigades were drawn from particular localities and included groups
of men who worked for the same employer, as well as in the same
occupation.
Although the Deputy Government Actuary argued to the Le Quesne
Committee that there were no more 'surplus' women after the first
World War than there had been at the turn of the century (H.M. Treasury,
1938, p.171), the 'spinsters' of the late l930s thought otherwise. It
seems probable that the plight of these unmarried women - some of whom
remained unmarried by the sheer chance of whether their fiances got leave
or not, made employers more conscious of single women's need for a
pension in old age. Likewise, the sympathetic employer might well
have been influenced in deciding to offer women membership of
occupational pension schemes (or an ex gratia pension) by virtue of
the fact that such women were seen to be single for 'good reason' and
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£31 lOs. A married couple could each receive a potential maximum
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Age Pension in the absence of an employer's ex gratia pension.
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1925 Act.
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37. For contemporary material on the position of women in the mid-
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50. Examination of Table 5, pp.39-62 of the Census of England and
Wales 1931, Classification of occupations (1934), London, HMSO,
showed 195 women 'lawyers', 119 'accountants' and 205 'engineers'.
51. Persons declared as 'out of work' were also included in occupational
categories, (ibid.).
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-101-
53. The Census (1931), Classification of Occupations (1934) (ibid.),
shows 409,781 young women 18-29 as of 'no gainful occupation'.
This represented a 'daughter at home' or of 'independent means'
though in some cases this may have been a euphemism for 'unemployed'.
54. Three quarters of a million men from the U.K. had been killed
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wounds or the effects of gas
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58. See Thane (1978d, pp.34-35) for comments on the exclusion of
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saved against sickness and old age. Women found it difficult
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59. See Roebuck and Slaughter (1979) for a discussion of the way
in which policy makers of the late 19th century defined financial
provision for old age as an issue about elderly men, despite
clear evidence on the extent of female poverty in old age. These
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poor'.
60. Mackay and Wilson (1941, p.104) show that over 41/2 million women
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(ibid., p.141).
61. For the history of women in the Civil Service see Martindale
(1939) and Holcombe (1973), Ch.VII. For the Post Office see
Clinton (1984). Maggs (1983, pp.49-51) cites Davin, A (1973),
'Telegraphists and clerks', Bulletin for the Society for the
Study of Labour History, No.26, Spring.
-102-
62. Some were products of an organised campaign to get women into
occupations other than teaching and domestic service (Martindale,
1939, pp.16-17).
63. It does appear that the young women were literate and numerate.
Since good secondary schools for girls were rare, this must have
been achieved by governesses, home teaching or self-education.
See ref.65 below.
64. Evidence from a senior Post Office official in a Report on the
Re-organization of the Telegraph System in the United Kingdom
1871; see Martindale (1939, p.18). In the event, women postal
workers developed a standing grievance with regard to their low
pay (Clinton, 1984, p.56).
65. Male civil servants strenuously resisted this move. The successful
applicants (at 14 shillings a week) were all 'gentlewomen of
limited means' such as the daughters of service officers, government
servants, and of professional and literary men. They had to
be nominated for their positions, pass a Civil Service qualifying
examination and serve six months' probation before becoming
'established', Holcombe (1973, p.166); Strachey (1978, pp.228-29);
Martindale (1939, C1i.1).
66. Royal Commission on the Civil Service 1912-15 (MacDonnell) and
the Select Committee on the Post Office (Holt), see Holcombe
(1973, p.184).
67. The number of women employed in central government departments
was not large by 1914. Martindale (1939, pp.65 and 71-72) states
that 3,000 women clerks were employed by the General Post Office
and 500 elsewhere - not all were established: the Public Trustee's
Office had 70 unestablished women clerks. There were 600 Civil
Service typists and about 200 senior women in the inspectorates
and other special posts. The vast majority of women civil servants
worked, nationwide, for the Post Office. See Martindale pp.75-96
for a perspective on women in the Civil Service during and immedi-
ately after World War I. See Clinton (1984, pp.191-196) for
detail on the Post Office.
68. Evidence submitted to the Royal Commission on Equal Pay 1944-46
(Appendix IV, S12O, p.46) shows that 8 women who had passed into
the administrative grade by competitive entry from 1925 were
retained in an unestablished capacity (5 of whom later resigned),
and that the 2 who were permitted to remain on the establishment
as married women were, incredibly, 'obliged to wait for 4 and
4Y years before the necessary permission to marry was given,
a condition of affairs which is calculated to discourage applications
for retention'.
69. For the history of women in teaching see Holcombe (1973) Ch.2,
Partington (1976), Widdowson (1983). Widdowson chronicles the
entry of women to teacher training colleges 1850-1914 and the
'feminisation' of elementary school teachers as a profession
in relation to female social mobility via education.
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70. The Girls' Public Day School Company was founded in 1872 and
was part of a wider growth of mainly middle-class girls' public
and private schools (Strachey 1978, pp.246-48). Large numbers
of Welsh girls began to enter teachers' training with the establish-
ment of the Welsh Intermediate Schools system in the early 1890's.
Some English school boards provided 'higher grade' schools and
the pupil teacher system enabled some girls to proceed to college
(Tropp 1977, p.22).
71. Tropp (pp.157-58) states that women teachers are said to have
played little part in this campaigning and to have been inactive
in trade unions until the 1900's. However, given the now acknowledged
'invisibility' of women in historical accounts it may be that
women's activities were not considered worth reporting. See
Lewis (1981).
72. Barker (1926, p.18) states that women were to contribute £2 per
year and on a notional salary of £76 p.a. would, if they taught
from 22-65, get about £40 p.a. in pension. Widdowson (1983,
p.67) documents that mothers of teacher daughters appreciated
the security of tenure and prospective pension offered by elementary
school teaching as a career.
73. Figures derived from London County Council records (Widdowson,
1983, ref.45, p.83). Holcombe (1973, p.40) states that some
authorities dismissed teachers on knowledge of an intention to
marry.
74. This argument derived from views which popularly defined single
women as persons who lived in an 'un-natural' state. Not only
did they lack husbands, but, by definition, children, since sexual
activity by women outside marriage, and, especially, motherhood
outside marriage, carried severe social sanctions including dismissal
from paid employment. Partington (1976, p.33) comments on extra-
marital cohabitation in London as a source of anxiety lest it
be discovered and as being in the provinces, 'an even more perilous
undertaking'.
75. No reference has been found to the position of women teachers
who were divorced. Since divorce conferred a 'stigmatised' status,
such women may have presented themselves as or have been treated
as widows. Other women whose marriages had broken down did not
necessarily divorce, even if they were the 'innocent' party (see
Ch.9) but on investigation might have been placed in the 'separated'
category.
76. The writer's mother, a teacher 'sacked' on marriage in 1931 after
seventeen years' service, withdrew her contributions and was
pleasantly surprised at 60 to receive a miniscule 'teachers annuity'
derived from notional employers' contributions to the non-existent
teachers' pension fund. This pension was worth a few pounds
initially: the final payment in 1977 was worth £46 p.a., thanks
to inflation.
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77. Rendel (1980) drew her statistics from study of the appropriate
Commonwealth Universities' Yearbooks. No women held university
posts at Oxford and Cambridge until after World War I: there
were two women in such posts by 1921/22 and 30 by 1930/31. The
U.S.S. supplied details on F.S.S.U. by personal communication.
78. For accounts of the history of nursing see Abel-Smith (1975),
Davies, ed. (1980), Holcombe (1973, Ch.IV), Maggs (1983) and
White (1978).
79. It can reasonably be assumed that a proportion of the middle
and upper-class nurses had private incomes, allowances from their
families and/or inherited money during this period, which may
have set an unfortunate precedent.
80. Holcombe (1973, Ch.IV) states that the scheme was originally
compulsory and that most nurses contracted out when an amendment
allowed them to do so after only one year of the scheme's existence.
On low pay, this facility must have been tempting. Holcombe
comments that nursing was a mobile profession, few nurses expected
to stay in the service and the pensionable age of 60 was considered
far too high.
81. Evidence of this can be found in old volumes of The Lady.
82. H.M. Treasury (1939), Minutes of Evidence, Le Quesne Committee:
witness Ivy Littlewood, hospital sister, p.45.
83. Abel-Smith (1975, p.159) states that in the 1930's, three quarters
of entrants to voluntary hospitals and 29% to municipal hospitals
had secondary education. In 1931, there were around 122,000
single women classified in the Census as nurses (ibid., p.294).
Much concern was expressed about 'nurse-wastage' in the 1930's,
during which time pay improved but remained low and living conditions
continued to be restrictive. Shortly before World War II 'down-
grading' occurred, to create a new category of 'state enrolled
nurse' (ibid., p.159).
84. Even before World War I, as Maggs (1983, Ch.5, esp. pp.155-56)
illustrates, hospitals were well established settings for popular
works of romantic fiction. London teaching hospitals provided
a particularly rich seam of potential doctor husbands for the
nurses who trained in them.
85. Spoor (1967), p.465. Information in this section is from Ch.28,
The Rights of Women, pp.465-79 and Ch.l4, Pensions Saga, pp.147-75.
86. Not before time, perhaps. In 1898 Bernard Shaw had discovered
a male clerk employed by St. Pancras Vestry who could neither
read nor write, after which junior staff were made to pass an
appropriate City and Guilds examination (ibid., p.27).
87. For discussion of women in clerical work see Holcombe (1973),
Silverstone (1977) and Anderson (1977). Maggs (1983) discusses
'clerical and commercial work' as 'white-blouse' occupations
attracting female labour from the same pool as nursing.
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88. The Association for the Promotion of Employment for Women (1859)
saw the potential for female employment using the new communication
and office 'technology' and encouraged women to become telegraphers,
telephonists, shorthand writers and typists (Silverstone, 1976,
p.101).
89. The extent to which women 'undercut' male clerks is debated (Maggs,
1983, ref.35, p.59). Anderson (1977, p.127) believes that women
were more likely to undercut each other by accepting low pay
in a well-supplied labour market.
90. An elderly woman encountered in a train told the writer that
when employed in a central London office in the 1930's, a colleague
commuting from the outer suburbs had successfully concealed the
fact that she was married from all but her closest friends for
four years until she left to have a baby.
91. For men, units of 30 shillings were matched in this way.
92. Census of England and Wales 1931 (1934): Table G, Occupation
of Males and Females at the Census of 1921 and 1931, pp.673-80.
93. In 1936 approximately 4,081,800 women were in insured employment
(Department of Employment, 1971, Table 113, p.214).
94. The NSPA was founded as a non-political organisation in July
1935 by Miss Florence White of Bradford. Its purpose was 'to
secure by constitutional means pensions on such terms as may
be just for spinsters who have been or are contributors to National
Health or Unemployment Insurance'. (Minutes of Evidence: Committee
on Pensions for Unmarried Women (Le Quesne), 1938, p.1). In
particular it campaigned for spinsters' pensions at 55 since
all widows of insured men were eligible for pensions regardless
of age, receiving them on average at 55Y years (H.M. Treasury,
1939, S52, p.24). By 1938 the Association had 125,000 members
in 97 branches, mainly in industrial and urban areas. It published
a monthly journal, The Spinster, 1938-56, in which its campaigns
are documented, along with knitting patterns and 'suitable' fiction.
95. Widows', Orphans, and Old Age Contributory Pensions - Voluntary
Contributions - Act, 1937. See A Wilson and Mackay (1941, Ch.XV,
pp.172-87). Women could be voluntary contributors if not in
'insurable' employment or 'not gainfully occupied' provided that
their total income did not exceed £250 per annum of which not
more than £125 could be unearned. For men the figures were £400
and £200. From 1939, the maximum age of admission as a voluntary
contributor was lowered to 40.
96. The Committee on Pensions for Unmarried Women (Chairman: C.T.
Le Quesne) was appointed by a Treasury Minute of 13th April 1938
'to examine and report on the complaints which are made as to
the position of unmarried women under the Contributory Pension
Acts, and on the practical questions which would arise if the
age at which Old Age Pensions under those Acts are payable to
unmarried women was lowered'. The report was issued in 1939.
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97. Le Quesne Committee: Minutes of Evidence, 16th, 17th, 29th and
30th June 1938. 9th and 10th November 1938. These minutes give
a clear evidence of the existence of 'two nations' of women in
paid work. Comparisons were drawn between women in occupational
pension schemes who had received an extended education and entered
the labour force in their early twenties, where they remained
in better health than their working-class 'insured' sisters,
such as the mill-girls of the industrial north who had been in
employment since the age of 11.
98. Thane (1978b, p.236), comments that the Le Quesne committee could
not decide whether the early age of compulsory retirement applied
to many women 'was due to the earlier physical decline of women',
which seemed inconsistent with their greater longevity, or to
'inexplicable employer discrimination against older women'.
The Open Door Council, however, was convinced that such discrimination
sprang from employers' requirements for 'an attractive and youthful
appearance' on the part of female employees and this submission
is borne out in evidence from persons connected with the retail
trades where occupational pensions appear to have been uncommon.
The Scottish Retail Drapers' ... Federation stated that 'A woman
of 55 behind the counter is somewhat of a problem'. 'The great
majority of firms, if there is reasonable excuse of dispensing
with a woman getting to an older period of life, are very glad
to have the opportunity'. (H.M. Treasury, 1938, pp.192-93).
99. They were 'the same' in that both the Civil Service and teachers'
pension schemes had come to provide lump sums on retirement as
well as pensions. The lump sum could be used if necessary to
provide for dependants of any type as a 'post-retirement' death
benefit. There were no widows' or dependants' pensions as such.
(See Ch.8).
100. Pay was low partly because it was commonly around two-thirds
of that of a comparable male employee. Campaigning for equal
pay was carried out, unsuccessfully, between the wars, by teachers,
civil servants and local government officers. However, school
teachers' pay in the 1930's compared favourably with other pro-
fessional occupations and seems to have been the most financially
rewarding occupation for a woman. Lack of opportunities for
promotion was a common grievance of public sector women -
i.e. to the higher grades of Civil Service and to headships of
mixed junior elementary schools. Public sector men also complained
about low pay.
101. The 1931 census shows a total of 200,000 single women as 'not
gainfully employed' in the age groups 45-59. Some of these would
undoubtedly have been caring for elderly and dependent relatives,
a usual responsibility for single women as the Le Quesne Report
shows. It was not uncommon between the wars for one unmarried
daughter to be financially supported to stay at home by another
such daughter who was in a full-time job. Such financial responsi-
bility could last for life.
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102. This was particularly the case in the nineteenth century: such
men in the industrial and commercial sectors might have knowledge
of the employer's processes and practices of great potential
value to a competitor.




Women as Members of Occupational Pension Schemes
1939-83
'The story of the employer who restricted membership
of his pension scheme to women measuring more than
42-40-42 is, however, almost certainly apocryphal'
(Filch and Wood, 1964, p.28)
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Part III
Women as Members of Occupational Pension Schemes 1939-83
Introduction
Part II traced the growth of formal occupational pension provision
from its 19th century origins to the outbreak of the second World
War, a period during which single women gained new employment opportunities
in 'white-collar' occupations and, mainly in such occupations, gained
limited access to employers' pension provision.
Part III addresses the expansion of occupational pension provision
during a period of considerable demographic and social change, character-
ised by greatly increased female labour force participation. However,
whereas the prototype white-collar or manual woman worker in a 'good'
pre-war job was single, her post-war successor was, increasingly,
a married woman who, if she had children, might well be working part-
time. Such married women have brought a 'second income' into the
household, long conceptualised as 'pin-money' and more recently, following
high inflation, acknowledged as a 'secondary wage' which is integral
to the finances of the marital household. The married woman, with
children, has increasingly followed a 'bi-modal'career, involving
a period of withdrawal from the labour market followed by further
employment, often part-time, which is fitted around domestic responsibilities.
The 'single' woman in the 35-50 age-range was, by the early l980s,
statistically speaking, most likely to be a 'divorcée'.
The period 1939-83 saw an enormous expansion in occupational
pension provision. Developments regarding statutory retirement pensions
encompassed a move from provision of a 'basic' pension derived from
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flat-rate contributions to the addition of an earnings-related 'second-
tier' pension, designed for the 'middle band' of wage-earners, not
all of whom hive access to employers' pensions. Successive governments
shifted towards formal 'integration' of state and occupational pension
provision, with legal regulation of the latter. Issues of access
to employers' pension provision and preservation of benefits in the
form of 'deferred earnings' from past employment increasingly moved
into the public arena and on to the political agenda.
Not the least of these issues since the late l960s has been female
access to occupational scheme membership and 'equal treatment' within
those schemes. Chapter 3 focusses on the growth of occupational pensions
during a period when the 'target beneficiary' has continued to be
the male employee with actual or potential 'family responsibilities'
for a dependent wife and children who might need 'survivors' benefits'
should their 'breadwinner' die. Outside the public sector it is the
better-paid and/or white-collar male who has been targeted.
As Chapter 4 shows, female access to occupational pension benefits
has continued to be more restricted. Not only do many women, especially
if married, follow employment characterised by low pay and occupational
segregation, - many, because they work part-time, are excluded from
employers' pension schemes even in the public sector. It has continued
to be more difficult for women to generate occupational pension benefits
from their own deferred earnings. As will be seen this state of affairs
is becoming increasingly questionable and is, indeed, being questioned.
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Chapter 3
The Expansion of Occupational Pension Provision
I The 'two nations' : 1939-59
From the second World War, through lengthy economic 'austerity'
to 1959, favourable tax concessions(1) and keen competition for labour
were instrumental in encouraging employers to expand or inaugurate
pension schemes. From 1948, the National Insurance scheme introduced
'basic' retirement pensions via flat-rate contributions. In the late
1950s, a major new initiative saw the introduction of a statutory
'second-tier' earnings-related pension scheme based on additional
graduated NI contributions.
During World War II the 'excess profits tax' enabled employers
to 'install non-contributory pension schemes for their employees at
little or no cost to themselves' (Pilch and Wood, 1979, p.7). Already
'Top Hat' employers' pension schemes for senior employees could be
devised so that highly taxed individuals could opt for larger pensions
in preference to further salary, thus reducing tax liability during
working age (ibid.).
The Finance Act 1947 'laid down limits on the amount and nature
of pension scheme benefits by providing that an employee should be
taxed on any contributions made on his behalf'... 'over a limit comparable
to the provisions of statutory schemes such as the Civil Service' (ibid.,
pp.7-8). Filch and Wood (1979) argued that this Act, introduced during
the first post-war Labour administration, constituted a 'fascinating
political paradox' in that it had the opposite effect from that intended
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by the legislation. Far from 'curbing the provision of tax-free benefits
under pension schemes' it was 'undoubtedly responsible for a tremendous
explosion in the number of such arrangements'. Thus, employers set
about extending occupational pension provision for their 'key employees'
encouraged by new regulations still permitting 'quite substantial
tax-free capital benefits to be paidin their retirement' (ibid., p.8).
In addition, the Act excepted certain types of employers' pension
schemes from its provision, including those for lower-paid staff,
so that 'it was therefore possible to set up schemes under which the
whole of the retirement benefits could emerge in tax-free form' (ibid.).
Further tax advantages accrued via section 379 of the Income Tax Act
1952 affecting investment income of insurance companies (ibid., p.9).
Filch and Wood argued that the professional and managerial classes
were hard hit by high personal taxation after the war, especially
the 'middle classes', as exemplified by the middle and senior ranges
of salaried staff in industry (Pilch and Wood, 1960, p.25). These
employees considered themselves the 'new poor'. Sympathetic management
'even if they could not afford to pay the office staff salaries commen-
surate with the earnings, based on overtime and piece rates of the
works employees ... could at least offer a degree of security by funding
in advance the pensions which, as the majority of them accepted, they
had a moral liability to pay' (Filch and Wood, 1960, p.25). Tax concessions
on occupational pension provision were further optimised via the Finance
Act 1956 which embodied limited legislative changes arising from the
1954 recommendations of a Treasury committee(2) appointed to review
the general question of the treatment of occupational pension schemes
for taxation purposes.
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Meanwhile major changes had taken place in statutory retirement
pension provision. The recommendations of the Beveridge Report(:3) (1942)
resulted in the eventual replacement of the pre-war contributory and
non-contributory pension schemes by new provisions (under the National
Insurance Act 1946) which form an important background to post-war
developments in the occupational pensions sector.
The Beveridge Committee had been asked to undertake 'a comprehensive
survey of existing schemes of social insurance and allied services
and their inter-relationship' to 'be considered in due course by the
Committee on Reconstruction Problems ...' (Beveridge, 1942, p.2).
The committee did not address itself, other than incidentally, to
the question of occupational pensions, which seem to have been viewed
as a desirable 'minority' adjunct to statutory provision. Beveridge
was concerned with the needs of that majority which had previously
been dependent on the then-existing statutory provision, including
supplementary pensions (Midland Bank Review, 1957, p.3).
The Report noted that superannuation provision was 'made for
persons in particular occupations by the State, by local authorities
and by many private employers' as well as by trade unions and friendly
societies, but was doubtful if all such provision covered 'as much
as one-tenth of the field' (Beveridge, 1942, S235, p.92). 	 It was
argued that the existence of such schemes 'called for no special action
by the state' though there was need for the state to make 'its own
development of compulsory insurance gradual, so as to give time for
any necessary re-arrangements of the occupational and voluntary schemes'
(ibid., S381, p.145). Employers' pension provision was a concept
in line with the Beveridge principle of encouraging citizens to provide
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for their financial needs in old age over and above subsistence level,
via other forms of saving (S239, pp.92-93).
Beveridge foresaw an increasing proportion of elderly persons
in the population from the mid-twentieth century (S234, pp.90-91)
with highly differential economic and social consequences for the
elderly individual (S235, pp.91-92).
'The problem for the future is how persons who are past work
can be given a guarantee against want, in a form which gives
the maximum of encouragement to voluntary saving for maintenance
of standards above the subsistence minimum, and at the same
time avoid spending money which is urgently needed elsewhere
or money on a scale throwing an intolerable financial burden
on the community.'
(S238, p.92)
The solution proposed included a universal contributory retirement
pension scheme based on insurance principles to cover four categories
of contributor - the paid employee, the self-employed, the housewife
and the non.-employed. All contributors except housewives were
to pay a weekly flat-rate contribution, chargeable at a higher rate
for	 Despite Beveridge's argument for a lengthy 20 year transitional
period before the scheme should become fully operative(6) (S241-243,
pp.93-95) the National Insurance Act 1946 brought all but a minority
of persons of working age within its scope when it became effective
in 1948.
By the early l950s, the financial aspects of provision for old
age had become a public issue. In 1953 a departmental committeet8)
was set up 'To review the economic and financial problems involved
in providing for old age, having regard to the prospective increase
in the numbers of the aged and to make recommendations' (H.M. Treasury,
1954; Sl, p.'). The committee endorsed the principle of universal
-115-
contributory NI pensions, while making recommendations for changes in
the operation of the scheme (ibid., S301-311). The interest of the
Phillips Report in the context of this study lies in its specific
discussion of occupational pension provision, the committee having
concluded that 'Pensions relating to former employment are playing an
increasingly important part in the provision for old age' (ibid., S216,
p.58), as envisaged by Beveridge (ibid., S4, p.7).
In 1953 there were few up-to-date statistics available on occupational
pension schemes and no official survey had been carried out since the
(9)pioneer effort of 1936.
	
On best available estimates, it was deduced
that 3 million people in public service employment and over 5 million
in 'industry and commerce' were covered by superannuation schemes.
The latter figure was 'three times what it was 20 years ago and there
is a continuing expansion in this field' (ibid., S312, pp.81-2), though
the recent origins of many schemes meant that they would not, in point
of fact, be actually paying out pensions for some years.
Of the total number assumed to be 'covered' by superannuation schemes,
it was estimated that about a million people, mainly from the public
sector, were already drawing pensions. The other seven million (estimated
as constituting about one-third of current NI contributors) included
2Y million in the 'public services', iY million in the Nationalised
Industries and 3 million in 'other industries'. This latter group had
a slightly higher proportion in Life Office schemes as opposed to 'inter-
nally administered' schemes.0) Women were very under-represented
among the existing pensioners and among the identified contributors
to occupational pension schemes (ibid., Appendix V, Table 2, p.114).
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The committee recorded its impression that there was a 'continuing
expansion' in the occupational pension sector and gave some brief details
on the nature of the various occupational schemes and their modes of
funding, commenting that schemes 'enable persons to preserve in retirement
a standard which is nearer to the standard of living they enjoyed during
working life' and that such pensions should lessen the need for retired
people to apply for National Assistance (ibid., S231, p.62). However,
it was pointed out that while 'the existence of such schemes in some
industries inevitably leads to pressure for the introduction of them
in others' (S233, p.62), in some cases cost might preclude the introduction
of such schemes or, in other industries such as building and civil engin-
eering, high turnover might make employers' pension provision a less
viable option (ibid.).
The committee felt that the combined income from both state and
occupational pension schemes should not exceed two-thirds of an individual's
final salary or equivalent, though it warned that inflation 'effectively
reduced the level of provision for retirement'. For the majority of
retired people whose pensions, at that time, were typically related
to average salary over a working life (not up-rated to current money
values), rather than final salary, there appeared to be no 'immediate
risk of superannuation resulting in over-provision for old age'. The
committee, recognising that a principle of 'two-thirds of final salary'
at maximum might result in very modest provision indeed for the lowest
income groups, advised that 'modifications may be needed in respect
of workers whose final wages are low.' (S24l, p.64) 	 They also warned
against employees having to make pension contributions which were too
high, having regard to the level of remuneration, thus leading to pressure
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for higher wages with the inherent danger of introducing inflationary
wage pressures (S242, p.65). In general, the Phillips committee endorsed
the principle of occupational pension provision, stating that 'The develop-
ment of superannuation schemes is desirable on grounds of social policy'
(S3l3, p.82).
Another reflection of public concern about financial provision
for old age was the preparation of 'a study on the impact of pension
payments on the national economy' by the Institute of Actuaries, also
published in 1954. This enterprise tried to obtain factual material
about the volume of current pension payments and pension rights, including
the number of members covered by existing schemes
Table 3







































Privately administered schemes 2,100
Life Office schemes 	 1,150
Mine Workers	 540
Total	 3,790,000
Grand Total	 4,960,000	 1,317,000 6,277,000
Source: Bacon et al. (1954), Table, p.150.
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The report commented that while occupational pension schemes were
a minority provision, they nonetheless put both spending and consumption
power in the hands of a group sizeable enough for this to constitute
'an important aspect of the national economy' (ibid., S89, p.165).
They also noted that the formalisation of pension schemes in the middle
years of the twentieth century 'leads to a relatively higher standard
of life among the old than they were able to command before organIsed
pension schemes were thought of' (ibid., S92, p.166).
Contemporary students of pension provision viewed the clearly increas-
ing amount of occupational pension provision with varying degrees of
favour or apprehension. In the latter category was Abel-Smith (1953)
who argued that
'Private superannuation schemes for the salaried and the upper crust
of the workers are growing so fast that the provision for old age
through the state is gradually becoming a sump for those excluded
from other superannuation arrangements be it by their grade or
occupation.'	 (Abel-Smith, 1953, p.39)
Heclo (1974, pp.260-272) has documented the part ultimately played
in developing the Labour Party's plan for national superannuation by
(12)Titmuss and colleagues at the London School of Economics. 	 Abel-Smith
and Townsend had argued the case for national superannuation, stating
'If such a scheme was introduced, people would not wish to make
as large a provision at present outside the sch ge, particularly
if tax concessions on future contributions to the funds of occupational
pension schemes were withdrawn.' 	 (Abel-Smith and Townsend, 1955,
p.25)
The authors also argued for 'proportionate contributions' to their proposed
re-modelled state pension scheme.
Abel-Smith and Townsend referred back to Titrnuss's earlier identifi-
cation of the existence of 'two nations in old age'-) The Labour Party
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came to accept (see Heclo, 1974, p.262) that the way out of such polaris-
ation lay in the provision of a comprehensive, earnings-related state
superannuation scheme, responsive to inflation, which would offer substan-
tial alternative and complementary provision to the occupational sector.
National Superannuation (1957), while pointing out the 'dangers and
disadvantages from the workers' point of view which can arise from occupa-
tional pensions', concedes that
'It would be foolish to deny, however, that the advantages of a
good superannuation scheme enormously outweigh its disadvantages.
Those employees who are members of such schemes form, indeed, a
privileged minority in comparison with the two-thirds of the working
population who are stilloutside any form of superannuation.'
(The Labour Party, 1957, p.13)
The new National. Superannuation scheme (giving women equal rights
with men) was envisaged as having a continuing compulsory flat-rate
retirement benefit and a second-tier graded pensions component into
which employers' pension scheme members could opt, bringing their existing
pension rights with them (ibid., p.54).
However, occupational pension schemes would be allowed to run alongside
the comprehensive state earnings-related scheme, requiring formal approval
if substituting for the second 'graded' tier of national superannuation.
Any 'approved scheme' would have to compare 'not unfavourably' with
the national scheme in respect of contributions and benefits, and transfer-
ability would have to be introduced into the occupational sector. Thus,
argues Heclo (1974, p.265), by not proposing to make full membership
of the scheme universal and compulsory, the Labour Party avoided arousing
hostility from groups such as middle-class people with pension rights
and trade unions with pension plans.
'National Superannuation' received a predictably hostile
reception from the Conservative party and also from organisations such
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as the British Chambers of Commerce who feared that occupational pension
growth would be restricted (ibid., p.266). The Life Offices Association,
representing companies heavily involved in the provision of insured
private pensions, also attacked the plan, reflecting widespread fears
among relevant financial interests of a nationalised insurance industry
(ibid., p.267). This anxiety was fuelled by the proposal that the National
Superannuation fund's trustees 'should have the same opportunity to
carry out profitable investment of their funds as private insurance
companies' (ibid., p.265 and see pp.267-8).
In the knowledge that Labour was preparing a pension policy statement,
the Conservative party began work on its own proposals in 1957, one
specific aim being to 'provide encouragement to private occupational
pensions' (ibid., p.264). Seldon (1957) in his critique of pension
provision, argued strongly for increased employers' provision and other
means of generating income and capital for retirement, independent of
statutory provision. His position rested on the notion that increased
economic prosperity and wider opportunities for the individual to provide
for old age would reduce the need for state intervention other than on
behalf of a small residual minority (Seldon, 1957, p.26). While arguing
strongly for wider access to occupational pension benefits, Seldon stated
that this provision should not be compulsory, since some persons might
prefer 'higher present pay instead of a pension scheme. They should
be free to do as they please.' (Ibid., p.7) A compulsory state superannua-
tion scheme would threaten the existence of occupational pension provision
(ibid., p.21), the merits of which rested on the responsiveniess of
the different schemes to the needs of the individual in the context of' the
particular' type of employment wherein the scheme was located (ibid., p.23).
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In Seldon's view, while state pensions 'have a part to play in a developing
society' they 'should be abandoned as soon as we can dispense with them.
We should use them as a crutch, to throw away as soon as we can walk.'
(Ibid., p.36)
In 1958, the Conservative governnent produced a White Paper outlining
proposals for a new initiative in state pension provision. The scheme,
subsequently introduced via the National Insurance Act 1959, is of partic-
ular interest in the context of occupational pensions since it included
a 'second-tier' earnings-related statutory pensions scheme to supplement
basic retirement and widows' pension provision for those persons not
equally well provided for via occupational pension provision. A key
feature of the proposed new arrangements was a procedure whereby employees
who were members of an occupational pension scheme giving benefits at
least as favourable as the new state earnings-related scheme were to
be 'contracted-out' of the latter.
The 'first tier' of the new state provision was to preserve the
principle of a flat-rate contribution by employer and employee up to
a modest 'ceiling'. Basic pensions on the existing National Insurance
principle were to continue, with exemption and special entitlement regula-
tions for married women as before. The 'second tier' pension was based
on a new principle whereby both employer and employee were to pay additional
'graduated' contributions on a further band of earnings, giving an additional
'earnings-related' second-tier retirement or widow's pension (Wiseman,
1965, pp.181-82). These graduated contributions would relieve the financial
burden on the Exchequer in respect of state retirement pensions.
It was claimed that 'It is clear that occupational schemes now
form an integral part both of the economy and of provision for old age
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for which allowance must be made in any development of the state scheme'
(MPNI, 1958, S19, p.8). Occupational schemes were viewed as an expanding
national asset, 'One of the most impressive features of this impressive
development' being 'the progressive extension of coverage from managerial
and clerical to manual workers t (ibid, S16, p.7). The schemes, while
exhibiting 'considerable diversity' were portrayed as having 'three
features in common:-
1) They provide cover which is more closely adapted to the individual
and his employment than any universal scheme can be
2) They offer an improved standard of living in old age for an
increasing section of the population
3) Their funds form a major part of national savings for investment
and thus help to recreate the real assets on which the future
standard of living of the old must depend.' 	 (Ibid., S18, p.8)
Ideas on improving the transferability of occupational pension entitlements
on change of employment were solicited (ibid., S20, p.8).
The White Paper viewed the increasing proportion of people who
had pension rights outside the NI scheme as an encouraging feature of
existing provision for retirement. However, it recognised the limitations
of such provision with two-thirds of industrial workers (including half
the men) not currently covered by such schemes, nor did it seem likely
that provision would be made for them via private schemes 'at any rate
for some time to come' (ibid., S24, p.8).
As already noted, in the previous year, 1957, the Conservative
Party, in office since 1951, had been faced by its opponents with a
major plan for National Superannuation designed to make greatly improved
retirement pension provision for just those categories of employee who
were not covered by occupational pension schemes. In its own proposals
for the reform of state retirement pension provision, the government
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therefore emphasised the case for graduated contributions and earnings-
related pensions.
'Developing needs of the old in a community enjoying rising standards
of life cannot adequately be met by contributions which have to
be fixed at a level all can pay. The speed of the convoy is that
of the slowest ship.'	 (Ibid., S23, p.8)
The Conservative government believed that an increase in flat-rate
contributions which fell with equal incidence on both the full-time
and part-time worker, or the high-paid and the low-paid worker, would
be viewed as inequitable (ibid., S25, p.8). A system of graduated employer!
employee contributions to a state scheme, related to some degree to
earnings, 'would institute a measure of' wage-related pension provision
for those who, for one reason or another, have no such provision through
a suitable occupational pension scheme.?
Just who these excluded persons might be had become more evident
from the findings of the first post-war official enquiry into occupational
pension provision. The Phillips Committee (1954) had argued that in
order to formulate an adequate policy on financial provision for old
age, 'information about occupational pension schemes in industry and
commerce' would be necessary and recommended that 'some central official
agency' should publish such 'adequate details' as schemes might be required
to supply (H.M. Treasury, l954a, S319, p.83)4) This recommendation
was adopted and the first official statistical survey of occupational
pension schemes and their membership was undertaken by the Government
Actuary's department, which reported in 1958.
The survey, based on numbers at the end of 1956, showed that over
8 million people were estimated to be in membership of occupational











of private sector schemes (GA 1958, S13, p.4). No count was made of
membership in the public sector (including the Armed Forces) or the
nationalised industries, but an estimate put this membership at 2.3
millions and 1.5 millions respectively (ibid., Sl4, p.5).
Table 4
Occupational scheme membership 1956 	 000s
































Source: GA (1958), S13, p.4.
These figures show that salaried men had a far higher chance of
occupational pension scheme membership as a 'fringe benefit' of their
employment than had wage-earning men, or either category of women.
Wage-earning men were marginally more likely than salaried women to
be in pensionable employment. Only two in ten wage-earning women were
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in occupational pension schemes as compared with seven out of ten salaried
men. In terms of the total membership of schemes, around 45% of both
men and women were ranked as salaried.
Many occupational pension schemes were very small. Out of a total
of approximately 37,500 schemes, 28,500 had less than 50 members. There
were 1,400 schemes designated 'large', with over 500 members. Only
400 schemes had a membership between 1,000 - 1,999, 100 had 2,000 -
2,999 members and 100 had over 3,000 members (ibid., S12, p.4).
Of scheme members, 76% of those with 'large' employers were in
non-insured schemes and 24% in schemes administered by insurance companies.
Those with smaller employers were less likely to be in an employer-
administered scheme (34%) than in an insured scheme (66%). It was found
that employees were more likely to be in an occupational pension scheme
where the employer had a non-insured scheme run by the employing organisa-
tion (ibid., S15, p.5). Evidence on the nature of schemes (which incor-
porated a sample from the public sector including nationalised industries)
showed that compulsory membership was 'almost universal' in the latter
sector. In the private sector there was a fairly even balance batween
compulsory and voluntary membership (ibid. S22, p.8). For whatever
reason, there was certainly an under-representation of women in membership
of occupational schemes in 1958.
The improved provision proposed for women participants in the Labour
Party's National Superannuation scheme was but one feature intended
to establish it as a viable alternative to occupational pension provision.
The Conservative Party, by contrast, viewed such alternative provision
as merely the vehicle for providing a basic retirement pension with
an improved but 'residual' second-tier pension for those unable to gain
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access to occupational schemes. On the evidence of the GA's 1958 survey,
women and non-salaried men would be prime candidates for such provision.
In pursuing its goal of 'reasonable provision for old age' the Conservative
government believed that 'an excessive extension of the state pension
scheme by way of graduation could do grave damage to existing occupational
pension schemes and future developments in this field. ' (MPNI, 1958,
S32-33, p.10)	 Occupational schemes were seen as 'an important channel
for the nation's savings' and 'a most valuable source of funds for invest-
ment.'	 (Ibid., S38, p.11)
In the event, a Graduated Pension Scheme was introduced via the
National Insurance Act 1959 (effective 1961), comprising a second-tier
extension to existing basic statutory retirement provision, including
additional widows' pensions. Rhodes (1965) argues that it was this
scheme which really focussed attention on the question of the extent
to which pensions should be provided by employers or the state. The
1958 White Paper had stated a government aim 'To preserve and encourage
the best development of occupational pension schemes' as well as to
provide 'some measure of pension related to their earnings' for those
who for some reason were not covered by 'an appropriate occupational
scheme' (Rhodes, p.187).
The graduated pension arrangements required all liable employees
to pay flat-rate contributions on the first £9 of their earnings15)
Employees with earnings between £9 - £15 were required to pay extra
'graduated' contributions towards an earnings-related second-tier pension,
unless they were 'contracted out' by virtue of belonging to an approved
occupational pension scheme. 6d. a week would be added to their eventual
sate pension for each £7 lOs. Od. worth of contributions (males) or
£9 (females).
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The introduction of these 'earnings-related' state pensions meant
that in cases where employers did not wish to introduce occupational
pensions, or, even more importantly, did not wish to introduce them
for certain categories of employee, such as manual workers or women,
they could point to the existence of an alternative, in the shape of
a second-tier state scheme making more generous provision for old age
than hitherto - provision designed to reflect the employee's level of
life-time earnings. It can be argued that the Graduated Pension Scheme
further institutionalised inequality in pension provision. As G.R.
Reynolds M.P. commented, 'The very section of the community which needs
a more adequate pension is being left out' (H OF C, 606, col.846, 9/6/1959).
Those earning under £9 did not benefit: some earning between £9 and
£15 though not 'contracted-out' by their employers, were in fact given
access to occupational pension provision.
This section ends at the point where the state introduced its own
'second-tier' provision. Green (1982, p.268) believes that it was the
absence of such provision which in part accounts for the expansion of
the occupational sector in the 1950s. Examination of contemporary public-
ations gives other clues.
Tax concessions are frequently mentioned as a rationale for occupa-
tional pension provision. Durham (1956, pp.3-6) in a technical publication
geared towards scheme providers, gives a lengthy explanation as to why
'Almost without exception the approval of the Inland Revenue authorities
is sought for new pension schemes because the advantages in relief of
taxation which result from approval are so great'. Employee contributions
are tax-relieved, employers' contributions are a legitimate business
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expense and the interest income of the pension fund qualifies for nil
or reduced taxation (Durham, 1956, p.4). Filch and Wood (1960, p.25)
and Seldon (1957, p.5) also emphasise tax benefits. Mr P. Geddes in
a Faculty of Actuaries' seminar in Edinburgh (14/4/1954) stated that
'It was known that many schemes were being set up more for the purposes
of easing or spreading the employer's tax burden than through any solicitude
for the wellbeing of, or any particular demand on the part of the employees'
and quoted employers as regarding their private pension schemes as 'a
hindrance', 'an embarrassment' or even 'a confounded nuisance'.
The Institute of Actuaries (1954) pointed out how, in the past,
employers' pension provision had been made on a voluntary basis, with
a strong moral imperative being directed towards a man (sic) to provide
for his old age (Bacon, et al., 1954, p.166). Filch and Wood refer
to motives of philanthropy on the part of the employers but also note
that employers' pensions were 'the least expensive and most effective
way of doing something which must be done if a business is to survive
and prosper for more than one generation.' (Pilch and Wood, 1960, p.39)
They also argue that such pensions are 'efficient' in that they allow
employees to be retired, thus avoiding blocked promotion and discontent
(ibid., p.40), an argument used by Seldon (1957, p.5) and Durham (1956,
p.2). Occupational pensions are also valued for their attractiveness
to employees. Durham (ibid.) argues that there is an ethical reason
for pensioning off long-service employees who have 'earned some right
to security and recognition in old age. ' However, he believes that
with the expansion of occupational pension provision, they come to be
taken for granted as 'deferred payments'. This notion of 'deferred
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earnings' is argued by Pilch and Wood (1960, p.26) to constitute an
'important shift of emphasis in objectives.' They recount that before
World War II, employers exhorted employees to be thrifty, emphasising
that pensions were intended to supplement not replace private provision.
Despite expression of 'similar sentiments' since the war, pension schemes
were planned 'cnthe assumption that they would provide substantially
the whole of an employee's income at retirement', apart from the basic
state pension.
'Thus, gradually, a new concept was developed - that all remuneration
was divided into two parts: an immediate and taxable portion which
should be sufficient to provide for current expenditure; and an
deferred part which should be accumulated, free of tax, to provide
for a man's (sic) retirement or for his dependants in the event
of his premature death. In other words, the purpose of a pension
scheme was to spread a man's earnings over the whole of life instead
of confining them to his working years. Only in this way could
he enjoy to his best advantage the rewards of his labours.'
The relationship between full employment (argued by some as 'over
full'), and pension provision also features in the literature. Filch
and Wood (1960, p.25) insist that employers must offer such incentives
in order to attract labour and reduce labour turn-over (Durham, 1956,
p.2). Seldon (1957, p.5) also follows this line of argument, the negative
side of which was noted at the Edinburgh actuaries' meeting (above)
when J.D. Binns spoke of a 'deleterious immobilisation', caused by older
or middle aged people 'ossified in their existing jobs' due to unwillingness
to cede pension rights by, presumably, moving or retiring (Institute
of Actuaries, 1954, p.211).
Seldon (1957, p.5) also offers a negative perspective on occupational
pensions, stating that they have less value as 'loyalty ties' when they
are more widely provided and employers have to be 'competitive' with
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each other regarding fringe benefits. Seldon does however praise
occupational pensions as a 'flexible' provision from the standpoint
of both employer and employee (Seldon, 1957, p.23), offering, for
instance, variable ages of retirement along with variable bases for
calculation of pension benefits and provision for survivors. This
view is however challenged by the Institute of Actuaries (1954) which
points out that as pension schemes became formalised and run by administrators
'less direct contact with the individual and his circumstances' results.
It is pointed out that frequently neither employers nor employees,
even in small businesses, live near their work, so that
'Many employers although they have a good idea in the aggregate
how their employees live, know very little of the circumstances
of the individuals. Consequently the test of whether a person
is to have a pension, and if so how much, ceases to be a test
of what he needs and becomes a test by rule: the pension is of
an amount fixed by scale and starts at a fixed age.'
(Ibid., p.166)
'Flexibility' was also stressed by the White Paper (M.P.N.1, 1958,
SiB, p.8), which also commended occupational pensions for holding
out the prospect of an improved standard of living for their beneficiaries
or, as put by Filch and Wood (1960, p.63), having the purpose of providing
'for something a little better than mere subsistence in retirement'.
As these authors noted (ibid., p.62), the lump sum benefit characteristic
of occupational pension schemes is an advantage to those who have
not easily been able to save for retirement. The White Paper also
commented on the ability of occupational pension schemes to generate
funds for institutional investment (MPNI, 1958, Sl8, p.8).
However, the potential of occupational pension schemes to lift
their members well above the poverty line in retirement, or even,
at worst, to 'over-provide' for retirement pensioners, was regarded
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by its critics as divisive. Labour's National Superannuation quoted
a Fabian publication stating 'The whip of unemployment ... is gradually
being replaced by the rod of the pension fund. The threat of starvation
in working life is being replaced by the threat of poverty in old
age.' (Labour Party, 1957, p.13)
It took the research findings leading to the 'rediscovery of poverty'
in the 1960s to actually highlight and document the part which occupational
pension provisions, or the lack of it, played in the creation of the
'two nations' in old age, and the extent to which poverty in old age
was, in reality, female poverty (see Ch.4).
k
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II 'Pensions for prosperity'? 1959-69
The decade following the National Insurance Act 1959 saw a considerable
growth in occupational pension provision. Employers' schemes had
to adapt to a situation in which 'contracting-out' of the second tier
of the new state scheme was a possibility. Although the Labour Party
formed the government from 1964, it took until 1969 to produce a White
Paper on national superannuation.
Heclo (1974) in his account of British post-war pensions policy
comments that 'Following the hyperactivity of the late 1950s, pension
policy entered a quiescent phase for most of the 1960s.' (Pp.272-73)
The providers of occupational pensions, as Rhodes (1965) clearly illus-
trates, had to accommodate their arrangements to the existence of
the Graduated Pension Scheme and deal with the ensuing technicalities
of administration. At the point where the new scheme became operational
in 1961, 4.1 million employees were 'contracted-out', far more than
the 2.5 million originally estimated by the government. Professional
pension specialists advised their clients to 'contract-out', especially
where they had a high proportion of better-paid workers. Insurance
shares did particularly well (Heclo, 1974, p.273).
By the early 1960s, the divergence between the two major political
parties with regard to pension policies was marked. 'The Conservative
government was seen by Labour to be restricting the state scheme to
a limited service for the supplementation of occupational pension
schemes.' (Webb, 1975, p.417) The Labour party was aware of a growing
number of elderly people who would have to rely on a means-tested
social assistance programme in the absence of adequate state pension
provision 'not least because the occupational sector offered little
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(16)provision for the low paid and limited provision for women' (ibid.).
It was also critical of the new Graduated Pension Scheme, arguing
that 'by paying graded benefits of outrageously poor value, the Tory
scheme has increased the insurance firms' business by driving people
to take out private pension cover' (The Labour Party, 1961, p.8).
'By combining a low level of National Insurance benefit with generous
tax concessions it has almost compelled the employer with a conscience
to establish his own private system of social security.' (The
Labour Party, 1963, p.10)
Lynes (1963), in a wide-ranging critique of the new Conservative scheme,
commented on the low level of the earnings-related benefits, not unrelated
to the fact that the scheme had been	 'deliberately pitched
at a level which left room for private schemes to operate concurrently
with it.' (Ibid., p.16)
The Labour Party argued that while it was 'in no way opposed to
the provision by progressive employers - whether private or public
- of their own superannuation, redundancy and sickness schemes', the
problem lay in restricted access to such schemes
'Outside the public services, the nationalised industries and a
few progressive firms, this kind of social security is normally
linked to a minority of executives, white collar employees and
industrial workers on the staff. Many millions of working people
today still belong to the other nation.' (The Labour Party, 1963,
pp.9-10)
By improved statutory pension provision, the Labour party 'determined
to guarantee to every working member of the orirnuriity as of right,
the high level of social security which is at present a privilege
accorded to a small minority by their employers.' (Ibid., p.5)
Opponents of public social service provision, such as Seldon,
believed that growing economic prosperity would in due course eradicate
all but a residue of poverty in old age. In a pamphlet suitably entitled
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Pensions for Prosperity, Seldon (1960) argued that 'In a society which
values personal liberty' and where people earn enough to save, it
should be a matter of individual choice to provide for old age, or
not.
'A man will be free to decide whether to spend most of his income
on himself or his family while young enough to enjoy it and leave
the future to take care of itself, or to live moderately while
he earns, and look forward to years of carefree ease when he retires.'
(Seldon, 1960, p.8)
Optional employers' pensions were a preferred alternative to comprehensive
statutory provision, in Seldon's view.17) With respect to the Graduated
Pension Scheme, Seldon argued for contracting-out of lower-paid workers
in the private sector on the grounds that
'good relations with employees may be bought cheaply at the price.
A pension is part of remuneration, one of the fringe benefits
of a good job that should be negotiated between employer and employee:
the state has no business here.' (Ibid., p.34)
Seldon maintained that the exclusion of lower paid employees from
occupational pension schemes could be divisive, leading to poor morale
in a work-force (ibid.). In addition, 'employers who wish to generate
a sense of loyalty to and identify with the firm as a continuing entity
will prefer their employees to look to the firm rather than the state
for their retirement income.' (Ibid.)
For whatever reason, membership of occupational pension schemes
increased in the early 1960s. A second survey was undertaken by the
GAD, covering both public and private sector provision (G.A., 1966).
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Table 5
Occupational scheme membership 1963





Men	 10.1	 4.0	 14.1
Women	 3.8	 1.6	 5.4
Total	 13.9	 5.6	 19.5
B	 Pensionable employees
Men	 6.4	 3.0	 9.4




Source: GA (1966), Table 1, p.7.
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The survey commented that a very high proportion of paid employees
worked for organisations which had pension schemes, but that only
a little over half were actually in membership of schemes. There
had been an increase of 4 million in the number of people in firms
with schemes in the private sector, and the proportion of employees
covered had grown from 42% to 52%. The GAD estimated that the number
of employees in schemes was growing by an average 500,000 per year,
reaching 12 million during 1965 (ibid., S20, p.7.).
Whereas in 1956, membership was analysed by sex, a distinction
being made between salaried or waged status, in 1963 an analysis w
made by sex and manual or non-manual status.
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Table 6
Employees in schemes by sex and category: private and public
sectors: 1956, 1963:GB.
(millions)
Private Sector Public Sector Total
Salaried 1956Employees:
	
	 1956	 1963 1956	 1963 1956 1963Non-Manual 1963
Men	 1.6
	
2.8	 1.1	 1.3	 2.7	 4.1


















Women	 0.4	 0.3	 0.1








7.2	 3.6	 3.9	 7.9	 11.1
Source: GA (1966), Tables 7 and 8, p.11.
The large growth in scheme membership related entirely to men and
was a phenomenon of private sector employment. The survey noted that
'Some schemes for women members appear to have been discontinued,
as a result of the introduction of National Insurance Graduated Pensions.'















in membership of occupational pension schemes may have fallen in 'consequence
of the introduction of the ... Graduated Pension Scheme.' (Ibid.,
S27, p.12)
Table 7
Proportions of employees in schemes, by sex and category
private and public sectors: 1956, 1963:GB.
Private	 Public




Salaried 1956Employees: Non-Manual 1963
Source: GA (1966), Table 9 and S27, p.12.
These figures appear to bear out Heclo's assertion that the Graduated
Pension Scheme 'not only avoided hindering the development of private
occupational pensions, but provided a positive fillip to the entire
private sector' (1974, p.273). Nonetheless, even taking the disparate
categories in the above table, there appears to have been a growing
'gender-gap' in terms of employee coverage, a point to be explored
in the next chapter.
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An illustration of the increasing perception in official circles
of occupational pension provision as an important and developing phenomenon
can be seen in the decision of RIPA to commission a major review of
'the policies currently implicit in public sector schemes' (including
administration and finance), 'which would also seek to set these schemes
in the wider context of a national pensions policy,' (Rhodes, 1965,
9)(18) The study examined twelve public sector schemes in detail
and also sought to make a limited comparison between such schemes
and those provided in the private sector. (See Rhodes: Ch.5, pp.127_52)(19)
The report provides a useful picture of the occupational pensions
sector in the mid-].960s. Public sector schemes were found to have
a considerable degree of similarity. By far the most important benefit
was found to be 'the pension (or pension and lump sum) which the member
expects to receive on retirement;' (ibid., p.73). Most schemes were
compulsory for full-time employees (with the exception of local government),
while part-time employees were seldom covered (ibid., pp.74-75).
The Civil Service was the only scheme not requiring employee contributions;
the typical contribution was 5-6% of annual pay. Apart from the
nationalised industries, the 'normal' age of retirement was, typically,
60 or below - for women, 60 was near-universal (ibid., p.75). Most
schemes required 10 years' service for eligibility to benefit, though
the teachers' scheme required 30 and the police and fire service schemes,
usually, 25 (ibid., p.76).
An attractive feature of the schemes resided in the typical retirement
pension being based on the average of the last three years' salary,
with a maximum of two-thirds salary being allowed, calculated on not
more than 40 years' service. Furthermore, unlike the private sector,
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public service employment commonly offered a lump sum (typically three-
eighths of the average final salary multiplied by the years of service),
payable on retirement. In some cases these lump sums were reduced
if widows' (and in some cases childrens') benefits were payable (ibid.,
p.77). Benefit entitlement also, typically, included (with variation
as between individual schemes), early retirement pensions on grounds
of ill-health, death-in-service benefits and widows' and childrens'
pensions (ibid., pp.77-78). Perhaps the most valuable feature held
in common by public sector schemes was that which established what
has become known as the 'transfer club' whereby it is generally possible
to transfer between two public employments, under certain conditions,
without loss of pension rights (ibid., p.83).
In comparing public and private occupation pension provision,
the study established both key differences and common issues. Public
schemes were very large indeed as compared with the typical private
scheme: thus, in the public sector many different types of employee
had to be catered for by detailed rules which attempted to cover all
possibilities and were operated with little discretion and within
a general climate of ensuring proper control over the expenditure
of public money (ibid., p.200). By contrast, private schemes were
very diverse (ibid., p.128) and tended to distinguish between salaried
staff and waged employees more than in the public sector schemes (ibid.,
p.130). Widows' and ill-health pensions were much less common in
the private sector within insured (as opposed to self-administered)
schemes (ibid.), but provision for straight-forward 'early retirement'
on a reduced pension was more common in the private sector, particularly
in insured schemes (ibid., pp.130-31). It was also very rare for
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private sector schemes to provide both a retirement pension and a
lump sum (ibid., p.131), though they appeared to make more provision
for members to make additional voluntary contributions to make up
for 'missed' years (ibid., p.133). It was not found possible to make
worthwhile comparisons on the level of benefits or contributions (ibid.,
p.135).
The RIPA study also dealt with the impact of National Insurance
on occupational pension schemes. With the introduction of the basic
NI scheme in 1948, it was no longer the case that occupations with
an employer's pension scheme were 'excepted' as they had been under
the 1925 legislation. Since there was fear that public servants would
be 'over-pensioned' and the post-war NI pensions were intended as
a universal provision, it was decided to reduce public sector pensions
by an amount which, at maximum, was roughly equal to a single person's
(20)
retirement pension in 1948 (see Rhodes, pp.158-64). 	 This practice
was identified in some private sector schemes (ibid., p.138), both
to avoid 'over-pensioning' and to reduce employer costs.
'Most members of public schemes' were found to be contracted out
of the Graduated Pension Scheme along with 'nearly 30% of the members
of private sector schemes'. What appeared to be happening was that
the employers were themselves adjusting their pension scheme arrangements
to take account of the new graduated state provision and in one case
documented, charging the employees a 'composite' contribution to cover
both NI and occupational provision. There was then no guaranteed
rate of pension payable by the employer, since the eventual amount
would relate, in proportion, to the eventual NI benefits, both basic
and graduated (ibid., pp.138-39). There is a sense in which this
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employer was anticipating the 1975 pensions legislation. As Rhodes
commented, 'this scheme goes further in practice than most schemes
and certainly further than public sector schemes in recognizing the
state scheme as an integral part of the pension provision for retirement'
(ibid., p.140), i.e. the occupational scheme aimed to supplement state
provision, to a given level.
Rhodes believed that the relationship between state and occupational
provision was crucial, and hence argued for a well thought-out national
pensions policy (ibid., pp.240-42). It becomes clear from this study
that public service employment was losing its former position as the
sector which provided a good pension for long-serving members of staff.
Occupational pensions were becoming valuable 'fringe-benefits' in
the private sector also, which in some cases offered a superior range
of benefits to their public sector counterparts. Rhodes argued that
in conditions of economic growth, it was likely that the working population
would demand better pensions for themselves 'on the grounds that the
elderly ought also in fairness to share in growing prosperity.' (Ibid.,
p.244) In this prescient study, Rhodes on behalf of RIPA, showed
awareness of issues which were to play a major part in discussions
of occupational pension provision in later years, such as preservation
of pension rights, transferability of rights and inflation-proofing
(ibid., pp.247-50). Rhodes' comments on occupational pension provision
at the time of the study (1963-64) foreshadow the 'pensions debate'
1969-75.
'The basic dilemma is that the development of occupational pension
schemes has been very uneven. For not only are there many people
who are still not members of such schemes, despite the rapid growth
of recent years, but the level of pensions provided by different
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schemes varies greatly. It therefore seems unlikely that in the
ordinary course of events everybody will be covered by an occupational
scheme and still less by an occupational scheme providing a reasonable
standard of living, for a very long time to come. Whether the
State should step in and fill the gaps left by the growth of occupational
schemes or whether every effort should be made to encourage the
growth of adequate occupational schemes is likely to prove the
central question of political controversy.. ." (Rhodes, 1965, pp.246-47).
At the time of the RIPA study, Labour came into office with 'national
superannuation' having formed part of their election proposals. However,
there was a considerable delay before the plan was activated. As
Heclo comments, the 1964 Labour government was elected on an extremely
small majority. On its 1966 re-election 'Another two years were lost
as the policy-makers grappled unsuccessfully with the immense administrative
problems of the Labour party ' s proposed minimum income guarantee and
with the recurring balance of payments crises.' (Heclo, 1974, p.274)
The work of bringing out a White Paper in 1969 was completed in the
late 60s and its theme was partnership between the state and the occupational
sector.
Heclo has traced the genesis of this partnership to debates of
the mid-fifties and to the solution found for 'two problems and one
dilemma'. Firstly 'though private occupational pensions could not
do everything they had done too much to be ignored' and secondly 'decent
flat-rate pensions could not continue to be financed by flat-rate
contributions without severely penalising those earning low incomes'.
The dilemma was that a level of state superannuation provision which
equalled the benefits of the private occupational sector would adversely
affect that sector and its 'crucial contribution to national savings'
(Heclo, 1974, p.275). Modest state provision, on the other hand,
would leave out many of the better paid whose contributions were widely
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viewed as a necessity for the improvement of the level of basic pension
provision.
A solution had been found for the Graduated Pension Scheme in
the form of a 'contracting out' device which was, in reality, only
partial contracting-out or 'abatement' (ibid., p.276). The notion
of abatement was further discussed by the 'pensions industry' in the
1960s (ibid.) and by the time the Labour party's White Paper was produced
in 1969, it was not the principle but the detail of 'partial contracting-
out' which was at issue. Heclo notes (p.275) that a great deal of
consultation was undertaken with relevant interests by Crossman (Secretary
of State for Social Services 1968-1970), whose published diary for
the period records a number of such meetings.21)
In anticipation of new national legislation likely to 'clearly
influence the structure and size of occupational pension schemes'
(GA, 1968, Sl, p.1), the Labour government commissioned a third official
survey of schemes.
Table 8
Occupational scheme membership, 1963: 1967
























Men	 3.6	 3.6	 1.7	 1.6	 5.3
	 5.2









Grand total	 7.2	 8.1	 3.9	 3.8	 11.1
	 12.2
Source: GA (1968) ,Table 3, p.8.
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In the four years since the previous survey, there had been a
further increase of one million in the membership of occupational
pensions schemes, mainly within the private sector, half of which
represented an increase in female membership.
Table 9
Proportions of employees in schemes by sex and category: 1963, 1967:



































Source: GA, (1968), Table 4, p.9.
Total membership of pension schemes had increased. There had been
a slight fall in the proportion of men in membership of private schemes
and a larger fall in the proportion of women in membership of public
schemes. The 1967 survey gave figures on causes of exclusion from
schemes, showing that, in the private sector, both men and women were
excluded on grounds of youth, age, insufficient service, ineligibility
of employment refusal to join the scheme or exclusion at employer's
option (ibid., S28, pp.10-li and Table 6, p.11). Women were about
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twice as likely as men to be so excluded. In the public sector, ineligible
employment was the overwhelming cause for exclusion with, again, approximately
double the number of women excluded. As will be discussed in Chapter
4, it was not unusual to exclude full-time women, while the growing
numbers of part-time female employees found themselves excluded as
routine employment practice.
Thus, in the 1960s, the providers of occupational pensions had
further expanded their operations and accommodated themselves to the
existence of the Graduated Pension. Scheme. Tax concessions, the
desire to attract and retain labour, plus considerations of 'efficiency'
continued to motivate employers towards the provision of pension schemes.
Meanwhile employees increasingly came to regard access to such schemes
as the hall-mark of a 'good' job. For senior staff, an occupational
pension was becoming a 'routine' fringe benefit. By 1969, the Labour
party was ready with its new proposals for National Superannuation.
The publication of this document heralded a prolonged period of debate
over the future structure of retirement pension provision and the
place of employers' schemes within that structure, culminating in
the SSPA 1975.
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III The 'pensions debate': 1969-75
The period 1969-75 is sometimes characterised as that of the 'pensions
debate', when three successive governments, of contrasting political
complexion, unveiled their pension proposals. First the 1964-70 Labour
government's National Superannuation plan appeared, with the bill which
followed being lost with the 1970 election. The 1969 'Crossman' plan
had sought a major role for publicly provided earnings-related retirement
pension provision. The 1971 'Joseph' plan, by contrast, favoured a
major expansion of employers' superannuation, leaving a residual role
for state provision. However, the 1970-74 Conservative government's
legislation was extinguished by the incoming Labour administration
of 1974-79. The 1974 'Castle' plan promised improved retirement pension
provision for all, and especially for women, via 'integration' of state
and occupational pension sectors. It was during this period that female
access to pension provision, including that offered by the occupational
sector, emerged conspicuously as a 'pensions issue'.
The 1969 White Paper outlined proposals for a comprehensive state
scheme of earnings-related retirement provision to be developed in
a context of partnership with occupational pension provision. The
plan was for all employees to pay a percentage of their earnings as
a social security contribution, up to a 'ceiling' of about 1 1/2 times
average earnings (DHSS, 1969, S55, p.20). For a single person, the
eventual retirement pension would replace 60% of his or her earnings
up to half the national average and 25% thereafter, up to the 'ceiling'
(S64, p.23). By this means, the goal of an adequate retirement pension
for all would be secured with the aid of a built-in element of redistribution
in favour of low earners. The scheme would mature within 20 years,
promising a 'dynamic' pension derived from 'revalued' contributions
during working life, which would be further adjusted during retirement
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in line with 'living standards' (S34, p.19). The White Paper included
proposals for members of occupational pension schemes to be 'partially
contracted-out', so that both employee and employer would pay lower
contributions to the state scheme on that range of earnings which fell
below the 'ceiling' (S138, pp.41-42). The employee would eventually
receive a reduced state pension with the employer required to make
up the difference with an occupational pension of a guaranteed amount
(ibid, p.42).22
It was argued that occupational pension provision, 'a highly valued
feature of employment' (Sl20, p.136), would gain from being underpinned
by a substantial basic compulsory state scheme (546, p.17) to be operated
on a pay-as-you-go basis. Such 'two-tier' pension provision would
assist the long-term development of occupational pension schemes (ibid.)
with their valuable 'savings principle' (S47, p.18) and ability 'to
meet the special needs of particular occupations and industries' (S48,
p.18). It was not, however, felt that occupational provision could
eventually meet all need for pensions in retirement, above a low state
minimum (SllO, p.33). Nor did a viable alternative reside in a combination of
extensive occupational provision with a residual means-tested pensions
scheme, since there was likely to be persisting differential access
to employers' pension benefits, notably among women and 'manual' men
(S1l3, p.34). Moreover, the typical occupational pension was small
(Sll2, p.34). Small firms tended not to provide pensions (Sll4, p.34),
nor were benefits necessarily adjusted to family needs, especially
widowhood (S115, p.35). Though it was proposed to legislate for entitlement
to preserve pension rights on job change ( (8) S49, p.18), logistically,
universal coverage seemed an impossibility. Even by the end of the
century it was anticipated that one-third of all 'retirement pensioner
households' would have no occupational benefits (Sl16, p.35). Finally,
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there would be a problem around maintaining the value of those occupational
pensions in payment (S117, p.36).
Heclo (1974, p.277) has commented on the quiet reception accorded
to the White Paper and ensuing legislation. The legitimacy of establishing
a comprehensive state superannuation scheme, as exemplified by the
'policy consensus', is attributed by Heclo to the previously mentioned
lengthy consultations with interested parties which preceded the White
Paper and accompanied the legislation. Room (1979, p.90) argues that
there was rather more conflict of interests inherent in the situation
than Heclo allows for, in that very different pension proposals emerged
under a Conservative government in 1971. Certainly, Crossman's diaries
document the role and influence of the 'insurance industry' among other
'pressure groups' with regard to Labour's National Superannuation plans
(Crossman, 1977), as does his account of the 'politics of pensions'
(1972). Lynes (1969, pp.25 and 26) considered that the Crossman scheme
constituted 'a major victory for the life offices' in that it enabled
the private sector of occupational pension provision to offer poor
schemes by comparison with a state scheme which was 'good value for
money', giving a better return on twenty years' contributions than
a comparable occupational pension scheme (ibid., pp.24-25). Furthermore,
a guaranteed level of inflation-proofed state pension would offer particularly
good value to the lower-paid worker (ibid.). By contrast, occupational
schemes would be permitted to offer pensions at fixed cash value, with
no requirement for inflation-proofing, no bias in favour of the lower-
paid and with no means of accommodating the benefits to any general
rise in living standards (ibid., p.26). Indeed, the expectation of
the Labour government appeared to be that the state would make good
the deficits of the occupational pension sector by providing widows'
pensions (not proposed as a compulsory provision in occupational schemes)
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and by bridging any difference between a pensioner's occupational er.titlements
and what he or she would have obtained from the State scheme (ibid.).
After the publication of the White Paper, it was the exact formula
for 'abatement' (or partial contracting-out) which engrossed the 'pensions
industry'. During this time, trade unions became more actively concerned
with pension issues, particularly those unions whose members were already
covered by good occupational schemes and who feared that these gains
might be eroded by the proposed new scheme (Heclo, 1974, p.278; Crossman,
1977). As Kincaid (1975, p.143) notes, large white-collar unions were
affiliated to the Labour party, providing a major source of finance.
They needed and were given assurances that the occupational pensions
sector would be safeguarded.
The National Superannuation bill began its passage in January
1970 and had almost reached the final reading stage when the General
Election was called in June, which Labour lost. As Heclo comments,
the imminent completion of this legislation did not inhibit the Labour
government from calling an election. The Superannuation bill fell,
due to a 'political accident' and 'For the second time since the 1950s,
it fell to the Labour Party to propose on superannuation and the Conservative
party to dispose' (Heclo, 1974, p.279).
The new Conservative administration was not well-prepared to legislate
on retirement pensions. Heclo (1974, p.299) characterises the Conservatives
as having been, in opposition, not 'particularly alert or well-informed
about superannuation' and lacking in both expert advice and interest.
Once publication of the 1969 White Paper provided the impetus, work
had started on an alternative plan, in the context of' a party commitment
'to ensure that private occupational pensions were not impaired' (ibid.).
The ensuing White Paper envisaged the future development of state and
occupational pension provision as resting on a new administrative framework
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assigning 'separate spheres' to the two sectors, allowing each to fulfil
its own specific purposes and function (DHSS, 1971, Si. p.1). Occupational
schemes were to be welcomed 'into full partnership with the State scheme'
so as to 'develop the scope they offer for greater independence in
retirement' (ibid., S3, p.1).
The 'Joseph' scheme was based on the notion of 'two-tier' provision
consisting of an annually uprated flat-rate state retirement pension
based on earnings-related contributions required as a 'social obligation'
and not to be confused with insurance principles (S9, pp.3-4). Above
this pay-as-you-go first tier would come, as much for the 'shop-floor
worker as for the top executive' an occupational pension (Sb, p.4),
with transfer arrangements for job changers (S4, pp.1-2). For all but
a minority, deferred earnings were to constitute a form of 'occupational
saving', providing the employee with 'higher living standards for him-
self and his family' (Sb, p.4).
For the minority without access to this expanded and improved
occupational pension provision, compulsory membership would be required
in a State Reserve Pensions Scheme 'of modest dimensions' (S27, p.9).
Evidence existed to show that women, 'blue-collar' and 'small-firm'
employees were under-represented in occupational schemes: nor did all
schemes provide adequate cover for widowhood (S25, p.9). Some
schemes provided 'meagre' benefits even to long-serving employees (ibid.).
There was no prospect of requiring employers to provide universal pension
provision, to a prescribed standard, not least because even employers with
'well-developed' schemes often found it 'impracticable' to cover all
employees, especially short-service workers (S26, p.9). The State Reserve
Scheme would be 'funded' and 'run along the lines of an occupational scheme
by an independent Board of Management' with, hopefully, up-rating of
-152-
benefits in line with prices, if the fund proved to be invested profitably.
There was no guarantee of this and contributions would be 'no higher
than the generality of such employers and their employees can afford'
(S27, p.9). The scheme was not intended to rival or substitute for
the expansion of occupational provision (ibid.). As will be seen,
the Reserve scheme offered a particularly poor deal to women, who would
almost certainly have been over-represented among its clientele.
The 'Joseph' plan aimed to encourage the growth of occupational
pension provision by licensing employers to exclude 'marginal' employees,
including women, for whom the costs of administering pension provision
was high in relation to their remuneration. The State Reserve Scheme
was designed to cater for such marginal employees, in hopes of keeping
them out of state means-tested social assistance provision in old age
(S16, p.6). The Conservative administration prized a buoyant occupational
pensions 'industry' as being valuable to the economy (S3, p.1), generating
funds then estimated at £10,500 millions. Employers were to be encouraged
to improve their schemes, deemed valuable also for their 'adaptability'
to the needs of particular employees and employment (S24, p.9). It
was the employer who met standards to be approved by the new Occupational
Pensions Board for 'appropriate pension cover, effectively secured
benefits and widows' pensions', who would be able to secure exemption
from participation in the State Reserve Scheme (S28, p.9; S56, p.17).
In future the 'normal' job would provide an earnings-related pension,
preservable or transferable if an employee left at 26 plus, with at
least five years' service (S65, p.19): younger/shorter service employees
would have their accrued benefits transferred to the Reserve Scheme
(S66, p.19). Considerable emphasis was put on the continuing application
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of tax reliefs to occupational pension provision (S70, p20). The Con-
servative administration sought a 'constructive and durable partnership'
(S85, p.27) between state and occupational sectors in which 'personal
enterprise and foresight' would 'secure higher living standards in
retirement' (S87, p.27).
Heclo (1974, p.279) commented that the 'Joseph' plan 'affirmed
several features of the policy consensus' which had emerged since the
1950s such as flat-rate up-rateable basic pensions derived from earnings-
related contributions and a state 'second-tier' earnings related pension
for those not in employers' schemes (ibid., p.280). The 'insurance
industry' which underwrote much private sector provision had, despite
persistent canvassing over the years, consistently vetoed the notion
of 'universal' second-tier pension provision via private insurance,
lest insurance 'sharks' operating at the margins should provoke government
regulation. It was feared that 'Increasing state controls would follow
and destroy what was ... an exceptional degree of freedom from state
regulation' (ibid.). As Walley (1972, p.135) observed, 'No privately
organised pension scheme could safely offer benefits of equivalent
value unless backed by a state guarantee which would, sooner or later,
bring its structure and all its operations under such close control
as to make it virtually a nationalised concern'.
Lynes (1969, p.27) had challenged some assumptions of the 'Joseph'
plan in his previous critique of the 'Crossman' proposals. He translated
'flexible cover to suit differing personal needs' as meaning assisted
tax avoidance by means of 'Top Hat' schemes for senior management personnel.
Furthermore, the average employee was obliged to join an existing pension
















of benefits for which he (sic) is covered' (ibid., pp.27-28).
In the event, due to the fall of the Conservative government in
1974, the Social Security Act 1973 never did become fully effective
in 1975, as scheduled. Walley (1973, p.169) had stressed the importance
for both employers and pension scheme administrators of securing reformed
pension provision 'capable of commanding broad and continuing support
across party lines'. Such provision had become equally necessary for
employees. The 1975 Social Security Pensions Act which followed was
in the nature of such a settlement.
Meanwhile, the Conservative government had commissioned a fourth
official survey of occupational pension schemes.
Table 10
Occupational scheme membership: 1967; 1971:
U.K. (Private and public sectors: estimate).
Private sector	 Public sector
Employees:
non-manual































Grand Total	 8.].	 7.0	 3.8	 4.1










The 1971 survey showed a large fall of one million in the membership
of schemes. A total of 1,200,000 men had 'disappeared' while 10,000
more women were in membership: the major 'loss' was among manual men.(23)
Table 11
Proportion of employees in schemes by sex and category: 1967, 1971
U.K. (Private and public sectors).
Private	 Public

















Source: GA (1968), Table 4, p.9: GA (1972), Table 1, p.6; Table 2, p.8.
This table suggests that non-manual men had further secured their position
as pensionable employees in the public sector and had maintained it
in the private sector. Likewise, manual men had gained in the public
sector but fafl&iback sharply in the private sector. Manual women had
gained in both sectors, while non-manual women had decreased their
representation in the private, and particularly, in the public sector.
As in 1967, women were much more likely to be excluded from employers'
pension schemes than their male colleagues: it can be inferred that
the fall in the representation of public-sector non-manual women is
accounted for by the presence of a growing proportion of female
part-timers during the period in question.
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The 1971 survey estimated that there were a million more former
employees drawing occupational pensions than in the previous (1963)
count. The increase was more marked in the private sector, and gave
a total of 2,450,000. There were also 50,000 widows and dependonts,
(60% from the public sector): this was an increase of 20,000 (GA, 1972,
Table 7, p.13).
The incoming 1974 Labour administration had to decide the fate
of the State Reserve scheme, which required a high outlay for a poor,
non inflation-proofed return - an even worse bargain for women than
for men (Castle, 1980, p.65). To the chagrin of the 'pensions industry'
it was decided to scrap the scheme in favour of an up-dated version
of the Labour party's earnings-related 'Crossman' plan (ibid, pp.100,116).
The White Paper of September 1974 once more proposed a partnership
between comprehensive state superannuation provision and 'good' occupational
schemes, retaining certain features of the two earlier proposals.
A 'first-tier' flat-rate basic pension would be derived from earnings-
related contributions and uprated in line with current earnings (DHSS,
1974a, S8, pp.2-3; S14, p.5). The second-tier pension would consist
of an earnings-related 'state additional' pension, calculated on the
up-rated value of an employee's 'best twenty years' of earnings between
a 'base' (equal to the flat-rate National Insurance pension) and a
'ceiling' of seven times that amount. On that band of earnings between
base and ceiling, the pensioner would get 25% of the average re-valued
earnings as an earnings-related retirement pension (S8, pp.2-3). However,
those with access to an 'approved' occupational pension scheme could
be 'contracted-out' of the state additional scheme. All occupational
pensioners would, in future, receive a 'guaranteed minimum pension'
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equivalent to what their benefits would have been had they been members
of the state 'second-tier' scheme: this arrangement promised a degree
of inflation-proofing for all occupational pensions (S58-61, pp.16-17).
Again it was pointed out that occupational schemes were variable
in both quality and coverage (Si, p.1), though 'socially valuable and
economically important'. 'Staff' were better covered than manual workers
and men better than women: many schemes gave little or no protection
against inflation, had inadequate coverage for widowhood and disadvantaged
job-changers. The second-tier state scheme (SEBPS) was designed with
attention to the needs of employees who were under-represented or dis-
advantaged in the occupational sector, including women, and it was
intended that should set standards which ocOupational schemes could
follow (S5, p.2).
It was argued that since inflation had moved many schemes in the
direction of a 'final salary' basis for calculation of pension benefits,
integration between state and occupational benefits had become a much
more realistic possibility. The existence of the 'best' occupational
schemes, which, typically, offered half-pay after 40 years' service,
would help make possible 'a new and much more effective partnership
in which state and occupational schemes can combine in a simple and
logical way to provide a total pension that is adequate and fully-protected
against inflation' (S57, p.16). All occupational schemes, whether
contracted-out or not, would be required to meet prescribed standards
regarding equal status for women, security, preservation and transfer,
provision of information to members and involvement of members (including
women) in the running of schemes. The Occupational Pensions Board
was to be retained and charged with upholding these standards (S74-
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81, pp.21-22). A Social Security Pensions bill was presented to the
House of Commons in February 1975 as a measure promising a durable
mode of integration between the state and occupational sectors. The
ensuing Social Security Pensions Act incorporated the major features
of the White Paper.
A further Government Actuary's survey was undertaken in 1975.
The total membership of employers' pension schemes had by then risen
by 400,000 to 11,500,000 of whom 2,800,000 were women (GA, 1978, Table
3.2, p.9). In the public sector, 74% of employees were members - 84%
of men and 59% of women, with an increase of 500,000 men and 600,000
women in membership (ibid., Table 3.1, p.8). In the private sector,
53% of men and 17% of women were members, representing a decrease of
500,000 men and 200,000 women (ibid.). Over 7 million employees were
excluded from schemes - 5Y2 million in the private sector and nearly
2 million public employees, including 1,600,000 part-time or temporary
women employees (ibid., Table 3.11, p.17). It was still the case that
private sector employees were far more likely to have access to an
employers' pension scheme if they worked full-time for a large company
(ibid., Table 3.5, p.11). Pensions in payment continued to be small
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Source: GA (1978), Table 3.2, p.9.
During the period of' the 'pensions debate' three successive govern-
ments sought a means of providing reformed second-tier retirement pension
provision which, in Labour's terms, would accommodate the occupational
pensions sector or, in Conservative terms, would promote it. Both
parties strove to set up an administrative framework within which the
two types of provision could be harmonised. While the Labour party
favoured comprehensive state second-tier provision, the Conservative
party saw its statutory duty as lying in the provision of a 'residual'
second-tier scheme only. The outcome was a compromise 'solution',
involving greater state regulation of employers' pension schemes as
a consequence of full legal integration between the state's own second-.
tier provision and 'contracted-out' occupational pension schemes.
The penultimate section outlines the new provisions which became
effective in 1978 and comments briefly on the operation of the 'Castle'
scheme to 1983.
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IV The Social Security Pensions Act 1975 26)and after
The pension provisions effective from April 1978 comprise a basic
state pension and a second-tier pension which is either a SERPS or
(27)
a 'contracted-out' occupational pensions.	 Employees are contracted
'in' or 'out' of SEIRPS not as individuals, but by virtue of their
'emp1oyment'. 28 At the outset, employers had to make decisions about
which 'employments' to contract in or
	 In the event, public
sector employees were well-nigh universally contracted . out, while in
the private sector 73% of employees (72% of men and 77% of women) were
contracted-out (GA, 1981, Table 2.2, p.5).
On revised figures from the previous Government Actuary's survey
it was shown that between 1975 and 1979, total membership of schemes
rose by 400,000, a gain of 500,000 women (mainly in the private sector)
and a net loss of 100,000 men. A loss of 200,000 men in the private
sector was compensated for, to an extent, by a 100,000 male gain in
the public sector (ibid., Table 2.3, p.6).
Table 13
Occupational scheme membership, 1975°: 1979
























Private sector	 Public sector
Source: GA (1981), Table 2.3, p.6.
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Responsibility for the issue of contracting-out certificates devolved
upon the Occupational Pensions Board 	 originally set up in 1973
to supervise arrangements for preserving the pension rights of 'early-
leavers', to assist schemes to change their rules, or wind up, and
to advise on Ministerial regulations and on questions referred by the
Secretary of state.(32) Under the terms of the SSPA 1975 it deals
also with 'equal access' for men and women to membership of schemes
and matters arising from the implementation of the Act.
Since the Board began receiving governmental 'remits' to consider
specific questions, and since the 'Castle' scheme became operational,
a number of issues have emerged for public discussion, both in terms
of the relationship between 'contracted-out' occupational pensions
schemes and SERPS and regarding occupational provision itself. The
major questioning has centred on the solvency and accountability of
pension schemes, their legal status, members' participation in the
running of schemes, the preservation of pension rights and the 'disappointed
expectations' of scheme members, 'pensionable age' (33) and employee
access to membership of schemes.
Pension fund solvency was a key issue from the outset. While
discussion of the financial market operations of pension funds lies
outside the scope of this study, it must be noted that some pension
schemes control huge funds, the fortunes of which rise and fall with
(34)the ebbs and flows of the investment market.	 The funds' defenders
emphasise the usefulness of such investments to the economy.	 Detractors
point out that schemes went un-regulated up to 1973 'drawing their
financial structure from a less responsible era' and that they can
be 'inflexible and unpredictable', 'responsible to nobody except their
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own trustees' (James, 1984, pp.13, 16, 21). The OPB has emphasised
the necessity for adequate funding of pension schemes within an adequate
legal framework (OPB, 1982, Ch.3, pp.9-15).
Pension funds have been heavily criticised in connection with
the two related issues of preservation of pension rights in respect
of 'early leavers' 6
 and 'indexation'. 37	It is alleged that funds
have, traditionally, profited from 'early leavers' without preserved
pension rights, by using their non-refundable employers' contributions
as a source of income to the fund from which the individual employee
has, all too often, failed to benefit (James, 1984, p.11). The OPB
reported on early-leavers in 1981, focussing specifically on preservation
of their rights until pensionable age (OPB, 1981, S19, p.3). Their
problems have been particularly acute in the private sector, since
the existence of the 'transfer club' and indexation of pension benefits
in the public sector makes job-changing or 'career breaks' less of
a problem (ibid., Appendix 6, pp.120-21). The Board made recommendations
for 'evolutionary change' so as to enhance the pension rights of' 'early
leavers' and revalue them over and above the required Guaranteed Minimum
(ibid., S6.2, p.31; Ch.7, pp.36-42).
Indexation of pension benefits to preserve the monetary value
of what are popularly called 'frozen' pensions leads on to the question
of indexation of occupational pensions actually in payment. Inflation
was a particular problem of the early 1970s and 1980s, eroding the
value of employers' pensions. Again, public sector pensions have been
protected by a system of 'indexation', the subject of a government
inquiry in 1980.38) This inquiry was appointed in response to criticisms
of the effective system of inflation-proofing available to public service
pensioners and, in the event, presented its findings in such a way
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as to highlight the benefits of inflation-proofing in the public sector
- an arrangement which, it could be inferred, private sector schemes
would do well to emulate (H.M. Treasury, 1981).
The OPB issued a report on security for the rights and expectations
of scheme members concerned, among other matters, with the protection
of' pensions in payment, noting the trend towards 'final salary' schemes
during a period of inflation and addressing the extent to which existing
pensioners have suffered from 'disappointed expectations' (OPB, 1982,
Ch.9, pp.51-56). It urged that all concerned with occupational pensions
should 'recognise a responsibility to give a measure of' protection
for the real value of pensions in payment' (ibid., S9.23, p.55). The
report also gave further consideration to issues around disclosure
of information to scheme members about the solvency of schemes and
about pension rights, including suggestions for an improved system
for dealing with members' complaints (ibid., Chs. 6 and 7, pp.30-40).
Both this report and the Wilson Committee (l98O) 	 had expressed
dissatisfaction with the legal basis of occupational pension schemes
in trust law, recommending a comprehensive review of laws which (see
PartVof this study) have become increasingly anachronistic (ibid.,
Ch.8, pp.44-50).
Finally, there has been continuing concern, since the SSPA 1975
was passed, with issues of unequal access to occupational scheme membership,
in view of persisting under-representation of low-paid and/or manual
(40)
workers, including women and those who work for small firms. 	 In
the case of women, the Act's requirement for 'equal access' has not,
despite an early remit to and report from the OPB, resulted in further
legislation to ensure equal status and treatment for men and women
in occupational pensions schemes. It is on the position of women in
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occupational scheme membership, including their under-representation
and unequal access to benefits, that the remainder of this study focusses,
after a retrospective view of the growth of occupational pension provision
(41)from 1939-83.
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V The growth of occupational pension schemes 1939-83
A considerable expansion of occupational pension provision has
taken place since World War II, with the major growth occurring in




Male and female employees in pension schemes 1936-1979
























































Source: GA (1981), Table 2.3, p.6.
The number of public sector members increased dran'iatically after the
war with the creation of the National Health Service and public corpor-
ations, with an employer's pension becoming a near-universal provision
for permanent, full-time public sector staff of both sexes. In the
private sector, a spectacular rise in male membership was followed
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by decline after 1967. Some members were transferred into the public
sector, the male labour force declined due to retirements and, increasingly,
due to redundancies and unemployment. From the late l950s, successive
governments have sought to foster 'partnership' between state and occupa-
tional sectors by means of strategies which have included the provision
of 'second-tier' state pension schemes for that 'residue' of employees
who continue to be excluded from or given limited access to occupational
pension benefits.
The number of scheme members shown at any point in time gives no
indication of the adequacy of their eventual pension entitlements.
The average employee does best out of lengthy full-time employment in
a public sector occupation where sideways or upward job changes have
no effect on pension rights and transfers between public sector employ-
ments can usually be effected without undue detriment. By contrast,
as James (1984, p.26) has pointed out, private sector employment within
'dying' industries has been particularly vulnerable, in pension terms,
to the risks of redundancy. Small firms seldom provide pensions(GA,
1981, Table 6.1, p.28). People who change jobs, leave the labour force
or belong to pension schemes which offer little revaluation of accrued
pension rights are particularly likely to end up with modest pension
benefits. Yet, in a sense, the system is predicated on a degree of labour
turnover, not least among women and less skilled employees.
The early pension schemes were set up for male employees so as to
check abuse in the public service, promote 'efficiency', attract and
retain staff and enable the employer to discharge a moral obligation
to 'worthyservants', originally in the absence of any state contributory
pension provision. By the inter-war period, tax advantages had emerged
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and some schemes were making provision for dependants, especially if
death occurred during the member's service. From the second World
War to the present, employers' pension schemes have continued to display
certain familiar features and have familiar claims made on their behalf.
Reddin (1979) and Green (1982) have pointed out the ways in which members
and providers of occupational pension schemes have continued to enjoy
generous tax advantages not available within the statutory pension
system. Fogarty (1976, pp.106-7), among many others, has emphasised
that, at best, occupational pension schemes have provided a flexible
form of retirement provision, with 'good' schemes pioneering standards
for others to follow.
Green (1982, pp.271-74) argues that employers' pension provision
(43)has served as a mechanism of control for management 	 and has been
a strategy for 'corporate welfarism', which, by the 20th century, has
changed from the paternalist to the bureaucratic mode (ibid., p.271).
In the interests of 'efficiency' an employer can impose a 'normal'
retirement age and set up mechanisms for 'early' retirement. 	 Until
the later 1960s, when unemployment began to increase in certain sectors,
occupational pension schemes were provided mainly on the initiative
of management, perhaps stimulated by the life assurance companies (ibid.,
p.275).
Unions became seriously interested in occupational pension provision
at the point where Crossman's 'abatement' principles appeared likely
to affect public sector pension provision and Joseph's 'State Reserve'
scheme was being suggested (Lucas, 1977, pp.4-5; TUC Annual Reports,
1969-73). Just as, after the war, employers introduced pension schemes
so as to boost white-collar pay via 'deferred earnings', so the 1970-74
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Conservative government's 'pay code', which exempted improvements in
pension benefits from limits on pay increases, gave an incentive for
unions to engage in successful pensions bargaining around 'deferred
earnings' (Lucas, 1977, p.5). Since then, trades unions, encouraged
by the TUC, have taken far more interest in occupational pension provision
(TUC Annual Reports, 1969-83, 1984), which move has benefited 'organised'
labour.
When managements initiated employers' pension schemes so as to
attract and retain staff, the system operated on a basis of excluding
'secondary' workers, who, being 'insecure and -expendable at times
of crisis, are liable not to be in pension schemes' (Green, 1982, p.273).
Women have, typically, been 'secondary' workers in the labour force.
The next chapter focusses on female access to membership of occupational
pension schemes from 1939-83.
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Chapter 4
Employers' Pensions and the Woman Worker
I The female employee 1939-83
Before proceeding to discuss the growth of occupational pension
provision from 1939 in relation to female membership of schemes, it
is necessary to focus once more on female access to paid employment.
The aim of this section is to chronicle some significant changes in
female economic activity during this period, placing these changes
in their social and demographic context, as background for discussion
of the expansion of occupational pension provision for employed women.
The relationship between women's occupational pension entitlements
and their labour force participation is further discussed in Ch.7 as
an issue of equal access, treatment and status for men and women in
employers' pension schemes.
By 1939, it had become commonplace to find single women in 'white-
collar' jobs, with teaching, the Civil Service (including the Post
Office), nursing and a wide variety of 'office' jobs in the private
sector providing the best access to occupational pension provision.
Such jobs were characterised by low and/or unequal pay, with the ubiquitous
'marriage bar' effectively removing large numbers of women from the
labour force on marriage, though there remained a cadre of older single
women, politely classified as 'career-women'. There were also limited
categories of women in 'good' manual jobs, with access to occupational
pension benefits. Such women would, typically, have been working for
a large, 'progressive' and relatively prosperous industrial employer
and, again, would usually have been expected to give up their jobs
on marriage, perhaps with the inducement of return of pension contributions,
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gift-wrapped as a 'marriage gratuity'. By the thirties, a more even
sex-ratio was increasing the proportion of young women in the population
who were 'at risk' to marriage.
After the second World W' began, there was, in due course, a massive
rise in female labour force participation. 'Almost the entire population
of adult women was forced into wage labour' (Summerfield, 1977, p.27)
unless able to claim exemption for domestic reasons. Women not only
joined or re-joined the labour force: many, by choice or compulsion,
changed their occupation. Single women (unless exempt) became subject
to direction of labour and some, mainly the younger ones, were conscripted
into military service.' 45 At the 'peak' of female economic activity
in 1943, 90% of single women 18-40 and 80% of all single women of 'working
(46)
age' were in industry, home defence or the forces (ILO, 1946, p.13).
Married women with children under 14 and those not living apart
from their husbands were usually exempt from being directed towards
work of 'national importance' (Marwick, 1970, pp.292-93). It was cal-
culated in 1943 that eight out of ten married women between 18-40 were
in the forces or industry(Summerfield, 1977, p.36). The married
workers included those very women whose economic activity had hitherto
been proscribed by the 'marriage bar'. But, in point of fact, their
employment was overwhelmingly 'de jure' or 'de facto' temporary. The
vast increase in the number of women civil servants by 1944,
'must be ascribed almost entirely to the temporary replacement
by women of men on war service and to the needs of expansion
being met to an abnormal degree by the recruitment of women,
men being unavailable.' (RCEP, 1946, S27, p.8)
However, precedents were established by the widespread wartime labour
force participation of women (including mothers of younger children),
especially with regard to the creation of part-time paid work. These
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precedents were to have an important influence on women's post-war
economic activity patterns.
At the end of the war, the Ministry of Labour dissolved the existing
consultative committee on women's employment and re-appointed a successor
'to advise on questions relating to the resettlement of women in civilian
life' (ILO, 1946, p.37). Summerfield (1977, p.40) records that women
were mobilised into the labour force during the war 'for the duration'
and expelled from it in an orderly manner once hostilities ended.
Mixed messages were then given out regarding the place of married women
in paid employment (Wilson, 1980, pp.43-44). The ILO study published
just after the war commented that in the UK 'there seems to be no official
policy regarding women's post-war employment' (ILO, 1946, p.285) and
that while, in a situation of full employment, women were being encouraged
to carry on working, or indeed, return to employment, a considerable
number of married women had in fact withdrawn from paid employment
(ibid., p.153).
The report and detailed evidence from the Royal Commission on
Equal Pay 1944-46 offers a useful perspective on attitudes of women
workers and their employers at the end of the second World War. Equal
pay in the public sector was the issue under consideration, but evidence
came also from the private sector of employment, including banking
and insurance, where men had long-established access to occupational
pension provision and women had made some similar headway. 	 -
Employers typically perceived women as short-service employees
providing cost-effective labour for routine and undemanding work.
Arguing (unsuccessfully) for the retention of a 'marriage bar' in the
Civil Service, the Treasury stated that
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'the bar is a positive advantage as enabling a more rapid turnover
of persons for whom no avenues of promotion exist' ----'the
risks and inconvenience and embarrassment to the public service
of endeavouring to maintain in employment women who may require
considerable spells of maternity leave and whose domestic duties
may restrict their mobility and their availability for the
long hours of work which may be required at times of crisis
and pressure'
(RCEP, 1946, S476, p.156).
Banking and insurance employers in the private sector explained that
'opportunities for women were largely limited to routine clerical work
and to general clerical work --- not of a highly skilled nature' (ibid.,
S243, p.83) because 'Women --- enter these industries largely as a
temporary occupation until marriage, an event which is frequently the
occasion for enforced retirement' (ibid., S244, p.83).
As often in public enquiries touching on women's paid employment,
the medical experts were on hand, this time to explain some interesting
biological differences in the female propensity to marry:
'Women have a highly developed physiological urge towards marriage
and this engenders a short-term outlook with regard to training
for certain skilled operations'
'Outside the industrial classes any limitation of outlook attrib-
uted to the urge for marriage is less evident'
(Dr Sybil Homer, MM Inspector of Factories, ibid., Appendix
X, 2, Sli, p.118 ).
The trend which was not foreseen was the great post-war increase
in the labour force participation of married women - both younger women
who had not commenced childbearing and older women 'returners'. With
the high marriage rates of the period, single women formed an ever
diminishing pool of labour at a time when full employment was extending
opportunities for women to do paid work. 'Marriage bars' relegated
to the past, employers targeted married women for employment which
was, increasingly, offered on a part-time basis and which, even 30
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years after the war ended, was characterised as, mostly 'undemanding,
ill-paid and of low status with no prospects of advancement' (Manley
and Sawbridge, 1980, p.37).
As seen, the entry of women into white-collar 'pensionable' employ-
ment was closely related to the presence in the population of single
women who, for reasons of necessity and/or conviction, sought to be
financially self-supporting. Older women of the pre-1939 period were
commonly defined as 'surplus' since the number of women in their age-
group palpably exceeded that necessary to provide wives for 'available'
monogamous males. Increasingly, since World War II, a changed sex-
ratio produced, by contrast, a growing 'excess' of males potentially
available for marriage (Rimmer, 1981, pp.12-13).
Between 1951 and 1971, following the post-war surge in marriage-
rates, the trend continued upwards and the median age of first marriage
in GB fell by two years to 22.6 months .for women and 24.6 months for
men (ibid., Table 3, p.17) since when it has risen by some months.
Indeed, until recently it seemed that marriage, for women, was becoming
a near-universal experience. By 1977 in England and Wales, 95% of
the female age cohort born 1930-35 had been married (OPCS, l978a, Table
4.5a, p.54). They were part of the 'homemaking as a career' generation
who grew up to adulthood after the second World War at a time when
women, in particular, were subjected to strong moral imperatives in
the direction of marriage and family and 'marriage or career' was the
choice required of the better qualified young woman (see Wilson, 1980,
Ch.3). However, it was not marriage but childbearing which now typically
removed women from the labour market and there was much debate in the
1950s as to the point at which a mother might, without harming her
children, return to paid work, usually part-time.
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The current (1983) generation of middle-aged women contains a
very high proportion who have been married at least once. While marriage
rates have now declined to a small extent, with more women 'postponing'
marriage, this trend has been accompanied by other significant demographic
changes, notably an increase in divorce and remarriage (see Rimmer,
1981, Parts 4 and 6), divorce rates having risen sharply, especially
among the younger age cohorts, since the early 1970s. Widowhood, by
contrast, has declined, so that among women of 'working' age in England
and Wales, even in the age group 55-59, only 12.4% were widows in 1982
(OPCS, 1984b, Table 1.1, p.13). In addition there is clear evidence
that an increasing number of non-married people are 'co-habiting',
either as a prelude to marriage or in the interval between marriages,
in the majority of cases (OPCS, 1984a, Ch.4, pp.28-29; Tables 4.1 -
4.8, pp.38-40). Other significant demographic trends in the context
of female economic activity include smaller families (especially since
the mid-sixties), postponement of child-bearing and 'compression' of
child-bearing into a shorter period within marriage (Rimmer, 1981,
p.21). Nor is child-bearing any longer the prerogative of the legally
married woman.
Rimmer and Popay (1982, p.14) calculate that had married women's
economic activity rates remained at their 1921 level of below 10%,
there would have been some 4.36 million fewer married women in the
labour force by 1981, whereas, by the early 1980s, about half of all
married women were economically active. Women have formed an increasing
porportion of the labour force since World War II. Until 1980 their
numbers continued to grow while the number of males in employment began






































































Source:	 1921-78, Rimmer and Popay (1982)
1979 June, Employment Gazette, (July 1983, Table 1.1, p.57)
1980-83 June, (Employment Gazette, July 1984, Table 1.1,
p . S .10).
* Rounded totals
Female economic activity rates and the location of women within
the occupational structure are crucial variables in relation to female
access to employers' pension provision. They merit brief discussion
here and are the subject of later detailed comment (Ch.7) on the continuing
under-representation of women in membership of schemes and their diff-
erential access to benefits as compared with male employees.
Firstly, while large numbers of women have, since the war, become
economically active for a much larger proportion of their 'working
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years' (Martin and Roberts, 1984, p.122) female labour force participation
rates have, across the board, been much lower than male rates and display
considerable variation as between age groups (RCDIW, 1978, Tables M3
and M5, pp.256-57; OPCS, 1984a, Table 6.8, p.107). Married women
throughout the post-war period have been less likely to be in paid
employment than their non-married contemporaries (especially single
women), but 'most of the marital status differential is more appropriately
viewed as an effect of childbearing' (Joshi and Owen, 1981, p.4).
It is the presence of young children which accounts for the consistent
absence from the labour force of a high proportion of young women in
the 25-34 age group. It is motherhood rather than marriage which is
the crucial factor in determining the number of hours worked (Rimmer
and Popay, 1982, pp.49-50). It is married women and, especially, mothers
of younger children, who display the greatest propensity to work part-
time (ibid., pp.21 and 49, Robertson and Briggs, 1979).
Furthermore, since the second World War, women have continued
to 'do those jobs with which they have traditionally been associated,
semi and unskilled manual and clerical work' (Manley and Sawbridge,
p.36). The more highly educated and professionally trained women have
likewise tended to remain clustered in typical 'service' occupations
such as teaching, social work and the professions ancillary to medicine
(Silverstone and Ward, 1980), a tendency but lately beginning to be
eroded. As Hakim has documented, women have always experienced a consid-
erable degree of occupational segregation, both vertical and horizontal,
being employed (other than exceptionally) in a narrow range of occupations
and, in the case of heirarchical occupations, clustered on the lower
rungs of the 'career ladder' (Hakim, 1979). In addition, a high proportion
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of women, after marriage, have spent much or all of their subsequent
careers in part-time employment, especially in the service sector where
80% of the increase in jobs for women between 1959-1976 was accounted
for by part-time work, notably in public sector health and education
(Manley and Sawbridge,l980, pp.30-31).
The major change in women's employment from 1939-83 has been the
removal of the 'marriage bar' and an emerging pattern of near-universal
full-time labour force participation by women up to the point of marriage
and usually beyond it. Such women are now 'available for work' even
if, at a time of recession, they are unable to find it. The character-
istic point at which employers have come to expect their female employees
to leave the labour force is at the birth of the first child, with
a part-time return to work (sometimes at a lower level than previously)
once the youngest child goes to school full-time (Martin and Roberts,
1984, pp.13-14). Young women employees are now perceived by their
employers not so much as short-term employees who will leave the labour
force within a short time, in order to marry, but as short-to-medium
term employees who may well return for another lengthy period of, typically,
part-time service. Marriage is now the event which characteristically
confers on women added domestic responsibilities, which may affect
paid employment. It is motherhood which actually removes women from
the labour market.
Banking is an example of employment which has capitalised on the
availability of young female labour on a relatively short time-span
by operating personnel policies which ensure that all but a small minority
of the most ambitious and assertive young women leave the employment
for good, to be replaced by younger women (Crompton and Jones, 1984,
Ch.4). Nor is motherhood the sole cause of women leaving the labour
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market: responsibility for the care of elderly parent or ailing husbands
is a characteristic reason for the exit of older middle aged women
from paid employment and, at any age, a husband's job move can mean
a wife's unemployment, not least, in the 1980s, if she is skilled.
The pattern of female economic activity which has emerged since
World War II is known as the 'bi-modal' career and up to the present,
it has come to constitute the 'normal' mode of female labour force
participation - normal in the sense that it is both typical and socially
approved. For, as will be seen in Ch.7, this pattern arises from a
traditional and continuing domestic division of labour in a society
(49)
which promotes marriage 	 and assigns to men (as husbands or potential
husbands) the role of full-time paid 'breadwinner' and assigns to women
(as actual or potential wives and mothers), primary responsibility
for the unpaid work of the home, including child-rearing and care of
handicapped or frail adult relatives.
Throughout the period 1939-83, marriage (and, for younger women,
motherhood) has tended to be seen both by employers and the providers
of pension schemes as the primary goal and major life-focus of all
women. Evidence is becoming available to prove that not all women,
and especially younger women, conform to this stereotype (see Martin
and Roberts, 1984, Ch.6), one from which a minority of women always
have deviated during the period in question. One factor which has
continued to construct wives as the economic dependants of their husbands
has been the continuing requirement for husbands, under common and
public law, to maintain their wives (Cretney, 1979, pp.271-74). With
a woman's first duty being construed throughout the period as owed
to her husband and family, rather than to her employer, paid work for
women has been constructed as 'fitting around' their more important
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domestic duties (see Martin and Roberts, 1984, Ch.12). Throughout
the post-war years until the 'inflationary' period of the 1970s, married
women's earnings were characteristically defined as 'pin money' or
'extras' - a peripheral input to the family income. Since the 1970s
inflation arid then rising unemployment have helped to construct married
women's earnings as a much more crucial part of the household income
(Elias, 1984).
Furthermore, during the 1970s and 80s other influences came to
bear on the way in which women were regarded, and regarded themselves,
as paid workers. In 1975, both the Equal Pay Act 1970 and the Sex
Discrimination Act 1975 became law. While neither has revolutionised
the position of women in paid employment, these Acts have brought issues
of women's pay and conditions of employment, including access to occup-
ational pension benefits (not covered by either Act) into the public
arena. The same can be said for the Employment Protection Act 1975,
with its statutory requirement that employers give maternity leave
and, other than exceptionally, retain mothers in their jobs if they
so wish.
Recent 'equal opportunities' initiatives and legal decisions from
the European Community have profoundly affected the position of women
both with regard to paid employment and access to occupational pension
benefits (see Ch.5). In addition, a steep rise in the divorce rate
and a recent challenge to the right of ex-wives to life-long maintenance
from their former husbands, have also brought attention to bear on
women's capacities and, more importantly, opportunities to be financially
self-supporting, both inside and outside of marriage. These same forces
have brought to public attention certain issues concerning women's
abilities and opportunities to generate income and capital for old
age, including access to occupational pension benefits.
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II Women as members of occupational pension schemes
a) The 'second sex' and the 'two nations': 1939-59
As previously noted, women entrants to the Civil Service in the
1870s were incorporated into occupational pension schemes already established
for men. Subsequently, to 1939, female access to occupational pension
provision spread to other public sector occupations such as teaching
and nursing, which became popular occupational choices for women.
In addition, women in the 'better' white-collar administrative and
clerical jobs in the private sector became eligible for membership
of occupational pension schemes. These were sometimes set up specifically
for women and doubled as 'savings'/marriage gratuity schemes. Other
employers preferred to reward selected long-serving female employees
with some version of an unfunded pension. Less usually, a woman in
a 'good' manual job in industry would be eligible for an employer's
pension. While, during World War II, there was a tremendous rise in
female economic activity and the 'marriage bar' was universally suspended,
much of this employment was temporary and it is questionable whether
any substantial gains were made with regard to female access to membership
of occupational pension schemes.
At the end of the war, employers were viewing the typical female
employee as a short-service worker who would provide a cost-effective
source of labour for routine and undemanding work. The minority of
single women who became long-service employees had, pre-war, been defined
as useful supervisors of the younger women, and likewise cost-effective,
since women, however senior, were usually paid less than a man for
like or similar work. Public sector women, in particular, had campaigned
and organised around the issue of 'equal pay' for decades before a
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Royal Commission was set up in 1944 (Martindale, 1939; Partington,
l976).° They were never slow to point out that unequal pay led
to unequal pensions. For while it was true that the Civil Service
pensions which tended to be used as a model for other public sector
schemes were, at that time, 'the same' for men and women in that both
could qualify for a pension nd a lump sum on the same 'formula', women's
lower pay resulted in lower pensions. As the National Association
of Women Civil Servants put it:
'although men and women have the same retiring age and the
amount of pension is in part a function of length of
service (in which respect there is no sex discrimination)
it is also in part determined by the salary in the final
years of employment and to that extent involves discrim-
ination against women.'
(RCEP, 1946, S48, p.14)
Explanations for the conitinuing existence of unequal pay were varied.
Women's pay was set at 'the market point to attract female staff' (ibid.,
S336, p.107). While unequal pay might represent 'the prejudices of
a previous age embodied in the customs and traditions of the past'
(ibid., S337, pp.107-08), various witnesses to the Royal Commission
emphasised that there was less demand for the economic services of
women who, in any case, usually regarded paid employment as an 'incidental'
stage in their lives, retired from it at an early age in order to marry
and did not usually return. Thus women had a lower 'career' value
(S348-349, p.112). It was also explained that, in general, not only
did most women support only themselves, but some single women employees
were subsidised from home: most were looking forward 'to being supported
in the relatively near future' (S362, p117). Roy Harrod, an economist,
argued that there was a social purpose in the relative levels of men's
and women's pay 'to secure that motherhood as a vocation is not too
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unattractive financially compared with work in the professions, industry
or trade' (S366, p.119).
The long-serving female employees who gave evidence before the
Royal Commission were unimpressed by their low pay and inferior conditions
of service. Evidence was presented linking low pay to female poverty
in old age. Unequal pay made it more difficult for women, usually
in low-ranking jobs, to save for old age. Unlike an elderly widow
(or even an elderly married man) with children in a position to offer
financial support, 'The spinster who finds it difficult to live in
reasonable comfort on her pension can make no comparable claim on her
relatives (if she has any) who are still earning.' (Ibid., S4l2, p.135)
It was also argued by various witnesses that single women commonly
contributed to the support of elderly parents or paid towards the education
of siblings, sometimes to 'free' a brother for the financial responsibilities
of marriage (ibid., Minutes of Evidence, 23/3/1945,
However, in the mid 1940's the problems of single women employees
were peripheral to those who made policy in the pensions field. The
pro-natalist sentiments of Harrod found their echo in the Beveridge Report
(1942) which treated married women, especially those of childbearing
age, as the key group for consideration. The Beveridge Report not
only provided the blueprint for the treatment of women in the post-
war scheme but undoubtedly influenced and reinforced the attitudes
of providers of employers' pension schemes as regards the treatment
of female employees. Beveridge accorded to single women the status
of 'honorary men' in the sense that they were to be entitled to equal
'personal' retirement pensions for lower flat-rate contributions.
Married women, however, were given a special NI status in the Beveridge
Report, which was in due course reflected in the 1946 NI provisions.
-183-
These arrangements were designed to enable married women to desist
from paid work 'In the national interest -- as soon as possible on
pregnancy' and to ensure 'that mothers should be under no financial
pressure to return to work' since 'In the next thirty years housewives
as mothers have important work to do in ensuring the continuance of
the human race.' (Beveridge, 1942, S117, p.53)
The contribution rules gave married women the opportunity to opt
out of paying Class I contributions towards (among other benefits)
a retirement pension, on the grounds that their employment was likely
to be of an intermittent nature. But in order to qualify for a retirement
pension based on her own contributions, a married woman had to pass
the 'half-test', that is, to contribute as a paid employee for at least
half of her married life - a particularly stringent test for the woman
who married and/or had her family later in life. If she failed the
test, the whole of her previous record was lost. Since all married
women with adequately insured surviving husbands would in due course
qualify for a 'dependent wife's pension' at 60% of the 'single rate'
and were eligible for a widow's pension if over 50 when their husbands
died (or, if widowed earlier, when the last child was no longer deemed
'dependent'), most married women 'opted out'. Full contributions,
effectively, secured a pension at 60 which, for a married woman was
of equal value to that of a full single woman's pension only to the
point where her insured husband retired, when it represented only 40%
of the single rate and, in subsequent widowhood - nothing.
Most women on marriage did not consider the 'gamble' of continuing
to pay full Class I contributions worth embarking upon. As young married
women they expected to leave the paid work-place for an indefinite
period - in the climate of the l940s and 50s this might extend at least
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until the last child was in secondary school. The upshot of these
rules was that a high proportion of economically active women both
decided and were advised (or pressured) to opt to be excused payment
of NI contributions in their own right (Groves, 1983, pp.43-49).
These regulations were among the factors which helped to construct
women, once married, as 'intermittent' employees, financially dependent
on husbands who were, in law required to maintain them. The designation
of married female earnings as 'extras', designed for immediate consumption
on other than 'basic' household expenses, preserved the image of husbands
as 'good providers'. The NI regulations may also have helped to construct
married women as a group who were not, and did not have to be, 'interested'
in retirement pensions, since wives could properly expect to be 'provided
(52)for' in old age.
It seems likely that the providers of employers' pension schemes
were influenced in their treatment of female employees by the nature
of these NI arrangements. Furthermore, a society's social security
provisions incorporate values and assumptions which are part of the
wider values of society (Land, 1976, p.108). As previously described,
the model for a 'good' employer's pension scheme in the post-war years
was one which improved its death benefits so that larger lump sum and/or
widows' pensions were nie available to replace, in part, the income
of a male 'breadwinner' who died in service or retirement. The 'good'
occupational pension scheme endorsed the traditional division of domestic
labour, and by endorsing it, helped to sustain it.
The Phillips Committee (1954) noted the increasing number of women
in the labour force, including a new phenomenon, the 'married woman
returner', typically working part-time. It felt that a growing elderly
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population would 'impose some check on these tendencies by obliging
middle-aged daughters to stay at home with their parents' (H.M.Treasury,
1954a, S96, p.25). Such women, married or single, were defined as
'available' carers, liable, if married, to a second interruption of
paid employment. Yet the Phillips Committee appears to have viewed
the position of women with regard to occupational pension provision
as unproblematic. No link was made between 'caring' as a full-time
occupation incompatible with paid employment and involving possible
loss of pension rights, even in respect of single women carers. Women
were mentioned in relation to occupational pension provision only in
the context of sex-differential 'pensionable ages' (ibid., S243-245,
pp.65-66).
The Institute of Actuaries report (Bacon et.al., 1954) illustrates
attitudes towards women in employment and in relation to employers'
pension provision. Discussing the necessity for increased economic
productivity in Britain, it noted that, with single women's economic
activity rates already very high, it was married women who constituted
the pool of untapped female labour. Yet harmful social consequences
might ensue from mobilising married women into the labour force in
greater numbers - 'it might have a bad effect on family life -- and
-- reduce the number of births' (ibid., p.212). The actuaries, seemingly
an entirely male body, gave no thought to increasing female access
to occupational pension scheme membership, being far more concerned
with the issue of widows' benefits (ibid., p.245).
The Institute of Actuaries estimated that 1,301,000 women were
members of occupational pension schemes as compared with 4,960,000
men. Slightly over half the women were in public sector employment,
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with the biggest contingent of 260,000 being employed by the National
Health Service (ibid., p.120). The first Government Actuary's survey
(1956) showed, for private scheme membership only, 830,000 women members
as compared with 3,470,000 men. Of all the women who were working
for employers with pension schemes, 34% of salaried and 23% of waged
women had access to a scheme, as compared with 71% and 38% of salaried
and waged men (GA, 1958, S13, p.4).
Durham (1956), in his handbook for private sector pension scheme
administrators surveyed the practices of 'a representative cross-section'
of firms in membership of the Industrial Welfare Society. He found
that most admitted women to schemes, though usually at a later age
than men, commonly 25 or 30, as against 21. 'A few' excluded all women
or married women. In addition, some schemes gave lower benefits to
women for the same level of contribution as men, because of greater
longevity and earlier retirement. Also, it was customary to exclude
women from death and disability benefits, which seemed 'hardly justified
considering the number of working women who have dependents' (Durham,
1956, p.20).
Labour's plan for National Superannuation, as discussed, was intended
to provide substantial alternative and complementary provision to the
occupational sector. As part of this strategy, it promised women (a
disadvantaged group as regards employers' superannuation schemes) 'equal
rights' with men, accompanied by an equal requirement to pay earnings-
related contributions, regardless of marital status. Women were promised
a guaranteed minimum basic pension, equivalent in value to the existing
state 'dependent wife's' retirement pension, in recognition of married
women's characteristic period of absence from the labour force. Close
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reading of the document, however, reveals this 'married women's' concession
to be, in reality, a universal 'guaranteed minimum pension' to be made
available to all adults over pensionable age (The Labour Party, 1957,
p.45). More interesting in this context is the proposal for a redistributive
formula affecting the earnings-related component of the eventual retirement
pension. This arrangement was designed to favour both women and manual
workers, since pensions were to be calculated on 1/120th of annual
earnings before the age of 25 and between the ages of 45-65 (the new
eventual pensionable age for all) and on 1/240th of annual earnings
between 25-44 (ibid., p.63).
The National Superannuation plan did not address the question
of female access to occupational pension provision. Nor did the Conservative
White Paper (1958) which proposed that the 'married women's option' should
continue in the National Insurance scheme but that all employed
women should be required to contribute in full to the proposed graduated
pension scheme. Women would in fact be required to pay more for a
graduated pension of the same value as a man's, since they lived longer
and could draw their pension five years earlier, after a shorter 'contributing'
life (MPNI, 1958, S37, p.11). Given employers' rules regarding compulsory
retirement on reaching pensionable age, this shorter working life did
not in fact necessarily arise from choice.
The 1959 Graduated Pension Scheme is noteworthy in the context
of female access to occupational pension provision in that the Parliamentary
debates allowed interested M.P.s to draw attention to the under-representation
of women in employers' pension schemes. While most of the discussion
about women and such schemes related to the treatment of widows (for
whom 'contracted-out' employers were not to be required to make provision),
G H Reynolds (Lab.) raised the plight of the 7 million people who would
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not benefit from the proposed scheme because they earned less than
the £9 minimum weekly earnings required for inclusion. Sir Keith Joseph
(Cons.) replied that 434 were women. Harold Finch (Lab.) criticised
Sir Keith for discounting the needs of women, whereupon Sir Keith claimed
to have said married women (which he had not) and asserted that they
were part-time. Finch answered that 'The very section of the community
which needs a more adequate pension is being left out', noting the
presence of low-paid men, dismissed by Joseph as young men just beginning
to earn. Other speakers emphasised that too many women, without access
to occupational pension provision, were also in danger of being left
out of the Graduated Pension Scheme. Meanwhile providers of employers'
pensions could pick and choose just which employees to contract in
and out, saying 'None of my women workers will be in my scheme' (H of C,
Deb.606, Cols.818-905, 9/6/1959).
It was in Standing Committee that the issue of poor female access
to occupational pension provision got its best airing. After Richard
Crossman (Lab.) took up the cause of low-paid workers facing exclusion
from both graduated and employers' pension schemes, Miss Herbison (Lab.)
took on Miss Pitt (Cons.) for referring to 'the man on the shop floor'
when 7of all women were not in employers' schemes. Miss Pitt replied,
'As for the women, certainly I believe in any developments which
help women, but we have to remember the practical point that a
large number of women marry and are not so vitally interested
in such things as are the men'
(HofC. 1958-9, col. 32).
Miss Herbison was tenacious in promoting the cause of women excluded
from employers' schemes, claiming that the 'better' schemes catered
mainly for professional women. As a colleague observed, 'Employers
won't put themselves out to provide good schemes for women.' (Ibid,
col. 1025).
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Whereas in the later 1950s there were about 7 million women in
the G B work force (Table 15), the Government Actuary's 1956 survey
shows that in G B and Northern Ireland, about 3 million were working
for firms with occupational pension schemes and 830,000 were in schemes.
There was a particular disparity between the access of salaried women
(at 34%) and salaried men (at 71%) (G A., 1958, S13, p.4). The 800,000
female public sector scheme membership in 1956 (G A , 1981, Table 2.2,
p.6) was a consequence of policies which gave full-time permanent employees
wider access to scheme membership.
The growth of occupational pension provision in the post-war period
rested to a considerable extent on tax advantages and the employers'
perceived need to attract and retain staff. In addition there was
a tradition of employer benevolence which, as Green (1982, p.269)
argues, 'helps to explain why the state has always been in the forefront
of providing pensions for its own employees since, for political reasons,
it liked to be seen as a good employer'. Employers' pension schemes
were 'efficient' in that they permitted the oldest employees to be
retired on a more comfortable income, generated by deferred earnings,
than would be provided by the state retirement pension alone.
In examining the position of women, as compared with men, during
this post-war period, it can be remarked, firstly, that women, with
their typically lower earnings, would certainly have attracted less
tax relief on their occupational pension contributions than their male
colleagues, especially until 'equal pay' (in the public sector only)
was introduced over a period of seven years in the 1950s. Furthermore,
employers appear to have been no more anxious to retain the services
of female employees as individuals than had been the case in the late
19th century. What employers wanted was access to an available piol
of cheap, competent female labour, with a rapid turnover. In fact,
the employers began to fish, simultaneously, in two pools.
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In the first pool were the young unmarried or newly married women,
defined by employers as cheap labour not likely to need, other than
exceptionally, an occupational pension on retirement. It was customary
for young women who were in occupational schemes to take out their
(53)
employee pension contributions on leaving their employment.
	
In the
case of better-paid and qualified women, with a tendency to marry a
little later than average, several years' employers' contributions
might remain to subsidise the pension fund in the future. It was unusual
for employees to be allowed to withdraw any but employee contributions,
without interest, as Durham (1956, p.39) illustrates with regard to
the private sector. Thus, pension funds benefited from accrued contributions
made in respect of female 'early-leavers' (Davis and Neale, 1969, p.21).
It was in the employer's interest to attract young women for cost-effective
short-term service only, if possible without incurring the cost of
occupational pension provision. This could be done in the private
sector by closing and severely limiting female access to 'career grades'
in a particular employment. In the public sector, by contrast, full-
time employees in established white-collar employment usually had a
right to belong to an occupational pension scheme.
The second pool of available labour consisted of 'married women
returners' who accepted part-time employment in increasing numbers.
Such women constituted a particularly cost-effective source of labour
for whom access to occupational pension provision was almost never
provided, in either private or public sector employment. 'Returners'
were deemed to be 'secondary' workers with 'secondary' incomes, financially
dependent on their husbands.
Where employers did offer membership of occupational pension schemes
to women, it was possible to ensure that in the interests of 'efficiency',
long-serving female employees left the work force at an earlier age
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than men. By setting the 'normal' compulsory retirement age for women
at 60 - 'pensionable age' under National Insurance, women could be
retired five years earlier than their male colleagues. Some could
be enabled or required to retire in their fifties if no longer 'efficient',
through strategies of 'early retirement' financed by membership of
the employers' pension scheme. Targets for such arrangements were
'manual' women who had 'slowed down' or women caring for sick husbands
or elderly relatives (Davis and Neale, 1969, pp.13, 19).
In a word, occupational pension schemes had not been provided
in the first place with the needs of women in mind. After the Second
World War, with an increasing number of women entering and re-entering
but much less usually remaining in the labour force, employers sought,
where possible, to avoid offering pension scheme membership to women.
Where offered, employers used such 'retirement' provision to facilitate
and induce the exit of female employees from the work force at an earlier
age than men.
b)	 1959-69: Whose pensions for prosperity?
An interesting perspective on the type of advice given to the
'pensions industry' in the 1960s regarding the treatment of women employees
in pension schemes, is to be found in the first of a series of well
established texts written for pension scheme administrators 	 Pilch
and Wood (1960) addressed the question in unusual detail in the context
of cost-effectiveness in the administration of private sector schemes.
Firstly, the authors argue that an occupational pension scheme
is a means to 'attract and retain the right type of employee in service'.
While young 'family men' are normally uninterested in retirement pensions,
they will succumb to the lure of good benefits for death in service
(Pilch and Wood, 1960, p.41). However, a badly designed scheme may
be worse than no scheme at all
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employer, for example, having installed what he regarded
as a generous scheme to cover every member of his staff, complained
that he found it even harder to get shorthand-typists than before.
In view of the facts, that the scheme was contributory, and that
few of the young girls who joined it had their eye on any goal
more distant than marriage, it was hardly surprising that they
regarded the compulsory contributions as merely another deduction
from pay, without any thoughts for the benefits provided from
the scheme.'
(Ibid., p.41)
This anecdote is followed by an example of a firm providing an 'unfunded'
pension scheme for women staff, due to the high turnover of young women
leaving to get married. A 'funded' scheme would have been uneconomic,
since few women would remain in the scheme until retirement. Also,
few would have dependants or need life insurance. 'At the same time,
the directors did not want female staff to feel neglected when news
of the pension scheme for male employees was released' 'Reassurance
was needed for older women'. The women were sent a letter.
Dear Miss Bloggs,
'After careful consideration, the directors have decided to introduce
a pension scheme for male employees. For technical reasons, it
has been considered best for female staff to be excluded from
the scheme, but the directors want you to know that it is the
intention of the company to provide you with a non-commutable
and non-assignable life pension if you remain in our employment
until 60, based on salary in the last five years'
(ibid,, p.80).
This offer, as analysed by Pilch and Wood, requires only a small reserve
for its operation and is a flexible and cost-effective way of dealing
with that small minority of women who prove to be long-service employees.
This is not, as fairly pointed out, a 'good' pension from the employee's
point of view, since, for the pension to be paid at all, on this 'unfunded'
basis, the company must remain prosperous and, indeed, remain in business.
It is not as secure an arrangement as the 'insured' pension scheme
provided for men: no tax relief is due until the pension is paid and
there is an absence of insured death benefit (ibid.). In other words,
it is a second-class pension arrangement for women. Not for nothing
do Pilch and Wood raise the issue of female access to pension schemes
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in a chapter headed 'Some Special Problems', returning later to devote
three pages to 'Female Employees' in a chapter entitled 'More Special
Problems'.
Women employees are defined as the cause of 'special difficulties'
with regard to employers' pensions, due to the short term 'temporary'
nature of their employment, and the fact that they regard such paid
work as 'no more than a stepping-stone to marriage' (ibid., p.139).
Moreover these 'girls' are by 1960 becoming less predictable, since
'Many will leave as soon as they get married, others when the first
child arrives.' (Ibid.) There is even a rising phenomenon known as
the 'married woman returner' who has apparently been traditional in
some industries. It is not, however, suggested that she should be
admitted to, or re-established in, an employer's pension scheme. The
only real purpose of occupational pension provision for women is 'to
secure the orderly retirement of those who do remain with the employer
until normal retirenent date' 	 (ibid.), preferably by means of an unfunded
scheme.
If 'valid reasons' exist for providing a funded scheme, there
must be 'fairly stringent' age and service qualifications for female
membership. Women should be over 30 and under 55 on entry, with a
minimum of five years' service. There should be little or no life
insurance protection. Reference is made to the higher cost of purchasing
a female pension than one for a male of the same age (ibid., p.140),
a situation 'aggravated by the tendency to retire women at the earlier
age of 60' due to the lower pensionable age in the NI scheme. Pilch
and Wood assert that the annual cost of a pension at 60 for a woman
is 50% higher than for a man of 65, not mentioning that the woman is
likely to be earning a good deal less than her long-serving male colleague,
he being likely to have secured promotion.
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Pilch and Wood (1960) found it 'difficult to imagine any scheme
which is likely to prove satisfactory as an incentive to attract and
retain the services of female employees' since pension benefits in
general were not attractive to the 'under 40s, women had few dependents
and they were likely to be deterred by a contributory scheme' (ibid.).
By implication, women were not earning a 'household' income needing
eventual replacement on retirement, elderly parents were better off
under post-war NI provision and married women were not responsible
for maintaining themselves or dependants. The only type of pension
scheme which might 'conceivably hold some attraction for a girl
is the marriage dowry benefit (usually at the rate of one month's salary
(55)for each year worked up to twelve years maximum)'
	
- a 'sentimentally
attractive idea' of questionable worth. Such a 'dowry' could only
act as an incentive to marriage if such were needed. Employer interest
would be better served 'in the majority of cases if the girls did not
leave in order to get married but continued working' (ibid.).
It does not seem to have occurred to such commentators that there
might be a link between the rapid labour turn-over of young women in
a situation of full employment and personnel policies which carefully
defined them as transient staff, confined to routine work outside the
type of 'career path' offered to white-collar males. For it is white-- -
collar female employees which Filch and Wood prove to be discussing:
their 'problematic' fast labour turnover is equated with the comings
and goings of (male) manual workers, a group equally difficult to corral
into pension schemes (ibid., p.142).
In the light of these attitudes it is not surprising to find that the
GA's second survey (1963) estimated that there were only 800,000 women
in membership of occupational pension schemes in the private sector,
as compared with 6,400,000 men. The proportion of women in public
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sector schemes was much higher, with 900,000 women to 3 million men
(GA, 1966, Table 1, p.7). In the private sector there were 500,000
non-manual women, representing 18% of the total non-manual private
scheme membership, and 300,000 manual women, representing 8% of the
manual workers (ibid., Table 7, p.11). In terms of scheme membership,
40% of non-manual women were covered (80% men) in the private sector,
and 15% of manual women (55% men). In the public sector, 80% of non-
manual women (90% men) were covered, and 15% of non-manual women compared
with 65% men (ibid., Table 9, p.12). The Government Actuary's report
attributes the apparent decline in provision for manual women since
1956 to the introduction of the National Insurance Graduated Pension
Scheme (ibid., p.12).
The GA's report shows that in 1963 an estimated 140,000 women
were already receiving public sector occupational pensions as compared
with 820,000 men. 90,000 women were receiving private sector pensions,
as compared with 460,000 men. The majority of these pensioners, 4
out of 5, were in 'non-insured' schemes (ibid., Table 10, p.13) with
74% receiving less than £3 per week and 25% of the total were getting
less than £1 per week. A mere 7% were getting more than £7 (ibid.,
Table 14, p.20). This evidence corroborated the findings of research
(undertaken between 1959-64) showing women as the poorest of the elderly,
one reason being that few had access to employers' pension provision.
Cole and Utting (1962, pp.56-57) found that in 1959-60 only %of women
in their sample as opposed to 38% of men, had occupational pensions,
mainly women who had been in teaching or the Civil Service. Townsend
and Wedderburn (1965, pp.101-102) found that in 1965 only 16% of women
of 65-69 and 7% of women of 75 plus had any sort of occupational pension
provision, as compared with 45% to 38% of 'couples'. Among the single
women in the sample, 18% had pensions as compared with 9% of widows.
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Townsend and Wedderburn recorded the single women, mostly with a substantial
record of paid employment, as much worse off than men (ibid., p.109).
The MPNI (1966) surveying the financial circumstances of pensioners
in 1963/64 found only	 40,000 'wives' with occupational pensions,
as compared with 880,000 'men and women' (S40, p.14). Occupational
pensions were being paid to only 1 in 7 of single women, 2 out of 5
single men, and f in 2 of the married couples (ibid., S32, p.11).
Thus in the mid-sixties, it was clearly demonstrable that single
women were greatly under-represented among current occupational pensioners.
Married women were even more notable for their absence, due to patterns
of economic activity and employers' personnel and pension scheme practices
already discussed. However, by the mid-sixties there were married
women, especially in the public sector, in full-time pensionable employment,
qualifying for eventual receipt of occupational retirement pension
benefits. Once more it is the perceptive Rhodes, in his study of public
sector pensions, who briefly identified and commented upon the increasing
labour force participation of women as significant in the context of
employers' pension provision:
'If this trend continues, there will be a need to assess what effect
it will have on pension provision; whether, for example, married
women are likely to look more towards their own employment to
provide them with a pension, or at least to provide a supplementary
pension to any earned by their husbands.'
(Rhodes, 1965, pp.243- 44)
The thinking of Pilch and Wood (1964) on married women had not advanced
so far. Even in 1967, they were still advising that it was 'virtually
impossible to treat men and women alike for pension purposes' (Pilch
and Wood, 1967, pp.26-27). Under a section laconically entitled 'Sex',
the authors assert that, owing to the NI pensionable age and the differential
patterns of female employment, there are 'powerful arguments against
the inclusion of women in occupational pension schemes at all.' (Ibid.,
p.27)	 It is a 'small minority' who remain unmarried and stay with
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the same employer until retirement age. By 1967 the authors, aware
of 'married women returners', state that 'even if they subsequently
re-enter employment' it is likely to be 'on a different footing', i.e.
part-time or in a different type of employment' (ibid.). The inference
is that the married woman is a secondary worker, possibly in a less
responsible job than she was before she took her 'career break'. This
time round the authors are not as enthusiastic as they once were about
unfunded pension provision for the deviant minority of single women.
It is pointed out that their need for adequate retirement pension provision
is 'just as great if not greater as for men' (ibid.). Thus, there
are good grounds for admitting women to the 'men's' schemes provided
that more stringent entry qualifications are applied to women. This
cuts out 'wasteful administrative work associated with the inclusion
of large numbers of female employees who are likely to leave within
a few years for reasons unconnected with the pension plan' (ibid.).
By 1967, as the GAs third survey showed, there were 2,300,000 women
in membership of private occupational schemes, as compared with 6,800,000
men: in the public sector there were 1 million women as compared with
2,100,000 men (GA, 1968, Table 3, p.8). In the private sector 800,000
non-manual women were covered by employers' pension schemes, representing
25% of the total non-manual private scheme membership, and 500,000
manual women representing 14% of all manual workers included (ibid.).
40% of all non-manual female private sector employees were covered
by schemes as against 75% of the men: 15% of all manual women were
covered as against 60% of manual men. In the public sector, 70% of
all non-manual women were in schemes (90% of men) and 15% of non-manual
women as compared to 65% of men (ibid., Table 4, p.9). The report
pointed out that 'although 85% of the firms employ both men and women,
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only 50% of their schemes incorporate both sexes, and women are frequently
excluded ' (ibid., p.9).
'Manual' women, with their typically low earnings, were most at
risk to being excluded from schemes in both public and private sector
employment. Even the proportion of non-manual women covered in public
sector employment had seemingly dropped since 1963, almost certainly
due to the diminishing pool of full-time single women employees. Nonetheless,
there were far more women in schemes, especially private sector schemes,
there being more women in paid employment. However, as indicated in
the previous chapter, women were proportionately more likely than men
to be excluded from membership of employers' schemes for various reasons
cited in the GA's 1967 survey (1968, S6, p.11), especially part-time
working.
No information was given by the GA on occupational pensioners
in 1967, though Townsend's poverty survey in 1968-69 sampled pensioners
in the U.K.(56) He found 16% of non-manual single women and 4% of manual
single women with employers' pensions. Townsend compared these findings
with 'married' households where the husband and/or, less usually, the
wife, had an occupational pension. 45% of non-manual and 30% of manual
'married' households were in receipt of occupational pension income
(Townsend, 1979, Table 23.12, p.810). A steady 'across the board'
38% of men were receiving employers' pensions at under 70, 70-79 and
80 plus. By contrast, women (including widows) were represented at
23% in the under 70 group, 18% in the 70-79 group and 10% in the 80
plus group (ibid., Table A.96, p.1064). Clearly there had been an
improvement, if slight, in female access whether as scheme members
or 'survivors', to occupational pension benefits, though the amounts
in 1969-70 were small. Only 11% of all women under 70 were receiving
more than £200 per year (20% men): 6% of women over 70 (16% of men)
were in receipt of such a pension (ibid., Table A.97, p.1064). In
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th lower income ranges, women appeared to do slightly better than
men, which suggests that the male figures may have been 'skewed' by
the presence of male 'manuals' on low pensions, while the females included
a higher proportion of 'white-collar' workers with pensions from 'professional'
occupations and widows of salaried men from the 'better' pension schemes
which provided death benefits.
By the late l960s there were signs that, particularly in the private
sector, where female access rested on the individual employers' decision,
this was emerging on an issue of personnel practice, not un-related
to the appearance of the Labour White Paper (1969). The NAPF decided
to feature a 'Pensions for Women' session at their annual conference
in May 1969, though being unable to find any woman speaker from the
'pensions industry' they had to be content with a woman personnel officer
from Boots and a sympathetic male pensions officer from Imperial Tobacco!
(Davis and Neale, 1969, p.31)
	
It was there pointed out that most
pension 'texts' gave 2 or 3 pages to women (ibid., p.11). Reference
was made in the discussion to mechanisms which enabled 'married women
returners' to buy back or buy in past service and to schemes which
made membership compulsory for married women. More typically, married
women were given the option of joining a pension scheme on the assumption
that many husbands would already have made arrangements to 'provide
for' their wives (ibid., pp.14-15). It was noted that the state pension
usually comprised a far higher proportion of a female's income in old
age (ibid., p.15) as compared with that of a man, and that women tended
to be left in the Graduated Pension Scheme rather than being provided
with access to an employers' pension scheme (ibid., p.16). Financially
speaking, it was not worth an employer's while to contract them out.
The point was also made that part-time women were not provided
for in employers' pension schemes and suggestions were offered for
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a formula whereby such provision might be made in the case of married
women 'returners' with previous service (ibid.). Widowers' pensions
were deemed anumecessary expense. Speakers backed the idea of giving
women 'retrospective' pension rights if, say, they stayed with an employer
for 10 years (ibid., p.19). This discussion was almost certainly taking
place among the 'enlightened' but it serves to illustrate the fact
that the access of women to occupational pension schemes was coming
on to the agenda for discussion by occupational pensions administrators.
Thus in the 1960s, occupational pension provision showed a modest
growth in respect of women. But while full-time permanent female employees
in the public sector had high access to scheme membership, there was
still a marked reluctance to include women, especially younger women,
in private sector schemes. The vaunted 'flexibility' of employers'
schemes included their facility for excluding women. More attention
was being given (see Ch.8) to the needs of widows. Indeed, research
findings revealing the extent of female poverty in old age were used
to advance the case for improved widows' benefits. With single women
patently forming an increasingly small minority of the adult female
population and with the 'bi-modal' employment career of married women
becoming more widely recognised 1 policy makers in both the statutory
and occupational pension sectors appear to have been far more concerned
with the situation of women as potential widows of male employees than
as 'employed' persons needing to generate a replacement income in their
own right for earnings interrupted by death or retirement.
c)	 The 'pensions debate' and the female employee 1969-75
During the period of the 'pensions debate' women's issues were
coming more into the public arena and questions relating to female
access to retirement pension provision likewise became more prominent.
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The 1969 'Crossman' plan promised a 'new deal' for women, requiring
contributions on the same basis as men (DHSS, 1969, S72-74, pp.25-26).
With its redistributive format, favouring the low-paid, the scheme
clearly acknowledged women's limited access to occupational pension
provision (ibid., S13, p.34), though it was anticipated that female
membership would increase. The 1970 Labour government announced its
intention of legislating for 'equal pension rights' before the EPA
1970 became effective in 1975 (H of C, 801, cols. 1788-89, 27/5/70).
When the Secretary of State for Social Services opened the debate on
the second reading of the National Insurance bill, there was brief
mention of the exclusion of women from membership of employers' pension
schemes, though this exclusion seems to have been equated with married
status and was used as an argument for extending occupational coverage
for widows. No case was made for extending occupational scheme membership
to a greater number of employed women (H of C, 794, col. 56, 19/1/1970).
The 'Joseph' plan of 1971 proposed to continue the 'married women's
option' arrangement for the basic state retirement pension. The White
Paper emphasised that about 4 million women were currently 'opting
out' and that most wives worked for 'only a part, and often only a
small part' of their adult lives. Such women were, typically, low-
paid and tended to work part-time (DHSS, 1971, S47, pp. 14-15). However,
regardless of marital status, all employed women would be required
to pay earnings-related contributions towards their membership of the
State Reserve Scheme if' not 'contracted-out' into an approved occupational
scheme (ibid., S77, p.24).
The White Paper noted that 'on present evidence' it appeared that
two-thirds of male but only a quarter of female employees were in occupa-
tional pension schemes (S24-25, p.9). It stated that since cover for
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widowhood was still inadequate in many schemes, all wishing to be
'recognised' for contracting-out purposes would be required to provide
a half-rate widow's pension if the husband died in retirement or at
least a lump sum if he died earlier (S57, p.17). 'Recognised' schemes
were to be allowed to pay a lower minimum rate of pension to women
members 'to take account of the fact that the pension must be available
to them at 60 (compared to 65 for men) and their greater longevity,
with an offset to allow for the absence of mandatory dependency provision'
ibid., S59, p.17). The OPB would also be allowed to recognise schemes
which gave women a slightly lower level of personal retirement pension
where survivors' benefits were available for dependants, such as elderly
parents (S59, p.18).
A woman employee, like her male colleagues, would have her
occupational pension 'frozen' (provided that she had attained the age
of 26 and completed five years' service) if she gave up paid work or
moved to another employer, unless, unusually, her pension rights could
be transferred to another employer's scheme. If she had less than
five years' service, her contributions would be paid over to and preserved
in the State Reserve Scheme (S65, p.19) where, however, female pensions
were to be lower than male. A woman entering the Reserve Scheme at
21 with earnings at entry of £30 per week would get a Reserve pension
of £12.70 at 60 representing 14% of her earnings at retirement, assuming
that they had risen at 3% per annum. A man earning the same amount
would get £21 at 65 (Table B, p.23). Furthermore, it was proposed
to pay the pension to women at 60 regardless as to whether retirement
had actually taken place, giving no opportunity to 'enhance' the pension.
This was because an 'earnings rule' was considered to be inappropriate
for this type of scheme and a retirement condition, to be effective,
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would need to be supported by an earnings rule (S73, p.22).
The lower pensions which would accrue to women were justified
on the grounds that female longevity and earlier 'pensionable' age
more than offset the cost of widows' benefit provision (S74, p.22).
A widow would be entitled to half her husband's pension under the Reserve
Scheme, if he had one, and could seemingly draw this in addition to
a full Reserve pension earned in her own right - just as she could
receive an occupational widow's pension and her own Reserve benefits.
It was estimated that half the 7 million people who would be required
to join the Reserve Scheme would be women (Appendix 3, p.20), whose
employers, presumably, were among those who found it 'impracticable'
to include them in occupational pension schemes (S26, p.9).
The pensions bill whith followed was castigated by Barbara Castle
(Lab.) as 'an insult and an injury to the women of this country' (H
of C, 847, col. 227, 8/5/1973), to which many women's organisations
had objected (ibid., col. 238). Having 'put all the emphasis on the
occupational pension scheme - they have given women no statutory right
to belong to it' (ibid., col.. 228). She argued that membership of
ancccupational scheme gave superior benefits to the Reserve Scheme,
yet 'equal rights', as the government claimed to be offering as regards
second-tier pension scheme provision, would, for many wonen, mean,
in reality, compulsory membership of the Reserve Scheme (ibid., col.
331).
Mrs. Castle argued that unless women were given a statutory right
to belong to an employers' pension scheme they would find themselves
relegated to the Reserve Scheme. To the extent that occupational pension
benefits had become recognised as 'deferred pay' it was necessary to
'legislate for equality of rights for women in pensions' otherwise
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women would continue to be severely under-represented in scheme membership.
'We all know that the occupational scheme is more likely to be introduced
in those areas where the employee is strongly organised, well-paid
and able to assert himself.' (Ibid., col. 229) Finally, Mrs Castle
asked that at least one-third of the membership of the OPB should be
female, since despite assurances to the contrary at committee stage,
the first eight members' names announced were male (ibid., col. 234).
Mrs Kellett-Bowman (Cons.) supported mandatory equal access to
schemes for women at the same age as men, pointing out that many women
probably did not take a 'keen interest' in membership precisely because
early in their careers they were not able to acquire enough years of
service for preservation. Yet women 'may have to change jobs willy-
filly not because of their own promotion but because their husbands
move --' (ibid., col. 237). However, Mrs Kellet-Bowman dismissed any
disadvantages to women under the bill as 'a few snags', one of which
was the lack of facility for women to earn a higher Reserve pension
after the age of 60 (ibid., col. 235).
Other members were more critical. Alec Jones (Lab.) quoted the
National Council of WomEn's comment that the bill but little reflected
general social change 'and especially the rapidly changing position
of women both inside and outside the home' (ibid., col. 338). Geoffrey
Stewart-Smith (Cons.) demanded that the OPB sIould 'use its powers
to make mandatory the right of women to be given access to occupational
pension schemes. Nothing less is good enough' (ibid., col. 239).
However, despite the efforts of Michael Meacher (Lab.) to illustrate
the extent to which women were discriminated against in occupational
pension provision (ibid., cols. 251-53) it became abundantly clear
in the course of' the debate that the Conservative government did not
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wish to inhibit the growth of occupational pcnsion schemes or antagonise
employers by requiring equal treatment for women (ibid., cols. 250,
253, 258-59). As a government spokesman put it, 'There is no doubt
that many employers who have large numbers of female employees - many
of whom will be in part-time employment and many of whom will work
for a short period and then retire - who at present are prepared to
set up occupational pension schemes for men alone would not' (in the
event of an equal treatment requirement) 'be prepared to set them up
at all.' (Ibid., col. 258) It was further argued that the greatest
discrimination against women was practised by 'small employers' as
the evidence of a recent British Institute of Management survey showed:
such employers would most easily be persuaded to discontinue or fail
to embark on employers' pension provision (ibid., col. 255, Norman
Lamont, Cons.).
Had the Social Security Act 1973 become fully effective, it would
have offered a residual statutory second-tier retirement pension as
an alternative to inclusion in an employers' pension scheme. The Conser-
vatives were subjected to considerable criticism for this proposed
treatment of women (Groves, 1983, p.51; Kincaid, 1976, p.51; Land,
1976, p.125).
The fourth GA's survey of employers' pension provision, undertaken
in 1971, threw further light on the continuing under-representation
of women in occupational pension schemes. Female employees were sometimes
excluded from schemes as a class, where men were admitted. More frequently,
as with private sector manual workers, they were simply not in a category
of employment which qualified them for scheme membership (GA, 1972,
Table 6, p.12). It remained the case that women had far better access
to occupational pension provision in the public than in the private
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sector, though the influx of women into part-time public sector employment
was visibly diminishing female access even in this traditionally 'good'
sector (see Ch.3, Table 11 above). The actual numbers of women remained
the same in 1971, with a million female members of public sector schemes
as against 3,100,000 men. A further 100,000 women were in membership
of private sector schemes, giving a total of 1,400,000 women as compared
with 5,600,000 men, whose numbers, as previously noted, had reduced
by over a million. The slight increase in the proportion of manual
women n membership to 25% in the public sector and 19% in the private
sector had been offset by a decrease among non-manual women to 60%
in the public sector and 36% in the private sector. Such evidence
gave no reason to suppose that the access of women to employers' pension
provision was improving (see Ch.3, Table 11 above).
While no GA's report had yet given part-time work as a specific
reason for exclusion from pension scheme membership, it was this which
placed many women in both public and private sectors outside the scope
of occupational pension provision. That coverage was particularly
variable for women, as compared with men, in terms of occupation, hours
worked and age, was well illustrated by the findings of the New Earnings
Survey 1970, which included questions on occupational scheme membership.
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Table 16
Percentage of employees in occupational pension schemes:
by occupation group, April 1970, GB.
Occupation group
Non-Manual	 Males Females Full time Full time
Men 21+ Women 21^
1. Managers	 73.1	 35.2	 74.0	 37.7




7. Other professional and
technical	 71.6	 57.7	 76.3	 64.6
8. Office and communications 69.8 	 35.8
	 76.0	 43.9
9. Sales	 53.9	 7.1
	 63.6	 13.0
Manual
6. Medical, dental, nursing
and welfare	 83.3	 37.6
8. Office and communications 72.7 	 23.6
9. Sales	 38.3	 2.0
11. Catering, domestic and
other service	 27.2	 9.8












All NES categories 1-16
Non-manual	 73.2	 38.6	 78.0
	 50.4
Manual	 45.3	 11.9	 49.9
	 19.0

















































Percentage of employees in occupational pension schemes:
by age group, April 1970 GB.
All Males All Females Full time Full time
Males	 Females
All ages	 54.4
	 26.4	 55.3	 36.0
Source: Department of Employment, 1971, New Earnings Survey 1970,
Table 111, p.199.
The 1974 White Paper Better Pensions emphasised 'equality for
women' arguing 'For too long women have been treated as second-class
citizens in pension and benefit provision.' (DHSS, 1974, p.iii) The
proposed statutory pension schemes, the first-tier basic pension and
second-tier SERFS (see Ch.3 above) would permit women to qualify for
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full benefits on retirement in return for full contributions while
in paid employment (ibid., S45, p.12). Credits would be given towards
entitlement to a basic pension for time spent out of the labour force
on specified domestic duties (see Atkins, 1980) and SERPS would be
based on a contributor's revalued 'best twenty years' of earnings, a
'positive discrimination' measure designed to complement the 'credit'
system both for persons who withdrew from the labour market as 'carers'
and for those whose better earnings occurred at an earlier stage of
their employment career. In addition to improved widows' benefits
in both state and occupational provision (ibid., S62, p.17), occupational
pension provision would incorporate 'equal status' for women.
'The government are committed to the principle that women
should have a fair deal in occupational pension schemes.
This demands that schemes should not discriminate against
women in the rules for admission. It is proposed therefore
to legislate so that women have the same access to occupational
schemes as men doing comparable work, so that they are
admitted at the same age, after the same period of qualifying
employment and on the same basis of compulsion or choice.'
'Comparable work' would be defined along the same lines as under the
Equal Pay Act 1970 (ibid., S75, p.21). With a right to 'equal access'
secured, the government would then 'review in detail all the considerations
relating to providing cover for women in occupational pension schemes'
to see if further action was required to eliminate sex discrimination
(ibid., S76, p. 21). The issue of female participation in the running
of occupational pension schemes had already been remitted for consider-
ation by the OPB (ibid., S8l, p.22).
The Social Security Pensions bill of 1975 had a stated aim 'to
make provisions for securing that men and women are afforded equal
access' (p.1) and the Secretary of State (Mrs Castle) announced 18/3/1975
that she had formally asked the OPB to advise 'on what further provisions
are needed to end discrimination against women in occupational pension
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schemes' (H of C 888, col. 1433). During the debate on the Second Reading
Mrs Castle did not warm to Mrs Kellet-Bowman's (Cons.) argument that
employers should be encouraged to admit women to 'good schemes' (in
which the presence of women would be an added expense) by giving such
employers preferential terms of rebate in respect of 'contracted-out'
female employees. Norman Fowler (Cons) expressed fears that unless
such preferential arrangements were made, employers with a high proportion
of women workers would be dissuaded from 'contracting-out', faced with
the knowledge that women both live longer and retire earlier (ibid.,
col. 1511). No such preferential arrangements were made and Mrs Castle's
reference of 'equal treatment' issues to the OPB seems effectively
to have deleted the topic from discussion in Standing Committee A.
The interest of that discussion lies in the extent to which members
expressed views constructing female earnings as sporadic, incidental
or undertaken at times of household financial 'crisis' other than in
the case of a deviant minority of 'serious career women' (H of C, 1974/75,
cols. 61-62, 10/4/1975) alias 'a few middle-class professional women
of advanced thought' (ibid., col. 114, 15/4/1975) or women's 'libbers'
(ibid., col. 122). 'I think we all agree that a women's place is clearly
in the home' stated Mr Hall-Davies (Cons.) (ibid., col. 132).
That women were not, in point of fact, 'in the home' to the extent
which might have satisfied Mr. Hall-Davies is evident from the GA 1975
survey (1978) which showed an increase of 400,000 in female membership
of occupational pension schemes. A gain of 600,000 in the public sector
was offset by a loss of 200,000 in the private sector (GA, 1978, Table
3.2, p.9). There were 1,700,000 women as compared with 3,700,000 men
in the public sector, with male membership also having risen, by 500,000,
in comparison with the revised 1971 figures. In the private sector
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there were 1,100,000 women members as against 5 million men. As previously
stated (Ch.3), in the public sector 84% of men and 59% of women were
in membership as compared with 53% of men and 17% of women in the private
sector (ibid., Table 3.1, p.8).
Women were greatly over-represented among those categories of
employee excluded from scheme membership, with, for women, part-time
or temporary employment being a major cause in both private and public
sectors (ibid., Table 3.11, p.17). A major cause of exclusion in the
private sector was 'non-eligibility of job'. Manual workers of both
sexes were particularly at risk to exclusion on these grounds (ibid.,
Table 3.12, p.17). Figures derived from the GHS 1975 showed that whereas
men and women were equally represented in membership of schemes between
the ages of 16-24, women were consistently and increasingly under-represented
in all later age cohorts (ibid., Table 3.13, p.18). No details were
given ontheaverage pensions payable to men and women, as separate
categories, already in retirement. However, some indication of the
extent of pension entitlement among married women is to be found in
Hunt's 1976 study, where only 5.6% of married women over 65 living
at home in England were in receipt of an employer's pension, as compared
with 51% of husbands (Hunt, 1978, Table 6.4.3, p.28).
The 'pensions debate' period 1969-75 saw the re-emergence of a
'women's movement' along with legislation on both equal pay and sex
discrimination. In the pensions field, Crossman's promised 'new deal'
for women was followed by Joseph's alleged 'poor deal'. The compromise
Castle plan and ensuing legislation promised improved access and serious
consideration of wcen's position in occupational pension provision.
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d) The Social Security Pensions Act 1975: implications for women
Under the new pension arrangements effective April 1978, all women
earning over a modest 'base' are required, regardless of marital status,
to contribute a percentage of their wage towards a basic retirement
pension, among other benefits. Those women who are in an employment
category not 'contracted-out' at their workplace then pay a further
percentage of their wage up to a 'ceiling' for eventual entitlement
to a SERPS. Those who are members of 'contracted-cut' occupational
pension schemes pay at a slightly lower rate on that band of earnings
between 'base' and 'ceiling'. Employer's contributions vary likewise.
Thus 'A', a full-time retail worker earning £9,000 per annum in
1983-84 pays contributions because she earns more than £32.50 per week
(fl,689.96 per year). She is not 'contracted-out' so pays Class 1
contributions at 9% on her weekly earnings, which fall below the 'ceiling'
of £235 per week (l2,220- per year). This will eventually qualify
her for a SERFS pension, based on her 'best twenty years' revalued
in line with inflation. For a basic retirement pension she must have
paid or be credited with contributions for 9/10 of her working life,
with credits available in certain circumstances if she is unemployed,
drawing child benefit or caring extensively for someone qualified for
attendance allowance. Assuming that £9,000 represents the average of
A's 'best twenty years' and she has a good contribution record plus
any credits, the value of her pension had she retired in 1983 at 60,
as if the scheme had reached its full maturity in 1998, would be £3,517.50,
that is a full basic personal pension of £1,690 plus a £1,827.50 SERFS
pension, all taxable as earned income. For this her employer, on 1983-
84 regulations, would have paid contributions on her behalf at 11.45%
including a 1% National Insurance surcharge.
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By contrast, 'B', a public sector professiaal worker earning £9,000
per annum also pays contributions in her 'contracted-out' employment,
at 9% on her earnings up to £32.50 per week and at 6.85% on her earnings
up to the 'ceiling'. She also pays 6.30% on her total earnings into
her occupational pension scheme. These contributions will eventually
qualify her for an occupational pension, since she will have completed
more than five years' service and be over the age of 26. Should 'B'
like 'A' retire at 60 in 1983, her pension will be calculated, typically,
on a 'best' notional annual salary over her last ten years of service.
If this is £9,000, she will get a pension of £3,937.50 for 35 years
service, calculated as 1/80 of final salary multiplied by total years
of service. She will also get a lump sum equal to three times her
pension, that is £11,812.50. To this pension, plus interest on her
lump sum, B canadd her state basic retirement pension of £1,690, provided
that her employer makes no notional deduction from the occupational
pension for this. B's employer will have paid contributions at 11.45%
up to the lower-earnings limit and at 7.35% up to the ceiling (see
Matthewman and Lambert, 1984, p.45). Unlike 'A', 'B' will have received
tax relief on her occupational pension contributions, plus a tax free
lump sum. This example is modelled on the typical entitlement of a
public sector worker with a lengthy full-time employment record.
These two simple examples serve to illustrate a complicated scheme
and are predicated on the continuation of the original arrangements
to 1998. 'A' pays non-tax relieved contributions at 9% for a state
pension with two components up-rated in line with the value of money.
Her 'best twenty years' of earnings will count, helpful if she was
at her peak earnings in mid career and/or if she took a 'career break'
for any reason. 'B' by contrast will have paid ccntributions at 15.30%
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on her earnings up to the base and 13.70% thereafter to the 'ceilir)g',
at which point thecontribution is 6.30% less tax relief. In public
sector employment 'B' could move her job without losing her pension,
which would itself be index-linked.
Thus:
'A' State retirement pension	 £1,690
















Membership of SERPS is designed to advantage persons with lower
life-time earnings and interrupted careers, a group wherein women are
over-represented. Furthermore, the SSPA 1975 contained a requirement
for a 'guaranteed minimum pension' whereby all occupational pensioners
are assured of an eventual pension of 'At least as much as the State
scheme would have paid on the upper bank of earnings in respect of
the period of contracting-out, had those same earnings been used to
calculate the State pension for that period.' (TUC, 1981, p.30) The
GMP concept is designed to assist 'early leavers' and those who leave
pensionable employments before retirement age. To 'A' the prototype
state pensioner and 'B' the public service pensioner could be added
'C', a ioman whose private sector employment would give an eventual
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modest entitlement to occupational pension benefits derived from several
employments - a recipe for an eventual pension which might be no better
than SERPS, though probably with some 'lump sum' entitlements. However
'C' 's pension entitlements from the private sector would be at risk
to losing their value.
A high proportion of women members of employers' pension schemes
(77%) were 'contracted-out' of SERPS 57 by 1979 (GA 1981, Table 2.2,
p.5) at which point over 8 million men and 3 million women were in
membership, an increase of a further half million women, mainly in
the private sector, in contrast to a continuing small loss of men.
These figures continued trends previously discussed in Ch.3. 62% of
all male and 35% of all female employees were in occupational schemes,
with 55% of public sector women (90% men) and 24% private sector women
(50% men) included (ibid., Table 2.1, p.5).
While 34% of women and 22% of men were not in schemes in the private
sector because their employers did not provide them, a further 14%
of women (12% men) were ineligible on grounds of youth or short service.
28% of women (17% men) were not in private schemes by choice, because
their employment was part time or for other reasons (ibid., Table S2.8,
p.10). In the public sector, occupational scheme membership was near-
universal for full-time staff, but a massive 45% of' all female employees
were not in schemes by virtue of their service being 'part-time or
for other reasons' including temporary status. Only 7% of male employees
were in this category. (Ibid.)
Undoubtedly part-time working was the major and continuing cause
of the exclusion of women from scheme membership. Indeed, the new
arrangements permitted low, and by definition, part-time, earners,
to be excluded from contributing to the National Insurance scheme.
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In the public sector, 89% of the part-time women were not covered by
existing schemes or exercised an option not to belong to them - only
11% were covered. In fact, 42% of all female public sector employees
were part-time, as compared with 4% of the men (ibid., Tables 2.8,
2.9, pp.10 and 11). In the private sector, 71% of the part-time women
were in employment where no occupational pension scheme membership
was available. A further 21% were either not covered by existing schemes
or did not choose to belong. Only 6% of part-time private sector women
employees were in membership of occupational schemes. 2,225,000 of
such female part-timers were not in schemes and none of the 500,000
male part-timers (ibid., Table 2-9, p.11).
Early in 1979 a survey of private sector employees (McIntosh 1980)
found that occupational pension schemes were available in 71% of establish-
merits in the sample to 'either supplement the state scheme or replace
it with a better one.' Schemes were 'available to 80-90% of managers
and 72% of non-manual workers' but to 'only 50% of manual workers and
38% of part-time workers' (McIntosh, 1980, p.1147). The establishments
with occupational pension schemes included 88% of all employees in
the sample, but although women represented 37% of all employees in
the survey, only 28% of the membership of occupational pension schemes
was female.
The Department of Employment's survey of women's employment showed
major differences in access to scheme membership as between full and
part-timers. 71% of full-timers but only 43% of part-timers stated
that their employer had a pension scheme: a modest 53% of full-timers
and a miniscule 9% of part-timers actually belonged to one.
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Table 18
Proportions of full and part-time employees whose employer has an
occupational pension scheme by occupational group, 1980, GB.
* % whose employer has scheme




1*	 II**	 I	 II	 I	 II
%	 %.	 %	 %	 %
Teaching	 96	 91	 92	 35	 95	 79
Nursing, medical,
social	 86	 79	 73	 21	 80	 54
Other intermediate,
non-manual	 72	 52	 68	 45





20	 27	 6	 34	 12
All non-manual	 79	 61	 50	 13	 69	 45
Skilled	 57	 34	 39	 11	 50	 25
Semi-skilled factory	 51	 30	 38	 8	 47	 24
Semi-skilled domestic	 47	 34	 43	 7	 44	 12
Other semi-skilled	 55	 44	 30	 10	 42	 26
Unskilled	 65	 37	 32	 3	 36	 8
All manual	 54	 34	 37	 6	 44	 18
All employees	 71	 53	 43	 9	 58	 34
Source: Martin and Roberts, 1984, Table 5.16, p.49.
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Part-time working was a major cause of exclusion from scheme membership
- 67% of part-timers were excluded, with some employees being excluded
on grounds of youth (25% of full-timers only) or by reason of short
service (23% full-time, 6% part-time). Small proportions of the sample
were too old (4% overall), temporary (5% overall), in an 'ineligible'
job (6% full-time, 9% part-time) while 18% of full-timers did not
wish to join what must have been a 'contracted-in' scheme (ibid.,
Table 5.15, p.48). 39% of part-timers worked for an employer without
a pension scheme as did 22% of full-timers (ibid., Table 5.14, p.48).
There was a strong association between membership of an occupational
pension scheme and completion of lengthy full-time service in the non-
manual occupations of 'teaching' and 'nursing, medical and social'
work (ibid., Table 5.16, p.49).
The 1975 pension legislation gave women 'equal access' to
occupational pension scheme membership but the 'contracting out' arrangements
in fact permitted private sector employers to exclude certain 'employments'
Martin and Roberts (1984, pp.49-50; Table 5.18, p.50) found that occupational
segregation played its part in excluding women from schemes (see Ch. 7).
Those in 'women only' jobs were less likely to belong to a scheme.
Despite the 1975 legislation there has been continuing under-
representation of women in employer's pension scheme provision and
continuing 'unequal treatment' of women in schemes, in the absence
of sex discrimination legislation applicable to pensions and death
benefits. Part IV of this thesis gives detailed attention to 'equal
access and treatment' issues, including the relationship between occupational
pension entitlement and women's paid employment, following a
retrcqective view of the growth of occupational pension schemes and
female access to membership.
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e) Women and the growth of occupational pension schemes 1939-83
This chapter has focussed on female access to employer's pension
provision 1939-83, a period during which such provision notably expanded
especially during the 1950s and 60s when 'full employment' prevailed.
However, Table 14, Ch.3 illustrates the extent to which undifferentiated
statistics on scheme membership mask very different trends in female
access as opposed to male. In particular, while membership in the
public sector increased for both sexes, in the private sector there
was a steady decline from a peak of 6.8 million men in 1967 to 4.7
million in 1979 while, by contrast, there was a steady rise in female
membership from 800,000 in 1963 to 1.5 million in 1979.
These trends occurred at a time of general decline in male labour
force participation (see Ch.3, section 5) and of a steep rise in female
economic activity over the same period. The composition of the female
labour force became increasingly different from its pre-war counterpart
in ways of direct relevance to employers' pension provision. With
the marriage bar abolished in the public sector and a high post-war
demand for labour, the female workforce came to consist mainly of younger
women in full-thne work prior to motherhood and 'married women returners'
typically working part-time. Demand for the latter remained buoyant
despite the economic recession of the 1970s and 80s 1 not least because
there is no obligation on most employers to admit such women to membership
of occupational pension schemes. The increase in female pension scheme
membership was accounted for mainly by an increased presence of younger
full-time women, plus a leaven of older full-time women of varying
marital and parental statuses.
During the period, public sector employment proved attractive
to 'white-collar' women. Central and local government as well as the
nationalised industries have normally included permanent full-time
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female employees in their pension schemes on a parity with men. Yet
even so, in 1979, 90% of public sector men were in schemes, but only
55% of women (GA, 1981, p.4), a disparity largely explained by the
exclusion of l million part-timers (ibid., Table 2.9, p.11). By contrast,
only 50% of men and a mere 25% of women employees were included in
private sector provision (ibid., p.4). Thus, at this particular point
in time, one out of two men and three out of four women in the private
sector were reliant on building up a record with SEBPS for an entitlement
to a second-tier pension over and above the state basic provision.
Such an entitlement depended upon their having sufficient earnings
above the lower limit to qualify for inclusion.
Public sector employment has offered women the best prospect of
occupational pension scheme -membership since World War II since, in
general, employers have had no choice but to include full-time established
or permanent women staff in their schemes, regardless of marital status.
Such women have shared with men the benefits of being in the 'transfer
club' on changing jobs and of having index-linked pensions which weather
inflation better than some private sector pensions. However, another
strategy employed to counter inflation, the move towards 'terminal
salary' benefits, has favoured women less than men, since, as will
be seen in Ch.7, unlike most men in pensionable occupations, women
do not necessarily receive the highest level of remuneration (in real
terms) in the closing years of their working lives, nor do they rise
on incremental pay scales to the extent that men do.
The private sector has offered more scope to employers who have
wished to restrict membership of pension schemes to men or impose more
stringent conditions of entry on women. Furthermore, the rules of
entitlement to NI retirement pensions established in 1948 made it a
dubious proposition for employed married women to pay contributions
in their own right in preference to exercising the 'married women's
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option'. The fact that a small minority of married women paid full
contributions up to 1978 helped to construct wives as employees 'not
interested' in pensions and 'naturally' dependent upon their husbands
for financial provision in old age. With a near-universal female marriage
rate, young women's potential needs for occupational retirement benefits
were discounted. Special arrangements were made for some of the increasingly
small number of women who embarked on lengthy full-time careers, married
or single, while others were treated as 'honorary men' and admitted
to schemes at a suitably advanced age.
The history of occupational pension provision shows how successive
governments have actively encouraged employers to provide pensions
for their better-paid and/or male workers by organising state provision
in such a way that lower paid and secondary workers can legally be
excluded from schemes, in good conscience, on the grounds that they
have access to an alternative state-provided residual second-tier scheme,
such as SERFS. Women, from the late 1950s, have been primary targets
for exclusion from the occupational sector and inclusion in second-
tier retirement provision, though a proportion earned too little even
to be included in the second-tier, which offers benefits more modest
*
than most occupational schemes. It is the 'primary' (and typically
male) employee, usually of non-manual or skilled manual status who
has been the target beneficiary of post-war employers' pension provision.
As the tax threshold has fallen, so tax advantages have accrued from
scheme membership, affecting a wider band of lower earners. However,
some women work part-time precisely so as to pay no tax on their earnings.
A particularly blatant example of 'exclusion' strategies is to
be found in the provisions of the SSPA 1975 which permit workers to
be excluded by virtue of their employment category. The under-representation
of women in occupational pension scheme membership in 1979 can undoubtedly
be accounted far not only in terms of 'domestic exits' from the labour
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force and part-time working, but also because, given the degree of
occupational segregation by sex which still permeates the British labour
force (see Ch.7 below), employers have, since 1978, been able to continue
to exclude whole categories of even full-time women from their pension
schemes. For most of the period women have been poorly unionised and
issues of female access to occupational pension scheme membership have
received scant attention until the mid-seventies (TUC, 1969-83). Even
now the focus of union activity seems to be more directed towards promoting
the equal treatment of women who are in schemes, especially with regard
to the provision of widowers' pensions (which advantage men), than
towards widening female access to schemes58)One problem here is that
women may be disadvantaged by working for small firms who are far less
likely than large ones to offer membership of an employers' pension
scheme. In 1979, only 7% of employers with less than 10 employees
had a scheme, and only 33% of those with less than 100 employees.
This chapter has shown a continuing under-representation of women
in membership of occupational pension schemes and has indicated the
existence of differential treatment of men and women within these
schemes. Part IV of this study examines evidence and addresses issues




Part III: Women as Members of Occupational Pension Schemes 1939-83
Chapter 3
	
The Expansion of Occupational Pension Provision
1.	 See Rhodes (l965) Appendix 7; pp.301-314, for discussion of the
relationship between tax and occupational pensions.
2. Committee on the Taxation Treatment of Provisions for Retirement
(Chairman: James Millard Tucker).
3.	 Inter-Departmental Committee on Social Insurance and Allied Services
(Chairman: Sir William Beveridge). See Beveridge (1942), S40,
pp.19-20 as to why this report was published under Beveridge's
name alone and Marris (1977), pp.378-417 for detailed discussion
of the Beveridge Report.
4. 'I	 Employees, that is, persons whose normal occupation is employment
under contract of service
II	 Others gainfully employed, including employers, traders
and independent workers of all kinds
III Housewives, that is, married women of working age
IV	 Others of working age not gainfully occupied.'
(Beveridge, 1942, Sl9 (ii), p.10)
5. Persons in classes I, II and IV were to pay a weekly flat-rate -
contribution: men were to pay more than women 'so as to secure
benefits for Class III' (ibid., (iv)).
6.	 Beveridge argued that while 'the existence of ... independent
provision is not a reason which should lead the state to avoid
making comprehensive adequate provision of its own for everybody
in old age ... it does affect the steps by which that comprehensive
provision should be introduced'. (Ibid., S240, p.93) Persons
with occupational superannuation provision in retirement were
identified by Beveridge as being among those classes who had resources
which would enable them to subsist outside of statutory pension
provision (ibid.). It was of course envisaged that means-tested
National Assistance should be available to indigent pensioners
(ibid., S369-74, pp.142-43).
7.	 Bacon et al. (1954), p.147, noted that in 1948, special arrangements
were made to enable people who were within ten years of pensionable
age, 'but were not then insured', to 'complete the minimum period
of ten years' contributions'. Some people stayed on at work beyond
pensionable age to qualify for a basic retirement pension so Bacon
et al argued that the number of elderly retired people was likely
to be 'boosted' from this source after 1958.
8. Committee on the Economic and Financial Problems of the Provision
for Old Age (Chairman: Sir Thomas Phillips).
9. Ministry of Labour (1938).
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10. Schemes run by companies specialising in life assurance business,
not by the employers.
11. Bacon, F W, et al (1954), a study made with particular reference
to 'The financial and economic effects of pension rights of all
kinds (under National Insurance, Civil Service and Local Government
schemes, schemes for nationalised industries and under private
schemes, both by private funds and Life Offices) having regard
to the future population trends of the U.K. and, in particular,
the growing number of aged persons in the population over the
next few decades'. (p.141)
12. See Heclo (1974), pp.260-272 for an account of the emergence of
the policies which led to the Labour Party's 1969 White Paper
on national superannuation and the part played in shaping these
policies by Richard Titmuss, Brian Abel-Smith and Peter Townsend.
13. This concept discussed by Titmuss, The Times, 29th, 30th December,
1953 ('The Age of Pensions').
14. Subsequent Government Actuary's surveys were undertaken 1963 (1966),
1967 (1968), 1971 (1972), 1975 (1978) and 1979 (1981).
15. See Rhodes (1965, pp.292-300) for detail on the Graduated Pensions
Scheme and the technicalities of its financial effects on occupational
pension provision. Lynes (1963, pp.21-29) also offers a comprehensive
critique of 'contracting-out'.
16. The Labour Party proposed a short-term measure - the income guarantee,
to take elderly pensioners out of National Assistance. This measure
was never introduced, though National Assistance became Supplementary
Benefit from 1966. (For detail see Labour Party, 1963, p.18 re
income guarantee, and Webb, 1975, Ch.14, 'The Abolition of National
Assistance', pp.410-471.)
17. In this pamphlet he answers criticism of' the growing power of
pension funds to control industry by acknowledging the dangers
implicit in large institutional pension fund holdings and by arguing
for competition between insurance companies and for a means of
safeguarding pensioners' interests	 (Seldon, 1960, pp.14-21).
18. Study undertaken by Gerald Rhodes (Research Officer) with the
assistance of a study group of five men drawn from local government,
the pensions field/industry/the Civil Service and academic life
(economics and public finance). Two further members, an actuary
and an accountant, eventually resigned because 'they found themselves
in fundamental disagreement with the views of the other members
of the study group and with the general tenor and conclusions
of the study', in particular its conclusions on funding (Rhodes,
1965, pp.7 and 9).
19. The public sector schemes were: Civil Service, Local Government,
Teachers, N.H.S., Police, Firemen, National Coal Board Principal,
Electricity Supply (Staff) (England and Wales), Gas Industry (Staff),
British Railways Staff (L.N.E.R.), Airways Corporation (General
Staff), Atomic Energy Authority (Non Industrial). The private
sector schemes discussed in detail comprised thirteen very large
schemes drawn from six anonymous firms. A further five firms'
schemes were also examined. See Rhodes, (1965, Ch.5,).
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20. The USS pension scheme still reduces the retirement pension by
£100 'to allow for the State pension' in line with Civil Service
practice recently ended (McGoldrick, 1984, p.94).
21. See Crossman, 1977, with index (p.1O17) documenting references
to extensive consultations with the CBI, TUC, NALGO, the Government
Actuary's department, the Life Office Association, etc.
22. Personal pension only: dependency and widowhood cover would be
available in full from the state scheme to those 'contracted out'
(DHSS, 1969, Sl38, pp.41-42).
23. The survey notes that 1967 totals may have been overstated and
that there had been a contraction in the labour force since 1967
(S3.3, p.6; S3.4 - 3.5, p.7).
24. The report refers to the findings of the Family Expenditure Survey
1970, in which the mean occupational pension was £6.45 per week
and the median £4.05, with 40% of pensioners getting less than
£3 per week and only 18% more than £10 (GA, 1972, p.14).
25. Figures revised from the Government Actuary's 1971 survey (1972).
No information given on relative proportions of manual and non-
manual workers.
26. This legislation builds on certain provisions of the Social Security
Act 1973 and the Social Security Act 1975.
27. A detailed exposition of the provisions as amended by subsequent
legislation and with explanatory notation of appropriate Ministerial
regulations is to be found in Matthewman and Lambert, 1983, Ch.11,
S11.5 - 11.57, pp.279-99.
28. An employer may contract out members of designated 'categories
of employment'. It may contract-out all 'administrative assistants'
and contract-in all 'clerks', or contract-out all persons earning
over £10,000 and contract-in all personnel earning less (see Ward,
1981, pp.23-24).
29. The 'technical' pensions literature of the 1975-78 period is replete
with articles advising employers on their best options.
30. Figures revised from the Government Actuary's 1975 survey (1978).
31. For detail on the OPB see Filch and Wood, 1979, Ch.4; TUC 1978.
Hart (1978) provides a graphic account of the vast initial 'contracting
out' operation. The Board usually has about 14 members, including
pensions specialists and trade union representatives.
32. The major issues on which the Board has been asked to report have
included solvency, disclosure of information and member participation,
equal access, the availability of cover for disabled people and
transferability of pension rights.
33. See Ch.6 of this study.
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34. For discussion see Minns (1980); Locksley and Minns (1984). Pension
funds had a market value of £53 billion in 1979, £8 billion of
which had been acquired in that year (GA, 1981, Table 4.3, p.19).
At times employers have been forced to top their funds up with
uncovenanted payments so as to be sure of meeting their liabilities
(Kincaid, 1975, p.55): at other times the funds have shown huge
surpluses (James, 1984, p.15).
35. Some are invested abroad: see Minns (1980), Ch.4.
36. Defined as those who change their jobs, become unemployed or self-
employed, leave the labour force for domestic reasons or to pursue
further education and training (OPB, 1981, S1.7, p.2).
37. Revaluation of pension benefits to compensate for the effects
of inflation.
38. Inquiry into the Value of Pensions (Chairman: Sir Bernard Scott),
see H.M. Treasury, 1981.
39. Committee to Review the Functioning of Financial Institutions
(Chairman: Sir Harold Wilson): see H.M. Treasury (1980). For
discussion of the law governing U.K. pension schemes, see Young
(1984).
40. This has been a continuing concern of the trade union movement
since the early 1970s but not all trade unionists endorse the
notion of employers' pension provision (Ward, 1981, pp.3-4).
41. In June 1984 the Secretary of State announced steps to compel
occupational pension schemes to offer indexation of benefits at
5% (or at the rate of price-inflation if less) on that portion
of the occupational pension which is not already indexed as a
Guaranteed Minimum Pension, provided that five years contributions
have been paid. The minimum age of 26 will be abolished (Pensions
Today, 1984, no.7, p.1) as will the practice of 'franking', except
in respect of pre-1978 contributions. The Secretary of State
had issued a consultative document on transferability, held a
national conference in September 1983 on 'early leaving' (DHSS,
1983), and taken advice from the OPB (1981, Chs. 7 and 9). During
1984 a government inquiry into retirement pension provision has
been in session, with much attention being directed towards the
notion of 'portable pensions', (which are in fact 'money-purchase'
schemes, long since discarded by the employer's pension sector)
which attach themselves to an individual. A consultative document
has been issued on 'portable pensions'. These latest developments,
though interesting, are too recent for discussion in this thesis.
42. Lower birth-rates between the wars had diminished the 'pool' of
younger workers.
43. Though employers no longer make receipt of a pension conditional
on their definition of good behaviour, as did 'ex-gratia' schemes.
However, a person found guilty of a criminal offence might lose
all but their Guaranteed Minimum Pension, which is inalienable
(Social Security Pensions Act 1975, S48, p.43). Furthermore,
as oulson (l975b) points out in an amusing article, high treason
is still a capital offence and capital punishment the only means
whereby a GMP can be lost, other than from natural causes.
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44. The use of the USS to facilitate what are, effectively, mass redundancies,
under the terms of the Premature Retirement Compensation Scheme
which terminates 30/9/1984, is an example.
Chapter 4	 Employers' Pensions and the Woman Worker
45. Marwick (1970, p.293) argues that in practice it was the 19-24
age group which was mainly affected.
46. Including the Civil Nursing Reserve.
47. Summerfield (1977, p.36) points out that absenteeism was a problem
among this group until state welfare provisions and accommodations
within the family and neighbourhood made it easier for married
women to work. All these women war workers must have been invisible
to the opponent of equal pay who claimed that 'even at the height
of the war half the women of the country remained unavailable
even for part-time employment' (RCEP, Minutes of Evidence, 17/10/1944,
and S340, p.108). Some 'non-employed' women were doing voluntary
work which was vital to the war effort.
48. For discussionsof the size and sex ratio of the postwar U.K. labour
force see Metcalf and Richardson (1980, pp.237-41).
49. The tax system, for instance, favours married men with an additional
tax allowance. Widow's benefits in both state and occupational
pension schemes are only permitted in respect of a legally married
wife (see Chs. 8 and 9). Due, supposedly, to an error in Parliamentary
drafting, it is legal to refuse a job to an applicant on the grounds
that they are not married, provided that men and women are treated
alike in this respect. It is still allowable to give paid maternity
leave on a discretionary basis to single women (Hewitt, 1975,
pp.9-10).
50. Civil Service pay was based on a principle of 'fair relativity':
men were paid in relation to comparable work outside the service,
and women were paid x% less (RCEP, 1946, S47, p.14). In teaching
and the Civil Service women got about 80% of the comparable male
rate (ibid., S90, p.27). Salaried local government women employees
got two-thirds to eleven-thirteenths of the male rate (S113, p.35).
This appears to have led to many anomalies as between the different
grades of employee, which were resented by women. The Royal Commission
was told of a chief county librarian earning £450 p.a. who had
died suddenly and been replaced by a man earning £600.
51. The Association of Assistant Mistresses had surveyed their membership
finding that 31% of their respondents had a fully dependent relative
- 16% had more than one. A further 20% had supported relatives
financially or were expecting to. Of the headmistresses, only
51 out of 353 never had and did not expect to give such support.
Civil Service witnesses stated that of those women of executive
grade or above, aged between 40-50, 55% were fully or partially
supporting dependants. The Royal Commission was reluctant to
accept this type of evidence (RCEP, Minutes of Evidence: 23/3/1945,
p.87; 18/5/1945, p.153).
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52. The existence of National Insurance widows' pensions for older
women and widowed mothers of' dependent children lent reality to
this line of thinking. There was, in addition, a low divorce
rate at this time.
53. A totally unscientific survey among the writer's school and university
friends who left the labour market for married motherhood in the
late 1950s and early 60s revealed that almost all cashed in their
employee contributions and spent them, typically, on refrigerators
and washing machines. A single 'job-changer' put hers towards
a car.
54. Five texts were published between 1960-1979: they are much quoted
in the technical pensions literature, the authors being highly
placed in the field of private sector pension provision.
55. The same formula employed by the Civil Service.
56. Not published until ten years later.
57. The plan ruled out the notion of providing 'housewives' with pension
credits for periods spent outside the labour market due to domestic
responsibilities (DHSS, 1969, Appendix 1, (8), 27-28, pp.56-57.
58. For discussion of the role of trade unions in promoting equalisation
of pension scheme terms, see McGoldrick (1984, Ch.8).
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Part IV
Equal Treatment for Men and Women in Occupational Pension
Schemes: Some Issues
'For women......the labour market is the hard core of a most
impermissive society in which the formal equality of the sexes
is mocked by occupational realities.'
(O.R. McGregor, 1972, p.58)
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Part IV
Equal Treatment for Men and Women in Occupational Pension Schemes:
Some Issues
Introduction
Part IV of this study addresses current issues of unequal access,
treatment and status as between men and women with regard to membership
of occupational pension schemes and entitlement to benefits. In focussing
on the continuing exclusion of pension and retirement provision from
UK sex discrimination legislation and on female economic activity,
Chapters 5-7 seek further to explain women's under-representation in
membership of occupational pension schemes and unequal access to scheme
benefits.
Chapter 5 discusses occupational pension provision in relation
to the limited extent to which relevant legislation requires employers
to treat men and women scheme members equally and makes reference to
recent developments which seek to bring occupational social security
benefits within the scope of the European Community's sex discrimination
directives. This chapter identifies two major discriminatory practices
within UK statutory pension provision with considerable implications
for occupational pension provision. The first is the operation of
a differential 'pensionable age' of 65 for men and 60 for women and
the second, the differential entitlement of men and women to confer
statutory survivors' benefits. These practices are discussed in Chapter 6
with particular reference to the differential 'normal' retirement ages
to be found within the rules of occupational pension schemes and to
eligibility to confer occupational survivors' benefits.
Chapter 7 continues the discussion of female economic activity
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and of the traditional domestic division of labour begun in Chapter 4
by addressing female access to paid employment and the location of
women in the occupational structure, in the context of female access
to and exclusion from occupational pension provision.
These chapters raise issues and document events which challenge
the traditional order whereby men are constructed within the rules
of occupational pension schemes, as elsewhere, as the major 'providers'
in the marital household. Women, by contrast, are constructed as persons
who, despite engaging in paid work for an increasing proportion of
their adult lives since World War II, are none the less 'normally'
financially dependent upon a husband or on financial provision made
in consideration of a husband's death. The field of occupational pension
provision is but one area which is being profoundly affected by a gradual
but evident shift in the financial and social position of women towards
a greater degree of independence within and subsequent to marriage.
In particular, more marital households have come to consist of two
earners during a period when high inflation has been succeeded by high
unemployment. Hence the question of replacement of a wife's earnings
is being accorded more serious consideration than once was the case,
though traditional attitudes die hard and it would seem that in the
mid-eighties, any moves towards establishing a non-discriminatory
occupational pension system in the UK are likely to come as a result
of pressure from the EEC rather than from indigenous sources.
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Chapter 5
Occupational Pension Provision and Sex Discrimination:
Issues of Equal Access, Treatment and Status
This chapter is concerned with the limited extent to which
occupational pension provision is currently subject to legislation
prohibiting unequal treatment as between men and women. It first
briefly accounts for the exclusion of pensions from existing sex
discrimination legislation in the UK and next discusses the context
in which an 'equal access' clause was included in the SSPA 1975. It
then addresses the report of the OPB (1976) on 'Equal Status for Men
and Women in Occupational Pension Schemes' and the consultative documents
subsequently circulated by the DHSS. Finally, the continuing unequal
treatment of male and female scheme members in the absence of action
on the recommendations of the OPB is reviewed in the light of recent
challenges to the British status quo arising from the 'Worringham'
(1)
case	 and the Draft EEC Directive on the Implementation of the Principle
of Equal Treatment of Men and Women in Occupational Social Security
Schemes (1983).
I Occupational pension provision and sex discrimination legislation
Pension provision is specifically excluded from coverage by the
EPA 1970(2) and the SDA l975. The EPA excepts the terms of a contract
relating to death or retirement or provision made by an employer in
this context, although, from April 1978, employers have been obliged
to conform with the 'equal access' requirements of the SSPA 1975 (see




originally been hoped to include pensions in the Equal Pay Bill 1970,
but at a late stage, Mrs Castle, then Secretary of State for Employment,
announced that there was insufficient time to include such a 'complex
matter' within the Bill (H of C, 801, col 1788, 27/5/l970).
During the report stage of the Bill, a Government amendment had
been moved to include pensions under 'equal remuneration' (H of C,
801 col. 736, 23/5/1970). It was argued that without such inclusion,
employers who wished to give greater monetary compensation to a man
than a woman for equivalent work, would be able to do so 'by giving
that man much more favourable pension conditions' (ibid., col. 737).
It was accepted that there would be continuing differences in the state
pensionable age and that women had a greater life expectancy which
could properly be reflected in differential pension payments as between
the sexes. However, men and women should have 'an equal entitlement
and eligibility' to belong to an employers' pension scheme 'for the
grade or class of work in which they are engaged'. They should also
have the right to contribute on the same basis (ibid.). The debate
on this amendment, which was withdrawn when Mrs Castle as Secretary
of State for Employment promised to consider the matter further, revealed
the complexity of the issues involved. Her deliberations convinced
her that the issues were indeed too complex for inclusion, despite
the Government's recognition that it was 'anomalous not to provide
safeguards against discrimination between men and women in occupational
pension schemes' (H of C, 801, col. 1788, 27/5/1970). She promised
that there would be legislation before the EPA became law in 1975 to
'prescribe a suitable date for equalising men's and women's pension
rights, taking due account of any inherent differences between men
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and women in regard to pension needs.' (Ibid., col. 1789)
The SDA excludes 'provision in relation to death or retirement'
(Part Il, 6(4), p.4) nor, despite the prohibition on the practice of
discrimination of' 'goods, facilities and services', is it unlawful
to treat men and women differently 'in relation to an annuity, life
insurance policy	 or similar matter involving the assessment of
risk' by virtue of 'reasonable' actuarial considerations, 'other data'
or 'relevant factors' (S45, p.28).
As explained, the SSPA 1975 contains an 'equal access' 	 clause,
discussed below, that is, a requirement (S53(2), p.46) that occupational
pension scheme membership be 'open to both men and women on terms which
are the same as to age and length of service needed for becoming a
member and as to whether membership is voluntary or obligatory'. (See
Part IV, S53-56, pp.46-49) Any rule providing for discretion in a
scheme must apply equally to both sexes (OPB, 1976, S2.23, p.10).
Otherwise, occupational pension schemes are allowed to treat men and
women members differently (Ellis and Morrell, 1982, p.16). However,
as will be seen, certain provisions of' EEC legislation can potentially
affect British provision at present - Article 119 of the EEC Treaty and
three Directives (1b1d.).	 There is also a Draft Directive (1983)
at an advanced stage of progress which is intended to directly affect
equal treatment for men and women in the member states as regards
occupational pension provision.(8) Since ' the supremacy of Community
law is now well established and accepted by the English courts' (ibid.),
it can be argued, as by Boden, (1980, p.374) that 'the current exclusion
for pensions in English law' will become 'meaningless. The impact
of this on U.K. pension provision could of course be profound'.
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'Equal access' and the SSPA 1975
The 'equal access' clause applies to both 'contracted-in' and
'contracted-out' schemes (OPB, 1976, S9.20, p.88). A duty is laid
on the trustees and managers of private pension schemes and on those
responsible for the administration of public pension schemes to bring
them into conformity with these 'equal access' requirements (SSP, 1975,
S54, p.47). A duty is laid upon the OPB to 'advise whether the rules
of a scheme do or do not in the Board's opinion conform with equal
access requirements' (ibid., S54 (2), p.47). If the Board determines
that the rules of a scheme do not so conform, it can order modification
of a scheme by authorised persons, or itself, by order, modify the
scheme (ibid., S56, pp.48-49).
The 'equal access' requirement was designed to put an end to practices
documented by the Board (OPB, 1976, Ch.9) such as employers commonly
admitting women to membership of an occupational pension scheme at
a much later age than their male colleagues or, less frequently, requiring
a longer period of service from women as compared to men, before granting
access to scheme membership. Such exclusions rested on the assumption
that the vast majority of young women would leave pensionable employment
before the age of 25-30 after comparatively short service in an employment
to which they would not return. Thus, arrangements to admit young
women to schemes at some specified age within such an age-band as 25-30
were predicated on the notion that women who remained in service to
such an age were likely 'career-women'. The more generous employers
credited previous years of service to such female 'career' employees,
once they reached the stipulated age for inclusion in a pension scheme
(see, ibid., S3.5(c), p.14).
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With the enactment of' legislation containing this 'equal access'
clause, it became illegal for employers to operate pension schemes
which discriminated against women at the time of entry with regard
to age or length of service, and as to whether the scheme was voluntary
or compulsory. However, even this limited provision had its weaknesses.
The OPB (1976) noted that it still appeared to be 'legally permissable
for employers to continue to exclude married women from schemes while
admitting married men' (ibid., S9.33, p.93) and that there appeared
'to be doubt how far entry to schemes at the employer's discretion'
were subject to the 'equal access' clause (ibid., S9.34-36, p.93).
It also appeared that, under the terms of the SSPA 1975, it remained
permissable for employers to impose longer 'waiting periods' for entry
to membership of schemes on women provided that 'benefits were later
awarded automatically, in respect of these waiting periods' (ibid.,
S9.38, p.94). Thus, in respect of the age of entry to schemes, it
was deemed that the 'equal access' requirement in respect of age at
entry was being met if membership was subsequently conferred on women
who passed what was, in effect, an additional test - that of staying
with an employer long enough to qualify for retrospective membership.
The law interpreted 'membership' as including a waiting period for
entry, where the woman, in effect, showed herself to be a 'career'
person. This practice has now been successfully challenged in respect
of the Lloyd's Bank pension scheme by the Worringham case, with implications
for other schemes which embodied similar practices.
The 1974 White Paper 'Better Pensions' had stated that the Government
proposed to follow legislation on 'equal access' with a detailed review
of 'all the considerations relating to providing cover for women in
occupaticnal pension schemes to see whether there are other respects
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in which action is required to ensure that schemes do not discriminate
against women' (DHSS, 1974, S76, p.21) as well as addressing the question
of the representation of women on boards of trustees and management
of occupational pension schemes. Thus, when the SSPA 1975 became law
it had already been made clear that 'equal access' was merely intended
as a first step towards ending sex discrimination in such schemes.
In accordance with section 66(l)(b) of the Act, Mrs Castle, as Secretary
of State for Social Services, requested advice from the OPB on 'what
further steps were needed to achieve equal status in occupational pension
schemes' (OPB, 1976, S2, p.XV). As the Board noted (ibid.), it was
not asked to consider whether equal status was desirable.
'Equal Status': the OPB report 1976
The OPB report on 'Equal Status for Men and Women in Occupational
Pension Schemes', published at the height of the holiday season in
August 1976, was the first comprehensive report on women and occupational
pension provision. It used evidence from a large number of interested
organisations and individuals in drawing up its various recommendations
for 'legislation to help achieve equality of status for men and women
in occupational pension schemes' and indicated other desirable changes
which might be achieved by voluntary action (S15.37, p.192).
Reference has been made in the previous chapter to the report's
findings on the treatment of women in occupational pension schemes
up to the passing of the SSPA 1975. This section focusses on the Board's
interpretation of the term 'equal status' made in the light of the
above evidence. 'Equal status' was construed as meaning 'identical
treatment for men and women in identical circumstances' (equal benefits)
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rather than as deriving from principles linked to 'a comparison of
the amount spent by an employer on the 'average' man or woman in his
(sic) employment or from the actual financial value of different
'packages' of benefits (S6.29,
The main areas of differential treatment of men and women in
occupational pension schemes which would initially remain after the
new legislation became operative in April 1978 were identified as:
1) the lower 'normal retirement age' of 60 for women which
was characteristic of the majority of schemes, so that women
usually retired earlier than men, often with a shorter period
of service in consequence from which the occupational pension
benefits could be calculated (S3.5a, p.13).
2) the payment of survivors' benefits to widows only, in most
schemes exceptions sometimes being made for 'dependant'
widowers (S3.5b, p.14).
3) men being able to satisfy entry conditions more easily than
women, especially because 'some groups comprising mainly
women, especially part-timers, are excluded from many schemes'
(S3.5c, p.14).
There were other areas of differential treatment. Higher lump sums
were sometimes payable to women on commutation of part of the pension,
or lower deductions were required from a female pensioner where part
of the eventual pension was to be allocated to a dependant, though
higher contributions were required of women in pension schemes who
wished to pay in for additional benefits for themselves (S3.6, p.14).
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Other differences in the treatment of men and women were related to
the adjustment of benefits when the scheme member retired before or
after 'normal' retirement age. Though it appeared to be increasingly
common for the same factors to be used in calculating the amount of
such benefit for male and female scheme members, where differential
factors were still in use, men retiring early were accorded a larger
reduction in pension on early retirement and a larger increase on late
retirement (S3.7, p.14).
Reference was also made to possible inequities in the treatment
of men and women members where discretion is exercised by scheme trustees,
for instance with regard to scheme entry and the treatment of temporary
absences (including maternity leave) (S3.8, p.14). Also noted were
some schemes where women paid lower contributions on account of no
cover being provided for survivors and a few 'final salary' schemes
where higher benefits accrued to men on the grounds of shorter male
average life expectancy or where benefits were, conversely, higher
for women on the grounds that the period of service from which their
pension benefits would be calculated was shorter (S3.lO, p.15). In
the now relatively uncommon 'money-purchase' schemes, it was reported
that 'the rates of benefit are lower for a woman than for a man for
the same amount of contributions paid at the same age.'
The differences in the treatment of men and women were accounted
for under three headings:
a) different state pension ages
b) differential mortality between the sexes
c) differences in male/female employment patterns and




The Board viewed the existence of different state 'pensionable ages'
for men and women as an insuperable barrier to the introduction of
comprehensive 'equal status' legislation. While such legislation was
desirable, in principle, it could not 'reasonably precede legislation
to equalise pension ages' in the state pension scheme (Sl5.37, p.l92).0)
A further key factor in differential treatment was identified as residing
in differential mortality as between the sexes, in that, actuarially
speaking, women outlive men by several years (84.6 - 4.15, pp.18-21;
Ch.6,	 It was felt that this should not be a factor
in calculating pension contributions or benefits (S9, p.196).
The Board also noted differences in male and female employment
patterns (S4.l6 - 4.23, pp.22-23), (12) with greatly increased female
economic activity since the Second World War, including a substantial
rise in the number of part-time female workers. The differential treatment
of men and women in occupational pension schemes was felt to reflect
widely differing views on the role of women in society (S4.2l, p.23),
identified as 'traditional', 'moderate' and 'radical'. The first reflected
acceptance of the traditional division of domestic labour as between
male breadwinner and non-earning housewife and the second recognised
the presence of many women in paid employment who nonetheless fitted
their paid work around their domestic responsibilities. The third
view represented a wish to see the end of women's financial dependence
on marriage, with the help of improved state child care provision and
changed employment practices which would allow both men and women to
share the domestic responsibilities of the home.
In attempting to define 'equal status' the Board was mindful of
evidence received indicating that 'where there was a difference in
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the treatment of men and women in occupational pension schemes, the
difference could be viewed by different people as favouring either
men or women' (S6.1, p.33). In this light, the Board had felt bound
to give consideration to the actual form which 'equal status' should
take. One possibility was to give men and women members 'package deals'
which were different but equal in value (S6.2, p.33). However, the
Board concluded that 'the test of equal status should start from the
premise of equal benefits, that is, identical treatment for men and
women in identical circumstances' (S6.29, p.41).
Having considered evidence for and against 'identical benefits'
as opposed to 'equal packages' the Board came to the conclusion that
the case for the latter was weak, and it refuted assumptions that male
and female members of occupational pension schemes had needs which
derived from 'characteristics which are felt to apply to men and women
as separate groups' (S6.25, p.41). In particular the Board refuted
arguments which were based on the assumption that men have greater
income maintenance needs for themselves in retirement or for their
survivors after death, than do women (S6.25,
	
Nor did
the Board accept the greater longevity of women as justifying the payment
(14)
of lower benefits to women (S6.25, p.41). 	 In accepting the notion
of occupational pension benefits as deferred pay, the Board saw merit
in arguments for equal pension rights, with the cost to the employer
not being 'the determining factor' in deciding whether men and women
were to be treated equally (S6.28, p.41),
'... although the cost of pension provision must depend in part
on group characteristics reflected in actuarial calculations,
the only unambiguous way of measuring equal status for the
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individual is in terms of the benefits - including dependants'
benefits, actually provided' (S6.28, p.41).
Basic to the achievement of equal status would be a common pension
age in the state pension scheme from which common 'normal' retirement
ages for men and women in occupational pension schemes could be derived
(57.55, p.58).
The implementation of equal status for men and women in occupational
pension schemes
The OFE made a large number of recommendations requiring a change
in the law. Broadly speaking these covered supplementation of the
existing 'equal access' requirements to ensure equal treatment in relation
to marital status, rules regarding earning levels at which employees
could qualify for entry to schemes, waiting periods where benefits
were given retrospectively, individualised pension arrangements and
the exercise of discretion re admission to schemes. It was also argued
in relation to 'equal access' that pension schemes should not practise
'indirect discrimination' and that such discrimination in relation
to scheme entry should be illegal under provisions analogous to those
in the SDA 1975(15) with the individual employees being able to complain
before an industrial tribunal (S15.3, p.182). It was also recommended
that there should be additional provision for pension cover during
maternity leave, new powers for the courts in situations of divorce!
separation involving occupational pension rights, better advice to
scheme members, better access to information and a requirement for
joint exercise by members and spouses of certain options affecting
-243-
survivors' benefits (S15.3, p.18).
Regarding further steps to achieve 'equal status' which would
extend the notion well beyond the concept of 'equal access' as amended
above, the Board weighed the merits of attempting progress by legislation
as against voluntary action. 	 It argued that on evidence, it would
be impossible to achieve 'equal status' without equality of state pension
age, not least because 'contracting-out' arrangements are based on
the concept of a partnership between state provision and occupational
pension schemes (S15.17, p.186). The two sectors are legally 'harmonised',
a status which is 'inconsistent with a statutory obligation for one
partner to assume basic requirements which do not bite on the other
partner' tIbid., p.187). here occupational pension schemes have a
'normal' retirement age of 65 for both sexes, the terms of the SSPA
1975 require that women scheme members must be permitted to retire
at 60 without their employer's permission, albeit with a reduced pension.
The same problem with regard to 'harmonisation' applies to survivors'
pensions, which are at present available only in limited form in state
provision (Sl5.18, p.187).
The Board concluded that early legislation on equal status would
not be feasible. They were impressed by the number of witnesses who
emphasised the volume of legislative requirements which were arising
from the SSPA 1975 and fully stretching the efforts of occupational
pension scheme administrators (515.20, p.187) and their professional
advisers, who were also concerned with the effects of other changes
in both the tax code and employment legislation (Sl5.20, p.188). It
was also pointed out that equal pay and sex discrimination were measures
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newly introduced and that particularly where matters of 'indirect'
discrimination are concerned, legislation on sex discrimination 'causes
particular problems because by its nature, it cannot be clear-cut and
thus runs the risk of creating misunderstanding and even industrial
friction'. The Board was reluctant to legislate so as to bring the
complicated area of pension provision within the orbit of an as yet
largely untried area of legislation, lest this move should 'inhibit
the development of occupational schemes or even lead to some reduction
in provision' (S15.21, p.188). It was also argued that legislation
would require the appointment of more administrative staff and professional
advisers in the pensions field, with consequent expense, and would
place new and uncharted burdens on industrial tribunals who were not,
in general, dealing with pension matters (S15.22, p.188).
However, given the intention of the Council of the EEC to issue
a directive on the progressive implementation of the principle of equal
treatment in the field of social security as well as the existing sex
discrimination legislation, and notwithstanding the fact that the Board
considered that the time was too early for 'equal status' legislation
covering occupational pensions, the Board did address itself to the
possibilities for such legislation. These possibilities covered 'direct'
and 'indirect' discrimination, both in scheme rules and contracts of
employment and in 'employment practices and the discriminatory exercise
of discretionary powers, which could involve either direct or indirect
discrimination' (Sl5.23, pp.188-189).
With regard to legislation prohibiting direct discrimination,
the Board felt that a requirement could be laid on the trustees and
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administrators of schemes and that 'where, exceptionally, benefits
are regulated solely by contract, that contract' might 'also comprise
the "rules" of the scheme' (515.24, p.189). Alternatively, the model
for legislation might approximate more to that adopted for tax approval
of pension schemes, which could allow for more flexibility in applying
the rules to individual schemes. However, there were disadvantages
to this approach. The 'sanction' for failing to comply with the rules
would in this case have to be withdrawal of tax approval, which might
penalise members. There would be problems in that schemes were only
normally scrutinised by the Inland Revenue when approval or modification
was sought. Finally, an exercise of discretion in approving schemes
could mean the retention of inequality in some schemes, which would
make dealing with 'indirect' discrimination impossible (Sl5.25, p.189).
With regard to 'indirect' discrimination, the Board felt that
legislation analogous to the SDA should prohibit 'indirect' discrimination
arising from scheme entry conditions - this could also cover other
matters such as survivors' pensions or qualifying conditions for preser-
vation arrangements. Individuals would have the right to pursue their
grievances before an industrial tribunal or similar body (S15.27,
pp.189-190).	 The Board also considered that legislation should
cover the operation of discretionary powers by employers or trustees
of pension schemes (Sl5.28 - 15.29, p.190). However, they noted that
an area of complication might occur where both employer and trustees
were involved in the exercise of discretion, for instance with regard
to early retirement. The trustees' exercise of discretion to permit
such an early retirement would have been taken in the context of an
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employer's decision to retire a member of staff early on a full pension.
Thus, in respect of possible sex discrimination, there would need to
be a direct remedy against discrimination by persons exercising a dis-
cretionary power or operating a discriminatory employment practice,
since a procedure such as suing under trust law for breach of trust
would be a less desirable remedy (S15.30, p.190).
The Board made it clear that given the barriers to the achievement
of 'equal status' resulting from the unequal state pension ages and
survivors' benefit provision, 'it would be both premature and unfair
to introduce legislation which put a blanket prohibition on differences
in the treatment of men and women in occupational pension schemes',
since there would have to be such 'important exceptions' (Sl5.32,
pp.190-191).	 However, there appeared to be considerable scope
for voluntary action, not least because schemes had been moving towards
greater equality of treatment between the sexes, most having 'identical
treatment for men and women in relation to personal benefits and the
availability of options' (S15.33, p.191). It was argued that one-third
of schemes had equal pension ages and that there was 'some movement'
towards equal survivors' benefits (ibid.). The Board was hopeful that
these trends would continue without legislation and expected 'the question
of equal status to figure more prominently in discussions and negotiations
over scheme improvements' (ibid.).
It was argued that there was a case for immediate action on a
voluntary basis for equal availability of allocation options, commutation
options and additional benefits, together with equal benefits on early
or late retirement ('subject to differences to take account of pension
age'), and where additional benefits were financed by an employer.
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The Board felt, by a majority, that there should be equal early retirement
ages and equal 'upper' entry ages to schemes, even where pension ages
were different - a majority of the Board thought that there should be
'no restrictions, wherever practicable' on women being able to remain
in employment until men's pension age (S15.34, p.191). The Board also
favoured equal provision for orphans for all scheme members (Sl5.34,
p.192).
The provision of equal survivors' benefits for widows and widowers
was seen as a medium-term goal to be achieved initially by voluntary
action, as resources permitted, though voluntary action was not a feasible
means of achieving equalisation of 'pension ages' in occupational
pension schemes (S15.35, p.192). The Board felt that a point had been
reached where 'many pension schemes are responding to changing social
attitudes' with 'men and women being treated equally in many cases
despite the difficulties imposed primarily by unequal pension ages'
in the state scheme. However, there could be 'no certainty' as to
'when and how' equal status would be achieved by voluntary action
(S15.36, p.192).
The Consultative Documents
The OPB report was published on August 18th, 1976. A first
Consultative Document on Equal Status for Men and Women in Occupational
Pension Schemes (DHSS, 1976) was then issued with comments invited
from interested parties by October 1st, 1976. This was a very short
time-scale indeed to allow for considered responses to a detailed document,
not least because it included a holiday period.
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The document declared that 'The Government are committed to the
principle that women should have a fair deal in occupational pension
schemes. They intend to eliminate discrimination against women in
such schemes and to secure equality of status for men and women in
this field' (S2, p.1). The Government defined the principle of 'equal
status' as meaning 'equal benefits' so that men and women should generally
receive identical benefits in identical circumstances. However, two
major exceptions would continue to be equal pension ages and equal
survivors' benefits, these being differences in the State scheme which
the Government 'cannot yet tackle' (S7 and 8, p.3). With respect to
other differences in treatment, the Government felt that there was
a strong case for greater reliance on securing equal treatment by means
of legislation, rather than relying on voluntary action to the extent
that the Board proposed. It was pointed out that occupational pensions
had been left out of Equal Pay and Sex Discrimination legislation 'because
of the difficult issues and social economic questions which the Board
was asked to study' (59, p.4).
The Government proposed to proscribe, by legislation, the use
of mortality differentials as between men and women in calculating
levels of contributions or benefit in schemes (except in the case or
personal 'options') since 'there are known to be differences in mortality
rates between other groups in the population which are not commonly
brought out' (Sl4, p.7). It was proposed to rely on a mix of legislative
and voluntary measures to deal with the possibility of scheme trustees'
discretion being exercised in a manner which was discriminatory between
the sexes (Sl6, p.8).
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A second Consultative Document was issued in March 1977 for reply
by June 30th, 1977. This outlined the development of the Government's
proposals for legislation, in the light of responses to the first Con-
sultative Document, related these proposals to EEC law and discussed
how voluntary progress could best be made in areas relating to equal
treatment not covered by legislation (DHSS, 1977, S2, p.1). It was
proposed to introduce a bill as soon as Parlianientary time permitted,
though not necessarily in the 1976-77 session (S4, p.2).
From the response to the first Consultative Document it was obvious
that the 'pensions industry' (i.e. pensions and employers' organisations)
were totally opposed to the introduction of the proposed legislation.
By contrast, employees' and womens' organisations welcomed the idea
- some indeed claiming that the proposals did not go far enough (Annex
1, Sl, p.1). The opposition was committed to action on a voluntary
basis only, believing that legislation would give rise to a considerable
administrative burden and costs (ibid., S2, p.1). The Government weighed
up the pros and cons of introducing legislation which pinpointed specific
areas in which there was a need for anti-discrimination measures 'but
not seeking to establish equal treatment as a general principle' (Sb,
p.4) as against the introduction of more general measures to establish
the principle of equal treatment whilst continuing to permit such exceptions
as the differential pension age and survivorship benefits. The latter
approach was favoured (Sb, pp.4-5). Within this approach, the Government
proposed to legislate on strengthening the 'equal access' requirements
(S13, p.5), on disclosure of information (S14, pp.5-6), on consultation
with spouses over the exercise of options for the provision of survivors'
benefits (Sl7-18, pp.6-7), on retention of rights during maternity
-250-
leave (S19-20, pp.7-8) and on the power of the Courts with regard to
pension rights on divorce (S21-23, pp.8-9).
The Government intended to impose a 'non-discrimination' requirement
in addition to the existing 'equal access' requirement, applicable
once a woman had become a member of a scheme (S24, p.10) However,
it was not felt that amendment of the EPA was the most promising vehicle
for enforcement. Firstly, it would be necessary, under the provisions
of that Act, for a woman to be able to measure her claim against that
of a 'comparable' man. Secondly, the discrimination would need to
have arisen out of the terms and conditions of employment (S26, p.10).
The Government was more inclined to base legislation on the SDA 1975
rather than to make further use of the EPA 1970 (S27-28, p.11). In
this way, 'indirect discrimination' could be covered and the requirement
would be to establish that the occupational pension scheme member concerned
was being treated less favourably than a person of the opposite sex
thus obviating the need to establish the existence of a 'comparable'
man or woman. It would be open to the employer, trustees or managers
of the scheme to show that the treatment being challenged was justifiable,
irrespective of the gender of the person concerned (S27, p.11).
However, simply extending the scope of the SDA 1975 did not seem
a satisfactory solution, since major exceptions were to remain with
regard to pension ages and entitlement to survivors' benefits in employers'
pension schemes (S29, p.11). There appeared to be more potential in
the notion of bringing'equal treatment' legislation into one statute,
thus enabling the test of 'detriment' used in the SDA to be replaced
by a 'direct reference to entering, remaining in or benefitting under
a scheme, thus defining more clearly the particular circumstances in
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which equal treatment is required' (ibid., p.12). Meanwhile it was
proposed to introduce the 'equal access' requirements of the SSPA 1975,
as planned, in April 1978. Later, revised equal access requirements
could come into force, with two years' notice given before they became
compulsory (S37, 38, pp.13-14) along with the new non-discrimination
requirements.
Complaints, under the new legislation, would be dealt with by
an industrial tribunal: such a tribunal would be empowered to refer
to the OPB any question needing a ruling on the scheme's conformity
with legislative requirements. A tribunal, having upheld a complaint
and identified the exact subject matter of that complaint, would be
able to suggest an appropriate remedy (S39, pp.15-16). It was also
proposed to 'extend the duties of the Equal Opportunities Commission'
to cover discrimination in the occupational pensions field, including
review of the operation of legislation and the issuing of non-discrimination
notices (S40, p.16).
Despite these detailed recommendations, no further action was
taken by the Labour government on 'equal treatment' for men and women
in occupational pension schemes. No further document was issued relating
to the comments on the second Consultative Document which had been
requested by June 30th, 1977. Neither of the succeeding Conservative
administrations of 1979 or 1983 has addressed this issue. Impetus
toward change has in fact come from outside the U.K., since the European
Community is committed towards a goal of equal treatment in occupational
social security schemes and has (1983) a Draft Directive in circulation.
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II The EEC and sex discrimination in occupational pension schemes(16)
Over a period of twelve years, since the issue of sex discrimination
in pension provision was debated in relation to the EPA, the only British
legislation passed is that requiring equal access for men and women
to membership of occupational pension schemes. Considerable interest
has, accordingly, been shown in the potential of European Community
law to affect occupational pension scheme rules and practices. In
Lord Denning's judgement 'Community law has priority' where there is
any inconsistency between EEC law and British law (Ellis and Morrell,
1982, p.16, note 4). Hence the potential of favourable judgements
of the European Court of Justice to bring about movement towards equal
treatment of men and women in occupational pension schemes.
Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome established the principle of
'equal pay for equal work' ' and was followed by three directives
with possible applicability in the context of occupational pension
schemes.(18) Of specific interest in this connection is the case of'
Worringham v. LLoyds(19) Bank (Court of' Justice of the European Communities,
1981) which 'provided opportunity for judicial clarification' (Ellis
and Morrell, 1982, p.17) regarding the possible applicability of Article
119 to occupational pension provision.
The case concerned two young women clerical officers at Lloyds
Bank, which in the mid-seventies, for historic reasons (see Ellis and
Morrell, 1982, pp.17-18) operated, quite legally, two separate retirement
schemes for male and female permanent staff. Unlike other clearing
banks which had non-contributory pension schemes, Lloyds required contri-
butions, but offered extra gross pay to staff' so as to bring their
-253-
salaries into line with those of their 'competitors'. However, whereas
young men were required to contribute to the scheme from entry and
were paid an extra 5% of salary, which was promptly clawed back in
contributions, women were treated differently.
Young women, by contrast, were subject to a 'waiting period' during
which they were, technically, in membership of their occupational pension
scheme(2 but were not 'required' (i.e. allowed) to make contributions
until they had reached the age of 25,(21 at which point they started
to pay contributions on exactly the same basis as their male colleagues.
In effect, women belonged to a 'non-contributory' pension scheme up
to the age of 25, at which point the 'stayers' were blanketed-in as
contributors to their scheme with their total previous years of service
credited towards an eventual retirement pension, calculated on the
same formula for both sexes. The minimum age at which any employee
could derive future benefit from the scheme was 26, after a minimum
of five years' completed service.
This strategy was convenient and cost-effective - from the bank's
point of view. At the time when Ms Worringhani and Ms Humphries first
challenged it, Lloyds Bank claimed that 70%-80% of their female employees
were leaving while under the age of 25, so that the different contribution
rules for women saved costs (Ellis and Morrell, p.17, note 16). The
two clerical officers in fact left Lloyds service when still under
25 years of age, but, unlike comparable male colleagues, had no accrued
occupational pension contributions to transfer elsewhere or 'cash
In 1977 they brought a case before an industrial tribunal claiming
'equal pay' with their young male colleagues on the grounds that they
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had been engaged in 'like work' with their male colleagues in that
age group. However, the male colleagues had been paid 5% more and,
if they left at the same age and with the same service as their female
colleagues, they were entitled to the value, in some form, of their
pensions contributions. The women got no such entitlement: Ms Worririga
and Ms Humphries claimed that this was sex discrimination.
When the facts of the case were eventually set out before the
European Court, it was pointed out that the 5% higher 'gross pay' received
by the men incorporated other indirect advantages not enjoyed by the
women. 'Collateral benefits' were mentioned in this context, such
as 'unemployment benefits, over-time payments, redundancy benefits,
credit facilities, etc.', the amount of which would have been related
to a week's pay (Court of Justice of the European Communities, 1981,
p.5).
The women's claim was originally dismissed, since the industrial
tribunal found that their case rested on an interpretation of the EPA
and, being concerned with retirement and death benefits, did not come
within the scope of this Act (Ellis and Morrell, 1982, p.18). This
judgement was overturned by the Employment Appeal Tribunal which held
that there was indeed an 'inequality' in gross pay so that the case
did come within the scope of the EPA (ibid., p.19). The employer appealed,
the case went to the Court of Appeal in consequence, which invoked
the SDA in its interpretation of the pensions exclusion clause in the
EPA (ibid.). This led in due course to a case of immense technical
detail being brought, on the iniative of the Court of Appeal, before
the European Court of Justic(ibid., p.20).(23)
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The aim of this action was to test the applicability of Community
law 'to the refund of employees' contributions, so as to entitle the
claimants to the sum which they would have received had they been men'
and to obtain a ruling on 'the wider and more important issue as to
whether Community law applied in general to an occupational pension
scheme such as that provided by Lloyds Bank' (ibid.). Thus, the Court
of Appeal wished to know whether Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome
applied in such a way as to cancel out the EPA (Ellison, 1981, p.295).
Also, since this was a test case of great legal importance in terms
of precedent, the Court of Appeal sought the European Court's opinion
on matters of detail (ibid). The two broad issues were whether 'Article
119 or the directives applied to the refund of employees' contributions'
and hence entitled the claimants to a refund, and, secondly, whether
Community law applied generally to such schemes, so that contributions
and benefits are 'subject to the principle of equality' (Ellis and
Morrell, 1982, p.20).
The European Court ruled in March 1981 that the 'extra 5%' did
form part of pay, within the meaning of Article 119, and thus 'there
was no need ... to answer the broader question as to whether the rights
and benefits that the employee enjoyed, generally, under the pension
scheme, were within the scope of Article 1l9'(ibid., p.21). Ellis
and Morrell, commenting on this judgement, argue that 'even if the
spirit of Article 119 extends to non-state pension schemes, the Court
is most unlikely to hold that it can be enforced directly in that context'
(ibid., p.22). The Court of Appeal in due course declared that the
women employees of Lloyds Bank should be paid in accordance with the
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'equality clause' of the Equal Pay Act (section 1(1), as amended, as
well as in accordance with Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome (TUC,
1983b, p.6). They were entitled, on leaving the bank, to be paid an
equal refund of pension contributions to that which would have been
allowed to males employed on like work, in whose name contributions
had been paid to an occupational pension scheme (ibid., p.7). A settlement
was agreed to by Lloyds, for whom the case 'has entailed enormous financial
(24)
consequences'.
Ellis and Morrell (1982, p.25) have since pointed out that as
of 1981 there were still many differences in the treatment of men and
women in British occupational pension schemes and 'practical obstacles
to be overcome in removing the current differences without further
legislation and without the prior removal of differences in the state
scheme'. They also noted that there are different perceptions of 'equality'
with regard to occupational pension provision. Employers tend to think
in terms of 'equality of cost' in providing for male and female scheme
members: employees tend to think in terms of access to pension benefits
(ibid., pp.26-27). While this latter approach was the one supported
by the OPB in its 1976 report, even if it were to be supported by the
European Court of' Justice 'its implementation by the courts, without
the aid of further legislation, would be far from simple'(ibid., p.27).
Not only was there the question of a common age of retirement for occu-
pational scheme members in the fact of a persisting differential state
pensionable age. In addition, it could be argued that extending survivors'
benefits to widowers would be an inefficient use of resources if this
facility were to be provided on a universal basis. A preferable
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alternative might be to provide 'a range of options' which would facilitate
'whatever provision for survivors best suited their individual and
family circumstances' (ibid., pp.28-29). It was possible that 'unisex'
actuarial tables might disadvantage women (ibid., p.28).
Although the principle of equal pay has been. established in the
U.K. for some years, it has not been achieved with regard to pensions.
Hence, aggrieved persons look to the European Court for redress. At
the time of writing, Ellis and Morrell felt that such redress was likely
to be inhibited by the European Community's tendency to permit unequal
treatment within the statutory pension schemes of Member States, as
evidenced by the relevant Social Security Directive. They felt that
there is a strong case for British legislation in the field of sex
discrimination in pension provision, without which 'the position of
working women can never in a real sense be equalised with that of their
male peers' (Ellis and Morrell, 1982, p.28). However, the policy of
the two Conservative administrations since 1979 has been that 'improvements
in occupational arrangements should follow from voluntary rather than
statutory action' (TUC, 1983a, p.16) and no sex discrimination legislation
in the pensions field has been proposed. The 1983 administration has,
nonetheless, indicated its acceptance, in principle, of the need to
ensure equal treatment for men and women in occupational pension schemes
(ibid.) and is required to consider the Draft Directive on occupational
social security.
The Draft Directive on Equal Treatment for Men and Women in Occupational
Social Security Schemes
(25)	 .
The EEC Directive 79/7 	 on the progressive implementation of
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the principle of equal treatment for men and women in matters of social
security, which became fully effective in December 1984, contained
a specific commitment to ensure 'implementation of the principle of
equal treatment in occupational schemes' (Commission of the European
Communities, 1983, Article 3, S3). '26 This document was based on
a 1977 draft which included occupational provision(27) within its remit.
The then British government took the view that there was no provision
within Community law requiring equal treatment for men and women within
occupational pension schemes (DHSS, 1977, S43, pp.16-17), but gave
its opinion that, if adopted, the directive would 'oblige the U.K.
to move towards equal treatment' (ibid., p.17). The draft directive
thus provided 'additional impetus' for appropriate British legislation.
In the event, occupational provision was left out of Directive
7/79, but it was made clear that new proposals would be brought forward
within five years (TUC, 1983b, p.4). A new Draft Directive was published
in 1983, including occupational pension provision within its broad
remit.(28) This draft seeks to require Member States to introduce legis-
lation to forbid direct or indirect discrimination, on grounds of marital
or family status, against women or men, but without prejudice to maternity
provisions (Commission of the European Communities, 1983, Article 5,
S1-2). Both compulsory and voluntary pension schemes would be covered
(Article 2, S2). Equal treatment would apply in relation to the scope
of schemes and conditions of access, the obligation to contribute and
the basis on which the contributions are calculated, including spouses'
and dependants' benefits, and the conditions governing the duration
and retention of entitlement to benefits (Article 5, Si).
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Among the practices deemed 'contrary to the principle of equal
treatment' are those intended to 'specify those persons who may participate',
lay down differential rules on age of entry, minimum periods of employment
or of scheme membership required to obtain the scheme's benefits.
Also contrary would be to lay down differential rules for early-leavers
without a right to 'frozen' pensions, set different conditions for
the grant of benefits or restrict them to workers of one sex only,
fix differential retirement ages, suspend the retention or acquisition
of rights during periods of maternity or family leave 'granted by law
or collective agreement' or provide benefits whose level and amount
differ, arid, in particular, set the level of benefits by taking into
account differential factors of calculation, actuarial or otherwise,
with regard to the phenomena of ill-health, mortality or life expectancy'.
It would also be illegal to set contributions at different rates, on
such a basis. 'Transferred' or 'frozen' pension benefits would also
be covered by the directive (Article 6).
The original intention was that Member States should 'take all
necessary measures' to ensure that their 'occupational social security'
provisions comply with the terms of the directive by 1/1/1986, with
any necessary internal legislative change being introduced by 1/1/1985
(TUC, l983a, p.3). However, the European Parliament has since set
1/1/1987 as the target date for compliance (Pensions, May 1984, p.l1))29)
Member states are to be permitted to defer bringing in the principle
of equal treatment in respect of the age at which scheme members become
entitled to occupational retirement pensions and in respect of pensions
awarded to a surviving spouse, in circumstances where the principle
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of equal treatment has not yet been implemented in the corresponding
statutory pension schemes (Commission of the European Communities,
1983, Articles 8 and 9). This exclusion in the draf't directive mirrors
that in Directive 7/79, which also specifically exempts 'pensionable
ages' and survivors' benefits from its remit.
By the end of 1983, the Draft Directive had been well received
by women's organisations, the EOC and trade unions, among others, but
had become the subject of severe criticism from the 'pensions industry',
including the actuarial profession (Pensions, May 1984, pp.19, 23).
Indeed, it seems to have been this Directive which finally brought
the issue of sex discrimination to the active attention of the providers
of occupational pension schemes.(30) While the notion of 'equal treatment'
has been given support from this quarter, such support comes only on
terms which require 'equal treatment' to be operationalised not as
'identical treatment' in the sense used by the OPB (1976, S6.25-6.29,
pp.40-41) but as 'equitable' treatment in the sense of making 'equal
pension packages' available to male and female members of schemes.
This is precisely the interpretation to which the OPB was opposed.
The central point of contention is the greater longevity of women,
which factor has always been used by the insurance industry as a basis
for actuarial calculations.
Many of the private sector occupational pension funds are employer-
administered, but operated via the insurance industry, or are 'group'
schemes actually provided by insurance companies. Many of the latter
as indicated previously, are small, allowing less scope for the spread
of actuarial 'risks' than that offered by larger schemes (NAPF, l983a,
Table 9, p.7). It is the 'insurance interests' within the occupational
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pensions sector which view the Draft Directive with especial disfavour,
since its requirements run counter to all established practice. The
notion of' granting survivors' pensions to widowers appears to be a
palatable recommendation - indeed, it is the private pensions sector
which has increasingly offered such benefits in the knowledge that
they are a reasonably inexpensive innovation. (See Ch.6) It is the
notion of an enforced departure from practices such as offering lower
retirement pensions to women for the same contributions, if a scheme
so chooses, which 'has come close to bursting many an actuarial blood
vessel' (Pensions Today, May 1984, p.19). (31)
In a widely quoted technical paper, Wilkie (1983) has set out
some major criticisms from the actuarial point of view. In summary,
he argues that there are substantial flaws in interpreting 'equal treatment'
in the occupational pension context, as meaning that greater female
longevity should not be taken into account in determining the amount
of pension benefits or deciding the appropriate rate of contributions
(Wilkie, 1983, pp.19-23). Mortality rates differ far more substantially
by sex than by occupation and no legislation can alter this fact.
It is 'equality' between men and women with differential longevity
rates which is 'desirable and obtainable', not 'equality' as defined
in the Directive (ibid., p.1). Insurance, being a group undertaking,
can only be equitably arranged if all known factors, including longevity,
are taken into account - others include marital status, average age
of spouses and economic activity rates (ibid., pp.4-19). To operate
'unisex' actuarial tables would have unfortunate financial consequences
both for individual scheme members and the occupational pensions sector
in general. In essence, both men and women would find themselves paying
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more for certain benefits, such as life insurance and annuities, when
this had not previously been the case. Wilkie argues that a period
of recession is not the best time at which to contemplate such radical
change, which would increase labour costs and might well make employers
reluctant to give jobs to women (ibid., pp.38-40).
The NAPF is also on record as favouring 'non-discrimination',
interpreted as 'equity' of treatment - in 'packaged' form. Within
this approach, the greater value of a pension, in actuarial terms,
to the woman employee is traded off against the greater imputed value,
to men, of a contingent benefit to a spouse (Pensions World, September
1983, p.577). The Association argues that schemes should either provide
'equal benefits' or demonstrate 'equity of treatment'; if the former
is insisted upon, it should still be permissable to make sex-specific
actuarial distinctions with regard to any optional benefits which the
member may purchase, otherwise such benefits may be purchased more
cheaply on the open market (ibid., p.578; see also Wilkie, 1983, pp.35-
36; Policy Holder Insurance News, Feb. 17th 1984, p.29). NAPF emphasise
that an occupational pension scheme is a voluntary arrangement between
employer and employee, there being no obligation for a scheme to be
set up at all. It also observes that where 'burdens' are super-imposed
from without, they can pre-empt other equally or more desirable changes,
such as better protection for early leavers (ibid., p.578).
There is no doubt that the 'identical' version of equal treatment
as required by the Draft Directive is unpopular in the insurance world.
The requirements affect the larger schemes, with privately invested
funds, since actuarial calculations based on greater female longevity
-263-
can currently be applied when members of such schemes pay additional
voluntary contributions, take advantage of a 'commutation' facility
on retirement, or take early or late retirement (see: Pensions, May
1984, p.19). However, it can be argued that the large schemes offer
greater scope for redistribution of total fund resources (Wilkie, 1983,
p.3). Wilkie (ibid., p.37), among others, makes the point that the
'identical treatment' approach is fraught with difficulties in the
absence of legislation to provide for equal 'pensionable ages' with
the state pension scheme. There is no doubt that the Draft Directive
'brings into question long-adopted principles which have been fundamental
to the ways actuaries calculate risk and the way insurance companies
do business' (Pensions, May 1984, p.20).
Supporters of the 'identical treatment' approach have suggested
that it may not be necessary to use 'unisex' actuarial tables in calculating
contribution and benefit levels. It is possible to use sex-specific
tables, but then spread the costs across the scheme membership, male
and female. Thus, while actuarial considerations are allowed to enter
into the computation of the total costs of standard employee pension
benefits, the costs are then 'averaged' across the work force, to ensure
'identical treatment' (TUC, l983b, S63, p.19). On the question of
required retirement ages for scheme members, Finlay (1984, p.16) has
inferred that there is nothing to stop occupational schemes making
changes in their practices on a voluntary basis in advance of a change
in state pensionable ages. She has pointed out that the EOC gets 'a
stream of complaints' on pensions and argued that if, on average, women
live longer, they neither earn more, nor work less hard, so that it
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is questionable to assume that 'equity' means that women need lower
pensions (ibid., pp.17-18). Ivor Richards, Britain's European Commissioner,
also publicly stated that arrangements which give women lower pensions
because of assumed greater life expectancy, are discriminatory (Pensions,
May 1984, p.11).
It seems probable that the larger schemes would find it less problem-
atic to 'average out' the costs. Ellison (1983, p.24) has observed
that private occupational pension schemes tend not to exist in companies
where the majority of employees are women. On this argument it may
be assumed that schemes have more easily been able to sustain 'disciminatory'
practices where there has been a minority of women to raise objections.
If the Draft Directive becomes effective, it seems likely that
the 'pensions industry' will get to work on devising ways in which
to legally circumvent it. Suggestions have been made that small firms,
the self-employed and schemes not funded via employer contributions
should be exempt (Wilkie, 1983, p.34). As seen above, there is support
for the exclusion of 'optional' benefits and it has also been suggested
that 'money purchase' schemes might also be excepted (TUC, l983b, p.20).
However, as stated by the European Commission in their explanatory
memorandum to the Draft Directive and by the OPB in its 1976 report,
there are many factors which need to be taken into account in calculating
the cost of providing occupational pensions over and above the factor
of differential longevity between the sexes (ibid., pp.11-14, 19-20).
III Occupational pension schemes and sex discrimination
There has always been 'goodreason' for successive governments
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to avoid legislation on sex discrimination in occupational pension
schemes since the question was first addressed in the context of the
EPA. The question was too complicated to be dealt with in 1970. It
was omitted from the SDA in the knowledge that reference was being
made to the OPB on the issue of 'equal status'. Sex discrimination
was included within the SDA merely in the shape of modest 'equal access'
requirements.
The OPB 1976 report offered a very comprehensive analysis of existing
sex discrimination in occupational pension schemes, but was very con-
servative in its proposals for dealing with such discrimination. The
Labour government of the time produced two detailed consultative documents,
but declared voluntary action to be its preferred strategy for reducing
the inequalities in the treatment meted out to women, in particular
as regards membership of and access to employers' pension schemes.
In the event, the 1974-79 Labour government, like its Conservative
successors, took no further action regarding sex discrimination in
occupational pension schemes.
At the time when the equal pay and sex discrimination legislation
was in the early stages of its implementation, the highly complicated
'contracting-out' procedures accompanying the implementation of the
SSPA 1975 were in progress. As shown previously, the Labour government
like its predecessors, was, in 1974-75, anxious not to dissuade employers
in the private pensions sector from 'contracting-out' by insisting
that they should include female employees in schemes on terms stronger
than those required by the 'equal access' clause. That the 'pensions
industry' is hostile to the notion of 'equal treatment' in the sense
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of 'identical treatment' has become apparent from the reception lately
accorded to the Draft Directive on Equal Treatment in Occupational
Social Security Schemes. Events indicate that movement towards 'equal
treatment' in the U.K. is likely to come to the extent that it is 'super-
imposed' by Community Law. (32)
However, the Draft Directive as circulated in 1983 showed itself
to be a less than impressive vehicle for the achievement of equal treatment.
Despite its insistence on 'equalisation' of treatment with regard to
occupational social security provision, there are key omissions in
the context of the British pension provision. Member states would
still be able to operate differential arrangements within their statutory
pension schemes as regards the provision of survivors' benefits and
the determination of 'pensionable ages', as permitted under Directive
79/9. So long as such statutory arrangements persist, occupational
pension schemes will be permitted to treat men and women differently
with regard to their entitlement to confer survivors' pensions and
the age at which their employer requires them to retire. It is on
these two major areas of 'exception' that the next chapter focusses.
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Chapter 6
Equal Treatment: Issues Relating to Differential 'Normal'
Retirement Ages for Men and Women in Occupational Schemes
and to Eligibility for Survivors' Benefits
I Normal retirement ag
This section briefly explores the historic reasons for differential
'normal' retirement ages for men and women in occupational pension
schemes and seeks to explain their continued existence with reference to
the inter-dependent nature of occupational and statutory pension provision.
A number of issues arising from the current situation are then reviewed,
including the notion of a common retirement age, or age-band, for men
and women.
The 'normal retirement age' is defined by the Inland Revenue as
'the age specified in the rules of a pension scheme at which the members
normally retire and receive their pension (and perhaps other retirement
benefits)' (GA, 1981, S8.3, p.39). In recent years, schemes have increasingly
defined their 'normal retirement age' to harrnonise with the 'pensionable
age' which confers entitlement to a basic NI retirement pension - 65
for men and 60 for women. However, scheme members 'may well retire
earlier or later than the 'normal' age with the agreement of their
employer' (ibid.) and schemes may specify an upper age limit for compulsory
retirement above the 'normal' retirement
Thus, an employer may specify a 'normal' retirement age for men
of 65 and women of 60 and actually compel employees of these ages to
retire from work. Alternatively, 'normal' retirement ages may be so
defined, but with the women being permitted to stay on at work until
65 (or earlier) if they wish, in which case they have n rights to
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redundancy payments and cannot sue for wrongful dismissal (1-1 of C,
1982, I, S152, p.iix). An employer may specify 65 as the 'normal'
retirement age for both sexes in which case any woman who retires below
that age is, for the purposes of her occupational pension scheme, retiring
early, even though once past 60 she is of 'pensionable age'. Finally,
an employer can retire both men and women at 60, as happens in the
public sector, where occupational pensions are payable to men and women
(34)
at that age.
Connoisseurs of sex discrimination issues will recognise this
situation as one in which both men and women can claim, with some conviction,
to be either advantaged or disadvantaged. No 'employment protection'
or 'sex discrimination' legislation affects these differential practices,
which remain entirely legal and commonplace. Women can be required
to retire at 60, regardless of their wishes or any financial detriment
which may accrue to them, while their male counterparts can be required
to work on until 65. Hence both men and women will continue to be
denied 'equal treatment' in membership of occupational pension schemes
so long as employers are legally permitted to operate these differential
conditions of sevice with regard to the 'normal' retirement age and
any associated rules defining an upper age limit beyond which scheme
members may not remain in employment.
(35)The historical background
The OPB (1976, S7.11, p.45) noted a tendency for employers to
assign lower 'normal' retirement ages to women in the l930s, despite
there being a common age (65) for entitlement to the contributory state
old age pension. A government survey of private occupational pension
schemes showed that in 1936, 39.7% of white-collar women in schemes
were required to retire below the age of' 60, a rule applied to no white-
collar men. 10.1% of' manual women were under a like requirement and,
-269-
again, none of the men. 37.2% of the white-collar women (0.4% men)
had a 'normal' retirement age of 55 or below, with only 33.2% having
a 'normal' age of retirement of 65 (men 52.4%). Manual women had higher
'normal' ages of retirement, but again these were lower than for comparable
men (Ministry of Labour, 1938, p.174 and see Ch.l, above).
Women who were not members of occupational pension schemes were
particularly at risk to poverty if required to retire from employment
before the then 'pensionable age' of 65. The l930s campaign to lower
4
this 'pensionable age' to 55 for single women (see Ch.2) was opposed
by female public servants in employers' pension schemes who feared
a consequent lowering of their own 'normal' or compulsory retirement
ages. Such women were, other than exceptionally, single and paid at
lower rates than comparable men.
In 1940,	 'pensionable age' was lowered to 60 for women and left(36)
at 65 for men. This was partly a response to the demands of single
women and partly to rectify the anomaly whereby the younger uninsured
wives of men over 65 had been denied a pension until they themselves
reached 65, forcing some onto public assistance (Thane, 1978b, p.236).
'Goodwill and sentiment occasioned by the contribution of women to
the war effort' may also have helped (H of C, 1982, 26-lI, Sl.4, p.2).
Ironically, the 'war effort' ensured paid work for most older women
who wanted it.
The NI Act 1946 retained a 'pensionable age' of 60 for women,
viewing the differential treatment of men and women as unproblematic
since 'retirement' rather than 'old age' pensions were under discussion.
'There is no fixed age of retirement, but only a minimum pension age
-- at or after which each individual has the option of' retiring and
claiming pension' (Beveridge, 1942, S24.4, p.96). Envisaging continuing
full employment, Beveridge wished to encourage the postponement of'
-270-
retirement to a point beyond pensionable age. 'The capacity of different
people to work late in life varies from individual to individual.
To attempt to force people to retire before their powers and desire
for work fail' (ibid.) was undesirable. Hence, the provisions for
an enhanced NI pension for 'late' retirers.
The Phillips Committee recognised the importance of the influence
of the age at which the NI pension becomes payable on 'the age limits
of other schemes and retirement practices gen€rally' (H M Treasury,
1954, S182, p.148). In reviewing the arguments for retention of the
then differential pensionable age the Committee observed that the new
NI scheme had negated the original 1940 arguments for a lowering of
the female pensionable age, since the younger wife of a retirement
pensioner could now be classified as his dependant no matter what her
age. This left the 'spinsters' plus a very small number of married
or formerly married women who paid contributions in their own right.
In the light of greater female longevity and in keeping with its recom-
mendations for a longer working life for all, with consequent savings
in cost, the Committee recommended a 'pensionable age' of 68 for men
and 63 for women (ibid., Sl9l, pp.50-51). The point was made that
on the grounds of sex equality 'pension ages between the two sexes
should be the same'. (Ibid., Sl92, p.51)
The Phillips Committee declared itself 'bound to recognise that
women do in practice retire earlier than men' for reasons which were
variously ascribed to the existing lower female pensionable age, health
and, tellingly, employers' own retirement policies (ibid., S193, p.51).
They argued that the vast majority of women would in fact get a 'dependent
wife's pension' under Beveridge's 'Housewives Charter' (ibid.) and
that 'Working women, especially single women, who have to run their
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homes unaided outside working hours may wish to retire as soon as possible.'
(Ibid.) All but one of the Committee felt that the savings effected
by the raising of 'pensionable age' for women to match that of men
would be 'relatively small' and made at the expense of contributing
married women and spinsters.
Dr Janet Vaughan, in her minority report, saw 'no reason why one
section of the community should be in part supported by the rest of
the community, at an earlier age than their contemporaries. If women
expect the same opportunities and conditions of work as men, they must
also expect to make the same contribution to the productivity of' the
country through the length of their working life'. Dr Vaughan could
see no firm evidence that women were less fit than their male counterparts
in the same age-group and no reason to discount small savings which
might be made to the National Insurance scheme (ibid., p.93). Her views
did not sway the Committee and differential 'pensionable ages' still
operate.
II The current relationship between 'pensionable age' and the treatment
of women in occupational schemes
'The fact that pensions in the state scheme are payable
at 65 to men and 60 to women has led most employers to
adopt these ages as the ages at which employees are
generally expected to retire, and the earliest date from
which any occupational pension is paid except in special
circumstances such as early retirement due to ill-health.
Even where pension ages in an occupational scheme are
the same for men and women, state pension ages will often
affect the age at which employees actually retire.'
(OPB, 1976, S95, p.iV7)
The most recent GA survey of occupational pension schemes found that
'the normal retirement ages in occupational schemes continue to co-
incide with those of the National Insurance scheme' (GA, 1981, S8.4,
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p.39). The following table compares 'normal' retirement ages in 1979
and 1975.
Table 19
'Normal' age of retirement for men and women in occupational
pension schemes 1975: 1979, UK.
Normal	 Private Sector Public Sector
Retirement Age
1975	 1979	 1975	 1979
%
Women: Under 60	 1	 2	 17	 17































Between 60-65 4	 2	 27	 29	 14	 14





Source: GA (1981), Table 8.3, p.40.
(Percentages derived from numbers in thousands)
There are significant differences between private and public sector
practices. In the former sector, 95% of women and 90% of men are in
pension schemes with a 'normal' retirement age which co-incides with
'pensionable age'. In the public sector, where membership of an index-
linked occupational pension scheme is a virtually universal benefit
for full-time permanent employees, while 64% of women have identical
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'normal retirement' and 'pensionable' ages, only 23% of the men do.
Far more women have a 'normal' retirement age which is below pensionable
age in the public sector than in the private sector: far more women
have a 'flexible' normal retirement age which permits staying in employ-.
ment beyond 60. Nearly half the public sector men have a 'normal'
retirement age which is below pensionable age, a situation unusual
in the private sector. The 1979 survey notes that the number of employees
entitled to retire below pensionable age 'appears to have stabilized
in recent years' (GA 1981, S8.4, p.39). It is explained that persons
of both sexes in this category are those 'in arduous employment requiring
a high standard of physical fitness, in particular in the uniformed
services' (ibid., S8.5, p.40).
Unfortunately, the GA's figures do not give an indication of the
age of compulsory retirement for members of' occupational pension schemes.
It is, as noted, quite legal for employers to require that female staff
retire at 60. A female employee over 60 is not entitled to statutory
redundancy payments nor to sue for wrongful dismissal unless her 'normal
retirement age' is defined as higher than her own age (H of C, 26-I,
S151-156, pp.lix-lxi). It can be deduced that the vast majority of
employed women over 60, especially in the private sector, are vulnerable
to being 'laid off' from their jobs, particularly where an employer
wishes to shed labour by 'natural wastage' strategies.
A survey of retirement practices was carried out in 1977 on a
sample of women 50-72 and men 55-72 who had worked in the previous
20 years in Britain. It was found that men and women retiring actually
at 'pensionable age' were much more likely to be receiving an occupational
pension than those who retired later, though 'Men were very much more
likely to receive occupational pensions than women' (Parker, 1980,
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S4.2, p.26). 75% of full-time employed women under pensionable age
stated that they would have to give up their current job at 60, only
19% being allowed to work on to 65: only 4% of the men were made to
retire before 65 (ibid., Table A5.9, p.73). These rules were the outcome
of employers' policies rather than union policies, though it appeared
that whereas in the case of men, employer and union policy harmonised,
this was far less the case for women. 86% of the women's retirement
rules were ascribed to employers only, as compared with 65% of the
men's. 14% of the women's rules were ascribed to employer and union
policy as compared with 27% of the men's (ibid., Table A5.lO, p.73).
There has been a long-term trend since the second World War towards
both men and women retiring at pensionable age (OPB, 1976, Table 5,
p.43). Single women, the group most currently likely to have substantial
entitlement to a state or occupational pension benefits and to be working
full-time, are least likely to work on beyond pensionable age. The
GHS 1982 showed 22% of married women economically active between 60-64
and 18% of widowed, divorced and separated women. 5% of married and
4% of widowed, divorced and separated women were in paid work after
65. Only 9% of single women over 60 were shown as economically active
(OPCS, 1984a, Table 6.8, p.104). Evidence from the DHSS to the Parliamentary
enquiry into the Age of Retirement suggested that those who work beyond
pensionable age are 'men or women in firms where there is no occupational
pension, in small firms' (H of C 26-Il, 1982, S136, p.91). Given the
figures on women in membership of occupational pension schemes whose
'normal' retirement age is above 'pensionable age' and considering
the widespread complaints received by the House of Commons Social Services
Committee (i.e.: ibid., SlO, p.169), it seems unlikely that elderly
women workers are members of occupational pension schemes. Yet some
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women could advantage themselves financially by remaining in employment
to 65, if allowed, thus obtaining increased occupational pension benefits
and an enhanced NI pension.
The 'normal' age of retirement: issues for female members of
occupational pension schemes
As increasing numbers of women pay into the statutory pension
scheme in their own right, with the phased abolition of the 'married
women's option', more women in occupational pension schemes will find
themselves in the position of most single women now, in having the
option or being required to retire at 60 with a Category A retirement
pension and whatever benefits are due from occupational schemes. In
this respect, the position of women is unlike that of men, who do not
under any circumstances qualify for a statutory retirement pension
at 60.(38) The position of ever-married women differs also, in that
they may already be in receipt of a statutory or occupational widow's
pension. The financial position of women of 60 differs to an even
greater extent from that of men of 65, according to whether they have
been a 'main breadwinner' and whether they have sustained interruptions
to their working lives (see Ch.7).
The OPB (1976) stated that 'Our evidence is virtually unanimous
in pointing to the lower age of pension for women as the most striking
difference in the treatment of men and women in occupational schemes'
(S7.l, p.42). It has been seen that an employer may legally curtail
the working life of female as compared to male employees. This can
undoubtedly disadvantage some women, bearing in mind that women tend
to earn much less than men, even in professional occupations. If a
women has been promoted, she can have five years less in which to enjoy
any financial gains.
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A woman who is required to retire at 60 is at risk to having fewer
years of service to count towards her occupational pension and other
retirement benefits and is more 'at risk' to ending up with an incomplete
service record than her male counterpart whc is not required to retire
until the age of 65. The size of the pension and associated benefits
can be affected with specific regard to:
1) the calculations of benefits under commutation and
allocation options
2) the size of adjustments made on early and late
retirement
3) the amount of benefit secured by additional
voluntary contributions
4) also, in a few schemes, different pension ages
affect the rate of accrual of personal pension
(OPB, 1976, S4.3, p.17)
Occupational pension benefits are usually calculated against a
lengthy working life, the retirement pension commonly being based on
a fraction of 'final' salary (however calculated) multiplied by the
total number of years' service, to a maximum of 40 or 45 years. Many
schemes also award a 'lump sum' on retirement, which again commonly
relates to length of service. Where an arbitrary retirement rule of
60 is applied to women members of an occupational scheme, this is a
form of 'unequal treatment' which can operate to the detriment of women
as a class, though the degree of such detriment, if any, will be experienced
differentially by individuals. Not only can such women be affected
by loss of years of service, but, even if they manage to complete the
maximum number of years for their particular occupational pension scheme,
there is the possibility that remuneration will improve in real economic
terms in the five years after they retire while their male counterparts
in the same occupation are working on, thus enabling a higher 'final'
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salary figure to be counted in the computations on which pension benefits
are based. By the same token, a poor non-inflation-proofed pension
will be 'at risk' to loss of value during the first five years of a
woman's retirement, when she is, typically, aged between 60-65.
If a woman is compulsorily retired at 60 instead of 65, this may
also be to her detriment if she would prefer to work longer so as to
make up for earlier breaks in service and achieve a longer period of
service in which to make additional voluntary contributions. It will
be seen (Ch.7) that women are more subject than men to career breaks,
for a variety of 'domestic' reasons which can lie beyond the control
of an individual woman. Divorced women are a group who are particularly
at risk to detriment from compulsory retirement rules. A divorced
woman who gets little or no maintenance from her husband and/or who
has lost the right to benefit from his occupational pension scheme,
or who simply prefers to be financially independent, can suffer, in
occupational pension terms, from compulsory curtailment of her working
life.
A factor which compounds the 'curtailment' issue for the present
generation of older women workers relates to length of full-time education.
In the past, fewer women than men have had an extended post-school
education: where this has been the case, it is unlikely that a female
member of an occupational pension scheme will have started her career
before the age of 21 or 22, so that even if the scheme is one which
permitted early entry, such a woman can, if' made to retire at the age
of 60, be short of the minimum number of years' service required for
full benefits perhaps in one of the better paid occupations with good
pension provision. Compulsory late entry of women to membership of
occupational pension schemes is now illegal, as shown in the preceding
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chapter. Thus late entry is no longer permissable, but early exit
is, which seems illogical.
In addition, such a woman could well hesitate to take time out
to obtain an appropriate qualification by means of full-time study
unless the employer guarantees her pension rights. Otherwise, the
woman's length of service could be shortened further. It is illegal
under the SDA to offer women fewer opportunities for training than
men (SDA, 1975, Part II, S6(7)(c), p.4). However, in a situation where
neither men nor women are offered pension protection, a woman with
a shorter potential length of service due to employer's pension rules,
would seem to be disadvantaged. It is true that such a woman might
have the opportunity to back-pay her own and her employer's contributions
during the time she was on leave from her job. But a man with a longer
potential working life (and the prospect of higher earnings) might
not need to do this.
If a woman retires with both occupational and state retirement
pensions at 60, subject to any of the above detriments, one further
financial insult will come her way if she is taxed in her own right.
She will get no 'age allowance' from the Inland Revenue until she reaches
the age of	 In addition, there may be detrimental consequences
where the occupational pension is subject to a notional deduction to
take account of the fact that the recipient is expected to be drawing
a state retirement pension. This deduction is applied to the scheme
rather than to individual beneficiaries and usually relates to the
notional level of single person's retirement pension. Married or formerly
married women will not necessarily be so entitled to an individual
NI pension: a dependent wife's pension is payable at 60% of that rate,
and depends on the presence of a properly insured retired husband (see
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Ward, 1981, pp.95-100).
The OPB has noted that, occasionally, higher accrual rates are
allowed to make up for the fact that women in occupational pensions
stop work earlier than men. Occasionally the converse is the case
(OPB, 1976, S7.1, p.42). What seems little in doubt is that women,
because of their lower life-time earnings, are less able as a class
to purchase life insurance or participate in other forms of' saving
to compensate for early retirement.
Individual women may well, by virtue of their particular circumstances,
count earlier 'normal' retirement age rules as a form of 'positive
discrimination' which to some extent compensates for their generally
reduced opportunities in employment, as compared with men. Other women
may agree with ASTMS, which interprets such earlier retirement as a
'mixed blessing' - 'normally it merely means that a woman has a longer
time in which to receive a poorer pension,' (ibid., S6.l, p.33).
The case for a common 'normal retirement age' for men and women in
occupational schemes
The case for differential 'normal' retirement ages for men and
women in occupational pension schemes rests largely on the differential
'pensionable ages' defined in the statutory pension provisions. The
OPB concluded in 1976 that equal status must mean equal pension ages
(ibid., S7.35, p.52). This final section examines the assumptions
on which rules defining an earlier age of retirement for women are
based, and considers the possibility of gender-neutral retirement rules
for occupational schemes, with or without differential 'pensionable
ages' in the statutory social security system.
The OPB noted certain common justifications for the lower female
'pensionable age' namely:
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a) the average age disparity between husbands and wives
b) the fact that women have, in effect, two jobs -
running the home and going out to work
c) the reduced working efficiency of women in their
sixties
d) women's greater proneness to ill-health (ibid., S7.17, p.47).
In examining these justifications, the Board pointed out that it had
been shown by the 1971 census that 30% of wives were in fact older
than their husbands (ibid., S7.19, pp.47-48). Since that time re-marriage
is also affecting the 'average' age disparity of three years between
husbands and wives (OPCS, 1984, Table 3.7, 	 Nor do arguments
based on the assumed age-relationship of married couples apply to those
single and divorced women who appear to be represented in the full-
time labour force in greater proportion to their total numbers than
is the case with married women.
With regard to the argument that women have 'the dual responsibility
of running a home and going out to work' and should therefore be allowed
to retire five years earlier than men, the OPB agreed that this was
mainly the case, but pointed out that the 'same responsibility can
and increasingly does fall also on men, for example where a wife is
an invalid or a man is a widower with children' (OPB, 1976, S7.20,
p.48). The Board in fact remarked that 'normal pensicri ages, in both
state and occupational schemes, reflect to a greater or lesser extent
the ages at which society thinks that older people should be enabled
to stop working'. (Ibid., S73, p.42) It could indeed be argued that
the age of 60 is a prescriptive one in that married women are assumed
to be younger than their husbands and it is assumed that when these
husbands retire, married women should be at home to 'look after' them.
This argument is in fact borne out by a recent survey in which 60%
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of male respondents stated that women should retire before their husbands
'so that their wives would be at home when they retired' (Richie and
Barrowclough, 1983, p.27).
It is possible that the current 'pensionable ages' and associated
'normal retirement ages' serve to reinforce the traditional domestic
division of labour. Such practices are questionable when, at a time
of high unemployment, a wife may have a financial need to stay in her
paid job for as long as she can. Furthermore, unmarried women run
their own homes, with or without assistance, with or without responsibility
for servicing other members of the household - as do unmarried men.
It can be queried whether assumed domestic responsibilities should
have any place in defining the 'normal' age of retirement in occupational
pension schemes on a basis which can result in the expulsion of women
from the work force five years earlier than men, regardless of individual
circumstances.
The OPB dismissed arguments that 'the efficiency and enthusiasm'
of older women 'tended to wane in their sixties, often due to lack
of promotion', on grounds of lack of evidence - nor was the Board convinced
by available statistics on ill-health, which did not allow for comparisons
to be made between men and women (OPB, 1976, S7.21, pp.48-49). And,
having found no good reasons to support the differential 'pensionable
ages' which underpin the practice of occupational pension schemes with
regard to the setting of 'normal retirement age', the Board examined
some alternatives. These included reducing 'pensionable age' to 60
for men, raising it to 65 for women, or finding a 'break-even' point
between these two ages, with a fourth possibility lying in the direction
of a flexible age-band for retirement for both men and women (ibid.,
S7.26-7.50, pp.50-57).
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Lowering the male age to 60 would increase the cost of occupational
pension schemes and raise issues around the fact that a statutory retire-
ment pension for men is not available until 65 - and men are now more
restricted in applying for unemployment benefit than they were in 1976.
It was queried whether a 'normal' retirement age of 60 for all would
permit employers to let men stay on beyond the new normal pension age
and it was pointed out that the Inland Revenue would have to change
their pension regulations. The additional costs would fall most heavily
on the private sector (ibid., 5.7.37-7.41, pp.53-54).
The possibility of raising the normal retirement age in occupational
pension schemes to 65 for both sexes was felt by the OPB to raise questions
as to the rights of existing scheme members who expect to retire at
60 and the problems which transitional arrangements for such a change
might create. In both suggestions for a common pension age of 60 or
65, the question of integration or 1k of it, with the statutory pension
provisions, loom large. An equal pension age somewhere between 60
and 65 appeared achievable without cost only at about age 64 - which
would raise much the same issues as age 65 (ibid., S7.42-7,44, pp.54-55).
The OPB felt that 'equal provision for more flexible retirement
ages may well be the ultimate solution' though 'not the easy solution
it is sometimes claimed to be'. It was pointed out that there 'is
already some flexibility in many occupational pension schemes allowing
retirement before or after normal pension age'. (Ibid., 57.44, p.55)
As an interim measure the Board suggested that in occupational pension
schemes with differential retirement ages for men and women, women
should not be 'prevented, solely because they have reached that age,
from staying at work and earning additional pensions up to men's age
(or until the date at which they earn the maximum pension permitted
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at pension age, whatever is the earlier).' The Board saw certain dis-
advantages in requiring that women should not be retired earlier than
men - such as inequities 'between women who had earned the maximum
pensions at normal pension age and those who had not, and between women
who could take advantage of the arrangements, and men who could not'-
also 'the greatest inequity - that between women who were members of
an occupational pension scheme and those who were not'. A higher 'normal
age of retirement' would not prevent women being retired, made redundant
or dismissed on grounds unconnected with sex - matters on which the
employer should have the final say. There were also issues around
the Inland Revenue rules so that their 'limit of two-thirds of final
salary would have to apply at whichever was the lower pension age in
the scheme', so that men and women could qualify equally for any extra
pension available after that age (ibid., S7.46-7,48, pp.55-56). Despite
these problems, the Board concluded that 'wherever practicable' women
members should not be made to retire before men, solely on grounds
of sex' (S7.48, p.56).
During the 1981-82 Parliamentary session, the House of Commons
Social Services Committee examined the need for change in the present
pensionable age and retirement age system in the light of what was
perceived as a growing demand for a lower state male pensionable age
(so as to ease the unemployment situation) and a growing movement towards
early retirement (H of C, 1982, 26-I, Sl, p.vii). It was stated that
'The difference in pension ages between men and women is the biggest
anomaly in the present pension system' and that the rectification of
this anomaly 'must be one of the prime objectives of any new pension
age policy' (ibid., S64, p.xxix). The Committee was not persuaded
by arguments for a lower female pensionable age based on recognition
of women's greater share of domestic responsibilities or on the typical
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age discrepancy between husband and wife. Nor were they convinced
that the lower age 'does anything to help make for the disturbingly
persistent pattern of lower female earnings' (ibid., S66, pp.xxix-xxx).
The Committee noted that no account had been taken of the recommendations
of the OPB (1976) despite the fact that it had insisted that 'equalisation
in the state scheme was a necessary precondition of equal status in
occupational schemes'(ibid., S67, p.xxx). Nor had the efforts of the
EOC, the NAPF and other bodies led to any government commitment to
the principle of' equalisation of pensionable ages (ibid., S68, P.xxx).(41)
After its own deliberations, tI.e Social Services Committee recommended
that there should be a flexible pension age 'based on flexibility and
on equality between men and women'. (Ibid., S71, p.xxxi) The notional
common pension age was recommended as 63 for both men and women, at
which age contributors would become eligible, if so entitled, to draw
their full statutory pension benefits. Retirement on an abated state
pension would be permitted from the age of 60 (ibid., SXIV-XV, pp.lxxxii-
lxxxiii). It was felt, on the evidence presented, that such an arrange-
ment would involve no substantial cost to the occupational pensions
sector (S96-97, pp.xxxviii-xxxix). The occupational schemes showed
interest in the notion of' a flexible 'normal retirement age' (ibid.,
Sl36, pp.lii-liii). A lengthy time-table was proposed for the changes,
to be complete by 1998 when the 'Castle' pension arrangements fully
mature (ibid., Sl42, p.lv).
Evidence presented to the Committee from various interests indicated
that equalisation of' pensionable age would be welcomed by the providers
of occupational pensions. A survey of the British public conducted
in 1982 showed that 79% of' respondents favoured the same 'pensionable
age' for men and women, and that most favoured a lower common age (Richie
and Barrowclough, 1982, p.ii) and were prepared to pay higher contributions
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to this end (ibid., p.iii).
Many of the issues around a common age of retirement for men and
women in occupational pension schemes illustrate the reality that
such issues are inextricably bound up with the age of entitlement to
state pensions (Pilch and Carroll, 1976; EOC, 1977; DHSS, 1978a; H of C,
2982, 26-I and II). The arguments for a rise in the female age to
65, a reduction in the male age to 60, or a 'break-even' point have
been rehearsed in detail which is outside the scope of this study.
Meanwhile the European Commission has produced a draft Council Recommendation
on the Principles of a Community Policy on Retirement Age (1982) which
urges a flexible retirement system on Member States, regarding it as
'likely to solve the problem of equal treatment for men and women as
regards the retirement age' (H of C, 1982, 26-Il, Annex 3, pp.22-23).
However, as the Social Services Committee observed, 'As a recommendation
it has no teeth; it should rather be taken as a portent' (ibid., 26-I,
S52, p.xxv). Member states have two years in which to examine their
own provisions and the possibilities for introducing flexible retirement,
after which a further report will be made (Employment Gazette (1982),
Vol.90, No.2, p.46).
The differential pensionable age as a barrier to equal treatment of
men and women in occupational pension schemes
The differential pensionable age, used to justify differential
'normal retirement ages' in occupational pension schemes is a major
and persisting barrier to the achievement of equal treatment of men
and women in employers' pension schemes. Where 'normal retirement
age' is 60, as is the case in the private pensions sector (other than
exceptionally), a woman may be dismissed at or after that age without
any recourse to employee protection provisions. At a time of' high
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unemployment, employers have a legal means of compelling women to retire
five years' earlier than men. Yet the majority of working women at
present have no entitlement to a state retirement pension in their
own right: even single women may have an interrupted contribution record.
However, many women employees nonetheless are denied an opportunity
to make good any shortfall in their state or occupational retirement
entitlements because of retirement rules which rest largely on the
unequal pensionable age.(42)
Neither the EC 'Equal Treatment' directive 79/7 nor the Draft
Directive on equal treatment in occupational social security schemes
tackle the issue of unequal pensionable ages. No progress has so far
been made on this issue in Britain, despite the 1982 report of the
House of Commons Social Services Committee on the Age of Retirement.
The Government replied briefly and without commitment in November 1983
(EOCb, 1984, p.l3). 3 The EOC declares itself to be 'still deeply
concerned about the volume and variety of complaints received about
inequality in treatment - in relation to retirement age, pensions and
other issues -' which link to unequal pensionable ages (EOC, 1984a,
S6.1, p.25). The Commission is currently supporting a case brought
by a woman compelled to retire at 60 where a man would have been allowed
to continue to 65 (ibid., S6.3,
A journalist once commented on a DHSS memorandum entitled 'Pension
Age' that
'The impression conveyed by the DHSS document is that
the computer is programmed for men aged 65 and women
aged 60, and that the DHSS is determined to preserve
this status quo so that the programme does not have to
be changed'.
(45)(Pilch and Carroll, 1976, p.23)
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However, since women who do manage to work beyond 60 are currently
permitted to revoke their NI pension rights there seems no reason why
occupational pension schemes should hide behind the statutory pension
system as a continuing excuse for promulgating inequalities. Some
schemes do manage to treat full-time women members as 'honorary men',
that is, as members with full rights to benefit from an equally long
working life. Perhaps no area better illustrates the questionable
wisdom of excluding social security matters from the SDA 1975 than
this issue of differential ages of retirement.
II Eligibility to confer survivors' benefits
While employers' pension provision was originally designed to
provide a replacement income for earnings foregone in retirement, it
has since been extended to provide a range of benefits which constitute
another major example of permitted sex discrimination in occupational
pension schemes. This is differential entitlement by male and female
scheme members to confer death-in-service or death-in-retirement benefits,
including pensions payable to surviving spouses, children or other
nominated beneficiaries (who may be subject to a test of financial
dependency or subject to proof of kinship) and/or lump sum payments.
These are, in a sense, uncollected retirement benefits and, as will
be shown, these benefits can be substantial. Pressure is growing from
scheme members and trades unions for such benefits to be made available
on an 'equal access' basis to men and women alike,46) and some private
sector schemes have already made this move. However, some commentators
urge that before a blanket extension of such benefits is permitted
throughout occupational pension schemes, the principles on which survivors'
benefits have hitherto been granted s1ould be reviewed in the light
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of social and economic change.
Widowers' benefits
It is a requirement that contracted-out occupational pension schemes
must provide a guaranteed minimum widow's pension in respect of married
male scheme members who die before or after reaching pensionable age
(SSPA 1975: S36-39, pp.28-32). No such requirement exists with regard
to widowers' pensions. Thus, female members of occupational pension
schemes can quite legally find themselves in a position where their
male colleagues can, potentially, confer an 'automatic' survivor's
pension on their widows, while they themselves, as married women, can
confer no such pension on their widowers. However, some schemes do
permit the payment of pensions to widowers on proof of financial dependence
(usually linked to ill-health). Not surprisingly, at a time when the
number of two-earner households has been increasing, along with the
risk of unemployment, such differential access to survivors' pensions
is being called into question.
A TUC discussion document on equal treatment for men and women
in occupational pension schemes identified dependants' benefits as
the main area, apart from retirement ages, 'where discrimination between
men and women is most visible' (TUC, 1983a, p.8). Differential provision
for widows and widowers is cited as a particular example of such discrimi-
nation. Widows' pensions have been provided on the assumption of female
dependency in marriage (see Ch.8). Widowers' pensions, provided as
'survivors' benefits' for men whose traditicnal role has been that of
'breadwinner', are a much more recent development. They are discussed
in this section as benefits arising from occupational pension scheme
membership, with regard to which women members are still, typically,
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treated differently from men.
In its discussion of the 'social background to the provision of
survivors' benefits' in 1976, the OPB pointed out that differential
treatment of male and female scheme members in relation to survivors'
benefits reflected the traditional domestic division of labour. Thus,
it has been the death of a husband not a wife which has been seen to
occasion a need for financial provision for dependants, in both state
and occupational pension schemes. However, the Board noted that 'the
death of a wife can also cause financial difficulties because child
care or household work may have to be paid for, but widowers' pensions
have not been provided as it has been assumed that this expense is
within the means of the male breadwinner' (OPB, 1976, S10.2, p.101).
The Board went on to discuss the growth of two-earner households and
the increased participation of married women in state and occupational
pension schemes. But it was pointed out that 'the death of a husband
still usually leads to a greater reduction in family income, and the
incidence of male dependency is therefore less than that of female
dependency, except perhaps for older women whose husbands have retired.'
(Ibid., Sl0.3, pp.101-2)
Arguments are made for equal treatment of men and women in terms
of survivors' benefits on grounds of equality. Those advocating such
equal treatment in evidence to the OPB in some cases linked their arguments
to notions of occupational pensions as deferred pay (OPB, 1976, S10.29,
p.109). They questioned assumptions of 'automatic' need being applied
only to widows. They pointed out that 'widowers' pensions should be
paid to compensate for the loss of both the wife's earnings and her
unpaid work in the home, and to help widowers with young families to
stay at home' (ibid.). Similar 'deferred pay' and 'costs of retirement'
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arguments could be made for granting widowers' pensions on death in
retirement.
Some organisations were in favour of retaining differential provision.
'The CBI and organisations in the pensions field said that widows'
pensions were provided because they met a real need not generally apparent
in the case of widowers' (ibid., SlO.31, p.109). Widowers' pensions
were agreed to be relatively less costly, due to the greater longevity
of women, but such pension provision was not a priority for employers
with limited resources, though it was acknowledged that there might
be 'a need for increased provision for widowers who hd been financially
dependent upon their wives - for example, due to ill-health' (ibid.,
p.110).
The NAPF argued that the concept of pensions as deferred pay was
'especially inappropriate to survivors' pensions' (ibid., Sl0.32, p.110),
since 'no employer .... paid a man more because he had no dependents
and hence no entitlement to dependents' benefits under the pension
scheme'. (Ibid.) The Board itself commented on the existence of witnesses
who viewed survivors' benefits not in terms of deferred pay, but in
terms of insurance, which justified rules of entitlement being based
on need. 'On this view, conditions for survivors' pensions such as
tests of financial dependency ,... are justified because the contingency
insured against - the loss of a spouse's income and consequent hardship -
is not present' (ibid., S6.23, p.40). Some witnesses queried the notion
of 'automatic' pensions for either widows or widowers, not least in
view of the increasing number of women in paid employment (ibid., 510.24,
p.108).
The OPB asked the Government Actuary's department to examine the
costs of widowers' pensions. It estimated that, should widowers' pensions
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be provided unconditionally, the additional cost would be greater than
if a dependency test were applied to both widows' and widowers' pensions.
It appeared that 'an automatic pension for a widower of half the personal
pension would add 6% to the value of a woman's personal pension'.
In a scheme 'providing a good level of benefits', it would increase
the employer/employee contributions by .6% of salary for new female
entrants. For existing female members .7% would be needed (ibid.,
Sl0.33, p.110). The difficulties of making an accurate estimation
of cost was pointed out, not least because this related to the number
of women scheme members (ibid., SlO.34, p.110).
The Board concluded that, in consideration of the increase in
the number of two-earner households, there was a case for equal treatment
of men and women with regard to survivors' benefits. It did however
hazard that 'the extension of widowers' pensions could lead some employers
and employees to consider whether survivors' pensions should continue
to be unconditional', which might be a progressive move (ibid., Sl0.36,
p.111). It was acknowledged that it might be difficult to introduce
legislation on such 'equal treatment' when it was not a priority among
those administering the schemes in the occupational sector, nor yet
a feature of the statutory pension scheme. Cost seemd to 'rule out
far-reaching changes in both cases for the present' (ibid.). As with
the differential 'pensionable age' as between men and women, the absence
of any but limited provision for widowers in the state pension schemes
was held to be a bar on extension of such benefits in the occupational
pension sector. The conclusion of the Board was that 'as resources
permit, whatever provision is made for widows' pensions in occupational
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schemes should apply equally to widowers' (ibid.).
The first Consultative Document (DHSS, 1976, S16(i), p.10) recommended
that 'equal provision' should be made in respect of widows and widowers,
but that the change should be 'effected by voluntary means, as resources
permit'. The second Consultative document noted some support for non-
discriminatory survivors' benefits in the responses to the first document
(DHSS, 1977, p.14) but recommended no action so long as treatment remained
unequal in statutory pensions provision.
It was only in the 1970s that Inland Revenue regulations first
permitted widowers' pensions to be provided as an occupational benefit
without a test of dependency (OPB, 1976, Sb-li, p.10447) In 1975,
widowers' pension benefits as such were uncommon, though 'some schemes,
including most of those in the private sector, provide benefits for
widowers who were wholly or mainly dependent on their wives under rules
which provide for dependents of deceased members generally' (GA, 1978,
S12.11, p.67). By 1979, a similar survey estimated that about 30%
of private sector scheme members provided widowers' pensions on death
in service on the same basis as widows' pensions, though some few schemes
operated a test of financial dependency (GA, 1981, S11.7, p.64).
The NAFF found in 1983 that 41% of scheme members were entitled
to a pension for an 'independent' widower on death in retirement with
2% entitled on discretionary basis. 61% were entitled to a pension
for a 'dependent' widower, and 19% were so entitled on a discretionary
basis. Public sector pension schemes provided 76% of the membership
with unconditional 'dependent' widowers' benefits, though this was
a feature of 'staff' and 'combined' but not 'works' schemes. 37% of
the public sector membership had unconditional entitlement to a pension
for an 'independent' widower (NAFF, 1983, Table 64, p.41). In the
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private sector the comparable figures were 49% and 43%. 25% of the
members could get a 'discretionary' widower's pension for a dependent
widower (ibid., p.42). The figures for death in service were stated
to be similar (ibid., p.41).
A widower may, whether or not a pension is provided, have entitlement
to lump sum benefits if his late wife died in service. As discussed
in Chapter 8, such lump sums can be large. Payment of the lump sum
on death in service is either to the deceased member's estate or elsewhere
by discretion of' the scheme administrators or trustees. Where payable
by such discretion, the lump sum is freed of liability for capital
transfer tax. It is possible for a scheme member to nominate a person
or persons to whom he or she wishes the lump sum to be paid, though
the trustees are not under a legal obligation to honour the members'
wishes (TUC, 1981, pp.58-59). Schemes commonly require such a lump
sum to be paid to the widow or widower if there is one.
Widows' pension provision is predicated on the notion of the male
wage as a 'family wage' and the financial dependence of women in marriage.
It is still the case that a married man is legally required to 'maintain'
his wife. There is no obligation upon a married woman to contribute
financially to the expenses of household expenses, though, as documented
in Chapter 7, the increased economic activity of married women over
the last two decades means that many women do make a financial contribution
to the home. Some married women are, by choice or necessity, main
or sole bread-winners. Nonetheless, the income generated by wives
is, typically, less than that generated by husbands and reflects the
domestic division of labour which designates married men primarily
as paid workers and married women primarily as unpaid workers in the
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home.
However, increasingly, married couples do not conform to the stereo-
type. Childless wives have economic activity rates analogous to those
of single women and mothers tend to withdraw completely from the labour
force only when their children are of pre-school age. Those women
who work full-time are most likely to have access to membership of
an occupational pensions scheme, and the higher their earnings the
greater their access to scheme membership. The higher their earnings,
the greater is the inequity between those married women whose scheme
membership does not confer a widower's pension on a surviving spouse
and those married men in respect of whom an automatic widow's pension
is inevitably payable.
Widowers' pensions feature modestly in statutory pension arrangements,
there being a provision for men over 65 to inherit their late wife's
pension record if she died when herself over the age of 60, and if
her record was better than that of her husband. No widower may exceed
the level of pension permitted to a single person (SSPA 1975, S8-9,
pp.5-6). In evidence to the OPB the DHSS explained that this arrangement
was intended to cater for husbands who 'because of old age or ill health'
had been dependent on their wife's income (OPB, 1976, SlO.17, p.106).
This differential treatment of married men and women scheme members
with regard to benefits for widows and widowers is an example of permitted
sex discrimination in occupational pension schemes. Its continuance
is justified on grounds of' tradition, the assumed financial dependence
of wives on husbands, wives' typically lower earnings and the cost
of extending automatic benefits to widowers. It is a subject on which
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the EOC receives a continuing correspondence from aggrieved married
women - not least those in schemes where men and women make equal contri-
butions and still receive unequal benefits.(48)If the principle of
equal treatment of men and women in occupational pension schemes is
accepted, then the practice of not granting automatic pensions to widowers,
so long as they are granted to widows, cannot be defended.
As argued above, the financial viability of many households has
increasingly come to depend upon the earning of both husband and wife,
though the wife is commonly the lesser earner. Some households have
the wife as 'main' breadwinner, such role reversal taking place from
choice or necessity, the latter increasingly arising from male unemployment
as well as from ill-health or other incapacity on the part of the husband.
In the future, more retired married-couple households will derive an
income from both husband and wife's pension benefits. There is a sense
in which those couples where the wife has gained maximum benefit from
SERPS will, in some cases, be advantaged over and above those deriving
pensions from occupational schemes, where the wife dies and her widower
is able to inherit her SERPS record. It is thus not surprising that
provision of widowers' pensions on a par with provision of widows'
pensions is being seen as a necessary corollary of the increasing parti-
cipation of married women both in the labour force and in occupational
pension schemes.
The tests of dependency 	 which are required in some schemes
before a widower's pension may be granted are a source of discontent.
There is a sense in which the married couple are required to legally
justify their 'deviant' financial circumstances. In 1982, women doctors
in the NHS pension scheme began to campaign for unconditional widowers'
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pensions, claiming that obtaining such a pension on grounds of 'dependency'
could be a 'humiliating and difficult experience' (Pensions Today,
Vol.5, No.3, 1982, p.4). Proven ill-health is the one traditional
ground on which a married woman scheme member may justify her role
of 'provider' to a dependent husband. However, it is growing unemployment
which is providing a spur to demands for an extension to the grounds
covered by dependency as well as for abolition of the dependency test
itself.
A woman Civil Servant has to satisfy her employer that her husband
is 'wholly or mainly' dependent upon her before being allowed to pay
iY2% of salary towards a widower's pension. A woman in the health service
or local government 'can nominate her husband as a dependent to receive
a pension on her death provided that her husband is permanently incapable
of earning his own living because of ill-health or infirmity: and is
at the time of the nomination wholly or mainly dependent on her.'
A teacher can nominate her husband for a dependant's pension under
the guise of a 'financially dependent close relative' (TUC, 1982, pp.4-5).
It is currently being argued that a husband's unemployment should
also be a recognised ground for claiming dependency. However, there
being somewhat less proof available of permanent financial incapacity
(50)than is the case in ill-health, this is problematic ground. 	 Nonetheless,
where a husband has been made redundant with little hope of obtaining
fresh employment, it might appear a convincing proof of 'dependency'.
There is also an issue around allocating husbands a 'dependent' status
in situations where a couple have made a choice that it is the wife
who will engage in paid employment and not the husband. For it may
be argued that the current arrangements for survivors' benefits prevent
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married couples from making a true choice as to their relative partici-
pation in economic activity. They are locked into the traditional
domestic division of labour, since their income in old age (or their
financial circumstances if one partner dies in service) will be enhanced
where it is the husband who is a member of an occupational pension
scheme.
The recent change in Supplementary Benefits regulations whereby
a wife may be nominated as 'main breadwinner' (see Luckhaus, 1983)
could serve as a model for further recognition of female bread-winners
in occupational pensions scheme membership. It can perhaps also be
kept in mind that there are circumstances after divorce where a wife
may, very unusually, be expected to maintain her ex-husband (Crethey,
1979, p.275). In addition, the Supplementary Benefits system will
not give benefit to a husband whose wife has any but miniscule earnings
(Alibeson and Douglas, 1984, p.49). Thus, there is within both family
and public law a recognition of the role of the wife as wage-earner.
Such recognition must surely add to the arguments for equal treatment
of men and women with regard to occupational survivors' benefits.
However, the same arguments which are made against the provision
of 'unconditional' widowers' pensions on the grounds that most husbands
generate an 'independent' income via earnings which carry an eventual
entitlement to a retirement pension, can be used to contest the principle
of 'unconditional' pension payments to widows, some of whom will have
substantial incomes and pension rights themselves. If survivors' pensions
are held to be provided on an 'insurance' basis against the need of
dependent persons, then it can be argued that widows as well as widowers
should be subject to a test of dependency. If, however, survivors'
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pensions are viewed as 'deferred earnings' to which a widow or widower
should have entitlement, then a case can be made for 'universal' pensions,
bearing in mind that when a husband or wife dies intestate, the law
awards the surviving spouse a major part of the estate if there are
other close relatives and the whole if there are not (Cretriey, 1979,
pp.259-260). It is also possible for a widow or widower to apply for
provision to be made under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and
Dependents) Act 1975, in which case the issue is whether 'such financial
provision has been made as it would be reasonable in all the circuin-
stances of the case for a husband or wife to receive, whether or not
that provision is required for his or her maintenance' (Cretney, 1979,
p.265).
It could be argued that occupational pension provision for widows
at the present time is paid to such women as wives whose marriages
have ended by death, rather than as dependants, and that by analogy
and with a view to equity, occupationalpension provision should be
available on exactly the same terms to widowers as husbands whose marriages
have terminated on death. Given that widowerhood is a far less common
event then widowhood (Haskey, 1982), the cost would be modest, especially
for those schemes where the proportion of women in membership is low.
Meanwhile the EEC Draft Directive on equal treatment in occupational
social security schemes covers pensions awarded to surviving spouses
but states that, as in the case of 'pensionable age' Member States
should have the right to defer implementation of this provision pending
implementation of corresponding provision in their statutory social
security schemes (Commission of the European Communities, 1983, Article
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9). Thus, there seems no likelihood of swift governmental action on
this issue.
Other survivors' benefits
Differential entitlement to occupational 'death benefits' for
children is an issue which was well publicised in 1983. This was due
to a particularly dramatic illustration of the manner in which occupational
pension schemes are permitted to treat male and female parents unequally
in this respect, with the possibility of a particularly unhappy outcome
in the case of a female-headed single-parent family.
A 'single-parent' nurse at a boarding school died of cancer aged
41 leaving four dependent children, whereupon her executors discovered
that whereas both men and women scheme members were required to pay
employee contributions at 5% of salary, a lump sum of two and a half
times earnings was payable on behalf of a man who died in service.
For a woman, a mere return of contributions plus 3% interest was payable,
in this case £434 (Pensions, May l94, p.19). An executor's claim,
backed by the EOC, was ruled 'out of time' by an industrial tribunal.
The trustees made an 'ex-gratia' payment of £7,500 to the children,
still far less than the entitlement for a deceased male scheme member
(Finlay, 1984, p.11).
The OPB noted in 1976 that children's pensions were a relatively
unusual provision and one where entitlement was less usually made available
to women than to men and one in which indirect discrimination against
female parents operated (OPB, 1976, S10.45, p.114). It is still the
case that schemes such as the Civil Service Pension Scheme require
that children's pensions are given as a death benefit only where the
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child has been 'wholly or mainly maintained by the deceased member'
(H.M. Treasury, 1982, S4.24-4.34, pp.51-55). This type of arrangement
is open to arguments that where a father is present in the family and,
especially if he earns more than the mother, that he is the parent
who is maintaining the children. The OPB (1976, S1O.45, p.114) also
reported female entitlements as sometimes subject to trustee discretion
where male entitlements were not. There were instances where such
benefits were payable to the children of a deceased scheme member who
had been a divorce ' widower,but not to the surviving children or a
divorcee or widow.
In 1975, pensions for the 'dependent' children of a deceased scheme
member were near-universal in the public sector, though less commonly
provided by private schemes, especially in respect of 'manual' members
(GA, 1978, Sl2.lO, p.66). Such provision is usually related to salary
and service and to the payment, or otherwise, of a widow's pension
(ibid., pp.66-67). By 1979, 37% of the private sector membership did
not qualify for children's benefits, 18% g±- them independently of
a widow's pension, 32% got them at a higher rate if there was rio widow's
pension and 13% got them only if there was no widow's pension (GA 1981,
Sll.8, pp.64-65). In the public sector the majority (84%) got children's
pensions at a higher rate if no widow's pension was payable. In some
cases children's pensions could be payable under a provision for dependants'
pensions (ibid., p.64). The 1983 NAPF survey showed that half of all
pension schemes paid 'automatic' children's benefits in addition to
other dependents' benefits: only 25% paid no benefit at all. It was
the larger schemes which were more likely to provide such benefits
(NAPF (A), 1983, S6.4, p.32).
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Occupational schemes in some cases offer provision on death in
service or retirement for the dependants of scheme members, as discussed
in Chapter 8. Such provision may well be contingent on the operation
of trustees' discretion. The OPB noted that such provision could commonly
be made by allocation or cash commutation or by nominating a recipient
for a death benefit where the scheme trustees had discretion as th
its destination (OPB, 1976, S1O.48, p.115).(51) It recommended that
'wherever practicable' schemes should enable members to provide for
those who are dependent on them, in the event of death, noting that
it is often single women who have elderly or sick dependents (ibid.,
SlO.51, p.116). A small number of schemes were identified in 1979
as making a difference in lump sum provision on death in respect of
married men and single women without dependants. However, these inequities
appeared to encompass both greater generosity towards women and penalisation
(GA, 1981, S1l.3, p.61).
In conclusion: survivors' benefits are an area of occupational
pension provision in which there are substantial inequities as between
the treatment of men and women. Widowers' pensions are a particular
case in point. However, while a good case can be made, in equity,
for the extension of widowers' benefits, some commentators urge that
a re—examination of the principles on which survivors' benefits are
granted should precede any blanket extension of such benefits in occupational
schemes. Ellis and Morrell (1982, p.27) point out that while 'at first
sight' it may seem equitable to extend entitlement to women for all
dependants' benefits currently available to men, this could well involve
an inefficient use of resources. Whereas some widows are not financially
dependent on their late husbands, even less so are widowers. A better
-302-
solution might be to make available 'a range of options which would
enable them to meet whatever provision for survivors best suited their
individual and family needs' (ibid., p.28; Darley-Jones, 1984, p.33).
Such a solution would allow women to provide for a range of dependencies,
including those categories less likely to be favoured by trustees.(52)
This scenario might well be a viable alternative had men and women
roughly equal opportunities to generate such occupational assets for
disposal. However, as illustrated in the next chapter, women have
unequal opportunities to generate occupational benefits via paid employment.
Should the form of provision for partners and dependants become a matter
for personal choice, then there is a risk that those with the lesser
economic power (typically, women and children) would be vulnerable
to the exercise of irresponsible or ill-informed choices, by male
'providers' in particular. The history of occupational widows' pensions
is illuminating in this context (see Chapter 8).
In that most marital households now consist of two earners, apart
from the period when children are young, it can be argued that both
partners should be equally entitled to the 'protection' of universal
survivors' pension provision to replace part of a 'family wage' lost
on death, by the transfer of the deceased spouse's deferred earnings
to the survivor. This does, it is true, advantage the married over
the single. However, the unequal treatment of women with regard to
widowers' benefits is a particularly glaring example of sex discrimination
in occupational pension schemes, as is differential provision for the
surviving children of female as opposed to male deceased scheme members.
In respect of unmarried men and women, it can be argued that both sexes
should have equal opportunities to confer benefits on adult survivors,
with or without a test of dependency. For while 'disaggregation' might
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be the most equitable system of all, allowing male and female members
complete control over the disposal of their 'deferred earnings' after
death, it is not perhaps a realistic solution in the light of women's
restricted access to occupational pension benefits and their position
in the labour market.
-304-
Chapter 7
Occupational Pension Entitlement and Women's Paid Employment
This chapter focuses on women's paid employment, emphasising aspects
of female economic activity which help to explain the continuing under-
representation of women in membership of occupational pension schemes
and the typically lower benefits which accrue to female scheme members.
Occupational pension schemes advantage those who achieve a lengthy,
continuous record of full-time employment, as exemplified by a 'reckonable'
period of 40 years long-term permanent service. Retirement benefits
are usually calculated on a 'final salary' basis, with a fraction of
this salary being multiplied by the total of completed years of service.
Those most likely to gain substantial occupational retirement pension
scheme benefits are persons with good earnings from employment which
actually provides an employer's pension scheme as a 'fringe benefit'.
Employees are, typically, further advantaged if they have remained
with one employer or have derived 'transferable' pension rights from
their occupational pension schemes.
It will be argued that the under-representation of women in scheme
membership and the typically more limited benefits which they receive
can partly be explained by the fact that the characteristics associated
with maximisation of opportunities to benefit from employer's pension
scheme membership have, to date, been more commonly possessed by male
than by female employees. Women tend, especially if mothers, to have
interrupted working lives, and low earnings, the latter often associated
with part-time employment. In addition, women tend to be largely
concentrated in certain types of occupation and are greatly over-
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represented in the lower grades of employment within those occupations.
Thus, women who do acquire entitlement to occupational pension benefits
typically retire with, in comparison to men, lower weekly rates of
pension, smaller lump sure and more restricted opportunities to confer
survivors' ben(its.
Discussion of women's paid employment in the context of access
to occupational pension entitlement can usefully be allied with discussion
of the traditional domestic division of labour (see Ch.4, section 1).
Women's access to paid employment, their economic activity rates and
location within the occupational structure have been much influenced
by beliefs and practices which assign the major responsibility for
unpaid domestic work to women. As Wainright (1978, p.168) comments,
'Domesticity appears as an inherent part of being a woman'. In the
period 1870-1983, married women have been designated as the financial
dependants of their husbands and the assumed beneficiaries of a 'family
wage' paid to their husbands. It is the risk of cessation of this
'family wage' which has led to the establishment of survivors' benefits
for widows and children within both state and occupational pension
provision (see Ch.8).
Ch 4 (I) discussed the position of female employees after World
War II and gave an overview of increasing female economic activity
rates from that time. Reference was made to the 'bi-modal' career
which typifies the employment history of the majority of women. This
chapter will comment further on economic activity rates, including
those of part-time female workers. The position of women in the labour
market will be examined with particular reference to occupational
segregation, pay and the risk of unemployment. Finally women's paid
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employment will be discussed in relation to women's traditional and
on-going responsibility for the unpaid domestic labour of the home.
While the detail of this discussion will necessarily be brief, the
chapter aims to pinpoint some particular issues which appear significant
in the context of female access to occupational pension provision and
the continuing under-representation of women in occupational pension
scheme membership.
I Female economic activity rates
In order to maximise opportunity to accrue occupational pension
benefits employees need to be 'economically active' 	 and in full-
time paid employment for a high proportion of their working
Late entry to the labour market may however enhance the opportunity
to obtain good occupational retirement benefits, despite a consequent
reduction in the number of years potentially available for employment,
where extended education and training leads to well-paid job opportunities
with access to 'fringe benefits'.
A D. of E. survey has for the first time provided information
on the 'complete retrospective working histories' of' successive cohorts
of' women in Great Britain who were aged between 16-59 in 1980. While
women do, characteristically, have shorter 'working lives' than men,
younger female cohorts are leaving the labour force for shorter lengths
of time, though very young women, in particular, are at high risk to
unemployment. It was estimated that at 1980 employment rates, the
20-24 cohort would have spent 67% of their 'working lives' in employment
by the age of 60 as compared with 59% for the 50-59 cohorts (Martin
and Roberts, 1984, Table 9.5, p.122). Childless women, regardless
of marital status, had much higher economic activity rates than mothers
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(ibid., Table 9.7, p.123). It is not marriage as such, but child care
and, to a lesser extent, the care of dependants (ibid., pp.112-114)
which is associated with withdrawal from the labour force.
Joshi and Owen (1981) studied the employment rates of successive
cohorts of women in Britain from l95O-l974, 	 finding that motherhood,
not marriage, was the key factor in determining the length of a woman's
working life. The 'average lifetime effect' of a woman's having 'an
average sized family' was withdrawal from the labour market for a total
of seven years (Joshi and Owen, 1981, pp.106-107). Again, the trend
was for younger cohorts to have higher economic activity rates (ibid.,
pp.107-108). Parker (1980, Ch.3) and Martin and Roberts (1984, pp.11-
12) have documented the sharp decline in female economic activity which
takes place from the mid-fifties, further shortening the working lives
of' the current generation of older women.
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Table 20








16-19	 20-24	 25-29	 30-34	 35-39
%	 %	 %
	
73	 56	 31	 23	 30
	
1	 9	 18	 33	 37
	
74	 65	 49	 56	 67
	
14	 7	 5	 5	 4
	
88	 72	 54	 61	 71
	







40-44	 45-49	 50-54	 55-59	 All
%	 %
	
33	 35	 33	 25	 35
	
41	 38	 34	 28	 28
	
74	 73	 67	 53	 63
	
4	 5	 6	 5	 6
	
78	 78	 73	 58	 69
	
22	 22	 27	 42	 31
Source: Martin and Roberts, (1984), Table 2.3, p.11.
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Since World War II, women have been spending increasing proportions
of their adult lives in paid work, though, as noted in Ch.4(I), female
economic activity rates have been much lower than male rates and display
considerable variation as between age groups. Nonetheless, succeeding
cohorts of women have shown an increasing propensity to be economically
active, especially during their 30s and 40s.	 However, this increase
in paid employment has been largely accounted for by an increase in
part-time working (Martin and Roberts, 1984, p.136) - a major feature
of women's employment since World War II.
Manley and Sawbridge (1980, p.31) have estimated that in Britain
'the proportion of the female work force engaged in part-time work
rose from 20-25% in 1960, to 30% in 1970 and 41% by 1976'. Joshi
and Owen (1981, p.13) present evidence that whereas in 1961 'about
half of the working women with dependent children were part-timers
by the 1970s, this proportion was about two-thirds.' (See Table 20,
above) Martin and Roberts (1984, p.17) in 1980 found that 44% of
all working women were part-timers, 28% working more than 16 hours
per week and 16% less. Part-time working was strongly associated
with motherhood - only 7% of childless women worked part-time (ibid.).
In a comprehensive analysis of part-time working, Robertson and
Briggs (1979) showed that during the period 1971-76, part-time work
became increasingly available (ibid., Table 4, p.673). During that
period, married women part-timers outnumbered men by about 5-1: the
(57)
number of women rose by 30% as compared with 17% for men (ibid.)
The EC Labour Force Survey 1979 is interesting in this context since
respondents were asked for a subjective judgement as to whether they
were 'part-time' workers. Of the whole population of 'economically
active' persons in Great Britain, 1.6% of men, 12.8% of non-married
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women and 48.1% of married women were recorded as part-timers (OPCS,
1982, Table 4.7, p.15). The GHS 1982 (Pcs, 1984a, Tables 6.9-6.10,
p.108) further confirms the association between marriage, motherhood
and part-time working. As noted in Ch.4, part-time workers are usually
excluded from access to membership of occupational pension schemes.
Martin and Roberts (1984, pp.137-138), studying the lifetime
histories of women 16-59 in 1980, found that 'childless women spent
the major part of their lives since leaving school in paid employment'
- an average of 87%. Since the mid-fifties, women have, typically,
worked full-time until the birth of their first child. The birth
of the first child usually signalled a period of absence from the
labour market lasting several years, though younger women were increas-
ingly returning to work within six months of the birth. This trend
was associated with having higher qualifications, i.e. A-levels or
above. 22% of teachers so returned, 26% of other intermediate non-
manuals but only 10% of clerical and sales workers (ibid., Table 9.12,
p.126).
The increasing number of women returning to paid work while their
children were very young was 'almost entirely attributable to increasing
proportions of women returning initially to part-time work.' (Ibid.,
p.137) Among women with grown up children, 90% had returned to work
at some time and the trend was upwards. However, there was evidence
that part-time work was not only done by mothers of younger children:
some older women worked part-time in the years immediately before
retirement.
Martin and Roberts found that part-time working was strongly
associated with not being in membership of an occupational pension
scheme (ibid., pp.48-49). As will be discussed later, both women's
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typically shorter working lives (as compared with men's) and their
propensity to work part-time are major factors in explaining the under-
representation of women in occupational pension scheme membership
and their typically less valuable pension entitlements.
II Women in the labour market
This section focusses on women in the labour market, concentrating
first on their location within the occupational structure, then on
their pay and finally on their vulnerability to unemployment. These
are crucialfactors in that the employees most likely to benefit from
membership of an occupational pension scheme are those with continuous
full-time employment in salaried or white collar employment.
Despite increasing numbers of women entering the labour force
in the 20th century, their location within the occupational structure
up to the present time has been characterised by two discrete types
of occupational segregation. Horizontal segregation occurs 'when
men and women are most commonly working within different types of
occupation' (Hakim, 1978, p.1264) and vertical segregation 'exists
when men are most commonly working within higher grade occupations
and women are most commonly working in lower grade occupations, or
vice versa. The two are logically separate.' (Ibid.)
Hakim, in her study of decennial population censuses 1901-1971,
found that in the case of horizontal segregation 'there has been no
decline, rather a small increase, in the occupational concentration
of women over the century' (ibid., p.1265). In about 25% of the occup-
ational categories 'women were at least as well represented as in
the labour force as a whole' but even by 1971, in 12% of those occupations,
women were 'greatly over-represented' at 70% or more of the work force
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(ibid.). 'Typically male' occupations remained at 75% of all occupations.
However, more men appeared to have made inroads into traditionally
female occupations than women into traditionally male occupations
(ibid., pp.1265-1266).
On examination of the 1971 Census results, Hakim found that almost
2 million women were horizontally segregated into occupations where
90% of all employees were female, i.e. typists, secretaries, maids,
nurses, canteen assistants and sewing machinists. Other 'personal
service' jobs, especially in the catering trades, were identified
as being largely female (ibid., p.1268). Furthermore, with regard
to vertical segregation, Hakim found that 'within each occupational
group, women tend to be over-represented among the less skilled or
managerial jobs' (ibid.). Hakim concluded that despite greater occupational
concentration by women, there had been a slight decline in horizontal
occupational segregation between 1900-1971, but that this was cancelled
out by the increase in vertical segregation (Hakim, 1979, p.34).
There had in fact, overall, been little change.
Hakim followed up her earlier study by examining trends in the
l970s, the decade during which equal pay and sex discrimination legis-
lation became operative from 1975. Her results suggested that 'legislation
had a marked impact in supporting and stimulating the long-term decline
in job-segregation observed over the previous seventy years.' However,
after 1977, the trend was reversed (Hakim, 1981, p.525). Thus, with
62% of women economically active by 1979 (ibid., p.523) there was
little change in horizontal segregation, though in terms of vertical
segregation, women did appear to have made substantial gains in their
share of 'higher grade' white-collar work in the l970s (ibid., p.525)
and, notably, their representation increased in 'higher professional'
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work (ibid.). Between 1973-79, the proportion of women in management-
related professions rose from 14%-21%, and for science-related professions
from 5%-9%. Interestingly, in professions related to education, welfare
and health, where women have been traditionally over-represented,
there was no change.
Martin and Roberts (1984, p.31) found that 'occupational segregation
between men and women exists to a marked degree both in terms of the
jobs they do and their views about what is men's and women's work
and why this is so.' 58% of full-time and 70% of part-time women
were in sex-segregated jobs (ibid., pp.26-27). Occupational segregation
of the vertical type 'was lowest among the high-level occupations,
which fall in Social Classes I and II' and 'highest --- in the semi-
skilled domestic category where 78% of women doing mainly catering
or child care jobs worked only with women' (ibid., p.27). However,
24% of teachers and 42% of full-time nursing, medical and social workers
reported themselves as in 'women only' situations: for full-time clerical
workers the figure was 64% (ibid.).
In a table relating occupational group to social class, Martin
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Source: Martin and Roberts, (1984), Table 3.2, p.23.
Using evidence from the GHS 1980, Martin and Roberts (Table 13.1,
p.23) analysed the occupational order for the jobs of full and part-
time working women, and working men. This gave further evidence of
horizontal occupational segregation in that 41% of full-time women
(22% part-time) were in clerical work as compared with 6% of working
men. 16% of full-time (10% of part-time) women were professionals
in health, education and welfare (5% men). 10% of full-time (41%
of part-time) were in catering, cleaning and hairdressing (3% of men).
By contrast, whereas 19% of men were in managerial occupations or
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were professionals supporting management, 7% of full-time and 1% of
part-time women were so occupied. Other large male occupational categories
- 'metal processing, making and repairing' (20%) and transport (11%)
had a very small number of females in those categories.
Martin and Roberts (ibid., p.32) concluded that 'The industrial
and occupational distribution of working women --- showed that women
are concentrated predominantly in a few occupations mostly in the
service sector. This distribution has remained relatively stable
over the past 15 years.' The part-timers were 'more likely to be
in the service sector and in low level jobs'.
Central to the position of women in an occupationally segregated
work force is women's education and training. Despite the post-war
trend towards co-education in the state school system and the 1975
sex discrimination legislation, evidence has accumulated which indicates
that within these schools, girls tend to follow a differentiated curriculum
and are at risk to receiving a very different and more restricted
educational experience, as compared with their male peers (Deem, 1978;
Sarah and Spender, 1981; Deem, 1981; EOC, 1984). The same risk occurs
in higher education (Rendel, 1980). Girls who are now young adults
appear to have received limited advice on careers while at school
(Rauta and Hunt, 1975; Mackie and Patullo, 1977, Ch.2, pp.26-38).
Certainly the fifth form girls studied in England and Wales in 1973
while having 'distinctly positive attitudes towards work' (Rauta and
Hunt, 1975, p.52) were entering or intending to enter to a narrow
range of jobs (ibid.,pp.49-52). Girls still obtain far less in the
way of qualifications and training during and after the school years
(EOC, 1984a, Appendix 9, Part 2, pp.65-74).
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In 1965; over 90% of women over 50 had passed no examinations what-
soever while at school: even for the 20-24 age group, the figure was over
70% (Hunt, 1968, Table H2a, p.215). Younger women were better qualified,
but only 2% of the 25-29 age group had a degree/higher national diploma
or certificate, while 3.2% had a teacher's certificate and 4.8% some
sort of nursing qualification (ibid., Table H7a, p.222). This group
must now largely form the middle-aged component of the female population
in GB and they in their turn are less well-qualified than their juniors.
In 1979, 74% of women (GB) between 50-59 were recorded as having no
qualifications. Only 6.7% of this group had any kind of higher education
qualification of which 1.5% had a degree and 5.2% some other type
of sub-degree qualification. Only 1.9% had completed an apprentice-
ship. Corresponding figures for men reveal 56.5% with no qualification,
6.9% with a degree, 2.8% with other higher education and 18.2% who
had undertaken an apprenticeship. By contrast in the 25-29 age group
41.6% of women (30.7% men) had no qualifications, 6% (11.5%) had a
degree or equivalent, 9.1% (5.3%) had some other professional or vocational
qualification and 2.4% of women (22% men) had undertaken an apprenticeship
(OPCS, 1982, Tables 6.1, 6.2, pp.44-45).
Women with post-school qualifications have tended to obtain them
within certain restricted fields. The existence of discretionary
post-school financial awards in the years prior to the SDA 1975 permitted
local authorities to ration awards to females so as, for instance,
to direct girls towards teacher training courses (Byrne, 1974, p.295).
Certain medical schools could and did put a lower quota on the number
of female medical students whom they were prepared to accept (Rendel,
1980, p.89).
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Until recently women were considerably under-represented on degree
courses and still are over-represented on arts and certain social
sciences courses. Within higher education women are still heavily
outnumbered by men in engineering, technology and sciences, and in
some areas of professional training and social sciences (EOC, l984a,
Tables 2.3 and 2.6, pp.69 and 73). This 'educational segregation'
is preceded by sex-specific 'choice' of subjects at '0' and 'A' level.
Although equal numbers of '0' level passes have recently been obtained
by boys and girls, in 1981 girls were still heavily under-represented
in physics and computer studies, and to some extent in mathematics
(ibid., Table 2.lb, p.66). Fewer 'A' level passes were obtained by
girls (46%) than by boys, and the differentials in subject choice
which were evident at '0' level, repeated themselves in exaggerated
form (ibid., Table 2.lc, p.66). 99.6% of 'A' level 'domestic subjects'
passes were obtained by girls and 98.4% of all 'technical drawing'
passes by boys.
Education plays a large part in determining access to occupations.
With growing unemployment, 'credentialism' is playing a much greater
part in determining such access. Employee selection from a large
pool of applicants is made an easier administrative task by insistence
on possession of paper qualifications not necessarily relevant to
(58)	 .the job.	 Meanwhile, occupational segregation rests on more than
gender-differences in qualifications and training: '--- stereotypic
beliefs about men and women, and the work suitable for them, still
effectively prevent the entry of women into certain occupations and
retard their promotion and advancement in many others' (Archer and
Lloyd, 1982, p.191). The link between education and horizontal segregation
between occupations is fairly self-evident: if so few girls, for whatever
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reason, complete apprenticeships and 80% of girls train as hairdressers
and manicurists (Mackie and Patullo, 1977, p.60), few women will enter
the technical occupations for which boys have traditionally completed
apprenticeships. With the decline of apprenticeships and the appearance
of' the Youth Training Scheme, it appears that segregation by sex in
training is a continuing feature of post-school training experience
(EOC, 1984a, p.69).
Vertical occupational segregation, whereby women congregate in
the lower grades of such occupations as they do enter, is perhaps
a more complicated phenomenon than horizontal segregation. Undoubtedly
many women are in less skilled or responsible occupations, or in the
lower levels of heirarchical job structures, because of poor qualifications
or qualifications which, though good, are poorer than those of comparable
men. This factor is itself related to the 'bi-modal' career followed
by the majority of women (Hakim, 1979, pp.4-17). Many women leave
full-time work in their twenties and return a few years later, as
previously shown. Mackie and Patullo (1977, p.43) see the propensity
of married women to return to part-time work as a 'pernicious barrier
to women's equality with men' since it 'acts as a further brake on
women being trained or promoted.'
Greenhaigh and Stewart (1982, p.329) note from research using
the National Training Survey 1975 (which recorded the retrospective
work histories of over 50,000 men and women in the UK), that discontinuities
in female labour force achment 'have an important impact on the
economic success of women, since skills are obtained to a considerable
extent through labour market experience and may be blunted in periods
of absence from the labour force.' They also observe that absence
from the internal labour market which operates inside larger places
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of employment can depress women's chances of getting the better jobs
on re-entry to the labour market after an absence (ibid.). Greenhaigh
and Stewart (p.333) argue that the interruptions to economic activity
which characterise female employment 'careers' are, typically, few,
and small in comparison with the whole of a woman's working life.
'Nevertheless, such interruptions do exert an important downward force
on later economic position.' (Ibid.)
Martin and Roberts studied job changes and occupational mobility,
noting that changes between full and part-time work could involve
'a complete change of occupation' (1984, p.151). 'Among childless
women 60% were in the same occupational category in their most recent
job as in their first job' (ibid., pp.151-152). Older childless women
were likely to have been upwardly mobile. However, for women returning
to work after childbirth, 37% moved downwards and only 14% returned
to a higher level. 'Downward mobility was strongly associated with
returning to part-time work: 45% of those who returned to part-time
work returned to a lower level occupation compared with 19% who returned
full-time' (ibid., p.152). The women who were most likely to have
moved 'up the occupational scale' were those who returned initially
to part-time work and moved on to full-time work (ibid., p.152).
Most part-time work is low-level work and is characterised by
low pay and poor working conditions (Hurstfield, 1980, pp.1, 5-10;
Glucklich and Snell, 1982, pp.20-22). Part-time work is mainly unskilled
manual work (including 'service' work) of a type graphically illustrated
in a study of women's employment in North Shields (North Tyneside
COP, 1978) or white-collar clerical and office work, which type of
work is also done by women on a 'temporary' basis (McNally, 1979).
Manley and Sawbridge (1980, p.31) have documented the growth of part-
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time low-level 'female' jobs, including service work performed within
the public sector. However, part-time work is much less available
(though prized by married women with younger children) in professional
occupations (Silverstone and Ward, 1980). An exception has, until
recently, been teaching, though opportunities in part-time teaching
diminished sharply during the 1970s (Trown and Needham, 1980).
Where women return to full-time work after a break, their male contempor-
aries typically have more work experience, more training and more
seniority. Thus, women who originally worked in skilled occupations,
including those requiring a high level of educational qualifications,
may find it difficult to re-establish themselves after a break, especially
where there is an over-supply of' labour. With part-time work, even
in the traditional occupation of teaching, being scarce, women have
to take what paid work they can. In 1974, the Department of Employment
commented on part-time work as mostly 'low-level work, ill-paid arid
of low status, with no prospects of advancement' (Mackie and Patullo,
1977, p.43). There is no evidence to suggest that this judgement
is out-dated.
Archer and Lloyd cite evidence on the tendency of women to have
lower expectations about their performance. Unlike men they view
failure as a consequence of their own lack of ability rather than
in terms of' the inherent difficulty of the task (Archer and Lloyd,
1982, p.193). However, 'women's lower expectations have been explained
as a further consequence of the gender stereotype of' lower competence'
(ibid.). Cooper and Davidson (1982), studying the working lives of'
women managers, produced evidence to support the preceding statement,
notably in their analysis of a study of' management attitudes and practices
towards women at work (Hunt, 1975). '47% of the companies surveyed
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never employed women as managers and 63% never employed women as skilled
workers' (Cooper and Davidson, 1982, p.115). Not surprisingly, in
view of the fact that 'more than 40% thought that a woman's place
was in the home and 50% felt that it was not worth training women
for work' (ibid.) top management and personnel managers in these companies
felt that men were much more likely than women to have the attributes
required 'for success in management and other related jobs' (ibid.,
p.116). Fogarty, Allen and Walters in their study of Women in 'Top
Jobs' (1981) note that increasing ni.unbers of young women are now on
the bottom rungs of careers which could lead to management positions
and the lack, in many situations, of adequate machinery and procedures
for career planning (ibid., pp.28-29). They relate what is, effectively,
vertical segregation, to a need for employers to respond to women's
domestic responsibilities (ibid., p.28).
The situation of women in professional, managerial and public
sector employment is interesting in the light of their generally more
privileged position with regard to membership of occupational pension
schemes. However, evidence is available to indicate that lower benefits
from such membership are linked to lower pay as well as poorer career
opportunities. Hence pay is the next subject for discussion.
III Pay
Women, as a class, receive lower pay than men, though the differ-
entials have narrowed in recent years. Routh (1980) has traced the
relationship between occupation and pay in Great Britain during the
period 1906-1979. His findings show that throughout this time women
were, on average, earning less than men, though women improved their
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position considerably (Routh, 1980, Table 2.28, p.123). Women clerks
showed the greatest relative improvement and female semi-skilled workers
the least. Routh comments on the latter as a group 'whose moderate
pay increase and large numbers' (nearly 33% of all women in 1971)
'have combined to hold down the women's overall average compared to
that of the men' (ibid., p.133).
Evidence is presented by Routh of male/female earnings differentials
not only as between 'sex-segregated' occupations but also within relatively
'integrated' occupations. For instance 'skilled men' in sex-specific
occupations such as coalface workers, engineers, carpenters, bricklayers,
railway workers and compositors were earning £1440 per annum in 1970
and £4354 in 1978: skilled women such as chefs, cooks, machinists
and hairdressers earned £667 and £2246 respectively (ibid., pp.102
and 106). By comparison male teachers were earning £2018 in 1970
and £5686 in 1978: women teachers were earning £1530 in 1970 and £4568
in 1978 (ibid., Table 2.9, p.72).
The average gross hourly earnings (excluding overtime) of women
over 18 were 63.1% of those men over 18 in 1970, rising to 75.1% in
1976, the year after the EPA caine into force. They peaked at 75.5%
in 1977, and were 74.2% in 1978 (EOC, 1984, Table 4.1, p.89).
Women's as
Women
- % of men's
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Source: EOC (1984a), Table 4.4, p.91.
The above table shows that male and female full-time earnings approximate
most closely very early in working life. Large disparities in average
full-time earning exist from the age of 30 and are even more pronounced
among non-manual workers over 40 than among manual workers, perhaps
as an effect of differential gradings and placement on incremental
scales.
Hakim has argued that occupational segregation is an inhibiting
factor in the move towards equal pay for men and women (Hakim, 1979,
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p.48). Chiplin and Sloane's study of sex discrimination in the labour
market led the authors to conclude that 'intra-occupational earnings
differences between the sexes are more important than the inter-occupational
distribution of employment (Chiplin and Sloane, 1976, p.47). These
authors highlight some effects on female earnings with regard to non-
manual workers (who tend to be employed on incremental pay scales)
on the one hand and manual workers on the other. Where non-manual
workers are paid incrementally (including in the public sector where
'equal pay' has been in force fully since 1961), males on average
earn more than females. 'This reflects not only the fact that men
tend to be employed more than proportionately on higher grades, but
also that on average men tend to be at a higher point on the incremental
scale relating to service'.
Such incremental scales are characteristic of, but not
exclusive to, public sector employment (ibid., p.45). Thus married
women 'will be at a disadvantage because they are more likely to experience
a break in service' since starting salaries (other than for beginners)
are related to previous service (ibid., p.46). In addition, appointments
on incremental scales are made in some cases with reference to the
'market point' so that women in general, with their tendency both
(60)to be paid less and to accept lower pay, can be at a disadvantage.
Chiplin and Sloane also produce evidence which indicates that women,
and, in particular, manual workers, are concentrated in lower paying
establishments and are over-represented in small establishments (ibid.).
Large numbers of women are employed in the Civil Service, local
government and within the National Health Service. Undoubtedly a
major factor in the disparities of public sector pay as between men
and women can be accounted for by vertical occupational segregation.
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In 1979, women comprised 90.8% of all Scale 1 primary school teachers,
51.5% of Scale 4 and 43.4% of all heads: they comprised 59.6% of all
Scale 1 secondary school teachers, 21.6% of all Scale 4 and 16.5%
of all heads (EOC, 1982, Fig.4.1, p.76). 32.4% of men but only 8.3%
of women were, in 1979, earning more than £6,000 p.a. in the secondary
sector (ibid., Table 4.7, p.75). In local government 'non-manual'
women are heavily concentrated in the clerical grades - around 80%
of employees in the lowest grades are women. About 25% of the adminis-
trative and professional grades (which include teachers and social
workers) are female, 10% of senior officers and a tiny proportion
of principal or chief officers (Local Government Operational Research
Unit, 1982, Fig.5, p.5). Popplestone (1980) has documented similar
occupational segregation in local authority social services departments
and McGuire (1980) has pinpointed the emergence of similar trends
in nursing.
The Civil Service is another occupation characterised by vertical
occupational segregation (Brimelow, 1981; SBC, 1979, Ch.7). Such
segregation was documented in detail for the DHSS in 1978 wherein
women comprised a higher proportion of staff than in the service at
large (SBC, 1979, Ch.7, S7.22 including Table 7.1, p.68). In 1982,
women comprised 81% of clerical assistants, 61% of clerical officers,
27% of executive officers, 7% of principals and 4% of assistant secretaries
(Management and Personnel office, 1983, Table 2, p.12). Thus highly-
paid women are a-typical in the Civil Service.
Even among the highly qualified, pay differentials between men
and women emerge at an early stage. Williamson (1981) studied 1970
graduates in 1977. Two-thirds of the women were still in employment
(ibid., p .18) but were earning consistently lower salaries than the
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men (ibid., p.20). After seven years, females were earning 10% less
than their male contemporaries (ibid., p.48). Marriage appeared to
be associated with higher male salaries and lower female salaries
(ibid., pp.52-53). These findings are consistent with those of Greenhalgh
(1980) who found that while women in general earned less than men,
married women were the most disadvantaged and single women the next
most disadvantaged group as compared with single and married men.
Greerihalgh (p.757) found that lower female earnings were associated
with the presence of children, while children were associated with
higher male earnings. However, despite their having less risk of
discontinuities in employment, Chisholm (1978, p.329) found that,
in 1975, single women graduates had achieved less in terms of career
development than their married male counterparts in the fifteen years
since graduation. Women in general had achieved better levels of
pay in school teaching and public service occupations.
There are still only small numbers of women in membership of
the elite professions and professional institutes and associations.
Only 23.4% of members of the British Medical Association were female
in 1983, 14.4% of the Institute of Bankers, 14.2% of the Law Society
(solicitors), 5.6% of the Institute of Chartered Accountants and 1.6%
of Chartered Surveyors. The largest group were the 16,517 qualified
female bankers, closely followed by the doctors: the surveyors numbered
only 818 (EOC, 1984a, Table 5.3, p.96).
The 1980 survey of women's employment well illustrates the typically
low levels of female pay, especially that of part-time workers. In
1980, the average earnings of full-time women over 18 were £73 and
those of full-time men over 21 were £124.50 (Martin and Roberts, 1984,
p.43). Only 6% of full-time women earned over £112.
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Table 23
Gross weekly earnings: full and part-time women: GB, 1980.












































Source: Martin and Roberts (1984), Table 5.1, p.43 (based on 90%
response to survey).
The best paid workers, both full and part-time, were the teachers
followed by other 'nursing, medical and social' workers. Among the
non-manual workers, sales workers (notably the full-timers) were partic-
ularly badly paid - only semi-skilled domestic workers earning as
little (ibid., Table 5.4, p.45). Teachers were by far the best paid
of the 'long-service' (10 years or more) women workers (ibid., Table
5.6, p.45) perhaps reflecting the high proportion of graduates who
chose teaching as a career in the 1950s and 60s (Kelsall et al., 1972).
In terms of' remuneration, far fewer women than men achieve levels
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of pay likely to ensure substantial occupational pension benefits
on retirement. Martin and Roberts (1984, p.46) show that women's
low pay is partly explained by horizontal occupational segregation,
i.e. working in 'women only' jobs. It remains to be seen whether
recent amendments to equal pay legislation intended to achieve equal
pay for work of 'like value' (see Townsend-Smith, 1984) will help
to reduce such male/female pay differentials (see Carty, 1984).
IV Unemployment
Since the mid-seventies, 'economically active' people have become
increasingly at risk to unemployment. Job loss hazards the completion
of the lengthy period of paid employment necessary for maximisation
of occupational pension scheme benefits. A job change, brought about
through redundancy, may lead to membership of a scheme conferring
inferior benefits to those previously enjoyed or to loss of access
to an employer's pension scheme.
Official statistics show that whereas in 1979, 316,300 women
(excluding school-leavers) were registered as unemployed, the figures
had risen by December 1983 to 832,000, including 334,100 married women
(Employment Gazette, 1984, Vol.92, No.8, Table 2.1, p.319). However,
official figures on female unemployment are notoriously unreliable,
since married women in particular tend to be under-represented (Rimmer
(61)
and Popay, 1982, p.30). 	 By the end of 1983, Britain was experiencing
the highest rate of unemployment of the post-war period, with certain
regions, occupations and age groups being particularly hard hit.
Such unemployment is significant in the context of this study since
it may delay entry to membership of an occupational pension scheme
or result in abrupt termination of employment with no 'freezing' of
occupational benefits if the job has been held for less than five
(62)years	 or reduce the total length of working life through enforced
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'early retirement'. Employees in occupational pension schemes are
'targeted' for so-called voluntary redundancy where employers seek
to reduce their payrolls by 'natural wastage' 6	The extent of
the effects of unemployment on access to occupational pension benefits
is not knon.
Martin and Roberts (1984, p.79) emphasise that their survey of
women's employment, unlike most unemployment studies, addresses female
unemployment in depth. It is clear from their findings that 'non-
working' women are a far more heterogeneous group than men. While
'unemployment', in the sense of not being able to find a paid job
when available for work, was, by 1980, being experienced by a signif-
icant proportion of very young women, a high proportion of other women
were unemployed, or rather, 'non-employed', for other reasons, largely
domestic. In 1980, 5% of all women but 15% of the non-working women
were 'unemployed' in the accepted sense of the term (Martin and Roberts,
1984, Table 7.1, p.81). Of the rest of the non-employed, apart from
6% who were permanently unemployed due to ill-health, 52% were economically
inactive because they were looking after children, 3% through looking
after other relatives and 20% because they were 'keeping house'.
In all, 26% of the sample were out of the labour market for 'domestic'
reasons. Only 21% of the 'non-working' women (mainly older women)
were not expecting to work again (ibid., Table 7.2, p.81). Pregnancy
was the major reason for giving up work for active job-seekers categorised
as 'non-employed' rather than 'unemployed' (ibid., Table 7.14, p.87)
but it is significant in the context of this study that such women
had also left their last positions so as to move because of their
husband's job, to look after children or other relatives, or for other
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domestic reasons (ibid.). 26% of the 'non-employed' and 12% of the
'unemployed' job -seekers had been out of the labour market for more
(64)than five years.
Thus, in recent years, unemployment has further complicated the
issues relating to female access to membership of occupational pension
schemes. For many women the 'normal' hazards of unemployment during
an economic recession (shared by men) have been compounded by women's
characteristic period of withdrawal from the labour market for 'domestic'
reasons. Such withdrawal effectively puts women in the position of
being 'long-term unemployed', a category known to suffer disadvantage
in the labour market (Hawkins, 1984, pp.61-66). When the constraints
of female domestic commitments as discussed in the next section are
added to the geographical immobility which is characteristic of women
whose husband or partner is established in a paid job, '65 the diffic-
ulties of re-entering the labour market after a break are increased.
It is on the issue of paid work in relation to domestic work that
the next section focuses.
V The domestic division of labour
From the discussions so far, it has become clear that the majority
of women do not experience an uninterrupted working life. Their absence
from the labour force derives from the traditional domestic division
of labour which assigns to husbands the role of 'breadwinner' and
to wives the role of 'housewife'. It also derives from the fact that,
other than unusually, women have a major responsibility for the care
of children (Hunt, 1968, pp.12-16; Martin and Roberts, 1984, pp.96-
101). Women also take primary responsibility for the care of sick
and elderly relatives (Hunt, 1968, pp.109-114, Finch and Groves, 1983;
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Martin and Roberts, 1984, pp.112-113). Martin and Roberts show clearly
that, while economic activity rates differ little as between childless
women of different marital statuses, there is a marked difference
between the amount of paid work undertaken by women who have had children
and those who have not (ibid., p.13).
Married women in particular show a propensity to work part-time:
in Martin and Roberts' 1980 sample, 55% of married women worked part-
time as compared with 37% of widowed, divorced and separated women
and only 4% of single women (ibid., Table 2.17, p.17). In 1980, 'among
women aged 45-59 only 29% of the married women were working full-time
as compared with 48% of the non-married women' (OPCS, 1982, p.84).
This age group has a small proportion of 'dependent' children. J
K Gaibraith has referred to women as a 'crypto-servant' class with
'the servant wife being available, democratically, to almost the entire
present male population' (Galbraith, 1974, p.33). While Gaibraith
was referring to the United States, evidence presented by Martin and
Roberts suggest that the remark was equally applicable in Britain
in 1980. Indeed, as Finch (1983) has shown, there are a number of
male occupations which actually incorporate the unpaid services of
wives. It is women in the 30-59 age group married to 'professional
men, employers and managers' who are least likely to be in paid work
where there are no dependent children (OPCS, 1984a, Table 6.23, p.116).
Becker (1965) has pointed out that households produce as well
as consume and that the household economy may usefully be divided
with time spent on paid activities by 'Members who are relatively
more efficient' (Becker in Amsden, 1980, p.75). Greenhalgh (1981,
p.18) has discussed the taxation of husband and wife in terms of
'the opportunity cost arising when individuals engage in market work
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rather than producing goods and services at home' and set out a model
tax system which 'avoids disincentives for the lower skilled to go
out to work' (ibid.). Undoubtedly the traditional 'division of labour'
between workplace and home owes much to the reality that up to now
women, as a class, have had lower earning power than men. Thus 'low
wages, dependence and housework for women are a trio of mutually re-
inforcing ideas, each justifying and producing the conditions for
the others' (Barrett and McIntosh, 1981, p.61).
Linked with the traditional division of labour, the history of
which has been traced by Wainwright (1978), is the concept of a 'family
wage'. Land (1980) and Barrett and McIntosh (1981) have chronicled
the mid-l9th century rise of' the 'male breadwinner', ideally earning
sufficient to 'keep' his wife and children. Low pay for women entering
white collar occupations in the later 19th century was justified on
the (erroneous) grounds that such women inevitably lived at home and
did not 'keep' their relatives. Unequal pay was still being justified
on such grounds after the second World War (Land, 1980, p.72).
However, since World War II married women in particular have
increasingly taken up paid work for financial reasons. In 1965, 80%
of married women in Hunt's survey of women's employment acknowledged
the financial attraction of work outside the home (Hunt, 1968, p.181),
while Dunnell in 1976 found that this featured strongly in the reasons
given by women who worked both after marriage and between first and
second births (Dunnell, 1979, Table 6.5, p.31). 'Financial' reasons
for engaging in paid work featured strongly in Martin and Roberts'
1980 survey (1984, Table 6.1, p.61), though married women as a category
had less 'financial dependence' on work than the non-married (ibid.,
Table 6.3, p.62).
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Evidence has accumulated on the crucial contribution of a wife's
wage to the household budget (Hammell, 1979; Land, 1981, pp.13-16;
Martin and Roberts, 1984, p.105). The FES 1980 showed that 1 in families
with dependent children 1 wives contributed an average 20.5% of household
income and 31.9% where there were no dependent children. Households
without a 'working wife' were significantly worse off (D of E 1982,
Table 43, pp.108-109). Such figures mask a range of wifely contributions,
including cases where the wife earns more than her husband (Rimmer
and Popay, 1982, p.62). Elias (1984, p.10) has shown from FES data
that the number of full-time working wives who earn as much or more
than their full-tine working husbands has risen from 5% in 1968 to
14.5% in 1980, representing one in seven households where both husband
and wife are in full-time jobs (ibid., p.15).
Layard et al. attempted to account for married women's labour
force participation and suggest that this rises in proportion to the
amount that a wife can earn (Layard at al., 1978, p.64). They found
that a rise in women's wages increased the proportion of women working,
whereas a rise in the husband's wage decreased it. The main barrier
to women's working was, however, the presence of children under 6
(ibid., p.65). Certainly, the tendency for women to do paid work
only up to a point where they are not required to pay NI contributions
and/or tax, squares with Layard et al.'s contention thatwcinen 'maximise'
their earnings. However, it does appear that where women are capable
of earning 'good' salaries, their propensity to work rises. A study
of female chartered accountants in 1972 shows that 89% were economic-
ally active, including 30% who were working part-time (Silverstone
and Ward, 1980, Table 2.2, pp.35 and 39). High participation rates
are also apparent in recent studies of women doctors (Elston, 1980,
-334-
pp.117-121) and dentists (Fox and Seward, 1980, pp.89-91). Martin
and Roberts (1984, Table 9.12, p.126) found that the best qualified
women, with 'A' levels or above, had the greatest propensity to return
to paid employment within six months of their first birth.
The time when a male-generated 'family wage' is crucial is when
the children in a household are very young. Layard et al. (1978,
p.65) found that female labour force participation was strongly affected
by the presence in the household of children under 6. Martin and
Roberts' (1984, p.13) findings were that women with dependent children
were significantly less likely to be economically active than those
without: the level of economic activity decreased where children were
very young or where the family increased in size (ibid., Table 2.5,
p.13). However, levels of economic activity among women with younger
children have increased in recent years. By 1982, 21% of British
women with childrei under 2 were economically active (5% full-time
and 16% part-time) and 34% of those with childr-i of 3-4 (6% full-time
and 28% part-time), as compared with 69% (25% full-time and 44% part-
time) where the youngest dependent child was over 10 (OPCS, 1984,
Table 6.11, p.109). Figures on female economic activity may well
under-represent the total, since the presence of young children is
a major factor in women undertaking 'home work' (Hakim, 1982, p.373)
which is, typically, low-paid (Glucklich and Snell, 1982, p.20), though
not inevitably (Hakirn, 1982, pp.375-76). Martin and Roberts (1984,
p.32) identified a group of 'subsidiary' workers in their 1980 survey,
some of whom did 'home work' for low wages.
Within the context of the 'domestic division of labour', women's
paid employment tends to be fitted around domestic responsibilities,
as recently documented by Land (1981, pp .16-21). This is as true
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for professional women as for others. A 1976 study of women doctors
found that 80%, if married, were solely responsible for shopping,
cooking and looking after sick children. 50.6% were solely responsible
for house cleaning, 4.7% had help from their husbands and 44.7% employed
paid help for cleaning (Elston, 1980, Table 5.2, p.122). Land (1981,
pp.16-18) argues that there is no evidence that men contribute substan-
tially to cooking, cleaning and household management at the present
time in married households. A recent study of households containing
a severely disabled elderly person showed that the full brunt of 'tending'
fell upon wives (Nissel and Bonnerjea, 1982). Thus 'there is often
a conflict between a woman's responsibility towards other members
of' her family and her activities in the labour market, whereas for
men there is not. Women and men do not therefore compete on equal
terms in the labour market' (Land, 1981, p.1).
Super (1957) quoted in Silverstone and Ward (1981, p.12) devised








little or no work history
gives up on marriage or first child
continuous working
combines work and home making
stops work when children are young:
returns later
irregular: depends on external events
succession of' unrelated jobs
This list, designed to categorise American women in the mid 1950s,
has a certain historic relevance, since the term 'conventional' applies
to a career pattern which has also been characteristic of the U.K.
The term 'conventional' would now be more usefully applied to the
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'interrupted' category, sometimes referred to in the British literature
as the 'bi-modal' career (Hakim, 1979; Silverstone and Ward, 1960).
It is noteworthy that seven categories are required to delineate the
career patterns of women, whereas evidence on male economic activity
indicates that, unemployment aside, the 'stable working' career is
still the one which applies typically to men.
As Wainwright has argued, the traditional domestic division of
labour was little discussed in the literature of the social sciences
until the mid 1970s. 'In an economy where a person's capacity to work
is bought and sold in exchange for a wage, labour which is performed
on the basis of personal relationships rather than on the basis of
monetary exchange is not regarded as labour' (Wainwright, 1978, p.160).
Women's domestic work appears as a 'natural part of family life'.
The economic dependence of most married women is regarded as 'natural'
- a relationship which is, ideally, based on affection.
Evidence exists to show that the aspirations of the current generation
of young women are, like those of previous generations, geared towards
the 'marriage career' or 'love career' (1-lakim, 1979, p.15) and that
this partially accounts for the low educational and employment aspirations
of many girls and young women. Purcell (1978, p.154) argues that
girls are 'brought up to think of womanhood as a career' and that
'the pinnacle of this career is motherhood'. By the same token, boys
are brought up to 'regard women's main career as a wife --- and mother'
(ibid.). Purcell points out that, having achieved that career, 'women
accommodate their employment arrangements to parenthood in a way that
men do not, simply because there are no practical alternatives' (ibid.,
p.153).
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Hakim (1979, p.14) notes the suggestion of Sullerot (1971) that
'the bi-modal work profile has consequences not only for the individual
person who follows this work pattern but more generally for all working
women in providing the basis of prejudice against them'. Undoubtedly
the association between female gender and domesticity (which represents
reality) does engender the stances quoted in Hunt's 1975 study of
management attitudes where it was notable that only 20% of the male
policy 'formulators' and one-third of the policy 'implementers' had
working wives and they themselves did little domestic work (Land,
1981, p.19).
In commenting on occupational segregation, Hakim noted that 'a
great many of the occupations in which women were over-represented
are typically feminine in that they draw on skills exercised on an
unpaid and non-specialist basis in the home' (Hakim, 1979, p.31).
'Professional' women are most highly represented not in the 'elite'
professions, but in teaching, nursing, social work and medical ancillary
professions, which might be said to call on traditional female 'caring'
capacities. Teaching is a particularly interesting case since there
is no doubt that the great popularity of teaching as a career, for
such women as have been able to gain access to necessary post-school
education since the second World War,lies in the fact that it is seen
as a career which 'fits in' with family life, one in which full-time
or part-time jobs (until recently) could be obtained in any location.
The result of this scenario has been that, as noted in a report on
promotion and the woman teacher (NUT/EOC, 1980):
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'There seems to have been established over the years
an immutable concept of the woman teacher as a
married woman with small children, who is
uninterested in promotion. As far as can be
ascertained all women teachers, young and old,
are related to this concept with inevitable and
disastrous consequences to their career prospects.'
(ibid., p.54)
Certainly the D of E survey has confirmed a number of earlier
findings alluded to above. In their conclusion, the authors state
that though women are working for more of their lives 'most women
are still primary domestic workers and secondary wage earners in a
family' (Martin and Roberts, 1984, p.191). While women's relationship
to paid work has been changing 'women do not participate in the labour
market on the same terms as men and the conditions under which they
offer themselves, for example as part-time workers, may go some way
to explaining the segregated and secondary nature of much of the work
they do'. (Ibid., p.192) 'Our data suggest that most women accept
or accommodate to the sexual division of labour---' (ibid.).
VI Women, paid work and access to occupational retirement benefits.
The aim of this chapter has been to focus on aspects of female
economic activity which help to explain the continuing under-representation
of women in occupational pension scheme membership and the typically
lower benefits which accrue to women.
In the first place, it can be concluded that the majority of
women suffer from discontinuities in paid employment largely attributable
to their primary responsibility for the unpaid work of the home.
Formerly, marriage was the event which removed women from the labour
market: now it is the birth and care of children (and, to a lesser
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extent, the care of dependent relatives) which now largely account
for women being economically inactive. Women of the current generation,
especially if married, have a propensity to leave paid work from their
mid-fifties, thus further shortening their working lives. Undoubtedly
the NI rules applied until recently to married women have contributed
to this 'early retirement' phenomenon. Thus, many women end their
working lives with a total number of years of service well below the
possible maximum: even if women end up with a good 'final salary'
and pay additional voluntary contributions into an occupational pension
scheme, a reduced total of pensionable service years reduces the value
of retirement pension benefits.
Secondly, many employed women have prejudiced their opportunities
to obtain occupational pension benefits by working part-time, or in
employments which do not provide such benefits. It has been shown
that employers commonly exclude part-timers from pension schemes (one
reason which makes part-timers a 'cost-effective' pool of labour).
Furthermore, a high proportion of women work in sex-segregated occupations
which makes it easy for employers to 'contract-in' all women in such
employments to SERFS, which does not provide lump sum benefits, nor
tax relief on contributions.
In addition, women are under-represented in those salaried and
professional occupations in which good 'fringe benefits' are commonly
to be found. And even where women are working in this type of non-
manual occupation, they tend to congregate in the lower, less well-
paid grades, where their eventual lower pension benefits (as compared
with men's) are a reflection of women's lower life-time earnings.
Martin and Roberts (1984, p.145) found that 'childless women were
much more likely --- to be found in non-manual occupations, particularly
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in the higher level occupations which fall in Social Classes I and
II, and in the clerical occupations.' 14% of childless women over
30 were teachers, 2% were 'professional': of women over 50 whose children
were over 16, 5% were teachers and a nil percentage was professional.
It does appear that the woman who achieves a lengthy working
life in full-time employment, in an occupation of the type which confers
occupational pension benefits, is a 'deviant'. In the past such women
were most likely to have remained unmarried: the 'older' women in
the current working population are the last generation of whom a choice
was expected as to 'career or marriage'. Given the negative stereotypes
of single women which were still being put about in the immediate
post-war period, this was not a 'choice' which many young women made
or were encouraged to make (i.e. Newsom, 1948, pp.108-9; Zweig, 1952,
pp.62-66).
From previous discussion it has become apparent that the typical
woman is a 'secondary' wage-earner, operating largely in a 'secondary'
labour market of poorly-skilled, badly-paid and less secure jobs as
compared with the 'primary' sector of comparatively well-paid skilled
and secure jobs characteristically occupied by men (Bosanquet and
Doeringer, 1973) and by some, mainly younger women. While it is true
that men in this primary sector are at risk to unemployment they are
better placed than the majority of women working in their own 'sex-
segregated' labour market (1-lakim, 1979).(66)
It is a minority of women who generate lifetime earnings on a
scale which ensures freedom from all financial worries or even consid-
erations in old age. As indicated, it is a substantial index-linked
occupational pension, with an accompanying lump sum, which especially
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advantages people in retirement. In consequence of women's traditional
position as financial dependants, both state and occupational pension
schemes have come to incorporate survivors' pensions and benefits,
initially with the needs of widows in mind. Such provision has tended
to re-inforce women's perceived position as the actual or potential
financial dependants of men. Furthermore, with the increasing incidence
of divorce, many more women are at risk to the loss of such potential
benefits, which may be regained only by re-marriage to a man who can
potentially confer them. Perhaps the most unenviable position of
all with regard to access to occupational pension benefits is that
endured by 'lone mothers' who are less likely than their married counter-
parts to be in paid work (Martin and Roberts, 1984, p.109). Their
financial need is much greater (ibid., p.110).
Women's position in the labour market and their primary respons-
ibility for the unpaid labour of the home, despite equal pay, sex
discrimination and employment protection legislation, places them
in a disadvantageous position as regards access to occupational pension
benefits.(67) Married women who outlive their husbands may be compensated
to some extent by eligibility for occupational widows' benefits.
It is on such survivors' benefits and their potential loss on divorce,
that Part V of this study focusses.
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Part IV: References
Chapter 5 Occupational Pension Provision and Sex Discrimination:
Issues of Equal Access, Treatment and Status
1. See this Chapter, section II below.
2. As subsequently amended by the SDA 1975 and other legislation.
Until 1/1/1984, the EPA provided that, where a woman is employed
on 'like work' to a man, or is doing work 'which is different
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Sex Discrimination Acts, see OPB, 1976, S2.16-2.22, pp.8-10.
5. The Crossman diaries (1977, pp.789-90) portray Mrs Castle as
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move Crossman and his DHSS strongly opposed, since the Bill concerned
'pay and wages, not benefits, our side of things'. When the
Bill was in Committee, Crossman received a letter from Mrs Castle
hoping that he would agree to insert a new 'pensions' clause
into the Bill. He was not prepared to do this, went specially
to the Committee and discovered that Mrs Castle had sent a deputy
to the meeting. At this point it appeared unclear to Crossman,
from discussion with the deputy, just how committed the Department
of Employment itself was to such a clause. The matter was dropped.
6. See OPB, 1976, S2.23-2.26, pp.10-il.
7. Article 119 of the EEC Treaty establishes the principle of 'equal
pay for equal work'. There are also three directives which are
'in essence ... an order from the Community to the Member States
to alter their internal laws so as to achieve a certain harmonised
result' (Ellis and Morrell, 1982, p.16: see also Rights of Women
Europe, 1983, esp. Ch.5, 6, 7 and 11). Directive 75/117 on equal
pay provides for the elimination of sex discrimination in matters
of remuneration. 76/207 is directed towards the equal treatment
of men and women with regard to working conditions. 79/7 'provides
for the progressive implementation of the principle of equal
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state pensionable ages for men and women are permitted (see:
Ellis and Morrell, 1982, p.17; Atkins, 1980; Luckhaus, 1983).
8. Draft Caincil Directive on the principle of equal treatment for
men and women in occupational social security schemes, see below.
9. An example of the 'identical' approach would permit both male
and female scheme members to confer a widowhood pension should
they predecease their lawful spouse: the 'package' or 'comparison'
approach would allow men, but not women members, to confer widows'
benefits. In this second instance, the 'actuarial' tendency
for women members to draw their pensions for a longer time than
men would be traded off against the 'actuarial' tendency for
men to pre-decease their younger wives.
10. See Ch.6, Sil.
11. See below in relation to the Draft Directive on equal treatment
in occupational social security schemes.
12. See Ch.7.
13. See Ch.6, Sli, and Ch.8.
14. An exception was proposed in the case of commutation, allocation
or additional voluntary contribution options exercised by scheme
members, where it was argued that it was fair practice to allow
for greater female longevity, even if the pensionable ages became
uniform (OPB, 1976, S8.39-8.59).
15, 'Indirect discimination' is practised where a requirement is
applied to a man or woman in such a way that (1) the proportion
of the members of one sex who can comply with it is smaller than
the proportion of the other sex who can so comply; (2) the requirement
cannot be shown to be justifiable irrespective of the sex of
the person to whom is it applied; and (3) it is to the detriment
of the person who cannot comply with it (SexDiscrimination Act
1975, Sl, p.1).
16. For general discussion of EEC legislation and pensions see Boden
(1980); Corcoran (1981); Ellis and Morrell (1982); Ellison (1983);
Rights of Women Europe (1983).
17. An early test of the applicability of Article 119 came with the
series of test cases arising from the case of a Belgian air stewardess
who was required to retire from her job at 40, when men were
not so required (see: Ellison (1976); Rights of Women, 1983,
pp.27-28, 48-51; TUC, l983a, pp.13-14).
18. See ref. 7 above.
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19. Factual detail on this case from Corcoran, 1981, pp.20-21; Court
of Justice of the European Communities (1981); Ellis and Morrell,
1982, pp.17-22; Ellison (1981); TUC, 1983a, pp.14-15; TUC, 1983b,
pp.6-7; Rights of Women Europe, 1983, pp.57-59.
20. Prior to the implementation of the 'equal access' requirement
of the SSPA 1975.
21. Apparently 'the bank felt that women under 25 were unreliable
employees and would soon leave the bank to marry and bring up
children' (Rights of Women Europe, 1983, p.57).
22. At the time, the provisions of the Social Security Act 1973 were
in force, requiring employers to 'freeze' employee contributions
(if not transferable) if the employee had completed five years'
service and reached the age of 26 (Muir McKelvey, 1977, Appendix
6, pp.212-223). Otherwise the employee could take a return of
contributions if the scheme so provided.
23. There is a sense in which the appellants were claiming 'equal
(deferred) pay'.
24. The outcome affected 13,800 women under 25 employed by Lloyds
at the time (Ellis and Morrell, 1982, p.8). The cost to Lloyds
of changing the pension arrangements has been estimated at £3
million (Rights of Women Europe, 1983, p.59). At first Lloyds
proposed to introduce an average contribution rate for all employees
under 25 'which would have worsened the position of male employees
without improving that of the female employees', though better
terms have since been secured by the Banking, Insurance and Finance
Union which had helped the appellants bring the case, which was
supported financially by the EOC under S75 of the SDA.
25. Directive 79/7 'requires Britain to abolish discrimination on
the grounds of sex, marital status or family status' in its
laws on social security, but specifically excludes pensionable
ages and survivors' benefits from its remit, which is also limited
to contributory benefits and Supplementary Benefit (See: Atkins,
1981). This document is also known as the Sex Discrimination
(Social Security) Directive (Ellison, 1983, p.21). In March
1984, the European Parliament recommended to the Commission of
the European Communities that the survivors' benefits clause
be deleted (McGoldrick, 1984, pp.122-23).
26. COM (83) 217 FINAL published 29/4/1983.
27. Proposal for a Directive 'concerning the progressive implementation'
etc. Document COM (76) 650 final, 3/1/1977), included as Annex
5 of the second Consultative Document (DHSS, 1977), see S8, p.2.
28. A discussion paper had been circulated in 1982.
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29. It was proposed in March 1984 that the text be amended to include
'part-time workers, temporary workers and those working at home'
(Pensions, April 1984, p.11).
30. The 'technical' pensions literature shows ample evidence of this.
31. An interesting technical question can be raised as to the effect
of the draft directive on the occupational mortality of actuaries.
32. Boden (1980, p.373) notes that the impetus for the European Community's
involvement with 'equal rights for women did not stem from any
fundamental desire to further the cause of women's rights but,
instead, to prevent one member state from having a competitive
advantage over another by being able to use cheap female labour'.
In legislating for equal pay, the motivation was not social,
but economic.
Chapter 6 Equal Treatment: Issues Relating to Differential 'Normal'
Retirement Ages for Nen and Women in Occupational Schemes
and to Eligibility for Survivors' Benefits
33. 'Retirement age' within the NI system is the age at which a basic
retirement pension and SERPS becomes payable (at an enhanced rate)
regardless as to whether the recipient has actually retired from
employment - 65 for women and 70 for men. The maximum increase
over five years is 37% (Matthewman and Lambert, 1984, S12.51-
12.53, pp.274-75).
34. See H of C, 1982, 26-I, S8, pp.ix-x. 28% of male public servants,
mainly in local government, can retire on pension between 60-65:
Civil Servants are among the 35% of public servants who can retire
at 60. Less than 25% of male public servants have a 'normal
retirement age' of 65.
35. For detail see Thane (1978b).
36. Widows' and Orphan's Pensions Act 1940.
37. It would seem likely that the existence of the menopause, along
with the myths and realities which surrounded it, fed into beliefs
that middle-aged women were less fit than men.
38. The Job Release scheme operative from 1/1/1977 has paid the equivalent
of an early state retirement pension to men and women leaving
their paid employment to be replaced by an unemployed person:
as of 31/12/1983, the arrangement applied to men of 62 (60 if
disabled) and women of 59 (H of C, 1982, 26-lI, Annex 9, pp.62-
63).
39. Age allowance for 1983-84 was £2,360 (maximum) as compared with
a single person's allowance of £1,785. It was available in full
on total incomes below £7,600 and tapers off above that amount
(Consumers' Association, 1984, pp.5 and 45).
-346-
40. Divorced men tend to marry women younger than themselves - older
men tending to select much younger women in a significant number
of cases. Divorced women commonly marry men younger than themselves
(OPCS, 1984b, Table 3.7, p.30: England and Wales).
41. Cost is the major reason why no move towards equalisation of
pensionable ages has been made. Savings would arise from raising
the female age, increasing as more women become entitled to pensions
on their own contributions. The 'break-even' point for equalisation,
at which savings from the raising of the female age would be
offset by the cost of lowering the male age, is 64. (See H of
C, 1982, 26-Il, Appendix I, pp.457-461).
42. The number of women who had revoked their National Insurance
pension after reaching the age of 60 were estimated by the DJ-ISS
as being 135,000 for Great Britain in 1977 of whom just over half
were single females. Of these, 18% were managerial, professional
or teachers (men 39%), 21% were clerical (men - nil), 6% were
shop assistants (men 4%), 10% were skilled manual (men 27%),
24% were semi-skilled manuals (men 23%) and 21% unskilled manuals
(men 7%). The meaning of 'single' is not given: man equals 'male-
headed family' (H of C, 1982, 26-lI, pp.403-404).
43. Equalisation of pensionable age is a matter being brought to
the attention of the Government Inquiry on Provision for Retirement
which is sitting during 1984.
44. A female employee of the Southampton Area Health Authority has
successfully pleaded unlawful discrimination under the Equal
Treatment Directive 79/7 since her employer required her to retire
at 60 where a man would have been required to retire at 65.
The Industrial Tribunal's decision was over-turned by an Employment
Appeal Tribunal, but the case is subject to an appeal being heard
in the European Court of Justice in 1985.
45. E. Short, Financial Times, 26/10/1976, quoted Pilch and Carroll
(1976).
46. NALGO launched a campaign in 1984 for equal occupational pension
rights for women workers, including widowers' pensions (Guardian,
27/4/1984).
47. A change made in the wake of the EPA 'as a gesture in support of
the principle of non-discrimination' through the exercise of
discretion under Section 20 of the Finance Act 1970 (Bates,
1983, p.692).
48. Personal communication: EOC (see: EOC, 1984, S9, p.26).
49. Scheme rules may specify, for instance, that the husband must
have depended on his wife for all or most of the necessities
of life or state that his wife must have been wholly or partly
maintaining him: it is frequent for the husband's ill-health
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to be a necessary condition for receipt of a widower's pension,
this being a 'legitimate' reason for a couple not to conform
to the 'normal' domestic division of labour with the male as
'breadwinner'. This is an area where, within the framework of
the rules, trustees' discretion operates (Rossetenstein, 1981,
p.325).
50. Julia Reay, a teacher, persuaded the Government Superannuation
Scheme that her husband, unemployed for three years, is a dependant.
This took three years. It was claimed by the scheme that dependency,
for a man, must mean 'inability to work, not just unemployment'.
She was also apparently informed that 'it is not the intention
to provide cover where the husband and wife have exchanged roles'.
(Pension News, No. 1589, 1983: The Times, 5/3/1983).
51. Married scheme members can be disadvantaged here, since the scheme
rules may permit only a spouse to receive such a death benefit,
despite the fact that the spouse might, for instance, wish the sum
to go to an adult handicapped child. The sum is tax free only when
paid out by the trustees and not if it is paid into the deceased
person's estate.
52. The writer is persuaded that at present, elderly mothers and
handicapped siblings would be typical 'deserving cases': male
cohabitees or 'gay' female partners, less so.
Chapter 7 Occupational Pension Entitlement and Women's Paid Employment
53. In the sense of being in paid work or available for it.
54. 'Working life' is typically defined as 16-59 (women), 16-64 (men).
55. Using National Insurance records.
56. Similar figures for 1982 appear in the General Household Survey
1982 (OPCS, l984a, Ch.6).
57. Male part-time working is associated with having reached pensionable
age: in 1977, 58% of male, but only 7% of married and 31% of
non-married female part-timers were over 65 and 60 respectively
(Robertson and Briggs, 1979, p.6'73).
58. A recent study of employers' recruitment practices show that
graduates are commonly selected partly on the basis of high A-
level grades and attendance at 'prestige' universities, factors
not necessarily having any relevance to the candidate's ability
to do the job (Times Higher Education Supplement, 14/9/84, p.12).
59. In the writer's opinion, women with younger children will
increasingly be competing for available 'professional' jobs against
highly qualified 'early retired' persons with good 'contacts'
providing access to such employment.
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60. Discussion with EOC staff revealed that female teachers and univer-
sity lecturers have problems over placement on incremental pay
scales: such placement is exceptionally difficult to challenge
since such incremental scales are held to be inherently 'non-
discriminatory'.
61. Married women used to be under-represented in the official statistics
because they neither drew unemployment or supplementary benefits
nor registered as unemployed. The 'officially' unemployed are
now those claiming unemployment or supplementary benefit or National
Insurance credits (Employment Gazette (1984) Vol.92, No.8, p.S55)
62. In which case the contributions are paid into SERPS.
63. Of which a good example is the universities' Premature Retirement
Compensation Scheme.
64. Respondents were classified 'unemployed' if looking for work,
waiting to take up a job, or prevented from looking for work
by temporary indisposition. However, among the 'economically
inactive' (mainly for domestic reasons) there proved to be a
group of active job-seekers and women waiting to take up a job.
These had not, initially, defined themselves as 'unemployed', '
so were eventually classified as 'non-employed' job seekers (Martin
and Roberts, 1984, pp.79-85). Unemployed men do not normally
define themselves as househusbands, the category into which older
'non-employed' women typically would have placed themselves.
Younger women tend to speak of 'full-time motherhood' as an occupation.
65. It is still unusual and often impractical, not to say, in some
cases, undesirable, for two members of a settled partnership
to become domiciled in separate locations. However, from the
writer's observation, there is a small trend, fostered by the
difficulties of the labour market, for highly qualified couples,
especially if childless or in middle age, to 'commute' between
two separate job locations.
66. For discussions of women and the labour market see Amsden (1980);
Barron and Norris (1976); Breughel (1983); and West (1982).
67. For that small minority who return to paid work promptly after
childbirth and are in an occupational pensions scheme, there
is no automatic payment of employers' pension contributions during
maternity leave (see OPB, 1976, Ch.1l; Wood, 1981, p.167).
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Part V
Survivors' and Dependants' Benefits
'The only call that could be made upon the Civil List is in
the event of Diana being widowed before Charles inherits
the throne. In that event she would be allotted a
pension of £60,000 a year'
(Junor, 1982, p.216)
'Marriage is really what has sometimes been called a
lottery: and whoever Ls in a state of mind to calculate
chances calmly and value them correctly is not at all
likely to purchase a ticket'
(John Stuart Mill to Harriet Taylor, 1832)
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Part V
Survivors' and Dependants' Benefits
Introduction
Part V addresses occupational pension provision with reference
to survivors' benefits. Ch.8 discusses widows' benefits and other
provision for female survivors of scheme members. Such benefits
originated in a context which presumed the obligation of men to provide
for female financial dependants - wives, unmarried daughters and other
female relatives.
Trends towards serial marriage and stable cohabitation as well
as the increased participation of women, notably wives, in economic
activity are posing challenges to existing policy and practice in
occupational pension schemes. Existing rules of entitlement to occu-
pational survivors' benefits are being questioned as are those notions
of dependency which bear a crucial relationship to the rules of
entitlement.
Furthermore, a steep rise in divorce rates, along with major
and recent changes in the law of divorce since 1969 are raising issues
in relation to loss of prospective widows' benefits on divorce.
Ch. 9 examines these issues.
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Chapter 8
Widows' and Survivors' Pensions and Benefits
This chapter outlines the development of occupational widows'
and survivors' benefits, with reference to relevant statutory provision.
The occupational provision discussed includes forms of benefit potentially
available to 'surviving' relatives and cohabitees. Finally, widows'
and survivors' benefits are reviewed in the light of current trends
towards serial marriage and stable cohabitation.
I Provision for widows to 1939
The relief of financial need among widows was a focus for charitable
effort in 19th century Britain, widows constituting a major Poor Law
client group. Treble (1983, pp.95-102) has documented the circumstances
of young and elderly working-class widows in urban Britain from 1830-
1914 as typically, 'pushed close to, or below, the primary poverty
line' (ibid., p.96). Such women tended to lack basic occupational
skills and were employed, characteristically, in 'charing, washing
and those workshop and home-based trades which were associated with
the sweated system' (ibid., p.98) with seasonal or casual work more
easily obtainable than regular employment.
A widow's 'best investment' was children of an age to support
her by their own employment (ibid., p.99). The low wages usually
commanded by widows forced on to the labour market are deemed by Treble
to be 'in part the product of those social assumptions which were
accepted by middle-class and working-class men as justification for
the low levels of earnings accruing to unskilled female labour' -
in particular the equation of the female wage with a levelof earnings
designed 'solely for the upkeep of' the single girl, living at home,
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until her marriage, thereby conveniently overlooking the crises of
widowhood ----' (ibid.).
Small wonder, then, that widows were a class which had recourse
to the Poor Law. Crowther (1983, pp.91-92) shows how widows, a clearly
identifiable needy group, were increasingly granted out-relief in
the early years of the reformed poor law system. However, as workhouses
became 'employers of labour on a large scale' widowed female paupers
began to be required to undertake domestic service in these institutions,
as a condition of receiving out-relief (ibid., p.141). Thane (1978,
p.37) states that at mid-century, widows were sometimes denied out-
relief on the grounds that 'if widows and deserted wives could assume
that they had a right to out-relief, the father's sense of responsibility
to his family would be undermined.' Treble (1983, p.97) presents evidence
to support his contention that there was a 'hardening' of attitudes
among Poor Law guardians in the 1870s and 1880s in the belief that
widows should enter the labour market (ibid., p.98). Stedman-Jones
(1971, p.275) notes out-relief for London widows in the early l870s
being replaced by admission of children into pauper schools as the
sole form of relief on offer.
Widows were a 'target group' for the Charity Organisation Society,
founded 1869, in its efforts to identify suitable 'deserving cases'
for charitable aid. Crowther (1983, pp.242-243) records that a number
of late 19th century boards of guardians were virtually 'taken over'
by the COS, resulting in decisions to stop out-relief where the home
circumstances of widows were deemed 'insanitary' or 'immoral'. In
1888, the Central Board was recommending a policy of taking children
into the workhouse as an alternative to out-relief for widowed mothers
but 'They frequently left the mother with one child to support, without
relief, lest she forget her dual role' (Thane, 1978, p.39). The COS
was a firm believer in 'self-sufficiency', though prepared to offer
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'abundant charity' for 'exceptional cases' (Annual Report of' a District
Committee 1876 in Mowat, 1961,
The situation of working-class widows in relation to poor law
and charitable aid plus their problems in obtaining employment, may
well help explain the existence of special charities for the middle
classes, including widows. Owen (1965, p.173) notes the existence
by 1861 of well established 'pension funds --- for the benefit of'
persons of standing who had been the victims of untoward circumstances'
and argues that the Victorians thought such charities 'especially
worthy, for they served a class of unfortunates who, critics of charitable
practice charged, were often neglected while benevolence was showered
on the more clamant but less worthy destitute'. Such provisions were
as much provident funds as charities and were often linked to particular
trades or professions (ibid.)2
Such charitable provision was, for obvious reasons, the preferred
alternative to poor law relief for indigent members of the salaried
classes who were unable or unwilling to obtain financial help from
their family and friends in the absence of earnings, or in the case
of dependent women, if without access to support derived from a 'family
wage'. The existence of 'occupational' charitable funds is of interest
in the light of the development of employers' pension provision.
Given the available financial alternatives for needy relatives of
deceased breadwinners, it seems likely that the growth of formal provision
for widows and survivors, especially on death in service under occupational
pension scheme arrangements, would have been an attractive development
for that small minority of employees who became eligible for such
(3)provision.
The emergence of widows' pension provision in the private occupational
sector was one result of the benevolent paternalism practised by employers
-354-
who were, in some instances, motivated by religious principles (See
Ch. 1). It was open to an employer to 'provide for' the widow and
dependants of an employee who died in service on an 'ex-gratia' basis.
Especially where such provision became formalised, the promise of
a widow's pension payable on death in service and/or retirement (plus
any provision for unmarried dependants, especially children or unmarried
adult daughters), was a tangible 'reward' for faithful service, thus
relieving the employee of understandable anxiety with regard to financial
provision for dependants should he die before them.
Owen (1935, p.87) noted the existence in the thirties of elective
'joint pensions' paid at a lower rate on the joint lives of' retired
employees and their wives and other schemes which guaranteed to pay
a retirement pension for a fixed number of years, even if the employee
died during the period in question (ibid., p.87). 'It is sometimes
the case that widows' pensions and other benefits are associated with
employees' pension schemes, either conditionally or as a free provision
by the employer.' The more recent schenswere insurance-based and
provided a lump sum on death in service (ibid., p.88). By this time,
employers might provide for the death of a male employee in service
and/or death in retirement.
The Ministry of Labour survey of private occupational pensions
undertaken in 1936 made no mention of death in service benefits but
included information on retirement benefits for widows and dependants.
It was noted that many schemes offered options to male scheme members
on retirement, the most common being a reduced pension payable on
the joint lives of' husband and wife until the survivor's death. Alternatively
a retired scheme member could opt to receive a pension of a larger
amount for a certain number of years and a correspondingly smaller
pension for the rest of his life. Other options included commuting
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the employers' contributions into cash or commuting the whole pension
into cash, with the employer's permission. Many schemes guaranteed
payment of the pension for a number of years, regardless as to
whether the pensioner himself survived: a typical period was five
years, though two to seven years was the range. In other cases, payment
was guaranteed of a certain amount of retirement pension so that,
in the event of the early death of a pensioner, his dependants would
get this guaranteed value, less the amount already paid during the
pensioner's retired life-time (Ministry of Labour, 1938, p.174).
Thus, up to World War II, 'widow's pensions' as such seem to
have been uncommon in private sector schemes. Provision for survivors
came in the form of 'options' enabling a 'male provider' to judge
what would best suit his particular circumstances. An actual widow',
pension for retirement appears typically to have been generated by
the scheme member himself foregoing some of his personal pension in
order to provide against the contingency of his wife surviving him.
A lump sum enabled provision to be made for a widow and/or other survivors,
such as children, unmarried daughters or other dependent female relatives
such as a mother or unmarried sister.
It may be recalled from Ch. 1 that the Civil Service pension
scheme provided a model copied elsewhere. However, death benefits
did not feature until the 1909 Superannuation Act which actually reduced
the amount of pension available to men on retirement in order to provide
a lump sum in addition (Rhodes, 1965, p.51). Under the 1935 Superannuation
Act male civil servants were enabled to allocate part of their pensions
so as to provide for a widow in retirement (ibid., p.79): this was,
however, an option. The first public sector occupation to introduce
widows' pensions was the police in 1918, with a national scheme being
introduced in 1921 (ibid., p.61). From the Teachers' (Superannuation)
Act 1937 came an option whereby a married male teacher could request
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that two-thirds of the lump sum payable to him on retirement be deferred
and 'kept by the state as a single premium to meet the cost of provision
for his wife should he predecease her' (Gosden, 1972, p.148).
Widows' pensions as such do not appear to have been characteristic
of public sector occupational pension provision, the police excepted.
Rhodes (1965, p.62) comments that 'What was originally designed as
a special award for special services has in the course of time come
to be regarded as a normal part of a public sector pension scheme'.
This development did not however take place until after World War
II. Before that time in the public sector, as in the private, provision
for widows and survivors, if available at all, was the product of
an 'option' exercised by a male 'breadwinner'. It was for him to
decide, in the light of his own personal circumstances, whether to
avail himself of such options as were available to replace the 'family
income' which he generated. His wife and/or dependants were reliant
on his exercising a suitable and responsible choice.
Statutory widows' pensions had been part of Lloyd George's health
insurance plan in 1910, but this move was defeated by the 'insurance
industry' (Gilbert, 1966, pp.298-300, 326-340). Beveridge argued
for widows' and orphans' pensions in 1924 (Gilbert, 1970, p.240).
The plight of widows was brought into prominence by the high loss
of life in the first World War. The Widows', Orphans' and Old Age
Contributory Pensions Act (1925) introduced insurance-based widows'
pensions, this provision being a main motive for the entire scheme
(Wilson and Mackay, 1941, pp.71 and 85; Gilbert, 1970, pp.235-254).
Men in occupational pension schemes and in better paid employment
were excluded. Widows of insured men got a ten-shilling pension for
life or until remarriage, regardless of age or parental status. From
1929, additional groups of widows were 'blanketed in' and granted
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pensions at 55 (Gilbert, 1970, p.252). As noted in Chapter 2, these
provisions prompted single women to campaign for contributory retirement
pensions at 55 in the mid-thirties.
The 1937 'Black-coated Workers' Actallowed men to elect to
contribute for widows' and orphans' benefits only, subject to age
and income qualifications (Wilson and Mackay, 1941, p.176), though
men in certain 'excepted' occupations such as teaching were not permitted
to participate. It seems likely that this exclusion gave added leverage
to employee efforts to secure better provision for survivors of men
in such 'excepted' occupations.
Thus by 1939, widows of' men in regular employment, earning 'average'
salaries or below, or of men with modest independent means, were assured
of a small basic pension for life, if their husbands contributed to
the scheme as most 'wage-earners' were required to. The widows of
men in better paid salaried employment, including that which offered
superannuation benefits, were far more likely to be dependent on their
husband's actively making provision by the exercise of 'options' or
taking out life insurance 5 The exercise of an 'option' could involve
taking a 'gamble' that the husband would die first, so that considerations
of age as well as of the financial circumstances of the wife were
cruciai6) Furthermore, where 'lump-sum' benefits were made available,
while these sums might be used to provide an income or annuity for
a widow, there was no guarantee that the widow would have access to
the capital or control over its disposal	 The Inheritance (Family
Provision) Act 1938 allowed a spouse to contest her deceased husband's
will on the grounds that inadequate financial provision had been made,
but it was not concerned as to whether a 'reasonable' share had gone
to the widow and was easy to evade (Cretney, 1979, p.261).
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II Provision since 1939
Before discussing post-war developments attention can usefully
be drawn to the Beveridge Report recommendations resulting in legislation
characterised by Walley (1973, p.65) as 'one of those rare cases in
which a social benefit once provided would be withdrawn as a result
of continuing opposition to the principle involved.' Beveridge broke
with the philosophy of the 1925 Act which provided pensions for all
widows of insured men and argued that, on principle, and presuming
full employment, childless widows of 'working age' should engage in
full-time paid work and be entitled, if unable to obtain work, to
apply for means-tested 'assistance' (Beveridge, 1942, S156, p.65).
It was recommended that a short-term widow's benefit should be payable
for thirteen weeks plus a 'training benefit' designed to enable a
widow to re-enter the labour force if possible (ibid., S153(c), p•4)8)
Beveridge believed that 'Permanent provision for widowhood as
such --- is a matter for voluntary insurance by the husband' (ibid.,
S156, p.65), an argument echoed in his discussion of the possible
need for a cash grant to widows on the death of their husbands, a
provision which he felt should be made through private insurance (ibid.,
S154, p.65). The recommendation to abandon the 'unconditional' 1925
widow's pension was apparently supported by nearly all such witnesses
as commented upon it, though anxiety was expressed on behalf of' those
women who were widowed or whose children ceased to be dependent 'when
they were advanced in age, would have difficulty in finding, or being
trained for, new employment' (ibid., Sl56, p.65). Certainly, had
the proposals been enacted in this form, they would have made the
'Beveridge housewife', conceived as not engaging in gainful employment
during marriage, especially dependent upon her husband's having 'made
provision' for her in the event of widowhood in later life. Women
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whose husbands were in occupational pension schemes providing survivors'
pensions would have been notably advantaged. Beveridge did not in
fact relate the existence of superannuation schemes to his proposals
for widows in the new NI scheme.
In reality, post-war social insurance legislation gave childless
widows over 50 who had been married for at least ten yearsa 'permanent'
widow's pension (ceasing on cohabitation or re-marriage) which at
60, turned into a retirement pension (George, 1968, p.139). Until
1956, when the age of entitlement was raised to 50, widowed mothers
who were over 40 when their children ceased to be dependent, became
entitled to a NI widow's pension: 'the differential age-limit between
the two sub-groups created gross inequities in some cases' (ibid.,
'S
p.137).
The post-war period saw developments in the provision of occupational
widows' benefits. Pensions for widows and dependants were introduced
into the Civil Service in 1949. Around half the cost was met by the
individual civil servants through reduction of the retirement lump
sum or payment of special contributions (Rhodes, 1965, p.52). Local
government officers were granted widows' pensions in 1953, lump sum
death benefit payments being introduced into the scheme for this purpose.
Married men were required to give up two-thirds of' these lump sums
on retirement so as to 'meet the prospective cost of widows' pensions'
(ibid., pp.57-58). Police widows' pensions were improved in 1956
(ibid., pp.116-117).
The first survey of occupational pensions undertaken by the Government
Actuary in 1957 showed a high rate of widows' pension provision in
the public sector, including nationalised industries, it being estimated
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that 83% of schemes gave an annuity to widows (GA, 1958, Appendix
1, S1l-12, p.21) with five out of six men being covered (ibid., p.12),
whether death occurred in service or in retirement. The rest paid
a lump sum on death in service or 'unexpired instalments of guaranteed
annuity, etc.' on death after retirement (ibid., p.21). In the private
sector, while figures were not given on the percentage of employees
covered, 23% of 'non-insured' and no 'insured' schemes gave a widow's
pension on death in service, though payment of a lump sum was common
(ibid., Sil, p.21). Widows' annuities paid on death in retirement
were uncommon - 12% of non-insured and 2% of insured schemes paid
them. 21% of insured and 33% of non-insured schemes gave no benefits
on death in retirement. 'Allocation' of part of the retirement pension
so as to provide for a widow was an option permitted to husbands in
73% of public sector, 50% of non-insured and 88% of insured schemes,
with wide variation as to whether this choice could be made 'at or
near normal retiring age' or 'at some other time' (ibid., S18, p.24).
It was quite usual for private pension schemes to permit conversion
of the retirement pension into a lump sum payable on retirement, rather
than a widow's pension.
Thus, in 1956, occupational pension schemes provided better widows'
pensions in the public than in the private sector. Arrangements which
relied on the husband exercising an option were common. However,
the woman who was 'adequately' provided for in old age via her husband's
occupational pension benefits was the exception. The Phillips Committee
(H M Treasury, 1954, S71, p.17) noted that nearly half the women of
pensionable age were widows, the proportion rising steeply with age,
but did not spell out the relationship between female longevity and
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poverty in old age. It was the 'poverty' studies of the 1960's
which pinpointed the limited extent to which elderly widows were
supported by occupational pensions derived from their husbands'
employment. In 1959-60 a miniscule proportion of widows in Britain
appeared to be living on an occupational widows' pension, according
to a national survey (Cole and Utting, 1962, p.57). Most were dependent
on state benefits, including National Assistance. Townsend and
Wedderburn (1965) in a national study of old people in Britain found
that only 9% of widows had occupational pensions. Their findings
gave 'little support --- for the view that private superannuation
arrangements are taking over from the state' since the majority of
people, widows included, had no pensions or, if they had them, had
them in exceedingly small amounts (ibid., p.102).
The second GA's survey of 1963 indicated that widows' pensions
continued to be a far more common provision in the public than the
private occupational sector (G.A., 1966, S98, p.41). The small
proportion of private sector scheme members who were covered for widows'
pension provision were most commonly granted continuing payment
of their retirement pension for a fixed number of years (ibid., S99,
S
p.42). However 90% of private sector schemes paid lump sums to widows
on death in service, as was the case in the public sector where widows'
pensions were a common feature on death in service or retirement (ibid.,
Sl00, p.42). Private sector schemes sometimes paid 'balance payments'
i.e. lump sums to widows whose husbands had died shortly after retire-
ment (ibid., Sl02, p.43).
By the mid-sixties, the Civil Service, local government, teachers,
National Health Service and most nationalised industry pension schemes
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paid out a lump sum to an employee's widow on death in service. Most
paid a widow's pension of about one-third of the husband's salary
on death in service or retirement, sometimes with a requirement as
to minimum length of completed service. The major exceptions were
the Government Superannuation Scheme for teachers and British Rail(10)
(Rhodes, 1965, Appendix 4, pp.280-285). Rhodes noted the tendency
of private sector pension schemes to provide lump sums rather than
widows' pensions, but found some large private occupational pension
schemes which provided widows' pensions on a scale more generous than
the public sector (ibid., p.132).
Teachers were in fact the last public sector group to get widows'
pensions, though the NUT had made representations since 1949 for a
scheme to be set up similar to the Civil Service provision. Cost
was the stumbling block, with failure to agree as to how the costs
could be shared between central and local government and the employee.
In 1956 a scheme was established, paid for by the teachers themselves,
which permitted a widow's pension to be paid on death in service as
well as in retirement, by surrendering part of the lump sum payable
(Gosden, 1972, pp.148-149). It took until 1966 for a widow's pension
as such to be provided on a basis which permitted existing married
male teachers to 'opt in' (ibid.).
The inclusion of the teaching profession brought 90% of public
sector male employees in occupational schemes within the orbit of
widows' pension provision on death in service or retirement by 1967.
However only 10% of private schemes recorded in the third GA's survey
provided such a benefit, covering around one-third of male scheme
members and suggesting that 'large' schemes were more likely to be
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providers (G.A., 1968, S73-74, p.27). 70% of private scheme members
could 'allocate' i.e. forego part of his pension in favour of a widow
or dependant, on or shortly before retirement: the same facility was
generally available in the public sector, though little used. Private
sector schemes relied heavily on lump sum payments for provision to
survivors on death in service, some schemes paying up to four times
annual salary, the limit permitted under Inland Revenue rules (ibid.,
S76-77, p.27).
In the late sixties, widows' pension provision began to increase
in the private sector. By 1971, in respect of death in service benefits,
while the majority of private sector schemes still provided only lump
sum payments, the larger schemes were more typically providing widows'
pensions, especially those schemes with both manual and non-manual
members (GA, 1972, S12.3, pp.40-41). Some private sector schemes
were by now providing widows' pensions which did not cease on re-marriage
(ibid.). This type of provision is in line with the notion of an
occupational pension as 'deferred earnings' in the form of a continuing
'family wage' payable to the member's widow regardless of her future
marital status. Lump sums paid on death in service were commonly




Death in service benefits: 1971, UK.
Type of benefit
Widow's pension no lump sum
Widow's pension + lump sum


















Source: GA (1972), Table 34, p.40.
Table 25
Widow's pension provision on death in retirement: 1971, UK.
Type of provision
Unconditional widow's pension



















Source: GA (1972), Table 38, p.43.
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With regard to pension provision for widows on death in retirement,
the majority of private sector schemes still relied heavily on the
exercise of an 'allocation option'. 'Unconditional' benefits were
provided by the larger schemes (ibid., Sl2.7, p.43), whereas the 'over-
whelming majority' of public scheme members were so entitled. The
1971 survey found that a high proportion of manual workers' pension
schemes made no provision for widows and argued that this could be
because the benefits in some schemes were so low that there was little
scope for allocation (Sl2,8, p.43). In the private sector, 39% of
staff but only 22% of manuals were eligible to confer 'unconditional'
widows' pensions. The advantage which could accrue to the widow of
an occuaptional scheme member is illustrated by the fact that in 1971,
about half the schemes which gave widows' pensions on death in service
based that calculation on the number of years which the husband could
have worked had he survived to retire (ibid., S12.14, p.46). This
undoubtedly served to improve the financial position of women widowed
early with effects extending into their own old age, especially if
the benefit was periodically revalued. The impression given by the
1971 GA's survey is that the most generous provision for widows was
made by large private sector firms.
Between 1971-1975, by which time the 'pensions debate' was well
under way, the total number of men in occupational pension scheme
membership entitled to confer a widow's pension on death in service
increased from 56% to 74% (GA, 1978, S12.5, p.64).
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Table 26
Death in service benefits: 1975: widows' pensions, UK.
percentages
Private sector	 Public sector
Mode of calculation 	 Total


























* allocation options: including conversion of lump sum into widow's
pension or surrender of part of personal pension to provide a
widow's pension
Source: GA (1978), Table 12.6, p.65.
Thus by 1975, a death-in-service widow's pension was a virtually
universal provision in the public sector and one more comonly provided
than not for non-manual staff in the private sector. Manual staff
widows were the 1et well prtvided for.
	
In addition, all public sector
employees were entitled to a lump sum benefit on death in service,
typically equal to between 1-2 year's salary, while generous lump
sums were available to some members of private sector schemes (ibid.,
Table 12.5, p.64).
Death benefits payable after retirement also improved between
1971-75. A striking change during this period was the increase in
the number of private sector widows' pensions available on an uncon-


























personal pension to be foregone. Whereas in 1971, 35% of private
scheme members received such a benefit, by 1975, 74% did so. The
proportion of members able to exercise an 'allocation option' only
fell to 19% from 55% and the proportion with no access to widows'
pension provision on death after retirement fell to 8% from 18% (ibid.,
Table 12.11, p.68).
Table 27
Death in retirement benefits: 1975, widows' pensions, UK.
percentages




Non-manual Manual Non-manual Manual
* allocation options: including conversion of lump sum into widows'
pension or surrender of part of personal pension to provide a widows'
pension
Source: GA, (1978), Table 12.3, p.69.
The increased provision of widows' and survivors' benefits during
the late 60's and early 70's were related to parallel developments
in statutory social insurance provision. Labour's National Super-
annuation plan of 1957 was designed to improve widows' benefits.
It included suggestions for payment to younger widows of a cash
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sum equal to half the husband's earnings for the five years before
his death. For older widows it was proposed that earnings_related
pensions should be paid in proportion to the length of married life
(The Labour Party, 1957, pp.45-46). The 1959 Graduated Pension Scheme
provided for half a married man's pension to be paid to his widow
(Matthewman and Lambert 1984, Sl2.45, p.273). During the debate on
the relevant legislation, the Opposition suggested that contracted-
out occupational pension schemes should be required to incorporate
widows' pension provision which would make it compulsory for married
men to allocate part of their personal pension to their potential
widow (H of C, 598, cols. 974-5, 27/1J1959).1) This was not done.
The 'Crossman' plan of 1969 proposed to improve statutory provsion
for widows by offering pensions on a sliding age-related scale to
women who were widowed, or whose responsibility as widowed mothers
for the care of dependant children ended, at 40-49 (DHSS, 1969, S79-80,
pp.26-27). Women widowed after 50 would receive an earnings-related
widow's pension (ibid., S78, p.26). A widow over 60 would be allowed
to use her husband's pension record if better than her own, with
credited earnings if the husband died before reaching the age of 65
(ibid., S75, p.26). The White Paper did not discuss widows' pensions
in relation to occupational provision: the proposed system of partial
contracting-out does not appear to have encompassed compulsory provision
of widows' pensions as a requirement for contracting out.
The 'Joseph' plan of 1971 included proposals for a widow's pension
at half the husband's rate to be payable to the widows of male members
of the State Reserve pension scheme (DHSS, 1971, Table B, p.23).
The Conservative proposals were in fact a key influence on the provision
of widows' pensions in occupational schemes since it was proposed
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that such provision would be a condition of 'contracting-out'. A widow's
benefit was to be payable in the form of a pension at half the husband's
personal pension rate should he die in retirement, but could be paid
in the form of a lump sum should the husband die in service. The
widow's pension, if paid, should be periodically revalued in the same
manner as the personal pension (ibid., S57, p.17).
Although the Conservative proposals were not enacted, they had
a profound influence on occupational widows' pension provision since,
as the results of the GA survey of 1975 show, many schemes in the private
sector introduced widows' pensions for the first time (GA, 1978, S12.5,
p.4). The SSPA 1975 made widows' pension provision a condition of
'contracting-out' by occupational pension schemes.
(12)III Provision for widows since the SSPA 1975
All widows of appropriately insured non-retired men are entitled
to a statutory weekly allowance for six months from the date of widow-
hood. After this, widows over 50 with no dependent children receive
a full basic widows' pension, if so entitled, and those widowed between
40-49 receive an abated age-related pension. Childless widows under
40 do not qualify for a state pension. A widow with children under
16 (or 19 if in full-time education or apprenticed) gets a widowed
mother's allowance: when she ceases to qualify, her entitlements are
(13)
age-related, as above. 	 A widowed mother's allowance or widow's
pension is increased by the amount of any state earnings-related pension
to which the deceased husband's contribution record may entitle his
widow (Matthewman and Lambert, 1984, S7.lO-7.40, 	 At
60, a widow's pension turns into a basic retirement pension, payable
at a reduced rate if the widow was under 50 at the time she first
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received it (ibid., S12.14, 	 This pension does not
cease on re-marriage after the age of 60. Where a woman is widowed
after the age of 60 she qualifies, if her husband's insurance record
so entitles her, to a single person's retirement benefit plus additional
pension derived from her husband's contributions, though she may not
claim more than a maximum single person's state additional pension
on her own and her husband's state additional contributions combined
(ibid., S12.29-12.32, pp.267-68).
Since the 'Castle' pension scheme 'integrates' state and occupa-
tional pension provision, the above provisions affect a widow's entitle-
ments under her late husband's occupational pension benefits, which
may be derived from more than one pension scheme. Under the terms
of the SSPA 1975, all contracted-out occupational pension schemes are
required to provide a 'requisite benefit' to the widow of any scheme
member over 26 who has completed five years' service,6) whether he
dies in service or during retirement, at a rate equal to not less than
half of the member's occupational pension or, (if higher) half the
guaranteed minimum pension to which the scheme irember was entitled
at the time of his death.	 However, the regulations require such
a pension to be paid only for any period during which the widow is
entitled to statutory widow's benefits (SSPA 1975, S36, pp.28-29).
If the husband's death occurs in service, a pension scheme is
entitled to use part of any lump sum payable so as to purchase an annuity
for the widow, without requiring her permission. This practice is
followed by a number of schemes (Ward, 1981, p.131). Under Inland
Revenue regulations, a widow's pension(s) may not exceed two-thirds
of the pension(s) which would have been due to her husband at the time
of his death (ibid., p.136). Where the scheme member has retired,
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the 'two-thirds' rule likewise applies (ibid., p.145). However, the
Inland Revenue rules provide that a 'lump sum' may be paid only as
a 'funeral benefit' of modest dimensions(18) or as a capital sum paid
in lieu of a continuing husband's personal pension, where the total
amount to be paid does not exceed the value of five years' pension
payments (ibid.).
By 1979, by which time the 'Castle' plan had become operational,
the majority of occupational pension schemes were providing widows
with both a pension and a lump sum, the latter payment being restricted
to deaths which occurred in service. The GA survey of that year showed
that unconditional widows' pensions were offered by public sector
schemes whether death occurred in service or after retirement. 0nly
12% of private sector schemes offered no widow's pension on death in
service, these being 'third tier' contracted-in schemes.(19) Most
offered pensions derived from the member's salary and service: a very
small proportion relied on those methods of allocation which once were
standard practice (GA, 1981, Table 11.4, p.62). 96% of schemes provided
payment of a lump sum on the death of a married man in service. In
the public sector this commonly amounted to between one and one-and-a-
half times annual salary: in the private sector, the amount was, typi-
cally, more generous at twice annual salary (ibid., p.59). 10% of
private sector scheme members were entitled to payment of a sum equal
to four times their salary (the permitted maximum under Inland Revenue
rules) on death in service: a further 17% were entitled to between
three to four years (ibid., Table 11.5, p.63). Only 8% of ('contracted-
in') occupational pension schemes in the private sector offered no
widow's benefit on death in retirement (ibid., Table 11.11, p.66).
As was the case with widow's pensions payable on death in service (ibid.,
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Table 11.5, p.63) such benefits payable after retirement in the private
sector were based on higher pension fractions per year than was the
case in the public sector (ibid., Table 11.13, p.67).
The 1983 survey of the NAPF shows that provision of a widow's
pensia plus lump sum continued to be near-universal in occupational
pension schemes (NAPF, 1983, Table 47, p.29). Just under one-third
of private occupational scheme members conferred death-in-service
benefits which provided for return of employee contributions in addition,
a facility virtually unknown in public sector provision (ibid., p.30).
The proportion of schemes in this category had risen from 85% in 1979
to 91% in 1983 (ibid., Table 48, p.31). The survey showed that 26%
of 'contracted-in' schemes offered no widows' pensions though only
1% offered no death-in-service benefits at all (ibid., Table 49, p.31).
The lump sum payable on death-in-service was particularly generous
in respect of 'staff' scheme members, where 52% were at more than three
years' salary, including 27% at four years' salary (ibid., Table 53,
p.34). The great majority of death-in-service benefits were based
on 'enhanced' service (ibid., Table 55, p.35). A recent study of forty
death-in-service schemes states that provision for manual workers has
improved in recent years (IRRR, 295, p.10, 10/5/83). The most generous
scheme noted was that of Marks and Spencer which provides a two-thirds
widow's pension plus a 'four times annual salary equivalent' lump sum
(ibid.).
By 1983, 97% of schemes gave a widow's pension as of right on
death in retirement, with about one-third of the schemes offering,
in addition, a facility for a married man to surrender part of his
personal pension so as to provide a larger pension for his widow (ibid.,
p.38). The latter facility accrued to 62% of members of public sector
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schemes and 40% of private sector members (ibid.). The majority of
schemes offered a half-pension to the widow, though half the members
in public sector 'works' schemes conferred a widow's pension at two-
thirds of their own level of retirement pension (ibid., Table 59, p.39).
Most schemes guaranteed payment of a member's personal pension benefit
for a certain period after death in retirement (typically for five
years), with over half permitting an overlap with payment of a dependant's
pension (ibid., Table 62, p.40). Most paid the guaranteed amount as
a lump sum (ibid., Table 63, p.41).
In recent years there have been certain interesting trends towards
change in the scheme rules relating to widows' pensions as regarding
cohabitation, re-marriage, length of marriage and age differences
between husband and wife. It has been usual for public sector schemes
to require forfeiture of a widow's pension on cohabitation or re-
marriage: private sector schemes did, traditionally, require forfeiture
of pension on re-marriage but much less commonly applied a 'cohabitation
rule' (OPB, 1976, S10.52-10.54, p.116).
Public sector schemes, typically, require a widow to declare if
she is cohabiting, though the more recent nationalised industry schemes
apply this rule less frequently. The Civil Service pension scheme
discontinues the pension of widows whose husbands retired or died in
service before 6/4/1978 on re-marriage or beginning 'to live with a
man as his wife'. For widows whose husbands retired or died after
that date, the pension is payable only in special circumstances to
widows under 60(20) or as a guaranteed minimum pension to widows who
re-marry or cohabit after the age of 60 (H M Treasury, 1982, S4.5,
p.38). The pension can be restored on 'compassionate grounds' or if
the secondmarriage ends or if the widow ceases to cohabit (ibid.).
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In recent years 'cohabitation rules' have virtually disappeared from
the private sector (21) and it has become far more common for a widow
to be permitted to retain her full occupational widow's pension on
re-marriage.
Since the SSPA 1975, the usual practice in the public sector is
for a widow's pension 'to be suspended or stopped entirely except for
the guaranteed minimum pension' (GA, 1981, Sll.6, p.63). In the private
sector, 60% of widows' pensions were, by 1979, completely unaffected
by re-marriage, with 2% continued at the trustees' discretion. 27%
were reduced to the 'guaranteed minimum' or stopped entirely while
4% stopped only if the re-marriage took place before the age of 60
and 2% continued, provided that the member died after retirement (ibid.).
The NAPF survey of 1983 found that 67% of all occupational pension
schemes continued payment of a widow's pension for life, 7% reviewed
it on re-marriage, 6% discontinued it if re-marriage occurred before
the widow's 60th birthday and 20% actually discontinued the pension
on re-marriage (NAPF, 1983, Table 57, p.37). 72% of schemes continued
the pension for life where the widow died in retirement and 17% continued
it until re-marriage. For 'retired' widows, the actual percentages
affected were 53% subject to no 're-marriage rule' and 39% wh6 actually
forfeited their pension (ibid., Table 61, p.40).(22)
Traditionally, occupational pension schemes did not provide widows'
benefits in respect of marriages which occurred once a scheme member
had left his employment (with preserved benefits) or after retirement.
Again, changes have had to be made in 'contracted-out' scheme rules
so as to conform with the requirements of the 1975 pensions legislation
and provide at least a guaranteed minimum pension in respect of post-
employment and 'late' marriages, including those which took place not
more than six months before the husband's death (OPB, 1976, Sl0.6l-
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10.62, p.118). The GA has noted that between 1975-1979 pension schemes
had, typically, changed their policies with regard to the provision
of pensions for the widows of men who had married(or re-married) after
retirement. Whereas in 1975, around 75% of scheme members were in
schemes which did not make such provision, by 1979 only 35% were subject
to such rules, those in 'contracted-out' schemes being entitled in any
case to confer a widow's pension equal to the 'guaranteed minimum'.
However, where the marriage had taken place within six months of the
husband's death, nearly one-third of those otherwise eligible were
not covered, or were covered only at the trustees' discretion (GA,
1981, Sll.15, p.68).
Finally it has been comon for schemes to reduce the amount of
widows' benefit payable where there is a disparity of age between
husband and wife of more than ten years, with the wife being the younger.
The OPB noted that schemes varied as to their definition of a significant
age disparity, some reducing the pension if the wife was as little
as five years' younger and some not unless she was fifteen years'
younger. A typical reduction was '2-3% in respect of each year in
excess of a stated number of years' (OPB, 1976, S10.65, p.119). It
is permissable under the SSPA 1975 so to abate any part of the widow's
pension other than the guaranteed minimum pension and such abatement
is a continuing practice (Ward, 1981, p.141).
In conclusion, occupational pension provision developed during
• the nineteenth century as an employer's benefit for white collar workers
in 'good' jobs or, less typically, for manual workers in particularly
'good' employment. The death of a male breadwinner was a particular
hazard at a time when the male death rate was far higher than it is
Among the class of men eligible for membership of early
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occupational schemes, the 'breadwinner' was expected to earn a family
wage sufficient to support his family without his wife (or, indeed,
his adult unmarried daughters) entering the labour market. Thus, over
time, formal occupational pension provision was developed in such a
way as to provide not only a personal retirement pension for the male
scheme member, but a replacement income for his family in the event
of his death.
Until well into the twentieth century, the typical provision for
a widow on 'death in service' was a lump sum, or, on 'death in retire-
ment', a pension provided by an option to forego part of the personal
retirement pension or a lump sum representing a 'guaranteed' amount
of personal pension. What is striking about occupational provision
for widows until well after the second World War is the extent to which
this was dependeit upon the husband's exercising a responsible and
appropriate choice of an option so to provide. 	 Such arrangements
underline the somewhat vulnerable position of widows of occupational
pension scheme members: they had no entitlement to the 'unconditional'
pension paid to the widows of insured men. Such wives, if left in-
adequately 'provided for' on widowhood, customarily had few skills
to offer the labour market beyond those developed in and for the
domestic arena. Even between the wars, marriage could effectively
'de-skill' a wife who had been self-supporting before her marriage,
due to the existence of formal and informal 'marriage-bars' as well
as social custom and an overcrowded labour market.
It was the state which pioneered the notion of the 'unconditional'
widow's pension - available to that large proportion of married women
who, from the mid-nineteen-twenties, were the wives of 'insured' men.
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Had Beveridge succeeded in totally abolishing, rather than diminishing,
access to unconditional widows' pensions, then occupational widows'
benefits might have developed more rapidly after the second World War.
In the event, women over 50, a 'higher risk' group in terms of the
likelihood of being widows, were allowed to retain their right to a
full universal widow's pension if married to a fully insured husband
under the terms of the NI Act 1946. However, the state insurance scheme
never has provided the 'lump sum' death benefits which characterise
provision in the occupational pension sector.
From the time of the 'pensions debate', the state has set standards
for the provision of widows' pensions, finally making such provision
a condition of 'contracting-out'. There is no doubt that the widows
of men with good occupational pension scheme benefits are at a financial
advantage as compared with women with entitlement only to statutory
(24)benefits.	 However, there is by now a considerable amount of
inequity of treatment with regard to the application of cohabitation
or re-marriage rules. A 'public sector' widow is supposed to declare
if she is 'living with a man as his wife', while a private sector widow
is usually at liberty to 'cohabit' if she so wishes. Private sector
pensions are increasingly being defined as 'deferred earnings' of a
deceased husband to which a widow should have lifelong entitlement:
public sector pensions are more commonly 'lost' on re-marriage. It
can only be assumed that these rules actually influence the conduct
and outcome of relationships with men established by 'occupational'
widows.(25) They are predicated on the notion of female dependency
in marriage and marriage-like relationships. Yet these rules are
strangely inconsistent. While the 'traditional division of labour'
makes it less likely that a woman will have been able to generate a
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good income for herself in old age should she have married, 'death
bed' marriages (made no more than six months before the death of the
husband), are penalised. Such a marriage may well be a prudent financial
step for a widow and not least, if she is permitted to retain the pension
from her first husband. Though as Ward (1981, p.148) remarks 'there
are better ways of making one's fortune than by marrying an elderly
occupational pensioner'.
IV Other female survivors' benefits
Some occupational pension schemes make provision for 'survivors'
other than widows and children, though it is not uncommon for such
(26)provision to be limited to 'female' dependants. 	 The target benefci-
aries before the second World War would have been financially dependent
relatives such as indigent widowed mothers or unmarried sisters or
daughters who were being supported by the deceased male scheme member.
At this time it was customary for unmarried women to 'keep house' for
relatives on a full-time basis, i.e. for a widowed brother. Unmarried
daughters also quite commonly cared on a full-time basis for elderly
parents. Such women, styled 'domestic spinsters' by William Beveridge
(Harris, 1977, p.403) were sometimes financially supported by a male
relative. In the past and present adult handicapped and disabled relatives
have been so supported, despite or in addition to provision of statutory
benefits.
The OPS found that while there was no 'universal practice' it
was quite common for schemes to offer 'options' for allocation or cash
commutation of pension benefits or to allow nomination of a dependant
for receipt of a lump sum death benefit, at the dIscretion of the
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pension scheme trustees (OPB, 1976, SlO.48, p.115). The Board recom-
mended that such options should be made more widely available (ibid.,
S10.51, p.116). However, the existence of a legal widow does, in many
schemes, preclude the payment of a lump sum or assignment of any part
of a widow's pension, notwithstanding the personal wishes of the male
scheme member and his potential widow.
Table 28
Provision for dependants other than spouses*: death in service, 1979, UK.
% of membership eligible
Dependant's pension	 Private sector Public sector Total
Trustees' discretion if no
spouse's pension payable 	 35%
	
18%
















* if a widower's pension payable on the same basis as widow's
Source: GA (1981), Table 11.7, p.64.
Thus, in 1979, just under half the members of occupational pension
schemes made provision for dependants other than spouses. Such arrange-
ments were, typically, dependent on the presence, or otherwise, of a
legal widow, in the case of married male scheme members. Schemes vary
as to the nature of the dependency to be covered. The 1979 survey
included arrangements which could cover children, though children were
mainly provided for by separate arrangements (GA, 1981, S11.8l, p.64).
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As noted in Chapter 6, S2, issues arise around the interpretation of
the term 'adult dependantl.(27) Typically the term may cover a close
relative who was financially dependent upon the scheme member at the
time of his death, an ex-wife who was receiving financial support,
or, increasingly, a 'cohabitee'. These provisions for 'dependants'
in occupational pension schemes constitute a little-known but nonethe-
less significant form of income maintenance provision derived from
employment. Its true extent is unknown.
'Dependency' provisions are currently a very live issue, since
by this means, usually at the discretion of the trustees, provision
can be made for ex-wives (see Ch.9) and cohabitees. Some schemes permit
assignment of part of a personal pension to an ex-wife by member's
allocation, though in all circumstances, a legal widow is entitled
to her guaranteed minimum pension.
Cohabitation also has considerable implications for the providers
of occupational pension benefits. It may or may not be a prelude to
marriage, it may or may not involve de facto 'financial dependency'
and the couple concerned may or may not consider themselves to be living
in a 'marriage-like' relationship. Nonetheless, cohabitation is now
such an extensive practice that the adult 'female survivor' whose claim
to occupational death benefits comes up for consideration by pension
scheme trustees is now more likely to be a 'cohabitee' than the tradi-
tional widowed mother or 'domestic spinster'.
Cohabitation is significant in the context of occupational pension
provision in terms of its financial implications. A proportion of
cohabitations are indubitably 'marriage-like' and, especially where
children are involved, display those typical features of the 'domestic
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division of labour' which characterise a high proportion of legal mar-
riages. Especially since the 1970's, there has been a marked trend
towards legal marriage being preceded by a period of cohabitation (OPCS,
1981, p.129). The GUS 1982 found that the propensity to cohabit was
highest, at 67% between 1979-81, among couples with at least one
previously-married partner (OPCS, 1984, p.29).
Brown and Kiernan analysed data from the GUS 1979, noting that
cohabitation appeared to be 'largely a childless period, withmost
childbearing occurring with the framework of legal marriage', but noted
that among the single women who regarded themselves as 'married', half
were, in fact, mothers (Brown and Kiernan, 1981, p.6). 44% of the
'married' single women were not in paid work, with a high proportion
(70%) having partners in manual work. The 'living together' single
women, by contrast, were almost without exception childless, better
educated and less likely (at 57%) to have a partner in manual work
(ibid.). 25% of the 'married' cohabitees had been together for more
than five years and 36% for more than two (ibid., Table 6, p.7).
These findings confirm the existence of partnerships which are
long-lasting, which include children and where the female parther is
noteconomically active. Where an unmarried male member of an occupa-
tional pension scheme (or his wife) feel that the relationship is
'marriage-like', they may compare the treatment of widows of occupational
pension scheme members with that of cohabitees. Even where the relation-
ship is one of non-marital 'living together', if viewing occupational
pension benefits as 'deferred earnings', the situation invites compari-
son between the ability of a 'cohabitee' to pass on those deferred
earnings to the destination of his choice as compared with the situation
of' the married man who may be entitled, or indeed, required, to pass
them on to his lawful widow. The situation can be considerably compli-
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cated where a male member of a scheme dies in service when cohabiting,
(28)but leaves a 'lawful' widow.
Freeman and Lyon (1983, p.71) state that there is much of legal
interest as regards the position of cohabitees and occupational pension
benefits. A female cohabitee is not entitled to any form of statutory
widow's benefit (ibid., p.78). The recognition of cohabitation as
a status is of current legal interest. 'reeman and Lyon note that
cohabitees may benefit from occupational pension provision, especially
where the scheme rules permit nomination of 'dependants' entitled to
receive a pension should the scheme member predecease his partner in
retirement. Such arrangements rest on 'proof of dependence' and thus
on 'the exercise of administrative discretion'. However, a cohabitant's
claim to death benefits of any type 'may be defeated by a prior or
subsequent allocation of the portion, or, alternatively by the partner's
later marriage' (ibid., p.79).
Occupational pension scheme provision for widows originated as
a response to the financial hardship which could be experienced by
financially dependent wives (and children) in families wholly or largely
reliant for income on the earnings of a 'male breadwinner'. As
Rossetenstein (1980, p.324) observes, 'Traditionally, occupational
pension schemes - have been structured around a legal family' with
certain benefits payable to a widow by virtue of her marital status.
Among the assumptions upon which the early pension schemes were based
was that of marriage as a life-long relationship.
Both cohabitation and serial marriage are presenting challenges
to the providers of occupational pension benefits. Rossetenstein,
in discussing the operation of scheme rules and trustee discretion,
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makes a useful distinction between 'employer dominant' schemes and
those operating on 'members' choice'. In the first case, as with public
sector schemes, the employer exercises a good deal of control, regarding
the benefits as 'employer assets': 'members' choice' schemes, by
contrast, regard the benefits as the assets or entitlements of the
employee (ibid., p.324). Thus public sector schemes tend to be less
-	 responsive to members' needs, to uphold the status of marriage and
retain a traditional position of 'moral hostility' towards cohabitees.
Inertia also plays its part in the retention of rules and practices
which fail to respond to the existence of alternative family forms
(ibid., pp.328-329).
Rossetstein raises a central question as to the extent to which
occupational survivors' benefits in relation to cohabitees should be
conceptualised as deferred earnings and the extent to which they are
more analogous to statutory income maintenance benefits given on an
assumption of need (ibid., p.330). He argues that 'legal history shows
that there is a marked tendency to extend recognition to de-facto unions
if they approximate the characteristics of marriage' and that this
is more likely to happen as cohabitation becomes more socially accept-
able. On this argument he speculates as to whether in the future a
legal wife might be required to demonstrate 'need' in order to benefit
from her husband's occupational pension benefits - for instance, that
she was engaged in child care.
English law does not treat a cohabitee as a 'widow' under statutory
pension provision, though survivors' benefits from a deceased male
breadwinner's employer's nsion scheme may provide a cohabitee with
an alternative to means-tested supplementary benefit. A widow over
60 may not receive more than the amount of a single person's basic
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retirement pension or state additional pension from her own and her
husband's contribution records combined. However, her occupational
benefits are an entitlement granted without reference to her own
financial circumstances. In the same way, a widow of 'working age'
is entitled to her statutory pension, if any, without reference to
any occupational benefits which she may be receiving.
With a growing incidence of cohabitation and serial marriage
pension trustees and/or adrninstrators are increasingly at risk to being
faced with the need to exercise discretion with regard to death benefits
and allocation options. They are also being required to scrutinise
the scheme rules with a possible view to change. The issues lie between
the rights of an individual scheme member to dispose of his 'deferred
earnings' in the manner which suits his perceived personal circumstances
and the need for the providers of benefits to 'protect' the interests
of widows and female dependants.
V Some issues
The trend in the sixties and early seventies has been towards
the provision of 'unconditional' occupational widows' benefits thus
offering husbands less scope for exercising choice regarding the dis-
posal of occupational death benefits. Moves to extend opportunities
for female cohabitees or, indeed, former wives, to benefit as 'dependants'
might be said to challenge the primacy of the legal 	 and
confirm the financial dependence of women in and after marriage, or
in marriage-like relationships. Conversely they recognise the weaker
financial position of most women in such relationships, notably where
there have been children of the partnership.
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• As with the extension of survivors' benefits to widowers, questions
can be put as to the positive and negative effects of 'institution-
alising' a wider range of dependencies to include cohabitees and ex-
wives. Such provision might be held to inhibit moves in the direction
of women themselves generating a replacement income for old age. Some
married women with a substantial employment record in the 'primary'
labour market are now in a position to generate substantial personal
pension entitlements of their own. Indeed, there is beginning to come
into existence a small 'financial elite' of married women who, if
widowed, will in retirement enjoy substantial widow's benefits in
addition to their own pensions. Other women may choose to cohabit
precisely because their own earning power makes them independent of
financial support fran a male breadwinner.
Such developments strengthen the case for 'disaggregation' in
occupational pension provision, whereby men and women would become
entitled to personal benefits only, with power to require disposal
of any lump sum death benefits according to their personal wishes.
However, as this study makes clear, the majority of women do not as
yet generate a sufficient income for old age through their own earnings.
They rely on entitlement to survivors' benefits should their male bread-
winner predecee them. Thus, the women who loses her right to potential
survivor's benefits on divorce can find herself in a particularly par-
lous financial state in old age, an issue addressed by Ch.9.
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Chapter 9
Loss of Prospective Rights to Occupational Pension Scheme
Benefits on Divorce under English Law
While occupational pension schemes have greatly improved their
benefits in recent years, including widows' provision, concurrent
changes in divorce legislation have put all wives potentially 'at risk'
to divorce. Divorce rates have increased. Thus, questions arise as
to compensation for loss of prospective rights on divorce.
I The Divorce Reform Act 1969 and subsequent legislation
On divorce, an ex-wife loses her right to any prospective
occupational widow's pension or other benefits derived from her ex-
husband's employment. As shown in Chapter 8, such benefits can be
substantial. Loss of pension rights featured, as part of a larger
concern with the financial consequence of divorce, in the debates
(32)leading up to the Divorce Reform Act 1969 and subsequent legislation.
Prior to the 1969 Act, divorce law was based on the 'matrimonial
offence' principle (LC, 1980, S9-13, pp.6-9), which was then abandoned
in favour of the principle of 'irretrievable breakdown of marriage'
(ibid., S14-22). The new legislation put all married persons 'at risk'
to divorce in the sense that, as will be seen, the 'five-year rule'
means that if the parties are held to have been separated for at least
five years, a divorce can be granted (even against the wishes of one
of the partners), provided that the financial arrangements satisfy
the court.
In contemplation of such an outcome of reformed divorce legislation
based on the irretrievable breakdown of marriage, concern was expressed
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in the middle and late 1960s as to the likely financial position of'
ex-wives. A matter which merited particular attention was the loss
of prospective widows' pension benefits by women divorced in later
life. In 1966, a study group appointed on behalf of the Anglican church
to examine possible divorce law reform (Archbishop of Canterbury's
Group, 1966) drew attention to the fact that 'divorce is apt to affect
a wife's economic position more adversely than a husband's', and
recommended that on divorce 'the court should be empowered to award
a wife, in appropriate circumstances, all or part of any pension and
insurance benefits she would have enjoyed had the marriage not broken
down...' (ibid., pp.72-73).
The Law Commission, in 1967, as part of a wide-ranging review
of the financial consequences of possible divorce law reform, set out
a detailed critique of the issues arising from loss of prospective
pension rights (LC 1967, Sl82-210, pp.79-91) stating that in contem-
plating reform,
'There is no doubt that one matter on which there is
strong public feeling is the loss of potential widow's
pension that a wife may suffer if she is divorced by
or divorces her husband. She may have been married
for twenty years or more during which her husband has
been a member of a superannuation scheme under which the
wife, if she survives him, would be entitled to a
pension or a lump sum, or if not entitled, would be the
likely recipient of benefits either at the discretion of
the trustees or as the result of a nomination by the
husband. On the dissolution of the marriage, her
prospective rights or expectations are normally destroyed,
since she can uo longer become his widow.' (Ibid.,
S182, p•79)(33)
It was emphasised that such loss of prospective pension rights were,
at the time of' writing, regarded as a hardship, notwithstanding that
an 'innocent wife' could then not be divorced against her will. It
-388-
was pointed out that such loss might be regarded as an even greater
hardship if the courts were to become empowered to 'dissolve a marriage
against the wishes of a wife who has not committed any matrimonial
offence' (ibid.). Furthermore, it was noted that, at the time of
writing, no occupational pension scheme appeared to attempt 'to make
any provision for safeguarding the position of the divorced wife as
such' (ibid.).
With divorce law reform legislation before Parliament in the late
1960's, issues were considered relating to the financial consequences
of divorce granted on 'irretrievable breakdown' to a wife who, under
previous legislation, would have been deemed an 'innocent party', who
could block any divorce actionon her husband's part. These issues
were emphasised in Parliamentary debates and in the surrounding public
discussion (see Lee, 1974). Media comment pointed out that 'most of
the criticism was concerned with the possible financial hardship that
a woman divorced against her will may well suffer, especially if she
loses her pension rights onherex-husband's death' (ibid., p.141).
However, despite opposition, a reformed divorce law was enacted.
Since January 1971, divorce decrees have been granted solely on
the grounds of 'irretrievable breakdown of marriage'.
	
Of particular
relevance in the context of loss of prospective widow's pension rights,
is the provision whereby either spouse may petition for a divorce on
the grounds that the partners have been separated for a continuous
perid of five years. Such a petition may be opposed by the non-
petitioning party on the grounds that a divorce would cause financial
hardship of sufficient severity to justify dismissal of the petition.
In particular, section 5 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, in allowing
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opposition to the grant of a divorce decree under the 'five-year' rule
'on the grounds that the dissolution of the marriage will result in
grave financial or other hardship tohimand that it would in all the
circumstances be wrong to dissolve the marriage', defines hardship
to 'include the loss of the chance of acquiring any benefit which the
respondent might acquire if the marriage were not dissolved'. As
Cretney comments, this is a defence to the petition of 'last resort'
and 'the defence, if successful will thus, contrary to the general
policy of the Act, keep in existence an "empty legal shell".
This is, in fact, a mandatory defence for wives wishing to oppose their
husband's petition for divorce on grounds of the 'grave financial
hardship' implicit in loss of their prospective pension rights.
Thus, divorce reform has put wives 'at risk' to divorce but given
them the possibility of a 'saving clause' wherewith to argue that
their individual circumstances are such that loss of prospective
occupational pension rights does constitute sufficient 'hardship' for
rejection of their husband's divorce petition. Before proceeding
to detailed discussion of the problems which arise with regard to loss
of occupational pension rights on divorce, and suggested solutions,
it may be useful to consider recent trends in divorce.
II Recent trends in divorce
During the 1970's there was a large increase in the number of
decrees absolute granted in the UK. There was a steep rise in both
petitions and decrees in the years immediately following divorce law
reform, followed by a steady growth, which peaked in 1978 and levelled




1961 1966 1971 1976 1978 1980 1981 1982 1983
Divorces granted
(thousands)
Petitions filed: husband 14
wife	 18
32
18 44 43 47 49 47 47 45
28 67 101 116 123 123 128 124
47 111 145 164 172 170 174 169
Decree nisi
	
27 41 89 132 152 151 148 149 150
Decree absolute	 25 39 74 127 144 148 146 147 147
Persons divorcing per
thousand married people 2.1 3.2 6.0 10.1 11.6 12.0 11.8 12.0 12.2
Percentage of divorces
where one or both
partners married
previously (E and W) 	 9.3 8.7 8.8 11.6 13.5 15.7 17.1 18.5 20.0
Source: Table 2.15 Social Trends 13 (1982) in Family Policy Studies
Centre, 1983, p.5.
Table 2.15 Social Trends (CSO, 1984, p.38).
The Demographic Review 1977 (OPCS, 1978a, Table 4.9, p.59) recorded
a 400% increase in the divorce rate in GB over the previous twenty years.
'An increasing proportion of divorces are occurring at shorter marriage
durations - especially for those who marry young' (CSO, 1979, p.85).
Longer term trends indicate that one in three marriages is 'at risk'
(Family Policy Studies Centre, 1983, p.6). Divorce rates peak between
the ages of 25-29 where nearly one in thirty couples divorces, six
times the rate for couples over 50 (ibid., p.7). Over half the divorces
which took place in GB in 1981 were of marriages less than ten years
old (ibid., p.8). Of relevance in the context of loss of prospective
-391-
widows' pension rights is that 18.3% were long-standing marriages of
at least twenty years' duration. Over seven thousand couples had been
married for more than thirty years (ibid., p.8). Over 13% of people
involved in divorce were over fifty (ibid., p.9). Loss of prospective
pension rights on divorce is a particularly serious consideration for
the older long-married wife with little or no retirement pension rights
of her own.
There is a major trend towards re-marriage: 34% of all marriages
in GB for 1980 involved a re-marriage for one of the partners (ibid.,
p.12). Re-marriage rates among the divorced population under thirty
years of age are high for both sexes, and particularly for women.
'More than one-third of divorced persons under the age of 30 re-marry
during a year 'suggesting that around 80% will re-marry within about
five years' (OPCS, 1978a, S4.33, p.62). In 1980, for GB, re-marriage
rates fell sharply after age 35, with more men than women likely to
re-marry at all ages (Family Policy Studies Centre, 1983, p.12). There
is thus a growing 'excess' of older divorced women. Some re-marriages
end in divorce though the true extent is not known. Divorced persons
are more likely to re-divorce than persons of the same age marrying
for the first time (ibid., p.13).
No official statistics are gathered which would provide infor-
mation on re-marriage rates including information on the length of
time which elapsed between new and previous marriages (ibid.). However,
an attempt has been made to extract such information (Leete and
Anthony, 1979, pp.5-11) by means of a 'pseudo-random sample of 1,000
divorces granted in 1978'. This year was chosen as being the earliest
likely to be representative of current divorce and subsequent re-
marriage patterns following the 1969 Divorce Reform Act.
After 4Y years, 55.5% of men in the sample had re-married,
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compared with 48% of the women, 'despite the fact that the average
age of the divorced men is higher than that of divorced women'. 'The
proportion re-marrying falls with age at divorce'. 60% of those under
30 had re-married by 1977, with only a small difference between the
men and the women. But re-marriage of women over 30 reduced more
rapidly with age than those of men: for example among those aged 40
or over at the time of the divorce, about one-third of divorced women
had re-married by the end of 1977, compared with about one-half of
divorced men.
The effect on re-marriage rates of length of previous marriage
differed between the sexes. For women, the length of the previous
marriage is inversely related to chances of re-marriage. For men
however, length of previous marriage does not seem to affect medium
term re-marriage prospects. It was also found that 'women whose
youngest child was under ten years old re-marry more commonly than
those whose children were older, or those who have no children'. In
addition, there were considerable changes in the age difference between
the partners in first and second marriages. Only 55% of second
husbands were older than their brides. However, 75% of men married
younger wives (the same proportion as with first marriages) and 56%
of these wives were more than four years younger than their husbands
(compared with 25% of first wives), while 23% of second wives were
(36)
more than ten years younger (compared with 2% of first wives).
Leete and Anthony's findings on differential re-marriage rates
between age cohorts related to a period within 4Y years of divorce.
However, other corroborating evidence suggests that, in the older age-
groups, women are less likely to re-marry than men. 'The number of
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divorced women in each age group is greater than the number of divorced
men' (OPCS, 1978a, S4.31, p.62). In 1982, in GB, 6% of women between
25-29 were divorced, 6% between 30-44, and 5% between 45-59. The
corresponding figures for men were 2%, 4% and 3% (OPCS, 1984a, Table
3.27, p.27).
Available statistics are less complete than is desirable in the
context of loss of pension rights on divorce. Many young divorces
re-marry, with unknown effects on their potential rights to occupational
pension benefits should they survive their second or subsequent
husbands. Divorce rates have certainly increased in recent years and
involve a significant number of couples whose marriages are of long
duration. It seems clear that a woman who divorces when she is in
middle life is, statistically speaking, less likely to re-marry than
her younger counterpart and less likely to re-marry than her male
counterpart. It is an interesting question as to what extent the
general divorce trends outlined above actually apply to that sector
of the population with entitlement to occupational pension benefits.
The study of the matrimonial jurisdiction of registrars (Baker et al,
1977) quoted now dated evidence which suggested that in almost two-
thirds of all divorces, the husband was in a manual occupation and
that marriages where the husband was employed in an unskilled manual
occupation have twice the chance of ending in divorce as marriages
where the husband is in a managerial or professional post (Gibson,
1974, quoted in Baker et al. 1977, 52.73, p.11). Haskey (1984) found
a significantly lower level of divorce among male professionals,
managers and clerks in 1979. However, with the growth of occupational
scheme membership and greater provision of private sector widowers'
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benefits, it would seem that in an increasing number of divorce cases,
prospective pension benefits will be at stake.
III The current jurisdiction of courts with regard to loss of a wife's
prospective benefits derived from her husband's membership of an
occupational pension scheme
A divorce decree can be refused under Section 5 of the Matrimonial
Causes Act 1973 if the petition is opposed on grounds of the 'grave
financial hardship' which would result from the dissolution of the
marriage rather than from its breakdown. The issue at stake is 'the
contrast between the respondent's position as a separated wife and
her position as a divorced woman' (Cretney, 1979, p.144). Cretney
states that 'most of the cases in which the court has found "grave
financial hardship" have been based on loss of rights under an
employer's pension scheme'and 'it has been said that loss of an index-
linked pension (i.e. one which gives a high degree of protection
against inflation) is prima facie grave financial hardship to a wife.'
(Ibid., p.145)
Under Section 25(1) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, the courts
have had a broad and flexible framework within which to exercise their
powers to make financial provision and property adjustment on or after
the grant of a decree. The over-riding aim of the court has been to
exercise that power so as to place the parties, (so far as it is practi-
cable and having regard to their conduct, just to do so), in the
financial position in which they would have been had their marriage
not broken down. Included in the circumstances of the case are the
parties' financial resources and earning capacity, along with the
financial obligations and responsibilities which each of the parties
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to the marriage has, or is likely to have, in the forseeable future.
Also taken into account are the standard of living previously enjoyed
by the family, the ages and any disabilities of the parties, the con-
tribution made by each party to the welfare of the family including
unpaid domestic labour, plus the loss of prospective benefits, such
as a pension, on divorce (see Hayes (1980), pp.3-12).
Where loss of prospective benefits derived from a husband's
membership of an occupational scheme is concerned, a clear distinction
has to be drawn between those benefits in which a wife might expect
to have a share (though not as a right) and other benefits which might
eventually accrue as rights. '--- a distinction must be drawn between
the husband's personal pension rights and the provision made in his
pension scheme for his widow. A wife cannot claim that by divorce
she has lost her share in her husband's pension as she has no right
to this: but she has lost her right to an widow's pension'. (Author's
emphasis, ibid., p.10)
A wife has a right to be maintained by her husband. This right
deri,ves partly from comon law which originally entitled a husband
to most of his wife's property, in return for which he was obliged
to provide her with 'bed and board' and necessaries suitable to his
station in life. While a husband is no longer entitled to his wife's
property and common law is now largely irrelevant, public law none-
theless requires, under the Supplementary Benefits Act 1976, that a
man should maintain his wife and children (see Cretney, 1979, pp.2'7l-
273; Stone, 1977, Ch.4A(i) ). While the converse applies in law, in
practice married women appear to be under no legal pressure to take
paid employment. When a couple are divorced, it is open to the court
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to order an ex-husband to make financial provision for his former
wife either by the settlement of property upon her and/or by periodic
payments for her maintenance which can be payable until such time
(38)	 (39)
as she re-marries	 or dies.
When divorce proceedings are underway which involve a husband
who has an expectation of benefits under one or more occupational
pension schemes, the court has to consider, as far as it is able, the
likely financial situation of the wife in old age, when she might,
but for the divorce, have reasonably expected to enjoy benefits
deriving from her husband's right to an occupational retirement
pension and any lump sum accruing under a retirement scheme. Possible
remedies here include ordering the husband 'in view of "the loss of
the expectation that she will be maintained in her old age out of
her husband's own earnings or pension" to make"whatever payment,
transfer or settlement (that) is required" to compensate her' (ibid.,
p.305). The court can also 'indirectly protect the wife's position
by giving her a share in the family matrimonial home and other family
assets.' (Ibid.) However, as Cretney comments, such provision may
alleviate the financial loss but in many cases the current remedies
available do not constitute adequate compensation for the wife. 'A
court cannot order the direct transfer of a pension from one spouse
to another, because pension schemes normally contain a total pro-
hibition against assignment: if the court wants to achieve this
objective it must do so by indirect means by ordering periodical pay-
ments, a lump sum payment or a property transfer order.' (Hayes, 1980,
p. 10)
There is also the issue of loss of a prospective widow's pension
on divorce. The OPB (1976) reported having 'received evidence from
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a number of women who had lost or were about to lose all rights to
an occupational pension scheme's widow's pension on divorce after
marriages lasting up to 29 years and after bringing up a number of
children' (OPB, 1976, S13.30, p.158). At that time, 'pension schemes
were increasingly receiving enquiries from solicitors acting in divorce
cases.' (Ibid.) Clearly, expert legal advice is required since it
may, for instance, be more financially advantageous for a wife to
oppose the petition and plead 'grave financial hardship' under the
five-year separation clause, than to agree to a divorce after two
years' separation. However, loss of prospective widow's pension rights
do not appear to have been a major stumbling-block to the grant of
divorce decrees in the 1970's.
The Law Commission in 1967 found the question of the alleviation
of hardship or loss of pension rights an extremely thorny issue.
For while the means whereby the court may compensate for the loss
of prospective pension rights may be seen to exist, in practical terms
there are often difficulties, not least because ex-husbands are liable
to acquire fresh family obligations. As the Law Commissioners
succinctly commented 'most men have neither the capital nor the income
resources to provide adequately for the wife or (wives) they have
deserted as well as for themselves and their new commitments. No
amount of ingenuity by actuaries, lawyers or legislators can alter
the facts....
a) Wealthy men present the law with no problems.
b) Poor men present problems k.cI-i can be solved
only within the framework of national insurance
and supplementary benefit legislation.
c) The man who is neither rich nor poor generally
has available an earned income, a pension
expectancy and a capital asset - a house
which may be encumbered with a mortgage.
He rarely has much else.' (Law Commission, 1967, p.91)
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It seems a fair assumption that the cases which present the courts
with most problems are those under category (c). A younger, child-
less divorcing wife is likely to get little allowance made for loss
of prospective benefits. However, as briefly indicated before, there
are remedies commonly used in the case of women with the care of
dependent children, or older women.
As stated, the court may make an order in respect of the matri-
monial home and family assets: the husband may be required to transfer
property within this category. In some cases, especially if there
is no surviving widow, a husband may be able to leave instructions
with the trustees of his occupational pension fund so that his former
wife may benefit, perhaps in the category of a 'female dependant's
or as the person to whom his 'lump sum' should be assigned, though
it is not possible to irrevocably guarantee that the trustees will
follow the deceased person's wishes. As an alternative, the court
may order a husband to secure his former wife's financial future after
divorce by other arrangements, such as the purchase of a deferred
annuity, or by taking out an insurance policy (Cretney, 1979, pp.304-C6;
Samuels, 1975, pp.6-li).
Hayes argues that 'the powers of a court under sections 23 and
24 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 are not wide enough to enable
it to order a husband to take out a policy of insurance or to
purchase an annuity for the benefit of his wife'. However, faced
with the 'Draconian alternative' of having to stretch out proceedings
from a two year separation to the 'five-year' rule at which point
he could fall at the 'grave financial hardship' hurdle, husbands can
apparently 'be compelled to do it voluntarily' with regard to meeting
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financial responsibilities to an ex-wife by means of insurance policies
and/or annuities (Hayes, 1980, p.10).
A survey of the matrimonial jurisdiction of registrars in England
and Wales, conducted in the mid-seventies, noted that in the light
of' increased access to occupational pension scheme membership, loss
of prospective benefits on divorce 'may potentially cause considerable
hardship, particularly to middle-class, middle-aged wives'. Those
registrars who commented thought that 'insufficient attention had
been paid to the problem' of loss of pension rights and life insurance
benefits 'and that there should be some clear cut direction as to
how they should deal with it' (Baker et al, 1977, S2.25, p.27).
Powell has observed that 'Following divorce, many women are
excluded -- from any benefits which may become payable under retire-
ment and death benefit schemes run by their former husbands' employers'
(Powell, 1984, p.187). He argues that although these benefits can
be valuable 'they are rarely taken into account in formulating a claim
(40)
against the husband.'	 Sometimes the value of the benefits has
not been appreciated by the lawyers involved: the necessary actuarial
value may not have been put upon them (ibid.). Even where the court is
sympathetic, the rules of an occupational pension scheme may preclude
any possibility of payment to an ex-wife.
In the case of Julian v Julian 1972 (Cretney, 1979, p.150; OPE,
1976, S13.23, p.157), the court was satisfied as to hardship and
refused a decree on the grounds that 'in all the circumstances' it
would be wrong to dissolve the marriage. In this instance it paid
particular attention, as the legislation directs, to 'the interest
of any other persons concerned' such as a prospective spouse whom
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the petitioner had in view, or a dependent relative of the respondent
who could be, in turn, adversely affected by the respondent's loss
of prospective pension benefits. Julian v Julian involved a retired
police officer aged 61 who wished to re-marry and whose current wife,
aged 58, in receipt of periodical payments from her husband and unable
to work due to poor health, opposed the divorce on grounds of loss
of a pension which could not in any case accrue to a second wife
acquired after the officer's retirement. Despite the petitioner's
offer to increase his wife's maintenance and to purchase a small
annuity, the petition was dismissed. So, the usual principle of ending
a 'dead' marriage was, unusually, overturned as a means of protecting
an elderly wife against loss of benefit from her husband's pensioit
scheme.
Le Marchant v Le Marchant 1977 (Cretney, 1979, p.146), a prima-
facie case of 'grave financial hardship' concerned prospective loss
of a substantial index-linked widow's pension. The husband finally
got his decree at 'one minute to midnight' after a hefty last-minute
compensation package which included outright transfer of the matri-
monial home to the wife, a large cash payment on the petitioner's
impending retirement (presumably from his 'lump sum') and a sub-
stantial life insurance policy taken out in contemplation of his pre-
deceasing his former wife. In Mathias v Mathias 1972 (OPB, 1976,
S.13.22, p.156), the young wife of a soldier, with one daughter, lost
her appeal against the grant of a divorce decree to her husband, with
consequent loss of prospective rights to an army widow's pension,
the judge commenting that with a 'young able-bodied wife - it must
usually be harder for her to ... make out the statutory defence'.
-401-
In Lee v Lee (1973) a wife aged 62, with an invalid son, success-
fully opposed her 67 year old husband's petition for divorce on grounds
of five years' separation. She pleaded that prospective loss of a
civil service widow's pension constituted 'grave financial hardship'
(Rakusen and Hunt, 1982, pp.37-38). An interesting case is Purse v
Purse (1981), in which a husband had obtained a divorce on the grounds
that he was unable to trace his wife. On his death she discovered
that she had been divorced without her knowledge, with consequent
loss of an occupational widow's pension. The court held that inade-
quate enquiries had been made as to her whereabouts and that she would
have had good grounds for resisting the petition on 'grave financial
hardship'. Hence, the divorce decrees were posthumously rescinded
and the widow got her occupational widow's pension (ibid., p.39).
Finally in Johnson v Johnson (1981) a 55 year old wife successfully
pleaded 'grave financial hardship' since her husband (aged 61) had
a good index-linked police pension but no capital and was unable to
purchase life insurance due to poor health (Family Law (1983), Vol.12,
No.2, p.116).
The OPB (1976) commented that 'the courts have taken the line
that where a husband has insufficient funds to provide some form of
compensation, petitions made solely on the basis of 5 years separation
may be dismissed'. The courts had also taken into account 'the age
of the parties, their conduct' and 'non-disclosure by one party of
assets such as pension rights.'(Ibid., S.l3.27, p.157) 	 They also
had taken into account the likely availability of supplementary
benefits in lieu of a widow's pension, as in Reiterbund v Reiterbund,
1975 (Cretney, 1979, p.146; OPB, 1976, S13.28, pp.l57_58).(41)
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Cretney pointed out that in 1977 a very small number of divorce
petition decrees (8.73%) were actually brought on the five-year
separation clause, 55% of such petitions being presented by women
(Cretney, 1979, pp.165-167). So much for Casanova's charter!'42
Certainly, a very small number of' cases based on loss of prospective
widow's pension rights seem to have been reported.
IV Suggestions for changes in the jurisdiction of courts regarding
loss of prospective pension rights on divorce
Following the SSPK1975, the OPB were asked to advise the then
government on 'what further steps were needed to achieve equal status
in occupational pension schemes' (OPB, 1976, Sl.2, p.2). Among tbe
related issues reportedtxxxi bythe Board in 1976 was the question of
'how occupational pension rights should be dealt with in financial
settlements on divorce and separation'(ibid., Sl.5, p.2). Previously
this problem had been candidly admitted to be particularly baffling
both by the Law Commission (1967, p.91) and the Finer Committee (1974,
S5.304, p.350).
The Board recommended new powers for the courts and changes in
the rules of occupational pension schemes. It noted that reform of
divorce legislation meant that women could be divorced against their
wishes, despite the absence of any conduct approximating to the former
'matrimonial offence'. Yet it was 'often totally impossible to com-
pensate a wife adequately for loss of pension rights. The position
was even worse at a time of high inflation, as the pension might well
be based on the husband's final salary at retirement and might qualify
for increases to offset rising prices' (OPB, 1976, Sl3.41, p.161).
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The problem was 'particularly acute' in the case of the older wife
who had stayed at home for a considerable period to care for her
husband and children, at the expense of her own earning capacity and
pension rights. Matters could not be left as they were. Many husbands
had insufficient assets for the award of lump sums at the time of
divorce or for maintenance to be continued after the husband's death
(ibid., Sl3.42, p.161).
With regard to the rules of occupational pension schemes, only
some permitted allocation of pensions (a device which could provide
for an ex-wife). Where trustees had discretion as to the allocation
of benefits on death 'evidence suggests that trustees might be more
likely to exercise discretion in favour of the present partner of'
the scheme member, whether or not married to him' (ibid., S13..45,
p.162). The Board noted that a personal pension paid to a scheme
member after retirement is part of income out of which maintenance
can be awarded and that as a wife has no actual right to any part
of the pension itself, a divorced wife should have no such right
either - otherwise she would have more rights than she would have
possessed in marriage. (Ibid., S13.69, p.169)
Many of those who gave evidence to the Board favoured compen-
sation for loss of pension rights and commented on the limited powers
of the courts and the equivocal position of pension trustees in being
asked to make judgements on matrimonial matters in cases where they
actually had the discretion to do this. There were questions of
priority for financial support as between a man's deperidants at the
time of his death and a former wife.
Two courses of action suggested themselves to the Board. One
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was that benefits 'should accrue to successive wives in proportion
to the length of each marriage'. This might seem a particularly
fair suggestion in the case of women who had been married to husbands
in occupations, such as the Diplomatic Service, which traditionally
incorporate a wife's services (see Finch, 1983). However, the Board
concluded that schemes should not be required to provide an inalien-
able right to a survivor's pension which had accrued during the period
of a marriage' since this would require the payment of 'trivial
benefits for young, childless wives with good chances of re-marriage
and with adequate time, if they so wish, to build up their own pension
entitlement'. (Ibid., S13.48, p.162)
A preferable solution lay in granting wide powers to enable the
courts, on evidence of a former wife's hardship 'to order that a sur-
vivor's pension automatically provided under the rules of' a scheme
should be paid in whole or in part to a divorced spouse.' (Ibid.,
Sl3.56, p.165) Such orders should be subject to variations or dis-
charge on application by either party to the divorce, and would 'over-
ride or modify the terms of the pension trust scheme deed.' (Ibid.,
S13.55, p.165) The Board felt that there would be scope for leaving
a widow with her inalienable right to a GMP derived from her husband's
occupational pension scheme, but using at least part of any amount
in excess of this, in support of a needy former wife. It was argued
that more occupational pension schemes should have rules permitting
the sharing of survivor's pensions (ibid., S13.50-l3.60, pp.163-166),
and that, as a further contribution to the alleviation of hardship,
courts should also be able to make orders concerning pensions payable
in respect of dependent children, since these are payable to a maximum
-405-
amount or for a maximum number of children in some pension schemes
(ibid., S13.69, p.169).
The first Consultative Document recommended that 'The courts
should be given wide powers to enable them, where appropriate
to order that a survivor's pension automatically provided under the
rules of a scheme should be paid in whole or in part to a divorced
spouse (DHSS, 1976, 6(1), p.3). It was also recommended that allo-
cation facilities within schemes should be brought within the power
of the courts and that orders should be available concerning children's
pensions (ibid., 6(u), (iii) and (v). 'Schemes should be encouraged
to adopt rules which would allow them to be more flexible in relation
to allocating personal pensions or apportioning survivors' pensions
between different beneficiaries' (S14 (i), p.9), but 'should not be
required to provide an inalienable right to a survivor's pension which
has accrued during the period of a marriage' (S26 (i), p.15).
The Labour government declareiitself prepared to legislate in
this area, intending, for administrative simplicity, to make the power
of the courts exercisable only on the death of a scheme member, with
the exception of an allocation option (DHSS, 1977, S22, p.9). Thus,
a former spouse might apply for an allocation option to be exercised
in his or her favour (S23, p.9) or, if a scheme member died, the courts
could order that a survivor's benefit payable as of right to a spouse
or child should be paid wholly or partly to a divorced or separated
spouse (or child of that marriage) - for life or until re-marriage
(ibid.). This would not affect a widow's GMP.
The second Consultative Document stated that the government had
had a 'mixed reaction' to the OPB's 1976 proposals (DHSS, 1977, 512,
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p.3). The pensions organisations opposed the proposals on the grounds
of administrative complication arid a belief that the courts should
rely on matrimonial law for dealing with pension benefits (S13, p.3).
In the event, no action was taken with regard to occupational pensions
and divorce by the Labour administration of 1974-79.
V Financial self-sufficiency on divorce: towards divorce law reform 1984
The divorce law reforms of the late sixties and early seventies
reflected a concern with the ending of dead marriages and with placing
the parties, so far as possible, within the financial position in
which they would have been, had the marriage not broken down. However,
as the Law Commission commented, 'although divorce terminates the
legal status of marriage it will not usually terminate the financial
ties of marriage which may remain life long'. (Law Commission,
1980, S22, p.14) The arrangements represented an attempt to secure
the financial position of the parties after divorce, not only by
a once-for-all re-allocation of property on divorce (which can take
effect at a later date), but in some cases by the award of potentially
life-long maintenance to an ax-wife, secured where possible. It
is this principle of a life-long financial tie, based on the concept
of a wife as the financial dependant of her husband, which has now
been successfully challenged, with radical implications for the
jurisdiction of the courts with regard to loss of perspective pension
rights on divorce.
The Law Commission's 1980 discussion paper called into question
the basic principles on which financial provision is made for ex-
wives on divorce and presented many different possibilities for change,
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as well as detailed arguments in defence of the status quo. It
recognised that the more radical suggestions, which would extinguish
the obligation for post-divorce maintenance on any but a rehabilitative
basis (and not necessarily then), would have substantial implications
in terms of loss of prospective pension (S6(ii), pp.4-5).
In its response to the 1980 discussion paper, the Law Commission
recommended that the duty of the court to place the parties to a
divorce so far as possible 'in the financial position they would have
been if the marriage had not broken down' should be abandoned as un-
attainable, inappropriate and undesirable in most cases (Law Commission,
1981, S17, p.7). It recommended that the welfare of any children
should be paramount (ibid., S24, pp.9-10) and that 'greater weight'
should be given to a divorced wife's earning capacity, and to the
desirability of both parties becoming self-sufficient' (ibid., VII(ii),
p.10) and that where 'practicable and applicable' a 'clean break'
should be imposed on divorce, i.e. 'a severance of financial obli-
gations between the parties' (ibid., S30, p.11). The Law Commission
stated that
'as a result of the evolution which we expect to
see away from the concept of life-long support for
divorced wives, the circumstances in which it
would be thought desirable to exercise any such
power to preserve the wife's contingent pension
expectations might be less common than in the past.'
(Ibid., S33, p.12)
It was however felt that in the case of long marriages and parties
near pensionable age there might be justification for preservation
of pension expectations and it was recommended that 'early consider-
ation be given to the introduction of legislation empowering the courts
to deal with the problem of occupational pensions.' (Ibid.)
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In the autumn of 1983 a Matrimonial and Family Proceedings bill
was introduced into the House of Lords. Its main aims were to allow
divorce petitions after one year (not three) and to legislate on
financial relief in matrimonial proceedings, removing the current
requirement that the Court should place the parties in the financial
position in which they would have been had the marriage not broken
down. The welfare of any children was to be paramount and the Court
was to place greater emphasis on the desirability of both parties
becoming financially self-sufficient, as far as possible (Family Policy
Studies Centre, 1983, p.4).
In December there was a discussion of 'the contingent nature
of pension expectations' and loss of prospective rights to survivor's
pension benefits on divorce. Speakers who argued that the likelihood
of re-marriage lessened the importance of' this topic were firmly
reminded that women re-married less frequently than men (H of L,
Vol.445, no.48, col.37, 12/12/1983). The Lord Chancellor promised
a consultative document on allocation of pension rights on divorce
for 1984, '	the Department of Health and Social Security having
solicited the views of the 'pensions interests' in 1983 on the matter
of occupational pension rights on divorce and separation (DHSS, l983b).
The bill moved through the House of Commons and was passed in the
summer of 1984. As from October 12th, 1984, the Matrimonial and Family
Proceedings Act 1984 has required the courts to encourage self-
sufficiency for both parties and to take into account any benefits,





Current occupational pension schemes can offer members and their
dependants a substantial degree of financial protection in retirement,
especially if the pension is index-linked. All schemes must provide
coverage for widows and most women marry, typically outliving their
husbands. A 'working-age' wife is similarly at risk to loss of income
with repercussions through to her own old age, should her husband
die in the service of his employer. However, such prospective
financial security as a wife enjoys through her husband's membership
of an occupational scheme (and such security can be considerable in
a generous scheme), can be shattered by divorce. To what extent,
given a new goal of self-sufficiency for both parthers on divorce,
are there grounds for compensating for loss of prospective pension
rights on divorce? There are two areas for consideration. In the
first place, should an ex-wife, self-sufficiency notwithstanding,
be entitled to a share of her ex-husband's occupational retirement
benefits during his lifetime? Secondly, should an ex-wife have access
to survivor's benefits on the death of an ex-husband?
The nub of the argument for the abolition of the principle of
maintenance appears to owe less to any ideological arguments for the
financial independence of women, than to the practical realities of
the situation - most men cannot afford to support two families (Law
Commission, 1980, S25-26, pp.15-16). 'It is upon the solid rock of'
indigence that all concepts of a private maintenance obligation founder'
(Gray, 1977, p.328). Some argue that a society which permits serial
marriage as a common occurrence should bear any financial costs as
a public obligation. Such evidence as is available (Maclean and
Eekelaar, 1983; Murch, 1980) indicates that only a small minority
-410-
of ex--wives do in fact get personal maintenance.
A sizeable proportion of those who do not re-marry depend on
Supplementary Benefit. Most, especially those with children, find
it hard to earn more than this, their power to earn depending very
much on their earning capacities during their former marriage.
Gray has argued that there is now a tendency for Western societies
to 'resolve the economic relationship between husband and wife on
divorce through property adjustment rather than the award of mainten-
ance or alimony.' This does not preclude the possibility of 'rehabi-
litative maintenance' being granted to the economically weaker party
for a fixed period, for instance while acquiring vocational skills.
Such legal principles uphold the concept of the 'clean break' on
divorce, and do not preclude the ordering of child support (Gray,
1977, p.156).
Occupational retirement pensions do, however, 'raise peculiar
legal problems on divor.ce'. (Ibid., p.155) Viewing such pensions
as deferred pay, Gray argues that superannuation rights are 'earned'
through partnership in marriage so that 'it would be quite unfair
that one of the principal economic products of the spouses' joint
efforts during marriage should be ineligible for distribution between
the spouses on divorce.' (Ibid., p.156) On this argument, pension
rights, on divorce, should be included under the heading of property,
not least because of the growing importance of capital elements in
many occupational pension schemes.	 '... consideration of retire-
ment pensions in terms of property rather than maintenance would
prevent the inequity which would otherwise occur in the loss of 'earned'
entitlements upon the re-marriage of the spouse of the nominal owner
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of the pension.' There could also be tax consequences of substantial
significance (ibid.).
For divorcing couples where the husband has occupational pension
rights, the extinguishing of maintenance would not preclude the
possibility of a once-for-all settlement treating pension rights as
property, along the lines suggested by Gray. A former wife could
be endowed with rights to a share of her ex-husband's prospective
retirement benefits, in recognition of her contribution to the marriage
and in proportion to the number of years in which she was actually
married. There is a precedent for this in the statutory social
security provisions which secure a basic retirement pension for a
divorced wife by allowing her to assume her husband's contribution
record for the period of the marriage, where it is better than her
own (see Smith, 1984, p.54). The OPB disagreed with the idea of
apportionment by duration of marriage in 1976 on the grounds that
it could benefit young childless wives, but this argument can be
countered since even young wives can prejudice their own pension pro-
vision by having to change jobs or becoming unemployed due to a change
of location and subsequent geographic immobility. Many wives have
or have had the care of children and have prejudiced their position
on the labour market in conseqence (LC, 1980, S45-57, pp.28-35).
The provisions of occupational pension schemes assume a wife's
financial dependancy in marriage and in this they faithfully reflect
current family and public law. Marriage is viewed as a partnership
where the norm is that the husband provides the major part of the
family income and the wife provides domestic services and a supple-
mentary financial contribution to the home, if any (Cretney, 1979,
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pp.300-303). The courts in divorce proceedings take full cognisance
of the fact that in many families the wife's role has been to stay
at home to look after the children and run the household. Courts
now give recognition to the fact that'purely domestic contributions
to the welfare of the family give a wife a claim to a share in the
matrimonial property' (Hayes, 1980, p.9). Barnett has argued for
importance to be given to 'the assessment of lost opportunity or
diminished prospects incurred as a direct result of --- marriage'
(Barnett, 1983, p.124).
Assumption by an ex-wife of a right to a proportion of her
husband's prospective retirement pension could mean that family law
would have to override trust law. Gray (1977, p.158) argues that
in English law as it stands, there is 'some support for the inclusion
of rights to a retirement pension within the assets which English
courts can reallocate on divorce.' A practical problem is that 'many
pension schemes explicitly prohibit or restrict the assignment or
commutation of the entitlements which they provide.' (Ibid.) Gray
believes that 'retirement pension rights will in fact increasingly
come within the purview of the English courts in the distribution
of matrimonial assets on divorce.' (Ibid., p.159) He points out that
it would be possible to have a system which permitted equalisation
of pension rights acquired during the marriage, where one spouse has
greater entitlements or prospects than the other spouse ... which
could include 'the direct payment of a proportion of a pension entitle-
ment as and when received.(46) A court order would presumably obviate
the need for pension fund trustees to exercise their discretion, where
allowable, in favour of an ex-wife. This scenario emphasises the
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fact that such rights are 'earned' by a wife and do not rest on a
plea of hardship, unlike the Occupational Pension Board's own recom-
mendations (OPB, 1976, S13.56-57, p.165).
However, such sharing of occupational pension rights could lead
to pleas of hardship from second wives, whose share in their husband's
retirement pension would necessarily be the less if the court had
ordered that part of it should be diverted to an ex-wife, or wives
(LC, 1980, S26, p.16). This does not appear to be a grave objection,
since at present a spouse is presumed, on marriage, to take the other
'subject to all existing encumbrances whether known or not - for
example a charge on property ... or an obligation to support the wife
or child of a prior dissolved marriage' (Cretney, 1979, p.298). A '
real objection might be raised by members of occupational pension
schemes which severely restrict the survivors' benefits payable in
respect of deceased women members, or unmarried members, if equal
contributions were payable by all members and large pay-outs permitted
to serially married men with multiple depennt progeny!
Discussion has so far centred on the rights of a formerly married
woman to a share in her husband's retirement pension. However, on
divorce, there is also. the issue of loss of what can be a substantial
widow's pension. Under present arrangements, a husband can, where
resources allow, be required to take out life insurance to cover the
cessation of maintenance payments at his death. If the principle
of maintenance for ex-wives was abandoned, logic would presumably
decree that an ex-wife would get no more and no less than the financial
provision made as a once-for-all property settlement. This could
include an appropriate share in any capital benefits accruing from
her former husband's membership of an occupational scheme. However,
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total abandonment of the principles of maintenance for wives with
the care of children, or for older women, is not what the amenders
of existing divorce law had in mind. (See Alcock, 1984)
Powell argues that there is considerable scope for the trustees
of occupational pension schemes to make provision for ex-wives by
allowing for commutation of a pension into a lump sum, extending dis-
cretionary power to the payment of widows' pensions or allocating
a portion of a retirement or widow's pension to an ex-wife, according
to the length of the marriage (Powell, 1984, p.188). An ex-wife in
receipt of maintenance qualifies as a 'dependant' under pension scheme
rules. However, given the limited number of ex-wives who actually
receive maintenance this is not necessarily a promising route to
	 ''
realisation of contingent benefits after divorce any more than is
making access to such benefits dependent on the ex-wife's not having
re-married. Powell (ibid.) suggests that an ex-wife should secure
her financial future by insurance, including a policy on the life
of her ex-husband. However, it might be a minority of ex-wives who
could afford such protection.
1983 DHSS consultative letter asked for opinions as to whether,
at the time of divorce, an ex-spouse should be entitled to apply for
share (over and above the GMP due to a widow) of an occupational
pension scheme member's 'automatic' survivor's pension to be appor-
tioned on the death of the scheme member, should this occur. Such
a share was defined as ceasing on death or re-marriage with a question
as to whether it should then revert to the legal 'relict'. A question
was also put as to whether the survivor's pension should be divided
according to length of marriage, which raises issues over periods
of separation. In addition there was a query as to whether a survivor's
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pension should be thus divided if the ex-spouse has substantial
financial resources. Finally, the question of the advisability of
providing for applications for review orders, to take account of
changes in circumstances, was also raised (DHSS, 1983b).
This chapter has considered highly complicated issues regarding
loss of prospective occupational pension rights and benefits on divorce,
a situtation which will, increasingly, face divorcing husbands as
well as wives. A major change occurred in the field of divorce law
in the early 1970's when 'irretrievable breakdown of marriage' became
the sole ground for divorce and all wives became, from then on, 'at
risk', in theory, to divorce. The courts were subsequently required
to leave the parties to a divorce as nearly as possible in the financial
situation in which they would have been, had the marriage not ended
in divorce. An ex-wife's lost expectations of sharing in her husband's
occupational retirement benefits, including an eventual widow's pension,
became highly relevant in this context.
Despite official recommendations, no action has been taken to
extend the court's powers with regard to occupational pension benefits.
Indeed, as has become clear in the discussion preceding the Matrimonial
and Family Proceedings Act 1984, all too little is known about the
financial consequences of divorce, including loss of potential sur-
vivors' benefits. Few divorce petitions appear to have been dismissed
on 'grave financial hardship' grounds.
With the courts nowrequired where possible to aim for financial
self-sufficiency for both parties on divorce, the issue of loss of
prospective pension benefits becomes more crucial. On the one hand
it may be argued that the principle of self-sufficiency renders concern
about such benefits less relevant. On the other hand, given the un-
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equal access of women to occupational pension benefits of their own
and the existence of survivor's benefits as a form of substitution
for a lost 'family wage', a case can be made for ex-wives to have
an entitlement to benefits which represent 'deferred pay' earned jointly
via the domestic division of labour, during the existence of the
marriage. It would add uncertainty to the situation if such benefits
were not treated as property to be re-allocated at the time of the
divorce. To leave such disposition to the death of the scheme member
or to make it dependent on the financial circumstances of the ex-wife
at that time, would surely add considerable complications to the
exercise.
Maclean and Eekelaar (1983, p.34) are emphatic that, on the basis
of their recent research into the financial outcomes of divorce, the
best insurance against ensuing financial hardship is re-marriage.
In this way, new potential occupational pension benefits may some-
times be secured. As Deiphy (1976, p.81) put it, '... marriage creates
the conditions for its own continuation and encourages entry into
a second marriage if the first union comes to an end.' However, a
future scenario of wider access to occupational pension benefits by
both sexes, accompanied by increasing trends towards serial marriage
and long-term cohabitation will perhaps lead to demands for 'dis-
aggregation' in respect of occupational pension benefits.
Meanwhile, the average prospective widow of a fully index-linked
occupationally pensionable husband is well advised, should she see
him straying in the direction of the divorce court, to stop him dead
in his tracks by some means short of actual murder. In terms of




Chapter 8 Widows and Survivors' Pensions and Benefits
1. Mowat (1961, p.32) gives two sample COS 'case histories' which
contrast the situation of a 'deserving' widow of 1883 with her
undeserving counterpart of 1873. The former was placed in
domestic service as a childrens' nurse, her own three boys being
placed in alternative care (ibid., pp.33-34) while the latter
'had broken her collar bone in an accident and her son aged 10
was in danger of losing his situation for want of boots.' On
enquiry it was found that she resorted to a public house every
evening and broke her collar bone when inebriated (ibid., p.36).
2. Owen (1965, p.174) cites the National Benevolent Institution,
the Royal General Annuity Society and the City of London General
Pensions Society as being 'dedicated to providing pensions for
decayed business and professional men and their survivors'.
He notes the large-scale growth of orphanages in the 19th century,
many in the second half of the century being 'more selective
with 'father's work' (Bank Clerks Orpanage, Railway Servants'
Orphanage) or 'social status' being among the special qualifi-
cations commonly required for admission'. Such facilities could
sometimes free a widowed mother for paid work.
3. The history of such provision has not been documented, though
the Business History Unit at the London School of Economics is
working on the history of occupational pensions provision in
the private sector: personal communication, Professor Leslie
Hannah.
4. Widows', Orphans' and Old Age Contributory Pensions - Voluntary
Contributors - Act 1937.
5. It is not known whether employers restricted membership of occu-
pational pension schemes to those whose income was too high to
entitle them to membership of the statutory pension scheme
(Russell, 1983).
6. Few wives of men in occupations offering employers' pensions
were likely to have themselves been in paid employment and thus
able to generate an income for old age: they might however have
inherited money or even have had money settled on them at the
time of their marriage.
7. From personal observation, the writer suggests that pre-war middle
class husbands tended to 'protect' their widows from having to
deal with financial matters and from 'fortune-hunters'. It was
by no means unusual for capital to be put 'in trust' and the
widow's financial affairs to be left in the hands of a son,
solicitor or bank manager. Alternatively, at a time when a far
greater proportion of people were in privately rented housing,







8. The training benefit was to be available for 26 weeks 'subject
to satisfactory attendance at a training centre' (Beveridge,
1942, S349, p.135). Presumably the vocational skills envisaged
were low-level.
9. The 'ten-year' rule was reduced to three years in 1957 (George,
1968, pp.157-158).
10. The Civil Service and nationalised industries also paid children's
pensions (ibid., Appendix 4, pp.280-285).
11. At a discussion held by the Faculty of Actuaries in 1954 a
speaker referred to allocation as 'an option which few in fact
ever did exercise' (Bacon et. al., 1954, p.208).
12. Operative from 6/4/1979.
13. Widow's allowance: £47.65 (as of 23/11/1983)
Widow's full basic pension: £34.05
Widow's abated pension: at 40 (30%) - £10.22
at 49 (93%) - £31.67
Widowed mother's allowance: £34.05
These benefits are payable (subject to tax) regardless of the
employment status of the recipient, but are suspended on
cohabitation and cease on re-marriage.
14. A widow is entitled to half of any state additional pension
entitlement which her husband has earned between 6/4/1979 and
the date of his death: current levels of additional benefit are,
in consequence, small.
15. A woman may 'top this up' with any pension entitlement derived
from her own contributions, provided that the total does not
exceed a single person's retirement pension (Matthewman and
Lambert, 1984, Sl2-l6, p.262).
16. The government has announced (1984) that these rules are to be
changed.
17. The widow's 'requisite benefit' must be paid at a rate which
is not less than 1/160th of her husband's final pensionable salary
multiplied by the allowable number of years of service.
18. £500 in 1981.
19. Some employers 'contract-in' all or some employees, but offer
a 'third-tier' or 'ride-on-top' occupational pension scheme.
This strategy is sometimes employed by firms with a high proportion
of female staff and/or a high labour turn-over. The arrangement
enables them to reward long service, typically by conferring
a lump-sum benefit which may be used as a death-in-service benefit
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(Ward, 1981, p.102). In 1979, 11.2% of employees were in 'third-
tier' occupational pension schemes, 12.2% of men and 9% of women,
almost exclusively within the private sector (GA, 1981, Table 2.2,
p.5).
20. Under the terms of the Social Security Act 1975, S36(6), p.29.
21. Private sector employers think it uneconomic to allocate resources
to the necessary 'surveillance': personal information, Mike Fowler,
Company Pensions Information Centre.
22. The public sector schemes were large thus accounting for the
much higher proportion of widos who were subject to forfeiture
rules as against the proportion of' pension schemes operating
them.
23. During the period 1838-1854 a man in England and Wales had an
expectation of life, at birth, of 39.9 years: in 1891-1900 it
was 44.1 years (OPCS, 1978, Table 2.5, p.19).
24. The Government Actuary's 1979 Survey (1981, S3.5, p.14) gave
the average amounts of new pensions as £15 for widows and
dependants of' private sector scheme members and £10 for their'
public sector counterparts. The state widow's pension in November
1981 was raised to £27.15 with a £7.70 child allowance. These
figures conceal a wide variation in the value of occupational
widows' benefits and take no account of lump sum payment.
25. The 'trend' in re-marriage of widows and widowers has been down-
wards over the twentieth century. Widows are far more likely
to re-marry if widowed at a younger age: widowers show a great
propensity to re-marry, throughout (1-laskey, 1982).
26. This is an area of provision in which occupational pension schemes
are currently changing	 their practices to a considerable extent,
mainly as a response to the increaseddivorce rate, the increasing
frequency of cohabitation and demands for widowers' pensions.
(Personal communication, Ann McGoldrick, University of Manchester,
Institute of Science and Technology). Ms McGoldrick is conducting
'a wide ranging study' commissioned by the EOC to examine 'varia-
tions in practice with regard to the access requirements imposed
by schemes and the benefits which they provide to members' (EOC,
1984, S6.11, p.27). See Part VI below.
27. For instance, the Civil Service 'allocation' rules specify an
'adult dependant' as 'a person (other than his spouse) who is
solely or mainly dependant upon the person making an allocation'
(H M Treasury, 1982, S5.2, p.64). The USS scheme offers trustees'
discretion, in the absence of a widow, to pay death benefits
to a 'dependant relative': the precise degree of close consan-
guinity required is spelled out and a proviso made that the
'dependant' must be 'wholly or mainly dependant on the member
for the provision of all or any of the ordinary necessities
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of life' (USS, 1982, Sl8(l)d, p.23). This scheme also contains
a provision for 'any other female Dependant' to be granted a
pension, in the absence of a wife (ibid., S7.4, p.59).
28. Some schemes require that any lump sum payment be made to the
widow: others specify that the couple must have been living
together. Press publicity was recently given to an alteration
in the scheme rules for Members of Parliament which will permit
them under certain circumstances to request the scheme trustees
to pay their lump sum death benefits to persons other than wives,
the implication being that this was, among other things, a
'cohabi tees' provision.
29. See Pearl (1978), Eekelaar and Katz (1980), and Freeman and Lyon
(1983).
30. For a striking set of arguments for the use of trustee's discretion
in enforcing traditional morality of widows see Toulson (1976).
He advocates forfeiture of widow's pension for women 'cohabitating
with another woman as her wife' (ibid., p.114). Yet he appears
happy to award 'widows' benefits' derived from the occupational
pension contributions of men who are currently living with women
to whom they are not married. The operation of Toulson' notion
of' discretion appears to celebrate female dependency in marriage
or marriage-like relationships and well illustrates the inconsis-
tencies of occupational pension scheme rules with regard to
cohabitation.
31. A widow is a prime beneficiary under the laws of intestacy
(Cretney, 1979, pp.259-260). A cohabitee cannot benefit under
intestacy provisions, but, like a widow, may claim for 'reasonable
provision' under the Inheritance Act (Provision for Family and
Depandants) Act 1975 (ibid., pp.261-268).
Chapter 9: Loss of Prospective Rights to Benefits under Occupational
Pension Schemes on Divorce under English Law
32. The Divorce Reform Act 1969 was followed by the Matrimonial
Proceedings Act 1970, both later largely repealed and re-enacted
as part of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973.
33. It should be noted that the converse can apply with regard to
loss of prospective widower's pension benefits, a potentially
serious loss for any so-called 'dependent' widower.
34. See Law Commission (1980), S15, p.10. The court must be satisfied
that the marriage has irretrievably broken down by proof of one
of five 'facts' connected with the respondent's (1) adultery;
(2) unreasonable behaviour; (3) desertion for at least two years
or (4) that the partners have lived apart for two years and agree
to a divorce or (5) that the partners have been living apart for
five years.
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35. A detailed account of the grounds for divorce, from which this
information is taken, is to be found in Cretney (1979), pp. 98-
156. See also Yelton (1974), pp.67-70.
36. All statistics in this and the foregoing paragraph from Leete
and Anthony (1979).
37. No findings have been identified on the relationship between
divorce and occupation and employers' pension benefits.
38. Cretney (1979), pp.278-9, points out that cessation of payments
on re-marriage means that a woman can severely prejudice her
financial situation by re-marrying a man poorer than her first
husband. However any arrangements for capital transfer at the
time of a divorce cannot subsequently be cancelled. The court,
in ordering financial provision on or after divorce can take
into account re-marriage or a definite plan by one of the partners
to re-marry, but is not allowed to speculate on 'prospect , chance
or hope of re-marriage' in the abstract (ibid., p.306). See
also Cretney (1979), pp.317-320.
39. See Cretney (1979), p.229. A secured order for periodical payments
will continue after the death of the former husband and cease
only on the death of his ex-wife (ibid., p.279). An ex-wife
may also apply for financial provision out of her late husband's
estate (whether or not he left a will), under the Inheritance
(Provision for Family and Dependants) Act, 1975 (ibid.,
pp.261-268).
40. This opinion comes from the director of' a pensions management
firm speaking at a solicitors' conference. It reflects opinions
given to the writer by a number of solicitors and divorced persons.
See also Ellison (1980), p.3303.
41. Cretney (1979), p.146; OPB (1976), S13.28, pp.157-158.
Supplementary Benefits issues are discussed in Lowe (1976).
42. Baroness Summerskill referred to the proposed legislation during
the passage of the Divorce Reform bill in 1969 as a 'Casanova's
charter', which would facilitate easy divorce for errant husbands
of 'innocent' wives (Lee, 1974, p.172). Mr Justice Finer (1974)
later suggested that Messalina's charter would have been an equally
inept catchphrase (Cretney, 1979, p.165).
43. Not available at the time of writing.
44. For initial comments on the Act, see Alcock, 1984.
45. See OPB (1976), S13.11, p.153, on the value of widows' benefits
over time, including Table 18, specimen values of accrued widows'
benefits.
46. Gray cites provisions now operative in West Germany and the USA
in support of this suggestion, which implies a community property
regime in marriage, lacking in the English legal system.
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Part VI
Gender Divisions in Occupational Pension Provision
'At the Woodhouse she remembered sitting under the
piano while her mother played, thinking: "0, I'm
glad I'm a girl, I'm glad I'm a girl. Somebody will
always look after me."
(Lady Diana Cooper, born 1892 -
quoted Zeigler, 1983, p.22)
'The debate on how occupational pension provision
can best be extended to suit the needs of women






Gender Divisions in Occupational Pension Provision
This study has explored the early history of employers' pension
provision and traced the entry of women into scheme membership up
to World War II. It has examined the post-war expansion of occupational
pension provision and documented the continuing under-representation
of women in scheme membership. Attention has been given to current
issues of unequal access, treatment and status between men and women,
both with regard to membership of schemes and entitlement to benefits.
Finally, female access to survivors' benefits, typically widows'
pensions and lump sum death benefits, has been discussed along with
issues that surround loss of potential widows' benefits on divorce.
In discussing the findings of this research, several themes
suggest themselves. The first relates to Titmuss' conceptualisation
of both occupational and fiscal welfare benefits as 'concealed multipliers
of occupational success' (Titmuss, 1963, p.51). A second theme incor-
porates two linked sub-themes, being concerned with the influence
of both married status and motherhood in determining female access
to occupational pension benefits. The third theme focusses on the
role of the state with regard both to employers' pension provision
and the position of' women. A fourth and complementary theme addresses
the differential treatment of men and women scheme members, emphasising
issues of sex discrimination which invite legal intervention and
remedy. Finally, female access to occupational pension benefits
is reviewed as an issue of female financial dependence and independence
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in the wider context of economic, social and legal changes during
the period 1870-1983.
It was Titmuss who, in 1956, first drew attention to the existence
of a 'social division of welfare' whereby state welfare provision
was paralleled by other forms of welfare provision derived from paid
employment and the tax system. Occupational pension schemes are
an example of such provision and have, as Titmuss (1963, p.52) observed,
favoured the better-off taxpayer and functioned as 'concealed multi-
pliers of success' derived from 'employment status, achievement and
record' (Titmuss, 1976c, p.192). The aim of this study has been
to explore the extent to which such provision has distributed its
unequal rewards in the direction of women. The issue of gender divisions
in occupational and fiscal welfare was not addressed by Titmuss,
though he was well aware that the majority of elderly people were
women, something 'generally overlooked by those who consider that
private occupational pension schemes for men will answer all the
questions of income maintenance in old age.' (Titmuss, 1963b, p.98)
The original public sector superannuation scheme was an innovation
designed both to combat corruption via the sale of office and to
cut public expenditure. The early models of occupational pension
provision, so widely copied, derived f'romaperiod when no women were
employed in the Civil Service. When the women telegraphists were
'nationalised' in 1870 they were, with respect to entitlement to
membership of the Civil Service Pension Scheme, treated as 'honorary
men'. The public and private schemes which were developed in the
nineteenth century were targeted towards higher status male employees,
one primary purpose being to 'superannuate' infirm or ageing employees
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in the employer's interest, that of 'efficiency'. There was much
debate as to the effects on employee moral fibre of an employer (or
the state) providing a replacement income for earnings foregone in
old age, thus reducing the incentive for a man (sic) to exercise
thrift during his working lifetime so as to provide for himself and
his surviving dependants.
In the twentieth century, both employers and their better paid
employees increasingly came to derive tax advantages from occupational
pension provision. From the 1920s, the 'insurance industry' derived
increasing profit from its involvement with employers' pension provision.
Where available, separate schemes were, typically, devised for managerial,
white collar and (less commonly) manual workers. Separate schemes
were commonly devised, in the private sector, for that minority of
female employees who were actually given access to employers' pension
provision. For, with the entry of women into white collar employment
in increasing numbers in the late nineteenth century, the rationale
of pension provision was, with regard to female employees, turned
upside down.
Employers' pension schemes were planned, in part, to construct
the prototype male employee as a 'stayer' who, trained and experienced,
would remain loyal to his same employer over a working lifetime.
Women, by contrast, were valued as a cheap supply of' labour suited
to routine duties, whose very cost-effectiveness depended upon the
existence of a regular outflow of young women into marriage and their
replacement by younger workers. Women were sometimes placed in
'unestablished' job categories which, unlike permanent employment,
did not include membership of an occupational pension scheme. A
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constant turn-over of women staff was effected by widely incorporating
a 'marriage bar' into female conditions of service, an arrangement
which sometimes included payment of a formal 'marriage gratuity'
derived from a woman's own contribution to her employer's occupational
pension scheme.
Thus, up to World War II, it was a minority of single women
who comprised the female 'stayers' and constituted a somewhat problematic
categoryfor pension providers. For one attraction of women employees
in general was that they would not remain in service long enough
to reach 'retirement age' and make claims on pension provision.
Many employers did in fact retire 'elderly' female employees at an
earlier age than men. It was permanent public sector employment
which offered most security to single 'career women' via occupational
pension provision. Such provision was less commonly on offer in
the private sector and, where supplied, typically applied different
terms to women from those applied to men.
With demographic change having reduced the supply of 'surplus'
career women and younger unmarried women by the l950s, employers
found a new source of labour among the 'married women returners'.
Just as their Victorian predecessors were valued for their cheapness,
competence and docility, so the 'returners' were valued as cost-effective
and efficient employees especially well-suited to routine and undemanding
work. Much of this was 'service' work, incorporating skills which
were quickly learnt and which to some extent replicated actual or
assumed female domestic skills which had been 'naturally' acquired,
cost-free to the employer. Such women were willing, for the most
part, to work part-time, a status deemed by employers to obviate
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the need for access to an occupational pension scheme.
Evidence presented on women's employment and education has shown
how, during the post-war period up to the 1980s, women have, typically,
received less education and training than men, and have entered very
restricted areas of the labour market. Most have been low-paid,
or lower paid than men in the same type of occupation, and greatly
under-represented in jobs with good 'fringe benefits' such as employers'
pensions. Women typically experience discontinuous employment careers,
have jobs in sex-segregated categories and have their employment
careers shortened by the application of rules which, typically, require
women to retire at 60, five years earlier than the majority of men.
'¼
While no research findings exist which fully document the extent
to which women have benefitted, or failed to benefit, from occupational
pension provision, evidence presented in this study indicates that
occupational pension scheme entitlements have served as 'concealed
multipliers of occupational success' far less for women employees
than for men. Even where women have completed a substantial career
in better-paid employment, only exceptionally have such women achieved
'success' in terms of the financial rewards (including retirement
benefits) which go with promotion and senior status. Not for nothing
were the special 'Top Hat' managerial pension packages devised in
mid-century nicknamed after an elite form of head gear worn only
by men.
'Occupational success' as deriving from paid work is itself
a gendered concept. For women, by contrast with men, career advancement
or the achievement of higher status in paid employment, with its
accompanying financial rewards (including pensions) have, on the
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evidence of this research, been rather little valued in British society
during the period in question. It is perhaps symptomatic that married
women are officially given a social status derived from their husband's
occupation, not their own, thus rendering the definition of social
class, for women, a problematic concept. For women the 'marriage
career', encompassing motherhood, in a context of greater or lesser
female dependence, has traditionally been accorded a far higher status
than the 'employment career'.
Given a straight 'choice' between marriage or a lifetime of
paid employment, most pioneer white-collar or better paid women employees
opted for marriage if the opportunity presented itself, not least
since marriage was a necessary condition for socially-approved child-
bearing. Given the low pay, occupational status and social position
of the typical pre World War II 'spinster', such preferences are
hardly surprising. Teaching and Civil Service employment in particular
came to be valued by women (and their parents) as 'pensionable'
employment, providing some insurance against 'failure' to marry.
There did emerge some grudging admission in the private pensions
sector that single women might in due course 'need' pensions, such
need perhaps being more clearly perceived in the aftermath of high
loss of life in the first World War.
The existence of 'marriage bars' in public sector and much private
sector employment up to World War II served to polarise the women
affected into actual or potential married 'housewives' on the one
hand and single 'career women' on the other. Such regulation indubitably
helped to construct and maintain the 'domestic division of labour'
in marriage, especially among the salaried classes. Husbands were
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'breadwinners' and wives concentrated upon the unpaid domestic work
of the home. The system was further bolstered by those occupational
pension schemes which offered 'death benefits' to widows or other
female dependants. The fact that men in occupational pension schemes
were in a better position than most to 'provide for' their wives
in old age or widowhood served to justify the exclusion of married
women from white-collar or better-paid jobs, especially at times
of high unemployment between the two wars.
Such married women were perceived as not 'needing' to engage
in paid work, let alone generate occupational pension provision for
themselves or dependants, even at a time when the delegation of both
housework and child care to domestic servants and the education of
children in boarding schools was established middle-class practice.
The non-working wife was one hallmark of male occupational success,
her existence partly made feasible by employers' pension provision.
Although, after World War II, 'housewives', i.e. married women,
increasingly remained in the labour force after marriage and until
motherhood, 'returning' as their children grew older, evidence suggests
that they continued to be perceived by pension providers as women
who did not 'need' pensions in their own right. The rules of the
NI system played a major part in constructing married women as the
potential financial dependants of their husbands in old age. With
demographic and social change all but obliterating single women as
a visible category of employee, it appears that from the post-war
period up to the late l960s, women became well-nigh invisible with
regard to issues of access to occupational pension scheme membership.
There was far more concern, given high marriage rates, with providing
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for women as potential widows, than as employees with a need to 'defer'
some part of their earnings so as to provide financially for themselves
or others in old age.
The domestic division of labour was further re-inforced by the
continuing operation of Inland Revenue regulations which, until 1971,
permitted widowers' pension benefits to be made available only when
a female scheme member's husband could prove his impaired incapacity
as a 'breadwinner' on grounds of ill-health. Women were defined
as 'not interested' in pensions, a state of mind which, where true,
was most likely shared with the majority of younger and/or low-paid
employees of both sexes.
In the 1950s and 60s, occupational pension benefits were increasingly
becoming conceptualised as 'deferred earnings' which salaried/white-
collar males were increasingly coming to expect as a guaranteed 'fringe
benefit' deriving from 'good employment'. Such 'deferred earnings'
represented payment of a deferred 'family wage'. Female salaries
or wages were by contrast conceptualised as earnings (or 'pin money')
which contributed essentially to present or near-future financial
needs - or luxuries. Women in occupational pension schemes were
encouraged to 'cash in' their contributions on 'giving up work' for
domestic reasons or, in some cases, received formal gratuities on
leaving, thus further confirming themselves as women who were 'provided
for' in marriage and old age.
The dependent status of married women, their characteristic
'giving up' of paid work on motherhood, though to a decreasing extent
on the event of marriage itself, were all factors used to justify
the differential access to occupational pension provision accorded•
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to women as compared with men. The acclaimed 'flexibility' of employers'
pension provision has included a facility to exclude women (or married
women), to restrict women to membership of sex-segregated schemes
or to offer different terms of entitlement within unisex schemes.
It was not until the 1970s that such differential treatment of men
and women emerged as an issue of sex discrimination.
Differential treatment of men and women has been a consistent
feature of both state and occupational pension provision in Britain.
Following the introduction of means-tested old age pensions before
World War I occupational pension providers characteristically devised
their own schemes with due regard to the existence of state provision,
up to the point where, in 1959, the two systems became formally related.
Under the SSPA 1975, the two systems were carefully 'locked-into'
each other, like Siamese twins, so as to provide second-tier earnings
related pension provision for elderly people and widows, over and
above the basic state pension provision.
After World War II, the new NI system set out to provide a basic
retirement pension for that majority of employees who had no access
to occupational pension provision. The state pension scheme was
devised, as noted, with the overt intention of re-inforcing the domestic
division of' labour. It followed that, with the advent of a political
will to provide second-tier state pension provision in the late 50s,
concern rested more on providing improved widows' pensions within
this tier than on enabling women to generate pension entitlements
in their own right. This was the case despite the efforts made in
particular by a minority of women MPs who consistently drew attention
to the position of women with regard to membership of employers'
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schemes.
The post war record of governmental moves to expand employers'
pension provision is replete with examples of political willingness
to permit the exclusion of women from scheme membership so as to
encourage employers to expand schemes to the advantage of men and
their widows. The SSPA 1975 itself permitted the exclusion of groups
of workers by 'employment', thus facilitating the exclusion of women
in sex-segregated occupational groups containing no comparable men
or none with claims on inclusion in an occupational pension scheme.
The major differences between the two main political parties at the
time of the 'pensions debate' rested firstly on the extent to which
the Labour Party prioritised the role of state earnings-related provision
in expanding second-tier pension provision, as against the Conservatives'
preference for an increased role for occupational provision, and secondly
on the nature and scope of the second-tier provision under consideration.
There seems no doubt that both parties viewed second-tier state
provision as a means of securing an income in old age for that majority
of female earners who would not qualify for admission to an employers'
pension scheme. In point of fact, the very lowest paid women have
always been excluded from membership of second-tier state provision,
as witnessed by the existence of a 'lower earnings limit' in the
'Castle' scheme below which people are not eligible to contribute.
Such rules also disadvantage disabled women whose labour force partici-
pation is limited, compounding their disadvantage 'on into old age.
The SSPA 1975 has led to an increase in the number of 'integrated'
schemes which permit employers to provide occupational pension benefits
only in respect of that band of earning above the 'lower earnings
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limit', a practice which McGoldrick (1984, pp.93-94) found to be
applicable in one-third of schemes, and on the increase. This practice
disadvantages the low paid, the majority of whom are women who, if
they are older and have exercised the 'married women's option' are
particularly disadvantaged by such integration, which presumes full
entitlement to a state pension. In the same way, women's characteristically
low earnings make it likely that, unless they are members of fully
index-linked pension schemes, the advent of any but modest inflation
will mean that, due to the arcane workings of the revaluation arrangements,
their eventual occupational pension entitlement will consist of a
GMP worth no more than its SERPS equivalent. However, the SERPS
'4
scheme, unlike occupational schemes, provides no lump sums and attracts
no tax relief on contributions.
There has been a clear tendency for employers to 'harmonise'
occupational pension provision with state provision. The setting
of the 'normal retirement' age in schemes at the same point as 'pension-
able age' in state provision, is an example. However, whereas the
NI scheme was designed to encourage workers to stay on to 'retirement
age' or beyond, high unemployment and cost-cutting exercises are
increasingly meaning that employers are insisting that women retire
at 60, with no possibility of extension. There is a trend towards
employer use of occupational pension provision to facilitate 'shedding'
of staff via early retirement, though the extent to which women, in
particular, are affected is not known. Another example of 'harmonisation'
is the restriction of' the requirement for the provision of' 'automatic'
survivors' pensions under the SSPA 1975 to widows, not widowers.
It is the private pensions sector which has so far moved to provide
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automatic widowers pensions in some schemes.
The differential treatment of men and women in occupational
pension schemes and the willingness of successive governments to
sanction it is a striking feature of British employers' pension provision.
The Labour government documents on 'equal status' of 1976 and 1977
were conservative in their approach, showing a clear preference for
moving towards equal treatment by 'voluntary action' on the part
of the pensions industry. The 1974-79 Labour government failed to
include retirement and death benefits under either equal pay or sex
discrimination legislation and displayed an equivocal approach towards
'equal treatment' by promising legislation which would, elliptically,
take 'due account of any inherent differences with regard to pension
needs'. It has taken the 1983 draft EEC directive on occupational
social security to stir up the 'pension industry' in respect of propo-
sals for 'unisex' actuarial calculations. Even this document proposed
to exempt from its remit differential treatment of men and women
with regard to survivors' benefits and pensionable ages where member
states make such distinctions.
Early in 1985, an EOC research report on equal treatment in
occupational pension schemes became available. While its findings
appeared too late for incorporation in this study, they largely corro-
borate and nicely complement material presented here, with evidence
drawn from an investigation of pension scheme rules and procedures
plus interviews with pension managers and trade union officials.
McGoldrick makes the point that the occupational pensions world is
exceedingly male-dominated, with few women in pensions management
or acting as trustees. The literature made available to scheme members
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was likewise heavily male-biased and, in some cases, outright misleading
to women members (McGoldrick, 1984, pp.128-30).
The period studied in this thesis 1870-1983 is that of the
'emancipation' of women. It can be argued that any current disquiet
over the position of women with regard to occupational pension provision
is symptomatic of disquiet over a number of remaining economic, social
and legal disabilities to which women continue to be subject, not
least the domestic division of labour. The issues relating to women
and pensions reflect the existence of a long-running debate relating
to the desirability of strategies which on the one hand promote or
on the other hand inhibit female financial independence, especially
within marriage.
The marked reluctance of successive British governments to include
occupational pension provision within the ambit of sex discrimination
can be interpreted as a marked reluctance, shared by pension providers,
to disturb the existing gender order. Women continue to be constructed
as individuals who, in the normal course of event; are 'provided
for' by their husbands, to a greater or lesser extent. It is married
men who, within the rules of contracted-out occupational pension
schemes, are automatically entitled to confer a 'guaranteed minimum
pension' on their widow in approved circumstances, without reference
to the woman's past, present or potential capacity to generate an
income for herself. By contrast, when a marriage ends in divorce,
increasing attention is being given to a wife's capacity to be financially
self-sufficient. There is a certain inconsistency in the principles
on which such practices are based.
It has become clear that lower-paid, manual and 'secondary'
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workers in their various manifestations have, to date, derived manifestly
less benefit from occupational pension provision than their better-
paid, non-manual, 'primary' counterparts. It has also become clear
that women are over-represented in the former category, though some
have potential entitlement to occupational survivors' benefits which
men are denied.
In noting some broad social policy issues which arise from this
study, with a bearing on female financial dependence/independence,
one major question emerges as to the extent to which all paid jobs,
however low-paid and/or part-time, should incorporate a mandatory
or optional facility to generate deferred earnings for old age and
death benefits for other individuals and/or dependants. A related
question concerns the capacity and will of the occupational pension
sector to provide such a facility, given that it has so far proved
itself rather less than able and willing to meet the needs of part-
timers, job-changers, the low-paid and those with interrupted 'employ-
ment careers' - among which categories women are in a clear majority.
It is motherhood which is now the life event which, above all
(old age excepted) inhibits the earning power of the majority of
women. The existence of occupational survivors' benefits (harmonised
with state provision) is meant to compensate a privileged proportion
of women for their degrees of dependence on a 'male breadwinner'.
However, such potential benefits can be lost on divorce, an event
to which all married women are potentially at risk. Further major
policy considerations relate to the desirability of legally strengthening.
ex-wives' entitlement to a proportion of their ex-husbands deferred
earnings on divorce, though such a move would draw attention to the
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weak position still held by married women in relation to access to
their husbands' earnings. Yet more policy considerations reside
in the debate as to whether cohabitees should be treated as 'married'
persons arid the issues which arise from serial marriage.
It can be argued that the very existence of survivors' benefits
(which mainly advantage married persons) inhibit those moves towards
establishing a greater degree of financial independence for all women
which,in the light of a high divorce rate and a 'surplus' of older
non-married women, might be a sensible policy option. To what extent
would it advantage both men and women, in the long-term, if occupational
pension benefits were to be 'disaggregated' accruing only to the
individual and giving that individual a choice over the disposition
of death benefits, perhaps making mandatory only provision for dependent
child survivors. Such a scenario would appear to require, for its
proper functioning, equal access to paid work for men and women,
equal shares in the unpaid work of the home (or availability of substi-
tute provision) and the concurrent introduction of disaggregation
policies into the tax and state benefits systems.
However, such a scenario, though it might lessen gender inequalities,
would not, of itself, prevent occupational pension provision acting
as a 'concealed multiplier of occupational success'. It would not
eradicate inequalities within the paid workplace, such as low pay,
differential access to fringe benefits, and the disadvantages which
accrue to members of ethnic minority groups. Furthermore, the paid
workplace, like marriage, is becoming an increasingly fragile vehicle
on which to pin hopes of a 'comfortable' old age, financially cushioned
by entitlement to deferred earnings, whether his or hers.
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Meanwhile, at the present time, occupational pension provision
continues to project the inequalities of the work place and the domestic
arena into old age. The current social division of welfare and sexual
division of labour, in both workplace and home, permit some favoured
citizens to seek 'occupational' rewards which are in due course divided
out both unequally and irrationally, not least due to the enormous
differences in pension scheme rules. In this process, both men and
women are disadvantaged, but women the more so, especially if non-
married in old age. Divorced elderly women are particularly at risk
to poverty.
For women, and especially mothers, despite the SSPA 1975, the
chances of having an adequate income in old age still appear to reside
to a considerable extent in marrying (or remarrying) and, even more
importantly, staying married to a man with good index-linked occupational
pension entitlements and a lengthy record of paid employment. Thus
it can be argued that marriage and motherhood are 'gender variables'
in relation tothe 'multiplier' principle suggested by Titmuss (1965,
p.51). A combination of self-generated and survivors' occupational
benefits is a promising recipe for financial solvency in old age,
especially for women.
From this exploratory study of women and occupational pensions
it has to be concluded that financial independence and self-sufficiency
for women (but not men) has, to date, been little valued in Britain.
Furthermore, the 'price' of marriage and motherhood for women is,
still, a greater or lesser degree of financial dependence in adult
life - a dependence which, characteristically, increases in old age.
Yet, in logic, the increased risks of divorce and unemployment which
-439-
have characterised the l970s and 80s call into question lifestyles
which incorporate heavy financial dependence upon another person,
typically, a husband. Such risks also call into question some traditional
values relating to women and money.
Being 'good with money' is generally defined as a feminine virtue
in relation to small-scale housekeeping in the context of the domestic
division of labour. However, female self-actualisation in terms
of earning a 'living' wage or making individual provision for old
age, let alone acquiring the type of professional financial skills
which can lead to a career in pension fund management or appointment
as a pension scheme trustee, is still seen as 'unfeminine' and disrup-
tive to the existing gender order. Those who wish to study gender
divisiorin British society have a fertile and under-explored terrain
available to them in relation to occupational pension scheme provision
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